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**The US-UK "Special Relationship" with Special
Focus on the Clinton/Bush-Blair Era (1997-2007)**

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Allah, our creator and our master, thank you for the guidance, strength, and power of mind, protection and skills and for giving us a healthy life. All of these, we offer to you.

Every accomplishment requires self-efforts and also motivation from people who matter; we dedicate this thesis to the closest people to our heart.

To my family, a Special feeling of gratitude and recognition goes to my beloved parents, who provided me with an endless support and love. My sweet sisters, Bouthaina, Marwa, Maram, Koudess and my beloved brother Akram who stood by my side in the darkest days.

To the one who kept faith in me, who lifted me up whenever feeling like giving up, who accepted me for the way I am and loved me unconditionally; to my alter Ego, Ines Yakoubi

To my close friends, Chikou, Sawsen, Fairouz and Sofyen for their prayers, tenderness and cheerful characters.

Merrahi Hafsa

In the name of Allah, the one I trust and thank for His grace.

I dedicate the fruit of my efforts to the closest to the soul and entity, to my father, the symbol of tenderness and challenge.

To my mother who always supported me, the symbol of sacrifice and love that words cannot describe. To My sister Amel, my soulmate and spiritual twin.

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Abstract

The US-UK relationship prospered during World War II, deepened during the ever long struggle with the Soviet Union, and has flourished further since the end of the Cold War. It is definitely surviving any new challenges and obstacles that may loom on the horizon just the same as it survived the crisis of Suez, Skybolt, and the Falklands. Therefore, this dissertation highlights the fact that these strong and intense arguments between London and Washington are not newly born. Without the “Special Relationship” the United Kingdom is just one mere medium size country among many European countries in the European Union.

Using a qualitative descriptive content analysis, the study confirms the special relationship between President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush with Prime Minister Tony Blair, which added many privileges to both countries, and how Blair intervened in many ways to support America. Furthermore the dissertation highlights Tony Blair's strategies and its direct impact on Britain's foreign policies, and the tactics he used to preserve Britain's standing in America. This study concludes with the results of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the two American towers and wars on a number of countries under the banner of eliminating terrorism.

Résumé

Les relations entre les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni se sont épanouies au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et se sont approfondies au cours du long conflit avec l'Union soviétique, et se sont encore développées depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Ces relations ont survécu à tous les nouveaux défis et des obstacles qui se profilent, tout comme elles ont survécu à la crise de Suez, Skybolt et les Malouines. Par conséquent, cette recherche confirme le fait que ces arguments forts et intenses entre Londres et Washington ne sont pas nés récemment. L'absence de "relations privilégiées" fait du Royaume-Uni un pays de taille moyenne parmi de nombreux pays européens de l'Union Européenne.

En utilisant une analyse qualitative du contenu descriptif, l'étude souligne la relation privilégiée entre le président Bill Clinton et George Bush avec le Premier ministre Tony Blair, qui a ajouté de nombreux privilèges aux deux pays, comment Blair est intervenu dans de nombreuses guerres pour soutenir l'Amérique et le message soulignant les stratégies de Tony Blair. Son impact direct sur la politique étrangère de la Grande-Bretagne et la tactique utilisée pour maintenir la position de la Grande-Bretagne en Amérique. Cette étude se termine par les résultats des attaques du 11 septembre contre les tours américaines et des guerres menées dans plusieurs pays sous le signe de l'élimination du terrorisme.

ملخص

ازدهرت العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة خلال الحرب العالمية الثانية وتعمقت خلال الصراع الطويل مع الاتحاد السوفيتي، وازدهرت أكثر منذ نهاية الحرب الباردة. إنها بالتأكيد ستتجو من أي تحديات وعقبات جديدة قد تلوح في الأفق تمامًا مثلما نجت من أزمة السويس وسكيبولت والفوكلاندي. لذلك ، يؤكد هذا البحث حقيقة أن هاته الحجج القوية والمكثفة بين لندن وواشنطن لم تولد حديثاً. عدم وجود "العلاقة الخاصة"، يجعل المملكة المتحدة مجرد بلد متوسط الحجم بين العديد من الدول الأوروبية في الاتحاد الأوروبي.

باستخدام تحليل نوعي للمحتوى الوصفي ، تؤكد الدراسة على العلاقة الخاصة بين الرئيس بيل كلينتون وجورج بوش مع رئيس الوزراء توني بلير ، الذي أضاف الكثير من الامتيازات لكلا البلدين ، وكيف تدخل بلير في العديد من الحروب لدعم أمريكا ، علاوة على الرسالة تسليط الضوء على استراتيجيات توني بلير وتأثيرها المباشر على سياسات بريطانيا الخارجية ، والتكتيكات التي استخدمها للحفاظ على مكانة بريطانيا في أمريكا. تختتم هذه الدراسة بنتائج هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001 على البرجين الأمريكيين والحروب على عدد من الدول تحت راية القضاء على الإرهاب.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CT	Counter Terrorism
EEC	British European Economic Community
EU	European Union
JIB	Joint Intelligence Bureau
JOWOGs	Joint Working Groups
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISC	Intelligence and Security Committee
ISF	Internal Security Forces
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MDA	Mutual Defense Agreement
NATO	the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
UK	the United Kingdom
UKUSA SIGINT	the United Kingdom and the United States Signals Intelligence
UN	United Nations
USA	the United States of America

USSR the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WW1 World War One

WW2 World War Two

Table of Contents

Dedication	1
Acknowledgments	2
Abstract	3
Résumé	4
ملخص	5
List of Acronyms And Abbreviations	6
Tables of Contents.	8
General Introduction	1
Chapter One: Historical overview	4
1. The “Special Relationship”: Genesis and Significance of the Term	4
2. The Special Relationship: Ups and Downs	8
2.1. The Suez Crisis and the Decline of the British Influence in the Region.....	8
2.2. The Skybolt Crisis and Britain’s Declining International Role	12
2.3. The Vietnam War and the Reshaping of the US Foreign Policy.....	14
2.4. Reagan and Thatcher, or the Extra Special Relationship	16
Chapter Two: Major Cooperation Domains in the US-UK Special Relationship	21
2.1. Personal Relationships in the Special Relationship.....	21
2.2. Military and Nuclear Weapon Development Cooperation	23
2.3. Security and Intelligence Cooperation.....	26
2.3.1. Intelligence Sharing	27
2.3.2. Enhancing Efforts Against Terrorism	29
2.4. Economic Cooperation.....	31

Chapter Three: The Clinton/Bush-Blair Era (1997-2007)	35
3.1. Blair's Doctrine	35
3.1.1. Humanitarian Interventionism	35
3.1.2. Britain as a Pivotal Power	38
3.1.3. Britain as a Bridge	39
3.2. The Kosovo War, 1999	41
3.3. The 9/11 and the "War on Terror"	44
3.3.1. Bush and Blair, the Odd Couple	47
3.3.2. The 9/11 Impact	49
3.3.3. The Afghanistan War	50
3.4. The Iraq War	52
3.4.1. Operation Desert Fox, 1998	54
3.4.2. Operation Southern Focus	57
3.4.3. Blair's Role in Shaping the War Case	59
General Conclusion	62

List of Works Cited

General Introduction

In a speech to an American audience in 1946, Winston Churchill, in his "Iron Curtain" speech, talked about a British desire for a "special relationship" with the United States of America. By doing so, Churchill perhaps just termed a long-established relationship and created a concept that continues to determine the harmony between the US and the UK.

Churchill's speech emphasized the historical importance of the Anglo-American relationship; an importance that has been converted into especially a special bilateral security cooperation that survived through both World Wars I and II, during the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is still significant facing the challenges of global security and the reemergence of Russia as a superpower and its collision course with Europe.

With the decline of the Communist bloc, worries were raised about the survival and the utility of such a relationship. Soon, however, these worries faded with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the ensuing war. Later, the appearance of a new unconventional threat represented by non-state actors and organizations like al-Qaida and its alleged 9/11 attacks revived interest in the "Special Relationship" and put at the frontline of international relations.

Thus, interest was renewed in the special relationship in both the United States and Britain. In the dawn of this new century, many critics, observers, and analysts started to focus on the Anglo-American relationship investigating the nature of the cooperation resulting from it and suggesting a number of hypotheses. While some argue that the "Special Relationship" has always been one-sided and biased, others prefer to say it is balanced; others go even far to question the very existence of such a relation.

Similarly, this study inquires into the validity, significance, and persistence of this relationship, and seeks to understand its nature. Although the dissertation traces back the historical development of the US-UK relations from WWII onward, more focus, believing in

the old proverb “a friend in need is a friend indeed,” is given to crises involving one or both countries. The period coinciding with the premiership of Tony Blair in the UK and of the presidency of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (1997-2007) serves as a case study of this humble research.

The study uses the historical analytical approach to review and trace development in the history of the special relationship across the twenty and the early twenty-first century. The comparative approach is also used in an attempt to identify factors of change and or of continuity in the special relationship across the succession of presidents and prime ministers in the US and UK.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, which is a historical overview of the topic, discusses the term “Special Relationship,” how it emerged, and how it is viewed in both countries. The chapter also illustrates how the Special Relationship survived the major crises of the twenty and the twenty-first century following a chronological order of events from the end of WWII until the period of this research case study.

The second chapter starts with a review of the role the personal relationships between leaders in both countries can play. Afterwards, the major cooperation domains between the US and UK are investigated, namely military, defense and intelligence, and economy.

The last chapter, dedicated to this research case study, scrutinizes the 1997-2007 period which is especially characterized by the perhaps unquestionable support of Tony Blair to the warmongering policies of the United States. Tony Blair’s doctrine of international humanitarian interventionism, his attempt to revive Britain’s role as a superpower and a leading European country, and his belief that the UK can serve as a bridge between the United States and Europe shaped the special relationship during that period. This chapter also discusses the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the special relationship, the UK’s involvement in

the wars waged by the United States, and Blair's role in making the war case against Iraq in 2003.

Chapter One: A Historical Overview

Winston Churchill once wrote, “Learn all you can from history, for how else can one even make a guess what is going to happen in the future . . . in history lie all the secrets of statecraft” (qtd. in Raymond 1).

Churchill had a point, and his advice is convenient to study the history of special relationship. He emphasized that the lessons of the past are not just mere help to keep the issues of the present at its rightful track, they also point out at a substantial conclusion: there is a tight and unbreakable link between the US and Britain, and its roots are very deep (Raymond 1).

Likewise, President George H. W. Bush described the special relationship as "the rock upon which all dictators this century have perished" (Raymond 3). Bush was referring to the vital role the special relationship had played in fighting Nazism, Fascism, and Communism in the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, although many skeptics issued doubts about the special relationship, President George W. Bush described Britain as the most crucial international ally in the “war on terror” (Mikesel 3).

1. The “Special Relationship”: Genesis and Significance of the Term

Seven decades ago, describing the friendly US-UK relationships in a speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill popularized the term “Special Relationship” which has since become a “trademark” of that relationship. In this speech, Churchill sought to highlight the part the United Kingdom had played in an international system that was wholly transformed due to WWII and the price it has paid. The major sacrifices the war had claimed clearly shrank the power of the United Kingdom which, compared to the other great powers, was the major loser (Gamble and Kearns 116).

Aware of that, Churchill mentioned that the UK still had its bright future as a great power, but at the crossroad of three circles – Empire, Europe and Anglo-America. For Churchill, the US-UK relationship was special because of the outstanding material and human resources deployed by both the countries to play a great role in forming world affairs where the United Kingdom works in parallel with the US as a junior partner.

In the decades that had followed the Fulton speech, however, the special relationship became a subject of mockery and criticism because the UK's both strength and capacity had receded and the US turned to be the most dominant power in the world and, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the sole superpower (Gamble and Kearns 116). While many considered the UK as the fifty-first state of the US, others called the leaders of the UK such as Blair as America's poodle.

Some critics have even argued that the special relationship is but a mere illusion since the US has many special relationships with other countries like Germany, Japan, Australia, Mexico, and Israel (Gamble and Kearns 116). Regardless of this, the term "special relationship," it seems, gained more acceptance in Britain than in the United States.

Even if the Fulton speech did popularize the term "special relationship," the particularity of the Anglo-American relationship lies in the history of their political evolution. A good understanding of this relationship necessitates the study of the political factors that led to the separation of the two entities and the development that follows in the field of political intellect of each country.

The relative similarity of governments and the common heritage of the two nations have led to a friendly relationship all along the nineteenth century onward. Yet, this friendship was hardly recognized and clearly articulated before Churchill's Fulton Speech and his use of the phrase "fraternal association." After the solid cooperation the two nations had materialized

during the two World Wars, the political relationship between them got deep and transformed into a genuine diplomatic military alliance that continues to exist until nowadays (Brown 2).

The special relationship, therefore, is a term that is generally used to describe the political, diplomatic, commercial, military, cultural, and historical relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. The term is specifically used to refer to the alliance of the two countries especially in war times. The two countries were allies through many twenty and twenty-first-century conflicts, including WWI, WWII, the Korean War, the Gulf War, the Cold War, and the War on Terror ("Special Relationship").

A year after the Fulton speech, Churchill once more used the phrase "special relationship," but in the context of the Cold War this time to highlight the role the US-UK special relationship can play to face Communism, and the contribution the Commonwealth countries under the leadership of the UK can offer to the Western efforts to stop the spread of Communism. In his "Sinews of Peace" speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, Churchill remarked:

Neither the sure prevention of war nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the "English-speaking peoples" ...a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges.

(Churchill 4)

Churchill here highlights the fact that the prevention of war or the persistent rise of the world organization would be a phantom or a hardly acceptable fantasy unless the existence of what he called the fraternal association of the “English-speaking peoples”.

He also added that the fraternal cooperation does not recommend overwhelmed friendship nor mutual understanding only, yet it needs the persistence of the intimate relationship their military consultants share, which leads to a common analysis and anticipation of possible risks, weapons and manual scripts that are similar and exchanging officials and trained forces in technical faculties.

Many historians think that the Second World War was the first instance in which the special relationship was tested; however, two earlier incidents had shown that the US and the UK were heading to an intimate, friendly and close relationship.

The first incident occurred during the Second Opium War where the US showed its complete readiness to offer help to the British against the Qing family; in 1859, the United States did not hesitate to bombard the Taku forts to support the British and French powers on the ground.

The second incident took place during the Spanish-American War when unlike most of the European powers that stood neutral; Britain sold coal and ships to the American Navy and permitted the American army to use underground sea cables to communicate. (Secunda and Moran 11)

As for the modern cooperation, it began with the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 1941, the supreme military staff for the western allies during WWII. In that war, the US and the UK fused their military efforts in a manner that was an original of its kind. In the post-war era, they stood side by side against the Soviet's attempts to spread Communism, and after the collapse of the USSR they combined efforts to wage “war on terror.”

Through their military, diplomatic efforts, exchanging technology and intelligence cooperation, the Anglo-American alliance was one of the most successful and settled international cooperative effort during modern history. Despite the fact that the lead target of this partnership during the twentieth century was to confront the threats of the World Wars and later the Cold War, the political evolution is the reason that made this cooperation possible and valid. (Brown 3)

The shared heritage of constitutionalism that is based on rightful law and political freedom has molded the United Kingdom and the United States into a partnership that is able to defend and transmit those ideas. The evolution of the constitutional conservative movement in the twentieth century made these two allies deeply close and paved the way to the ideological agreement which was previously missing in the Western entente. (Brown 3)

The evolution of conservatism in the twentieth century was a critical element in the Anglo-American special relationship and it defined the basis of this alliance that was considered as the cornerstone in the Cold War. (Brown 3)

2. The Special Relationship: Ups and Downs

The relationship between the two nations cannot be described with any term but unique, especially in the era of disorder and total war, and it can be summarized in the phrase "friendly superpowers". Peace between the US and the UK prospered even in the transitional period when the United States was referred to as "the world's richest and most potent nation state." (Dobson *Anglo-American* 1)

In light of the events that followed, both Britain and the United States were Great friendly nations; yet, they also had their disagreements and suffered from multiple political and diplomatic frictions (Dobson *Anglo-American* 1)

Even during the leadership of close friends in the White House and in 10 Downing Street, interests and objectives of the US and the UK may diverge causing crises and problems in the special relationship. The US views and the UK's diverged notably over Suez, Vietnam, the Yom Kippur, and Grenada.

2.1. The Suez Crisis and the Decline of the British Influence in the Region

In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abd Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company previously owned by European countries to finance building the Aswan dam after the US withdrew its promise to Nasser it would finance the dam project. In retaliation, Britain, Israel, and France angered by the Egyptian support to the Algerian Revolution waged a tripartite war against Egypt.

In his book *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* Scott Lucas referring to the special relationship in the Middle East pointed out that “Co-operation from 1954 to 1956 was based upon a tenuous convergence of aims” (Lucas 3).

Similarly, Nigel Ashton has identified a “patchwork . . . cooperation and conflict on the basis of perceptions of threat and of interest between Britain and America” (Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser* 117).

Ashton adds that the main reason the Middle East had emerged strongly among its component and “such a fertile ground for conflict between the two powers was simply that their interests here often failed to coincide.” Britain's inclination to view the case of the Middle East and keep its empirical interests opposed with the US Cold War policy that was summed in containing the Middle East (Smith 5).

Dwight Eisenhower was clearly concerned about a military solution to this nationalization crisis. In a clear message, he told Anthony Eden:

The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy. I do not see how the economy of Western Europe can long survive the burden of prolonged military operations, as well as the denial of Near East oil. Also, the peoples of the Near East and of North Africa and, to some extent, of all of Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to such a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation and, perhaps, not even in a century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russians to make mischief (Eisenhower 163).

Eisenhower's aim behind the withdrawal of the fund of Egypt was to push Nasser to reconsider his relationships with USSR and Czechoslovakia buying from them weapons and selling them cotton. Eisenhower was trying to ease the Arab-Israeli tensions and assure settlement in the area so that he can focus on the augmented threat of communism in other places. He knew of the growing Arab nationalism and the high-status Nasser had, and he was fearful that Arab countries join the Soviet alliance if the United States stood neutral (Hudson 139).

In October 1955 the British expelled the Saudi forces without first consulting and informing their ally the United States. As Tore Peterson has noted that this solo rude act on the part of Britain had caused “considerable consternation” in Washington and insisted that both Britain and the United States should “play it together from now on” (qtd. in Smith 6).

As soon as the Suez Crisis had started, President Eisenhower said that “At all costs the Soviets must be prevented from seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations” (qtd. in Smith 7). What Eisenhower tries to highlight here is the fact that the Soviet must be prevented from taking over the global leadership by exhibiting a fake show yet it made the smaller countries worried.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles questioned, “How can anything be done about the Russians even if they suppress the revolt when our own allies are guilty of exactly similar acts of aggression?”(Lucas 276). Highlighting what could be done if his allies are guilty as his enemies, Foster Dulles, the US secretary of state had summed the dilemma that faced successive administrations and told the Security Council:

For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies (qtd. in Luis 659).

Dulles here tries to highlight the fact that many years ago the United States was committed to preserving its relationship with its British and French allies from one hand, and to comfort themselves with a long-term relationship and understand the newly independent countries that escaped war from the other hand. He also emphasized the need to preserve and confirm that leadership; otherwise, these countries would leave and join the USSR and they would be looked upon as forever tied to the British and French colonial policies.

Regardless of the considerations of the Cold War, the United States administration was completely shocked by the British unilateralism. As Herbert Hoover told the British ambassador in Washington, Harold Caccia, “there had been Buraimi; then Jordan, and now Suez” (qtd. in Petersen 72). Realizing that the British kept secrets about their intention in the run-up to the Suez Crisis, the US president announced, “Nothing justifies double-crossing us” (qtd. in Hahn 230).

Alongside with the likely reaction in Washington to use force, Anthony Eden's misreading the American policy represented his failure over Suez. As Peter Hennessey noted, "Instead of the Cold War factor overriding US doubts about the attack on Nasser as the Soviets' chosen instrument of penetration through the Middle East and into Africa, the fear of hot war had led Eisenhower to insist that nothing be done by the British, the French and the Israelis that might increase the chances of it" (Hennessey 442).

Hennessey here pointed out the fact that instead of the Cold War actor that conquered all of the American doubts about the attack on Nasser, the fear of hot war is the factor that led Eisenhower to insist and assure that the British, the French and the Israelis should stand neutral and do nothing that might increase the chances of it (Hennessey 442).

The Suez Crisis in 1956 occupies a lead position in British history in the twentieth century. Contemporary politicians and historians tend to look at the crisis as a discontinuity or a pause in British history. Before 1956, it was said that Britain was confident with its continuity to remain a great power; after 1956, Britain was a second power, which was a fact that was referred to as the instant disintegration of its remaining empirical stand (Gorst and Johnman xii).

Suez crisis highlights the retroactive hypothesis that most British politicians shared in the fifties that say that the country remained a great power and could act that manner. Suez crisis, however, harshly revealed that this was not the situation; a lesson they learnt from the economic pressure exerted by their American allies.

Suez crisis also points to the central fact of postwar British history that has no longer the economy which can preserve the role of great power: the withdrawal in November 1956 and the outrageous cease-fire had clearly emphasized how much Britain was under economic pressures (Gorst and Johnman Xii).

2.2. The Skybolt Crisis and Britain's Declining International Role

On January 11th, 1968, there was a meeting in Washington between the British Foreign Secretary George Brown and his American counterpart, Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Brown had bad news and told Rusk the British government's decision to no longer police the Southeast Asia or the Middle East (Priest 1).

This meant that by 1971, its existence in Singapore, Malaya, and the Persian Gulf should be terminated. Brown said that all the British defense efforts will be directed to the North Atlantic territory. Rusk was discontent with the decision and Brown faced a long devastating verbal attack; Rusk urged the British to reconsider their decision. An American official present in the meeting asked Brown, "Be British, George, be British – how can you betray us?" (Priest 1).

Five years earlier, in December 1962, the British government members had gone out victorious of their conversations with their American allies in Nassau in the Bahamas. During the meeting, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan received confirmations from President John Kennedy that the United States would provide the Polaris missile delivery system to the British nuclear submarines "operating in the North Atlantic and integrated into the NATO,"

Therefore, expanding the UK's shield deterrent for at least the next twenty years. This agreement ended a period of tension between the two governments following the US cancellation of the Skybolt deal the British had been promised earlier (Priest 1).

Now, with the suitable alternative of Skybolt, it seems that Anglo-American defense connection has been secured and the global British commitments were reconfirmed (Priest 1).

The Skybolt crisis is significant because it represents the Anglo-American relationship in all its complexity. The crisis revolved around the attempt of the United States to strip Britain of its nuclear deterrent by cancelling the Skybolt missile program in 1962 (Greenberg 144).

The missile was not a bomb but a nuclear weapon, a stand-off missile that could break through the Soviet air airspace. Skybolt could give Britain's deterrent a long life and alternatives to its only nuclear option, hydrogen bombs (Greenberg 144).

The missile program was the promise of President Dwight Eisenhower to the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the agreement of March 1960. In exchange, Britain provided bases on the west coast of Scotland to the United States Navy for its Polaris missile pacifiers (Greenberg 144).

The intensity of this crisis can be judged by the massive failure of American policy to deprive Great Britain of its nuclear capacity, when it was measured on a winning card played by the British at Nassau where Macmillan persuaded Kennedy to drop his own policy concerning the cancellation of the Skybolt program and they agreed to hand Polaris missiles to Great Britain under supremacy British control (Greenberg 144).

In light of the of the disintegration of African empire of Britain which started with abandoning East Suez, and the persistence of post-war economic crises, Britain's international role in the sixties reached the lowest level in its history.

Although it is controversial to specify a certain period as to mark this turning point, it seems that the winter of 1962-3 which witnessed the failure of the first British attempt to join the European Economic Community (EEC), the crisis with Washington over the Skybolt, the Congo crisis, the Yemeni Civil War, and the Cuban trade embargo appeared to have crystallized the issue of the British international changing role (Ashton, Anglo-American Relations 120).

Indeed, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose December 1962 as a date to say that Britain lost its empire and could not find a new role (Ashton, Anglo-American Relations 120).

From the early 60s to the end of the Cold War, the Anglo-American relationship continued to be a crucial component of the western alliance; however, Britain's dwindling international role meant that its benefits and interests have never intersected with the interests of the US in many points around the world (Ashton, Anglo-American Relations 120).

Although the diplomatic, intelligence, and defense cooperation which were kept close in the Anglo-American, Britain did not engage in the American thinking as it used to do in the wartime and postwar years (Ashton, Anglo-American Relations 120).

2.3. The Vietnam War and the Reshaping of the US Foreign Policy

The seventies had made an unfortunate prediction concerning the future of the Anglo-American special relationship. Britain finally was accepted in the EEC in 1973; a year Henry Kissinger called the "the Year of Europe," as to show that the UK's connection to the United States was not attached to its continental membership (Brown 27).

Britain's economy declined to approximately half of Japan's GDP and Germany took over Britain's role as the greatest monetary contributor to NATO. Consequently, the United States sought to develop other relationships that may seem as "special" (Brown 27).

With the end of the Cold War, the Anglo-American relations entered a new era. The reason for this transformation lies once again in the changing international roles of both powers; this time it was the changing role of the United States more than that of Britain that mattered. The decline of the Soviet challenge to US dominance inevitably influenced the Anglo-American relations (Ellis 1).

The British government became more conscious than ever in the disproportion in power between Britain and the United States and, at the same time, more persistent than ever to prove itself as a worthy ally whenever the circumstances provided a chance.

The US foreign policy in the seventies was dominated by the Vietnam War; yet, historians are only now exploring the international dimensions of the conflict. US Under-Secretary of State George Ball's famous statement that Vietnam made it very hard for anything else to get attention and when attention was given judgments tended to be "colored by the Vietnamese situation." (Ellis 1).

Ball remarked that the Americans "were getting things totally distorted. . . . In fact, [he] once drew a map for Dean Rusk [Secretary of State]" and said, "This is your map of the world." "I had the tiny United States with an enormous Vietnam laying right off the coast," he added (Ellis 1).

George Ball's remark reveals to what extent the support of the US allies to the Johnson Administration was important. Having five other countries fighting by its side — Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines — the diplomatic cooperation of the main allies was conclusive in the United States propaganda war. No other verbal support of any of the countries was much important than also a democratic, social and a leading nation whose role model was crucial, not least to the Commonwealth nations (Ellis 1)

2.4. Reagan and Thatcher, or the Extra Special Relationship

The remarkable development in the US-UK special relationship during the late twentieth century was not related to the international context only. The Leftist challenge both the United States and the United Kingdom had faced was to play a decisive role shaping the special relationship in the eighties.

The conservative approach on both sides of the Atlantic represented a basic reordering of the domestic and foreign policy that is capable to express the constitutional principles that each country rely on (Brown 28).

By the 80s, this conservative movement gave birth to two leaders who were capable of emphasizing the common political heritage between the two nations, and the raising the special relationship to a level never reached before. These two leaders were President Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Brown 28).

The close relationship between Thatcher and Reagan originated from their common view of the world; Thatcher liked and supported Reagan's uncompromising policy against Communism. They both entered office with two major aims: reducing government's interventionism in economy, and replacing the old containment doctrine with an offensive policy against Communism.

As they held office in the years of 1979 and 1981 respectively, Thatcher and Reagan helped shape the philosophy of a rising conservative movement. This movement was based on the natural rights theory of governing, unlike the totalitarian Soviet philosophy and the collective, gradualist socialism of the European countries (Brown 39).

The years where Thatcher and Reagan held office projected the Anglo-American special relationship at its fullest. These two figures showed the ultimate manifestation of liberal governance any of world leaders shared at that time, and their visions gave birth to common goals that brought their nations together.

Their governments were different from the collectivist models that shaped many of contemporary western countries, and united to face the most extreme form of socialism: the Soviet Bloc.

This alliance successfully proved its efficiency during the Cold War, confirmed the importance of having common political principles in foreign affairs, unmasked the influence of the domestic orientations on the foreign policy, and reaffirmed the particularity of US-UK

relationship which shows that the United States and Britain were more than just plain allies (Brown 40).

The conservative philosophy that Thatcher and Reagan shared had a major influence on the special relationship. A number of situations that occurred in the eight years of their governance can be studied to test their alleged solid bond. Among these was the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982. The war started when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a remote British colony in the Atlantic that Argentina had always claimed sovereignty.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom received some warnings about a possible invasion. Thatcher received an urgent telegram from Reagan in April the 1st, 1982 warning that the invasion might be close and that he will instantly contact the Argentina dictator, General Galitieri; the latter had nothing to meet the requirements of Reagan.

President Reagan told his British friend that he “will continue to cooperate with [the British] government in the effort to resolve the dispute, both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out.” (Brown 44).

Reagan also told Thatcher that whiles the US “have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue; we [the US] will not be neutral on the issue involving Argentine use of military force.” On the first morning of the next day, however, Argentina invaded the Falklands (Brown 44).

Thatcher was obliged to make a decision of whether to use or not the British army to defend a small insignificant rocky island situated thousands miles away. Without too much hesitation, Thatcher ordered Chief of Naval Staff to assemble a selected working group of ships and be ready for military intervention.

After attempts of US mediation failed, Britain in a manifestation of power waged a war on Argentina to recover control of the islands. The conflict, which lasted for 74 days, took hundreds of British and Argentinean troops. Britain and mostly Thatcher emerged victorious (Brown 45).

Unlike the Conservatives, the Labour supposed Reagan's intervention policies in Central America. Responding to a report of a "US National Bipartisan Commission" about Central America headed by Henry Kissinger calling for a military solution to the instability in the region, the Labours demanded an alternative confirming that "claims made by the United States administration" about its needs to intervene in Central America "in order to stem Soviet-Cuban aggression is but a new name for an old claim—originating in the Monroe Doctrine" which had claimed the right to dominate Central America and Caribbean (qtd. in Holland and Anderson 3). These Justifications were used in 1983 to invade Communist-controlled Grenada.

The justifications of Reagan's administration concerning the invasion of Grenada in 1983 were rejected and categorized as "dishonest" by the British Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey who described the invasion of Grenada as a violation to the UN charter. Furthermore, the Labour Party clearly took a distance from the policies of the United States concerning national and international security issues after the Iran-Contra scandal and the US bombarding airstrike on Tripoli in 1986 (Phythian 192).

By the time of the 1987 general election, the Labour Party and the US government had an almost total estrangement. To decrease the views gap, Neil Kinnock, leader of the Labour Party was received in the White House just weeks before the British general election; a visit that was seen by some as a possible withdrawal of Reagan's support of the Conservative Party (qtd. Lewis 7).

The White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, however, noted that “the President made clear that he had no intention of intervening in Britain’s domestic affairs. But he said we disagree with Labor's defence policy” (qtd. Lewis 7).

During the election campaign, Reagan himself opened the intervention in elections to support Mrs. Thatcher. He stated that if another government in the United Kingdom was ever elected and that it adopted the disarmament from one hand and sought to remove US bases, he would try his best to convince that government not to commit such small errors, and that he had to express his admiration to the manner that Thatcher followed in dealing with domestic affairs not to mention international ones (Dobson, Labour or Conservative 90).

Conclusion

The history of the Anglo-American special relationship is closely bound to the similar political development in the two nations and the common cultural and political heritage. The similar views of world affairs meant that both the United States and the United Kingdom were on the same side each time threats are present. The two World Wars, the Communist threat, and the “war on terror” allowed these two countries to experience and test the power of their cooperation.

When signing the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin said, “We now must all hang together or we will surely hang separately.” The Anglo-American relationship has certainly “hang together” and survived the many challenges it faced.

In the beginning, the partners opposed imperialist Germany, then confronted the Hitlerian Fascism, and at the end they faced the Communist threat represented in the Soviet Union, acting in all three cases in a more consistency than before in a solid wider alliance context.

The United States accepted the basic strategic principle that although having the most overwhelming power, it needed allies to implement its policies and earn a needed legitimacy in a world meant to be governed by international instances and laws.

The two nations might have some severe disagreements over cases such as Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, and Grenada, but they were successful overcoming these crises each time.

This remarkable relationship had played a significant role in the twentieth century. This alliance had survived two World Wars and the multi-threat struggle in the Cold War. Certainly, their mutual political legacy of constitutionalism and the rule of law were guiding lines in the special relationship, but pragmatism and real politick are of great importance representing the ultimate goal of this relationship.

Chapter Two: Major Cooperation Domains in the US-UK Special Relationship

US officials and members of the Congress consider the United Kingdom as their closest and reliable ally. This extraordinary vision stems from a number of factors: the sense shared history, culture, values, as well as a common view of world affairs and a solid cooperation on a number of foreign policy issues.

The years between the Civil War and the Second World War had witnessed a fundamental change in the Anglo-American relations at the economic, politico-diplomatic, and cultural levels, from a first-hand competitive confrontation relationship to a cooperative one. This fundamental change was supported by personal friendships and partnerships between presidents and prime ministers that seemed to characterize the Anglo-American alliance. It was also accompanied and propped by a transfer of power in the international order from British-dominated world to a US-dominated world. American and British officials had shared many presumptions and interpretations of the Soviet Union as a common threat to their economic and political interests whereas there were negotiations and differences on regional strategies and economic policies, especially in Asia and the Middle East. The cooperation between the two nations was still remarkable despite the vast gap in power and the imposed requirements on the relationship that was set by the US containment strategy.

2.1. The Personal Relationship in the Special Relationship

A huge part of the received concept of the special relationship is the fact of personal relationships, especially those personal friendships between American presidents and British prime ministers. The history of the special relationship is often embodied through personal partnerships that seemed to characterize the Anglo-American alliance. The most recognized friendship during the Cold War was between Macmillan and Kennedy and between Thatcher and Reagan. The post-Cold War equivalent was the friendship of Tony Blair with Clinton and

George W. Bush. The image of solid Anglo-American relations led by personal friendships is highly convincing. Were the transatlantic rifts caused by the Suez Crisis of 1956 not healed by Macmillan and Kennedy who were actually related by marriage? Did Reagan and Thatcher not bury the rows of the Vietnam War and the cooling of the relationship that prevailed during Edward Heath's presidency? Did Clinton, Bush and Blair not renovate the special relationship in the post-Cold War after the removal of the 'shared anti-communist interests'? (Dumbrell 100).

The United States after WWII became a status quo superpower. It aimed to accomplish the global settlement; therefore, understanding the psychological needs of the other leaders was a means to achieve it and disrupt actions that might cause some unfortunate vicissitudes in the international sphere. This part of the psychology played a huge role in the issue of credibility. Despite being intangible, the matter of credibility was vital to the global leadership of the United States. Allies and opponents had to consider that the United States when obliged, would act to protect its interests. The psychological element had a huge part of it. Sending such psychological signals is credited to the interaction between world leaders and prevalence of the credibility zone did not reach other leaders only; it extended to include American people as well. "A president's credibility abroad influenced his credibility at home". (Hutchinson 8)

Given the fact that the interactions of personalities and emotions were at its peak, it already occurred inside the presidency institution. Presidents acted as a consultant due to the comfort feeling they had for their interlocutor. Some presidents had formed real friendships with other world leaders and they would assist them as much possible as they can. Yet, the role of the president as a consultant aims to deal with other not-so-close leaders. Presidents try to ease tensions because as being responsible for foreign affairs they often see it as the

best means to protect and bolster the objectives of the country's foreign policy. (Hutchinson 9)

2.2. Military and Nuclear Weapon Development Cooperation

The US and British military cooperation is unprecedented in terms not only to the US relations with other countries but also in international alliances' records. No other country has a similar contribution in the setting plans and preparing for operations that the United Kingdom had with the United States. American and British troops cooperated well in Iraq and adapted very fast with the changes on the ground and its transfer from its traditional phase to counterinsurgency operations. Experts from the United Kingdom have noticed that the British community was worried that the above is only going to occur at the tactical level. They were worried that the British influence on doctrinal prosperity in the United States is limited (McCausland and Carlisle 6).

Considering the inconsistencies of power between the two countries, keeping a close security relationship was more a main concern in London than in Washington. Unlike France, the United Kingdom has always maintained a partnership of power and leadership with the United States. Generations of British politicians who neglected the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon have accepted the part of the junior partner to keep a critical relationship with national security. The solid alliance with the United States kept being the cornerstone of British security and foreign policy for more than seventy years. Britain was capable of defeating the Nazi and the Soviet threats and it eased the influence of the great collapse in Britain's international role after 1945. At the start of the twenty-first century, the United Kingdom is no longer dependent on the United States (Wither 70).

The age of direct military threats has diminished, and Britain is a vital member of the European Union now; despite the solid commercial and financial relationships, the United Kingdom is no longer indebted to the United States. Even after joining the European

Community, there is no concrete evidence that the British government would favor its security relationship with its European allies over its relationship with the United States. This standpoint was reinforced with the strategic defense reviews of the years 1998 and 2002, confirming the continuation of the solid cooperation of the United States as the main ally of Britain.

In Europe, Britain devoted its efforts in developing the military "network-enabled capabilities" to remain within the technological operation's context with the United States forces. In a BBC interview that discussed the issue of Iraq in September 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair in a stark manner expressed the commitment of Britain stating that that the UK had to be prepared to take responsibility and pay a "blood price" in order to secure its security relationship with the United States (Wither 70).

CNN's European Political Editor, Robin Oakley, described the US and the UK as "traditional and instinctive military allies," where accommodation, consulting, and cooperation had shaped the relationship at the work level. During the Falklands War in 1982, US Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger provided help from the Pentagon to the British forces even before the support of the UK had been officially expressed (Wither 74).

Defense institutions in both countries have what is described as "familiar confidence" in their dealing with each other. To provide an oral proof before the House of Commons Defense Committee in the period of post Iraq War, the UK Secretary of Defense Geoffrey Hoon on his relationship with Donald Rumsfeld said:

Bear in mind that I would meet with the Defense Secretary in the United States on a pretty regular basis even before Iraq was a direct and specific issue, so our relationship goes back further than this particular context. We have always been able to speak frankly and openly to each other and part of the reason for that is that we do not disclose the contents of those conversations, but I can assure you that there was

excellent coordination at every level between the Ministry of Defense and the Pentagon. (Wither 75)

Traditionally, this cooperation was solid in the nuclear field in particular. The nuclear relationship between the US and the UK has been both original and unique in the past seven decades, and it considered as exceptional because the two countries cooperated on what observers define as the “ultimate weapon” of the second half of the twentieth century. In a period of only two years, a common secret project produced two unique home designs that changed history. Despite the fact that the cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom has started during the common struggle against Germany, this cooperation’s path is remarkable and unique and it gained the persistent attention from both of the United States and the United Kingdom. The British started working on the Nuclear Discovery Park in 1939 and rejected the request of the United States to join their efforts, but the United States soon overcame Britain and almost ended the cooperation due to the unfair circumstances, character, and historical events that the situation had reached and tuned into one of reciprocal sharing that was embodied in the Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) of 1958. (Mackby and Cornish 3)

The basis of the US-UK nuclear relationship was never officially reciprocal, yet in the beginning, the United Kingdom provided uranium to the US nuclear program and provided the military basis for the US nuclear strike aircraft and assisted the accumulation of raw data concerning the USSR nuclear activities. By the end of 1958, the United Kingdom had its own strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities and also the complete authority to access and use the US nuclear weapons in wartime with the MDA. It was capable of acquiring US weapon engineering expertise to build its own thermonuclear designs, nuclear materials, warheads and weapon components that could help the manufacturing in the United States, testing facilities and provides information on the antimissile system (Mackby and Corish 4).

Through the Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) and the Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs), which are still strong today, both countries benefited from each other's ideas and information as well as power in the diplomatic and international security field. In the absence of testing the progressive cooperation between scientists in the design field, computer assimilation, safety issues and credibility and the continuation of the Trident program provided the growth for the relationship. Some thought that following the difficulties articulated by Blair when he showed his complete support to the US in the Iraq War and in light of a UK's announcement of a nuclear-free world, the United Kingdom might be obliged to align itself with the European Union in future plans. The UK and the US defense is so solid and unlikely to dissolve; it seems it will continue to be an interdependent mutual secured defense (Mackby and Cornish 4).

While the relationship between the two countries has never been reciprocal, no other countries had exchanged information and built nuclear cooperation to the same extent as Britain and the United States did. Both countries were envied to obtain support for each other and for their foreign policy objectives and exchanged each other's nuclear policies (Mackby and Cornish 17).

2.3. Security and Intelligence Cooperation

Many elements were included in the security cooperation – among them, well-organized military tactics, collaboration in setting plans and policies, and exchanging intelligence on threats of common interest. The mutual view of threats supported by exchanging bilateral intelligence was the key to the success of military cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. Sharing intelligence enhances every other aspect of security cooperation, but it recommends a whole new level of trust; furthermore it upgraded the level of other aspects (Clark 22).

2.3.1. Intelligence Sharing

The US-UK intelligence relationship is universally considered the closest and enduring relationship in the world. Officials always complement the centrality of the intelligence field. Its political vitality and the role it plays are readily apparent. It is worth the investment for both nations (Svendsen 1). Canadian intelligence scholar Martin Rudner discusses that the Anglo-American intelligence alliance arguing it is located in the center of a web of relationships that reaches across the globe:

To some, [the UKUSA] hub-and-spokes pattern of liaison relationships exemplified the configuration of capability in the UKUSA alliance with Britain and the United States comprising core contributors, despite an unequal availability of resources, and the other partners who served more like auxiliaries at the periphery of global SIGINT [signals intelligence] operations (Rudner).

Rudner here tries to highlight the fact that Britain and the United States pattern of liaison relationship was a living proof of the ability of the two countries to raise an alliance and form core contributors despite the lack of resources and the other partners acting as chess rocks at the global Signal Intelligence operations.

The US UK intelligence cooperation was at its closest in the field of information collection by technical and human means. The readiness of some agencies and organizations in Washington to closely integrate collections with their British counterpart's efforts, despite the existence of many unequal amounts of exchange, has been expressed in two separate but relevant manners (Aldrich, British intelligence 342).

First, it has been related to the joint infrastructures and the solid personal associations that represented the legacy of the Second World War. Secondly, historians confirmed the ability

of Britain to project a picture that is (partially fake) in the wartime of a cautiously professional approach, based on secret service that dates back to centuries ago, unlike what is the so-called amateurs of the flourished American agencies. Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed to look at British intelligence as a semi-perfect organization. These arguments have powers and are mostly convincing in explaining the postwar cooperation between those who were formally members of, or had worked with Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) orders, also other members including Lord Portal of Hungerford who was the main supervisor of Britain's atomic intelligence program, Walter Bidell Smith, director of the CIA and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), not to mention Eisenhower himself (Aldrich, *British intelligence* 342).

Cooperation in the field of intelligence analysis and the establishment of national estimates, along with its influence on policy, is a more complex matter than that of collection, while large volumes of final checked estimates were exchanged and much more attention was paid to each other's systematic enhancements in the assessment machinery; nevertheless, this exchange process was going through doubts. Those fears were limited between either using intelligence to process and manipulate policy or that demands for commenting on estimates might be a tool to draw policy-makers to discuss subjects that they prefer to keep classified from the Allied context (Aldrich, *British intelligence* 345).

Moving forward towards the Seventies, Washington saw that the British still had a valid contribution in the intelligence and strategic weaponry arenas. In both of these areas, a huge part of the British contribution was derived from its foreign overseas territories and its residual empire that did not just provide priceless political connection but also provided a large number of airbases, naval facilities, and suitable sites for technical collection (Aldrich, *British intelligence* 349).

Intelligence cooperation is considered one of the most crucial weapons in containing the “new” terror threat, yet it is much more important than that. Through a number of issues of the post-Cold-War era, globalization undermined multiple familiar mechanisms that were providing peace to its population before. In fact, “organized crime,” drug dealing, money laundering, and immigration became the center of international interest because of its augmented transnational character. With the erosion of national borders, nations had set more active procedures to protect their populations greatly relying on their intelligence departments. In London, recognizing such streams was obvious since the year of 1998 in efforts not only to mirror the post-Cold War contractions in the British intelligence and security but also to expand it (Aldrich, *Transatlantic intelligence* 754).

As the twentieth century witnessed the well-formed, solid special relationship through the main contributions of the US-UK intelligence sharing, incidents at the dawn of the twenty-first century have placed the “special relationship” at the zone of test and shed the light on the intelligence field as both a problem and a solution for the uprising crisis (Clark 40).

2.3.2. Enhancing Efforts Against Terrorism

Whilst the British government had contributed troops and logistical support for US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it had also to focus its efforts to fight the great internal “terrorist threat.” Instead of handling the issue as a matter of policing, the government has chosen to categorize it as a matter that demands exceptional forces and a combination between theory and application of “counterterrorism.” The latter is worth mentioning because the counterinsurgency embodies a chain of techniques to target the “rebels” and the population that moves among them as an enemy, sapping the liberal democratic speech around whether if democracy even exists. The United Kingdom’s adoption of counterterrorism doctrine led to a series of precautions and practices that bears in its sleeves more than a standard resemblance to “terrorism” (Miller and Sabir 1).

The years from 2000 to 2005 had witnessed a chain of terrorist attacks. These major events point to the fact that terrorism is experiencing rapid development. On September 11th, 2001, international terrorism raided the United States. The attacks were spectacular and gained the attention of the world stimulating both the Bush administration and international engagement to combat terrorism. Four planes were hijacked; two were crashed against the towers of the World Trade Center, the third crashed against the Pentagon, and the fourth on its way to the White House it landed and crushed in one of the fields of Pennsylvania (Svendsen 39).

In the next year, on October 12th, 2002, there were two bombings at the night clubs in Bali. Approximately two hundred and two people died including twenty-six Britons. A month later, on November 28th, 2001, two missiles were launched at an Israeli civilian aeroplane in Kenya. Minutes later, a suicidal attack occurred in an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa taking the lives of eleven people (Svendsen 39).

The year 2003 witnessed brutal attacks in Saudi Arabia, Casablanca and the United Kingdom interests in Istanbul, which left behind more than seventy peoples dead including the British consul. On March 11th, 2004, four crowded trains in Madrid were attacked using ten bombs leaving one hundred and ninety one dead. On July 7th, 2005, three bombs exploded in London's underground metro. An hour later, a fourth bomb exploded on a bus. Four suicidal members executed the bombings; the other fifty two people died and almost seven hundred were wounded. Surprisingly, these attacks were the first time suicide acts occur in Europe. On July 21st, there was an attempt of other bombings in three trains and metro in London, yet the devices failed to explode (Svendsen 39).

These episodes project only the terrorist attacks that were witnessed during that period. The “New” terrorism that was hailed during the nineties has become a real fact. “Where and what next?” were the key headline questions. Emergency first-response became more urgent

than crisis management. The desire for pre-emption under the called “public safety” was among the top of the list of London’s and Washington’s options. It was the appropriate time for the intelligence and security services to increasingly think of solutions. Their top mission became gaining the prevailing “curve” of events (Svendsen 40).

The United States and the United Kingdom’s bilateral liaison on Counter-terrorism is highly crucial as a pattern of activity. Since the year of 2000 until 2006, Functionalism “viewpoint of the theory of the mind” and Evangelicalism “the beliefs of some Protestant churches and Christian groups in the teachings of the Bible” were the dominant movements. Eventually, there was a serious danger for both the United States and the United Kingdom leaving “narrower” considerations block the highly augmented scale of intelligence activity that is both required and demanded by policymakers and military operators (Svendsen 40).

The United States’ and the United Kingdom’s multilateral intelligence liaison on the topic of CT are also vital. CT displays the lead issue in such interactions. Despite being less exclusive than the multilateral liaison that gained its place in within the UKUSA SIGINT order, CT works on the foundation of global intelligence liaison with other nations and arrangements –among them, the UN, NATO, the G8 and the EU (Svendsen 40).

2.4. Economic Cooperation

Even during the dark days of the Second World War, officials from the United States and Britain discussed the post-war order. Some suggestions emphasized on the regional assemblies, some strove to stimulate colonial empire, and the other suggestions –defended by American officials- still called for building an open international economy that is based on principles of liberal multilateralism. The most notable distinctions in perspective over the post-war regime were those between American officials at Foreign Affairs Ministry, who sought to rebuild an open trading program, and British officials at the Council of Ministers in

the wartime, who sought to guarantee full employment and economic stability, hence they were thinking of the continuation of “the imperial preference regime and the bilateral trade.” One of the visions was to have a nondiscriminatory, multilateral trading economy. The other, despite its sketchy details, was the preferential economic assembly (Ikenberry 289).

Despite the fact that they had their differences, the United States and Britain were able during the Second World War to fulfill watershed trade and monetary agreement, which identified the terms of reestablishing an open global economy--which was considered a tremendous achievement in light of all the ravages and the multi visions to the post-war order. Yet the new order was different from any anything that the capitalist community had witnessed. The Anglo-American agreements had set some rules to the multilateral order of trade and payment, yet it did so in a manner that combined trade expansion with the commitments of the national government (Ikenberry 289).

Unlike other communities, the community of American and British economic planners who came to appear during the war did not stand alone outside the government. American and British official efforts had assisted the start of the post-war plans to motivate the thinking and improve organizational efforts to the experts. Also, colonizing parts of the US and the UK bureaucracies by Keynesian economists empowered the sense of community among experts. Large global community economists and policymakers had shared so many views that the Anglo-American experts convened (Ikenberry 304).

It was highly clear that the wartime was not the best time to set plans for a post-war era. Political leaders and the public were deeply busy handling the economic, military and political problems of gaining the war. Nevertheless, a realization came during the conflict emphasizing the vitality of avoiding the mistakes that helped to generate it in the first place. In the United States, the economic situations such as the 1930 worldwide depression, the commercial constraints maze and the legacy of the WWI unpaid debts were considered as a

top contributor to the aggression of Japan and Germany and the absence of group work to prohibit it. Peace was looked upon as a connection to world flourishing, free trade, and free capital movement, prosperity, and stable exchange rates (Ikenberry 304).

Despite the fact that the causality was vague, this cooperation was shaped in the Lend-Lease Act that Roosevelt signed on March 11th, 1941, and in Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, that stated that the United States and the United Kingdom agreed not to participate in trade discrimination that opposed each other's policies. Article VII was the main basis of the United States perseverance on nondiscriminatory exchange dealings in the Fund and also for nondiscriminatory trade supplies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Mikesell 4).

Economic planning was also influenced by the creation of the UN that processed the post-war political problems. The US government took the lead in the creation of the UN as an institute that will eventually hold all countries but it will be dominated by the four wartime Allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union. This concept was transferred to White's proposals for the International Security Forces (ISF) and the International Bank, in which White gave his ultimate vote for the Great Four and permanent seats on the boards of directors as well. White proposals also included an American agenda to replace the currency and trade aggregate in the '30s with markets of free-foreign exchange and nondiscrimination in trade and the capital stream. All of the mentioned opposed with the initial British regime, which would have dealt with post-war monetary issues through bilateral agreements between the US and the UK and also would have kept the sterling era and the imperial preference (Mikesell 5).

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is likely to remain close. Their special relationship will remain solid in a manner that the United Kingdom is a crucial and vital US ally, and that the two nations will remain partners in key sectors like military, security and intelligence, and economy. The lead dimensions of the Anglo-American relationship are deep and permanent in that it surpassed the personal dynamics of individual leaders and does not undergo to sudden movements or policy changes by either country.

Chapter Three: The Clinton/Bush-Blair Era (1997-2007)

Britain has been and is still busy with Tony Blair in various ways, especially the unique relationship between him and former US President Bill Clinton which paved the way for Clinton's successor, President George W. Bush. This latter, it seems, took advantage of this

special relationship to involve Blair in the US strategic plans around the world, especially the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Under a series of justifications and pretexts such as humanitarian intervention and campaigns of disinformation and propaganda Britain was unquestionably engaged beside the United States.

Leaders in both countries have been busy deploying military forces abroad and preoccupied with the growing threat of international terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, the relationship between Britain and the United States was strengthened, and Britain became a bridge between Europe and America.

3.1. Tony Blair's Doctrine

Blair's Doctrine shaped Britain's foreign policy from 1997 to 2007 and the US-UK special relationship perhaps even after. The doctrine was based on three principles: humanitarian intervention, Britain's role as a bridge between Europe and the United States, and Britain's pivotal role in international affairs. In April 1999, Blair established the "doctrine of the international community", when the Kosovo war reached its climax, the doctrine based on seemingly benevolent humanitarian principles by advocating a universal moral approach aimed at eradicating tyranny and spreading democratic liberalism, regardless of its ulterior motive (Atkins 277).

3.1.1. Humanitarian Interventionism

Some governments describe the military intervention in other countries as humanitarian intervention and international opinion is not convinced, and this law does not carry any specifications of its name and is illegal. If there is humanitarian intervention, it must carry with it all that is conditioned and desirable and associated in all the so-called humanitarian intervention where it preserves and defends rights and protects the human race from violations.

Humanitarian intervention is therefore “based on the use or threat of use of armed force by a state or group of states by an international body for the purpose of protecting human rights against flagrant violations by a state against its citizens in such a way as to deny their rights in a manner that shocks humanity” (qtd. in Jayakumar 1). Also, it is any pressure exerted by a government of a state on the government of another state in order for the latter's conduct to be in accordance with humanitarian law, through respect for the fundamental rights of the individual, where the state is unable or unwilling to protect its people. The United States was one of the first countries to adopt this principle (Jayakumar 1).

It is possible to say that the subject of intervention on humanitarian grounds is not considered a new phenomenon in the field of international relations. Its forms and uses have evolved over the past centuries. It uses force in the name of humanity to stop the oppression and cruelty of a country against its citizens. It was the war in Kosovo that led Tony Blair to the embrace of humanitarian intervention; The Kosovo war has crossed Tony Blair, his beliefs and his wisdom as a strong leader in crises and wars. He justified his campaign in Kosovo as a humanitarian war and was motivated by humanitarian considerations as a justification for British military intervention (McCourt 247).

Human intervention is a future challenge in the global system. Should military interventions protect individuals and atrocities be permitted by international law? This question has been of great interest beyond military interventions. In this context, such interventions may be used by countries such as Britain and the United States to the pretext for intervening to launch wars with ulterior motives. The United Kingdom under Blair was the most active player in NATO's intervention in Kosovo. This was not without motivation; Blair was the most persuasive among the decision-makers on the issue of military action, consciously seeking international support to ensure NATO's success, and that could ruin his political career and Kosovo can be led to his end. He has said that Britain has done what must

be done and what is right, for Britain and Europe, for a world where there is a conviction that barbarism must not be allowed to defeat justice. That is the right thing to do (McCourt 256)

Britain's military intervention in another region, Iraq, is also evident in support of its ally America and their bilateral relationship since Blair is obliged to support America militarily under the banner of the monopoly of terrorism and the spread of peace. Britain's link to America's moves is not coincidental; Blair's policy believed that US control will provide substantial returns to Britain and further strengthening of the expansion of the London Axis. The conclusion after a war for Iraq is that the United Kingdom was intended to show to the United States that it is a reliable force and a loyal ally of the United States (Dunne 909).

The invasion of Iraq did not favor the approval of some figures in the British government at the time, such as Robin Cook, the minister of relations with parliament, who said that the threshold of war must always be high and none of us can expect the number of civilian deaths in the imminent bombing of Iraq. The US warned that the bombing campaign will be strong and appalling and is likely to reach at least thousands of casualties. Iraq's military strength by then was less than half what it was in the last Gulf War. It is ironic to think about invading Iraq because its military forces are very weak. The war will end in a matter of days because Iraqi forces are very weak and in poor spirits and bad equipped.

There are criteria for military intervention. The first criteria are that military intervention must be limited to the following cases: large or real loss of life, with or without the intent of genocide, either as a result of deliberate state action or gross negligence. Scale, whether by killing or ethnic cleansing, intimidation or rape. The second criterion is the appropriate authority, which refers to the question of the body that should authorize military intervention and be by the General Assembly or regional organizations. In addition to this sound intention, this means that the intervention is only to stop the suffering of humanity. To resort to military force or to use weapons only after the failure of diplomatic attempts to resolve crises. In

addition to the proportionality which is a basic criterion for the principle of resorting to force. The last principle which is one of the most important principles is the responsibility of reconstruction as the strategy of post-intervention (Weiss⁷⁵⁰).

3.1.2. Britain as a Pivotal Power

A state is classified as a superpower when it has a military force in the first place and is also recognized by other countries, Britain emerged as a superpower when it entered the conflicts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. The outcome of these conflicts has opened the discussions on militarily important issues such as the replacement of the nuclear missile system, the construction of new aircraft carriers, and the financing and equipping of troops in the field. So Britain began to play an important role in the world. Superpower is not only limited to material resources but also to intellectual capabilities.

The new Labor Party changed Britain's foreign policy by adopting a new platform and integrating its moral dimension, which changed the context considerably, especially after the events of September 11. In Tony Blair's first speech in November 1997 on Britain's foreign policy, the minister had a futuristic view that Britain might have an active role in foreign affairs after the relative economic decline of decades. The basis of his speech was a comprehensive national renewal after Britain was separate from Foreign Affairs.

Blair realized that cooperation with the United States would not only be verbal support. Military support was an important element in achieving common interests. On the one hand, this cooperation ensured the status of Britain and, on the other hand, provided the United Kingdom with the ability to influence America's strategies. Britain is committed to several different relations in all areas and has a distinctive foreign policy. Blair said, "It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and

its future. Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where Britain must be.” (Wither 71).

3.1.3. Britain as a Bridge

Nearly half a century ago, the British foreign policy was acting as a bridge between its European neighbors and the United States. British prime ministers, one by one, continued Britain's intention to remain as the center of Europe while maintaining a special relationship with the United States. But from September 11, 2001, until the invasion of Iraq, the concept was reversed, as the British government gave its strong support to US policy. But despite Blair's strong support, he was not convinced that Saddam Hussein was a threat to global security. This support also resulted in Britain's efforts to influence Washington by providing such huge support.

Bush made promises about Iraq and its reconstruction after the war and that America will strive to do so, and he also made promises on the future consideration of the Palestinian issue. But all that the conflict left behind after the invasion made Britain committed to America uncomfortably due to the criticisms that it had been given after the Iraq war. Britain's cooperation with America had greatly damaged Tony Blair's efforts. To close European cooperation, The British government tried to rebuild relations with the French and German governments after the invasion because of their position against the invasion of Iraq. Many in Washington wanted Britain to work on its Euro-Atlantic ties, i.e., Europe and America, rather than choosing between them (Wallace and Philips 2).

The United States and the United Kingdom occupied an important place in Europe, and Britain played a key role in building the North Atlantic Alliance. Britain and America have seen great cooperation in various fields in terms of military cooperation and the development of US air bases in Britain, as well as other security cooperation to counter Soviet progress.

The United Kingdom has been a key factor in preserving and balancing the relationship between the North American continents and renewing the United States' commitment to European defense. Thus, Britain became a geographical and political bridge between America and Europe (Wallace and Philips 2).

Blair's goal since 1999 to create Britain as a central force has been instrumental in the alliances and policies that shape the world and its future. He said that it will play a pivotal role in linking relations between Europe and America and has been a model of trans-border foreign relations. Blair has managed to navigate a bumpy road despite the occasional tug-of-war by Europe and America. The United States continued to use NATO as a mechanism and a system of collective defense as a policy to ensure European countries' commitment to politics, strategy and foreign affairs, and to prevent Europe from forming an independent defense structure, thereby enabling it to acquire advantages that could threaten the power of the United States (Chilcoat et. al 51).

At the same time, the United States supported NATO in many developments outside the European region, and this helped the United States in its position in the Middle East, especially the oil-rich areas, which are in a strategic location, serves the United States. Chilcoat et. al stated that "the expansion of NATO has provided forward positions for the United States in its posture vis-à-vis the Middle East and oil-rich and strategically placed central Asian republics not only for oil, of course, but also in the confrontation with terrorism" (51).

Blair remained committed to Britain's role as a bridge between Europe and America across the Atlantic, despite the tensions after 2003, relying on Sir Malcolm Rifkind's statement that the bridge would be very unstable if it went too much in one direction. Gerhard Schroeder also had the same view and he stated that "Traffic across the bridge has always been in almost one direction" (Wallace and Philips 13).

3.2. The Kosovo War, 1999

The Kosovo War is an armed conflict that took place in Kosovo from 28 February 1998 until 11 June 1999. In this war, the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia, which controlled Kosovo before the war, faced a Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as the Army Kosovo Liberation, with air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO from March 24, 1999, with a ground support from the Albanian army.

The war in Kosovo was highlighted by researchers, journalists, and others who published stories about the British foreign policy during Tony Blair's years. The war in Kosovo helped to form British Prime Minister Tony Blair to become a strong leader. Blair's fear that Kosovo would fall, disappeared through international glorification for his efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Balkan. After that, a more confident, the capable leader was formed, committed with the integrity of British foreign policy in the theory of liberal intervention, freedom and equality. In March 1999, air strikes on Yugoslavia began and Blair was not convinced that it was enough. Clinton called for the deployment of troops on the ground, but he was not convinced, but Blair tried to persuade Clinton through the media and public opinion in the United States. Tony Blair's speech in Chicago on April 22, 1999, his first major foreign speech as prime minister, gave the most proof of his motives for Britain's involvement in the Kosovo war. He considered this speech a complete doctrine, and further emphasized that Blair's policy in the Balkans shows the existence of a government capable of heroic efforts (Daddow 547). Tony Blair said:

While we meet here in Chicago this evening, unspeakable things are happening in Europe. Awful crimes that we never thought we would see again have reappeared - ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass murder. I want to speak to you this evening about events in Kosovo. But I want to put these

events in a wider context - economic, political and security - because I do not believe Kosovo can be seen in isolation. No-one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that NATO's military action is justified... Anyone who has seen the tear-stained faces of the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming across the border heard their heart-rending tales of cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left behind knows that Bismarck was wrong. This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later (Blair 1).

Blair's speech was somewhat bold, but he managed to convince the United States, NATO, and the European Union that military intervention was the only solution to stop what was called ethnic cleansing, systematic rape and terrible crimes, although Clinton refused to send ground troops to Kosovo, Blair later persuaded, Blair's speech contained important parts, but the salient points are Blair's arguments for intervening in the Kosovo war and his Orthodox doctrine for peace and security; and also the extent that Kosovo is an extension of Blair's domestic policy, Where he said "we cannot stand and watch that great nation reeling on the brink of ruin", And called for consideration of situations and conflicts that could be interfered in, And then posed a series of indirect questions that appeared to be somewhat stages of interventions or questions are explained to the stages of military interventions (Daddow 549).

The Kosovo war was a long-term outcome as this war reshaped foreign policies and also the competencies of some political men. Blair thought that he had achieved great success in Kosovo, but in view of some of the views of researchers such as Edward Said shown that he

was a means of the United States, and was also led by the strategists of Washington, and that it was part of America's plan and its goal of expansion And spread its control in Europe. Edward Said believes that NATO's policy as imperialist as America's policy is to expand in large regions and control it, and has insisted that NATO is a cover for the United States to expand its power outside its territory (Zarnett 121).

Said was thinking that the military intervention was not a solution and that the solution to the Kosovo crisis could be a comprehensive meeting of the various parties to the conflict and discussion of solutions, and I think that America's exit from the region can solve the problems. Edward Said had views on America's ongoing interventions around the world to resolve disputes. Zarnett explained:

He believed that only if America could extricate itself from the region, the people could solve their own problems...One of Said's major arguments against NATO's intervention had to do with what he saw as American inconsistencies in regards to human rights abuses. For America to claim any semblance of morality, according to this logic, it must intervene consistently all over the world to try to end all humanitarian crises. (121)

Edward Said was confident that every military intervention by the United States and its allies behind it was a hidden goal, not a humanitarian intervention, as it was called, aimed at eradicating all that harms humanity and suppressing the rights of all peoples, urging his readers to resist every extremist leader, and this And this thought is produced From teaching and intellectual level in the humanities, analysis and intellectual courage (Zarnett 129).

3.3. The 9/11 and the “War on Terror”

The Americans' view of terrorism and terrorist attacks and the fear behind it was far from everyday life, but after the September 11 attacks on the twin towers of the International Trade

Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon, views on terrorism and its history have changed. September 11 was the beginning of the era of terrorism for Americans, Immediately after these attacks, politicians had declared that transnational terrorism, was another kind of threat to international security. Others have come to describe it as World War IV, and the permanent conflict between the West and Islam may continue (Smith and Zeigler 1). The world has become less stable than before. These attacks have increased tension between the Arab and Western world. For the latter, the fears and precautions against terrorism have increased. As for the Arab or Eastern world, all accusations have been made against it.

So, the use of military force is the legal basis for the war on terror, a joint decision by both houses of Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by President Bush on September 18. It shows a set of clear laws of using force against any organizations, states or people planning for terrorism or they practice it. This decision was an entry permit and military intervention in Afghanistan, which was aimed at overthrowing those who had a hand in the attacks of September 11. A close department to George Bush has been interested in managing and developing plans to eliminate terrorism by setting the key points for war. The same group has been named the War Council and has played an important role in managing the war on terror (Thimm 9).

After the events of September 11, America resorted to the adoption of secret procedures, and Bush made it an essential weapon of the fight terrorism. A secret warrant was signed on 17 September 2001 giving the CIA absolute power to arrest or kill terrorists, the Operation known as Graystone. One official said that the basis for the success of operations, the intelligence services must act and move in complete secrecy without going into much discussion of its methods, the operations were not limited to the CIA, but also to the Special Military Forces, which were expanded into the armed forces, and they have become interconnected.

The United States' goals have been clear against terrorism and its aim is to protect its citizens from it and prevent it from resuming attacks. It also targeted specific terrorist groups and limited all that might be the strength of these groups. After the September attacks, the competent authorities from all sides have worked to prevent and narrow down the terrorist attacks by various means to limit their movements (Goepner 108).

Robert R. Leonhard, he presented a set of key points for the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategies, including the first point of defining the nature of the enemy. After the events of September 11, America described its enemy as a network of terrorists and criminals under the protection of the Taliban, the armed Islamist political movement in Afghanistan. This group of extremists, but they were not in any way representatives of Islam, The results of this theory are based on the fact that if the enemy is a group of criminals, their defeat is a very easy issue and not a relatively difficult one. When the plan began, the administration had to abandon the idea that the criminals were members of the Taliban to expose and eliminate the terrorist network there. Robert R. Leonhard stated that:

The first step in solving a problem is defining the problem. The nature of the enemy is and will continue to be a major point of debate within the strategy of the war. Theorists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have reiterated the importance of understanding the true nature of the war and of the enemy. Failure to know the enemy is a conspicuous weakness in our current strategy. Related to this point is the criticality of deriving the objective of the war. (Leonhard 2)

The US strategy for four years of the September crisis continued to focus on capturing terrorists as a primary goal, but it appeared that the network was not as central as previously thought, but fragmented, it became clear that the problem was beyond the problem of individual terrorist, but of group of terrorists (Leonhard 2).

The September 11 attacks have greatly affected the security situation in America, leading to a comprehensive reassessment of security policy, America has adopted the point of attack by destroying or deterring any regime that protects al-Qaeda by coordinating work with all security forces. This has been somewhat successful because this step has cut off contacts between al Qaeda leaders and its members. However, this strategy was not fully successful because some operations against Al Qaeda failed to like the Anaconda operation, which was the first large-scale battle in the US war in Afghanistan because of the lack of US forces. This failure resulted in the resurgence of Al Qaeda's presence in southeast Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan; Things have also deteriorated in other parts of Africa, in part because of the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 (Van Evera 48).

US defense efforts also include increased funds for internal security since 9/11, and the ongoing work of the FBI to resolve crime and stop terrorism. In addition to domestic law, which is considered a plan to counter terrorism in war, in addition to a coordinated national monitoring list of a terrorism case, that it is an essential and necessary tool to suppress terrorism (Van Evera 49).

With the war on terror, tensions have increased, especially with the increase in the deployment of military personnel in Muslim-majority countries and the war on countries that have become powerless, which helped feeding and giving more force to terrorism. Reducing US military operations in countries with a large Muslim population, and perhaps even stopping it, could help stabilize stability and security and could eventually stop terrorist proliferation (Goepner 118).

3.3.1. Bush and Blair: The Odd Couple

In most interstate relations, common interests are for a common cause, such as between the US State Department and the British Foreign Office, but the convergence of personalities

between the leaders of both countries is also an important point for Anglo American relations. In addition, often, personal friendships among leaders can help ease tensions during international crises. There were conflicting views on what George W. Bush and Tony Blair relation would be like after Bill Clinton ended his term as many expected their relationship to decline because they were both abnormal politicians. Because of this difference, some commentators have referred to Blair and Bush as the odd couple after a strong bond.

Bush and Blair belong to two different sections. Each of them has specific tendencies and thoughts; Bush defends any issue that serves the national interests of the United States. As for Blair, he supports anything that serves international issues, as Wither stated, "Bush is a right-wing Republican, with an uncompromising approach to US national interests, while Blair is a liberal with internationalist instincts" (Wither 73).

Tony Blair's support for the issue of external military intervention for peace and good for the world has received the attention of many parties, especially George W. Bush. Blair was the European leader who supported many military interventions, for example, NATO in Yugoslavia in 1999 and was also America's ally in the war in Afghanistan. Although Tony Blair did not object to Bush's decision to invade Iraq, his goal was to reach an understanding with Saddam Hussein that he would agree to cooperate with not stepping down from power. Tony Blair's support for the United States in the Iraq war was neither weakness nor fear of America, but a demonstration of the power of Britain under his leadership (Porter 363).

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has revealed that former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the only person who could change US President George W. Bush's view on the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Blair could have changed Bush's position, especially in view of their special relationship; In addition, Britain was the only superpower to join former US President George W. Bush in the war. Blair later confirmed in his book "Journey" the right of his decision to enter the war on Iraq, Blair's recognition in the book that he cried repeatedly,

talking about how to live with the psychological effects left by the decision to enter the Iraq war. He apologized to the families of the soldiers who were killed there, apologized for the grief he caused, and caused him to shorten the lives of many, but insisted that his decision was the right one. He did not apologize to the Iraqis who led the war to hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded civilians, Destruction of the civilization of Mesopotamia, which dates back to 3000 BC (Wither 73).

Britain is the leading country in the use of soft power and is highly respected in the United States. British diplomacy rarely has a direct impact on American policy, where there have always been limits to influence. Wither stated that "Britain's vast experience of global diplomacy and its ability to apply the techniques of soft power, are widely respected in the United States.²¹ Yet it is rare for British diplomacy to have a direct impact on American policy formulation, and there have always been limits to the influence of even the most highly regarded British Prime Ministers" (Wither 73).

Blair and Bush's relations were affected by the events of September 11, which led to the convergence of views immediately after the events, The British position on the events of the United States is one of the most prominent and clear international positions that have emerged on the scene. The British role has emerged clearly from the first day of the crisis through continuous public statements and commitment to supporting the United States in all its measures against terrorism, Tony Blair personally, in addition, to rally international support and support for the US campaign against terrorism and overcome any obstacles that may stand in the way (Wither 73).

Before the events of September 11, the relationship between Bush and Blair was friendly, but it was never like the relationship between Clinton and Bush. Government has been troubled by Bush's unilateral stance toward several agreements Blair's, such as the Kyoto accord, which includes legal obligations that limit the emission of four greenhouse gases, and

the US rejection to combat global warming, and other agreements. However, after the events of September, the relationship between the United States and Britain is closer than ever describing their relationship as a different relation from any other country (Wither 74).

3.3.2. The 9/11 impact

Terrorism is a very complex phenomenon; is at the forefront of national and international agendas. To take various forms to combat it, which because of its nature is causing great damage to the world, so that the international community is forced to face this evil and prevent it from disrupting the stability of the security and peace of the world.

The attacks of September 11 were a distinctive transition for the relationship between Blair and Bush, which has become more powerful. Blair, who pledged to stand by Bush, added that the enemy is common and that the war between the world as a whole and terrorism. So we here in Britain stand side by side with our American friends in this tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is expelled from our world." These attacks were trumps card for Britain to show America that its commitment to the special relationship (Sarfo and Krampa 378).

The debate on terrorism has been a part of American policy since ancient times, but since 2001 it has had more space as a result of the September 11 attacks. These events have initiated many international interventions and numerous abuses against people, After September 2001, the countries launched anti-terrorism campaigns under the banner of the war on terror, which was unprecedented in that it included various regions of the world and used all necessary material and human resources, Especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where the United States and Britain intervened and adopted different policy strategies for the war on terror. Despite the cultural, political, and historical differences, the West agreed on one policy which is eliminating terrorism as a common goal, by adopting different methods and

strategies. In the United States, George Bush had various justifications for the war on terror using the term "freedom" each time, given that Terrorism posed a threat to the freedom of peoples. In the UK Blair has adopted the moral principle he believes in and strongly describes the stages of the war on terror as rational and appropriate (Holland 1).

3.3.3. The Afghanistan War

The war in Afghanistan or the American war in Afghanistan is the period in which the United States invaded Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks with the support of a number of its allies. Within months, the Taliban regime was eliminated by American and British forces chasing al-Qaeda terrorists. The Afghan state was also fighting the war took place immediately after the end of the civil war in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The main aim of the invasion was to destroy the base and establish a base of operations in Afghanistan by taking the Taliban out. With the encouragement of its allies, Britain intervened to support the United States from the beginning until the end of this phase. This armed conflict is the longest war in US history (Farrell and Giustozzi. 1)

The war was a phrase on two military operations on Afghanistan. The United States launched the first operation and called it the permanent liberation process, other countries participated in this process, and the geographical scope of this operation is the eastern part, the southern part of Afghanistan and the Afghan border with Pakistan. The second operation, launched in December 2001, by the International Security Assistance Force ISAF, was established by a United Nations Security Council resolution and the geographical scope of the Afghan capital of Kabul and the surrounding areas. In 2003, ISAF joined NATO on 23 July 2009.

The September attacks gave the United States an opportunity to eliminate al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The United States took advantage of this opportunity, launching within weeks

the most important and most expensive counterterrorism program in the history of the United States. George Bush pledged to launch a global war against terrorism and stated that the al-Qaeda leadership had a significant influence in Afghanistan and supported the Taliban regime. The war on terror begins with al Qaeda there, but it does not end there, and the eradication of terrorism will not end until every terrorist group with the global expansion is found and stopped (Wadsworth and Jones 2).

The war on terror was limitless and not limited to a certain time, Where the life of the war on terror took up a great deal of interest in the United States and used the September attacks as an important point to showcase the horrors of terrorism There were a large number of photographs of victims, survivors and their families, and the visual war was to remind the world of the crimes of terrorism. Griffin stated that:

End-of-year “special issue” pictorial reviews appearing in December and January also returned, as would be expected, to the attacks of September 11 as the year’s most important event. In doing so, however, they used photos of the 9/11 attacks to provide greater visual drama for a slightly different story: the ongoing ‘War on Terrorism’ in Afghanistan and ‘elsewhere’. Pictures of the World Trade Center and its victims were linked to images illustrating 12 other facets of the war (Griffin 389).

America used all available means and pretexts in its war against terrorism and intensified the conflict, especially after the attacks of September, which was a turning point in the history of the United States and its people.

3.4. The Iraq War

January 2002 was the month, in which Bush began to plan for the invasion of Iraq, informing Tony Blair of his intentions and deciding to unite with Britain to change the

regime in Baghdad. Enough pieces of evidence did not provide to Tony Blair from the Joint Intelligence Committee after leaving Iraq in 1998, so it was difficult to pass judgment on Saddam Hussein, although he did not cooperate; there were a lot of contacts between Blair and officials in the United States in order to ease the situation. By the summer of 2002, Blair had made it clear that the Iraq issue must be transferred to the United Nations to deal with it instead of avoiding it. The Iraq war is a long-running armed conflict that began with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by US-led coalition forces. Where the invasion toppled the government of Saddam Hussein, however, the conflict continued under the pretext of rebellion. The decision to invade Iraq as part of the war on terror has sparked debate and the most dramatic aspect of Bush's strategy. The Bush administration has presented several justifications for the war, which focused mainly on asserting that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and Saddam's government poses a major threat to the United States and its coalition allies, and the US officials have accused Saddam Hussein of supporting al-Qaeda. The proposal to invade Iraq has been in the minds of the Bush administration since the 1990s, but after the events of September 11, it confirmed the invasion of Iraq at the meetings of the US National Security Council, where the actual call to overthrow Saddam Hussein (Dumbrell 210).

America's goal in Iraq was to change the regime and create a democratic government. In return, Britain was more seeking to play its role as the US ally and to show that it was committed to the special relationship. Britain had no clear goal or plan in Iraq; it was committed to working with the United States without common and clear plans, while ensuring that its work performed well, without clear and shared principles. The United Kingdom was therefore not in a position to set any plans in Iraq (Betz and Cormack 324).

Britain has published a file on weapons of mass destruction in Baghdad that these weapons have become a significant threat to the security of the United Kingdom; this file also

contains information that Iraq is importing dangerous materials. As a result, Blair said Iraq's weapons may be ready in a short period. The United States, with the help of Britain, recognized the need for Iraq to comply with inspections. The deployment of US and British forces was within the confines of the friendly Gulf States, and the Iraqis brought inspectors from the United Nations back with the scenario of evasion (Dumbrell 211).

The United Kingdom has sought to play its role well and show its ally America that it is committed to the special relationship at a critical time, but there was no coordination with the United States or knowledge of its borders in Iraq, and therefore, as a result of this ambiguity, things went badly when the British civilian official arrived in Basra because he did not receive clear instructions on how to control his area and did not have sufficient human and material resources. In addition to the relationship with the Coalition Provisional Authority, that focused on the capital Baghdad and did not have sufficient interest in Basra (Betz and Cormack 324).

As a result of this ambiguity, things went badly when the British civilian official arrived in Basra because he did not receive clear instructions on how to control his area and did not have sufficient human and material resources. In addition to the relationship with the Coalition Provisional Authority, that focused on the capital Baghdad and did not have sufficient interest in Basra. Bush and Blair did not trust a clash over weapons of mass destruction but had no proven evidence on the subject. In all these events, the invasion was at least irregular for Britain because of the above-mentioned reasons. In mid-2002, US- UK bombing on Iraq increased, despite the insistence of London and Washington that a peaceful solution is still possible (Dumbrell 214).

The war in Iraq was a response to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, where America's response was strong as it worked with Britain to contain Iraq with strong air and ground attacks, in addition to the economic sanctions against Iraq.

3.4.1. Operation Desert Fox, 1998

Operation Desert Fox, 1998 is an air military strike by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq, which began on 16 December 1998 and lasted for four days, ended on 19 December 1998. When the United States made its decision to launch Operation Desert Fox in cooperation with Britain, a military operation carried out by the United States and Britain in 1998, targeted strategic and vital positions in Iraq, under the pretext of refusing the regime of Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations inspection of weapons of mass destruction.

Many aspects of this process were known to vary degrees. Indeed, during the period leading up to the military operations, the Americans and the British themselves were keen to leak a bit of information and indicators about their expected course, direct military objectives and broader strategic objectives.

On October 31, 1998, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act. In November 1998, Clinton stated that the decision to change the regime was US policy towards Iraq. These developments coincided with the time of heightened tension between America and Iraq. The president then delivered a speech on December 16 announcing the start of the Desert Fox as part of a strategy to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The air force has become the only way to hold Saddam accountable for his continued fighting, Clinton said that Saddam Hussein did not take advantage of the last opportunity offered to him and that he ordered the US forces to hit certain military targets in Iraq (Conversino 5).

In the early hours of December 16, 1998, US and British planes began bombarding sensitive sites throughout Iraq, especially around the capital, Baghdad. The United States recruited more than 200 combat aircraft, in addition to twelve British warplanes. The bombing focused on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) centers identified by

Coalition sources, which numbered about 100 chemicals related facilities and 90 other related facilities biological materials in different parts of the country. The US and the UK forces hit only eleven sites, where these were the most important locations. Due to the sudden attack, the Iraqis did not have time to defend, and organize their forces and equipment, as they did before when they were threatened. The shelling continued for nearly four and a half hours. US forces hit more than 50 targets out of 100 targets on the Desert Fox target list, most of the Iraqi air defence centers and many of the very important facilities were completely destroyed (Conversino 5).

Attacks in this operation have been one of the most violent attacks on Iraq, where a large number of Iraqi soldiers died. The US defense secretary said that attack could reduce Saddam Hussein's ability to attack neighboring countries. International views diverged to these attacks and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin denounced the Anglo-American attacks and considered them as attacks claiming to the international terrorism and violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

President Clinton appeared on television on the evening of December 19 and announced victory saying I am confident that we have achieved our mission. He promised to help remove Saddam from power to provide security to neighboring countries by helping the opposition in Iraq. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Foreign Minister for Defense George Robertson expressed his view directly and stated that the Republican Guard has a significant role in hiding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but the life they lived under attack and that after these attacks they have received a strong and clear message. The allies did not seek to change the Iraqi political system, because the serial destruction of the important installations because of the attack was the greatest success led to a major deterioration in Iraq, making it impossible for the operation to fail its objectives, Iraq refused

to resume the inspections until the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions against them. The United States and the United Kingdom clearly opposed them (Conversino 9).

Despite all that Iraq has gone through and all the troubles experienced, and the intensity of the attacks in this process, Saddam remained in control of the country, the intensity of the attacks in this process, Saddam's design was not affected and he used a more aggressive tone in a recorded speech on Al-Jazeera. He promised to reward to any unit that dropped the British-American coalition aircraft, as well as another reward for the capture of an allied pilot. The views of the military commanders differed as to what to do next. No military action would be taken in the future if Iraq accepted inspections. Despite this, the United States and Britain reserve the right to attack Iraq again, whether or not the UN Security Council Approves (Conversino 10).

The process ended without a change in the Iraqi leadership, where Saddam remained in power and the subject of weapons of mass destruction remained a mystery, Conversino stated that:

Yet when DESERT FOX ended a mere 70 hours after it began, Saddam remained firmly in power—minus some of his infrastructure—and the Iraqi dictator could claim to his people and to the world that once again, he had withstood an onslaught from the most powerful form of America's and the West's armed might—airpower. The status of Iraq's WMD programs would remain a mystery and these programs were now beyond the scrutiny of the UN. Moreover, DESERT FOX lacked clear political goals, an omission for which no amount of firepower could compensate. Despite the militarily effective, if brief, application of airpower, Saddam Hussein not only survived, he succeeded in ending UN inspections. (11)

3.4.2. Operation Southern Focus

“Like an earlier generation, America is answering new dangers with firm resolve. No matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult the task, we will fight the enemy, and lift the shadow of fear, and lead-free nations to victory.” (qtd. in Dale 8).

Operation Southern Focus was a period in the months leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, called Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the United States. This military operation of the US-led coalition in Iraq on March 20, 2003, the goal of this declared operation to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime and weapons of mass destruction or its ability to provide terrorists with this weapons. America based on a long-term goal of creating a new Iraq free of Saddam's regime. The use of force accepted by Congress on October 4, 2002, aimed at protecting America's security from the ongoing threat from Iraq and the entry into force of all relevant resolutions related to Iraq. After the initial fighting operations, the objectives of this process have expanded to become more interested in creating a new leadership, with a new regime, and with the development of the Iraqi economy (Dale 9).

The operation lasted two months of bombing the military infrastructure in Iraq, from March 2003 until the beginning of the invasion in Mai 2003. The operation was a prelude to the military attack coming to Iraq and was designed to lay the foundations for the next military campaign against Iraq, as Bush said that once the end of the period His presidency will end with Saddam.

The instability in Iraq has been increasing, sectarian violence has increased, with foreign fighters entering, and Bush has decided to adopt a new approach, including increasing the number of armed forces in Iraq with a large number of civilian experts, With the intensification of the efforts of the American and Iraqi military personnel and expertise in the various security services with the solidarity of efforts to determine the situation, violence has

become totally rejected by various parties, and from important figure in Iraq, such as Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric and his decision on the cease-fire And abandon violence by his followers (Dale 10).

The United States' road to security, stability and its claim to eliminate terrorist groups in the Middle East has many challenges and risks, but there is a possibility for success. The United States has begun to see the success and success of what it has determined in Iraq, Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US-led coalition has seen many successes, and there have been strong reasons for military operations in Iraq, such as Saddam's infrastructures, and raw materials, that can be used to make the weapons of mass destruction which seriously threaten the security of the world (Dale 11).

The invasion of Iraq has met strong opposition from some US allies, including the governments of Germany, France and New Zealand. They said that there was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that the invasion of the country was not justified. There were global protests against the war in Iraq, including a three million crowd in Rome, mentioned in Guinness Book of Records as the largest march Anti-war. Many believe that the military campaign was contrary to Article IV of Article II of the International Laws, which states that "a Member State of the United Nations is not entitled to threaten or use force against a sovereign State for purposes other than self-defense. Annan said after the fall of Baghdad that the invasion was contrary to the Constitution of the United Nations was in accordance with the opinion of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and on 28 April 2005, the British Justice Minister issued a memo that any military campaign aimed at changing the political system is illegal. The US occupation of Iraq officially ended on December 15, 2011, the landing of the American flag in Baghdad and the last American soldier left Iraq on December 18, 2011. According to former US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the mission of the coalition disarmament Weapons of

mass destruction from Iraq, and an end to Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism and the liberation of the Iraqi people (Arif 1).

3.4.3. Blair's Role in Shaping the War Case

On the day following the 9/11 attacks, Blair sent a letter supporting Bush, and his intention to hold the hijackers to justice, he said: "Some will fall in the measures to control" biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction...We are better to act now and explain and justify our actions than let the day be put off until some further, perhaps even worse, a catastrophe occurs." In July 2002, in another memo for Tony Blair, he addressed Bush and assured him he would be with him no matter what, but his decision faced many criticisms. Chilcot said that " Mr. Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from al-Qaeda to the UK and UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq's weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists" (Chilcot et al 1).

Tony Blair has branded Saddam a violation of international law and that allowing him to use his weapons considered as an irresponsible act. He has called on the UK and the world as a whole to stand up to the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, and that regime must be changed if Saddam does not acquiesce. Has also said that Iraq is not a threat, but the regime that governs it is not valid and must act in a different way than it is (Chilcot 1).

In the context of all these statements for Blair, it is clear that he has played a pivotal role in the campaign against the removal of the Saddam regime alongside George Bush and many other international parties. Tony Blair, with all this support for the United States, should have gone beyond the opposition on all sides, by the broad opposition in the European Union, his government and the Labor Party. He succeeded in this and showed great leadership within Europe.

On September 24, a meeting of the Parliament was held to listen to Tony Blair's 50-page dossier containing a strong condemnation of Iraq. The file was an important part of the campaign of political persuasion and deceiving public opinion, government and other parties. That dossier was a production of many parties to support the decision of Blair and Bush on Iraq. The file was produced illegally for the legitimate purpose of communicating the government's point of view directed against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction policy. Some researchers have argued that the file is based on deception in order to support the cause of the war and that Blair defended too much the cause of war (Herring and Robinson 522).

Leaked British documents from March 2002 showed that the British government informed the US government that regime change through military force would need a strategy to justify that military action to the public, the press and the parliament, and would also need support to justify the case at disarming Iraq. Blair faced considerable pressure and faced greater opposition, again creating great pressure to justify any military intervention (Herring and Robinson 523).

British military participation was the result of a conscious policy choice by Blair, The main reason for Blair's cooperation with the United States in the Iraq issue was his somewhat unique moral view of international politics. Earlier in the Chicago speech of April 22, 1999, Blair stated that the Kosovo war was "a just war, not based on any regional ambitions but values." International affairs must now be based on the concept of society. "He also stated his strong support for America that if the international community wanted a world protected by law, the world should support America as a key element in this project. From his point of view, Blair has been instrumental in launching the war against Iraq out of political necessity and in order to strengthen relations with the United States and ensure their special relationship (Kramer 99).

Conclusion

The era of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush was characterized by the development of the relationship with the United Kingdom, especially during Tony Blair's tenure as Prime Minister. Various international crises and issues were addressed by adopting various methods, such as military intervention, In the beginning of the Kosovo war, especially after the September 11 attacks in America, which increased the tension in the world and became the eradication of terrorism the concern of the two countries, which gave America a strong argument for the war on both Iraq and Afghanistan, Blair was also an important element in the development of European-American relations, by making Britain the bridge between Europe and America and the European Axis.

General Conclusion

Denying the existence of a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is an unwise act. This relationship defies any other bilateral relationship. The special relationship was useful for both countries. It granted Britain special high status among America's allies, a fact that almost every country is familiar with, and takes it in regard. In

turn, the Americans are granted the privilege of accessing the British facilities all around the world, and provided the diplomatic support to US actions.

However, the US-UK relationship, like any other international relationship had shared converging interests and objectives, but when these interests diverge, crises emerges in that relationship. Such crises are like the Suez crises, the Skybolt and the Falklands crises. During these crises, the special relationship between the two nations and the personal relationship between the leaders had become top vital in sharing different views and opinions.

Britain needed the United States and the vice versa, their cooperative efforts have categorized their relationship as the most convenient and remarkable relationship of all times, they also knew how their special relationship is balanced, so they did not felt embarrassed to discuss or to deal with their senior and junior partners , even in the Blair era.

The Blair era will always remain a landmark in the history of the special relationship. Blair's commitment to the "war on terror" and his stance towards the Iraq war were ultimately seen as "poodlism." To categorize Blair as a poodle is to underestimate his responsibility over the Iraq War and the following bloodshed. "Intervention" was the word that kept appearing in Blair's lexicon, and overthrowing Saddam has been his goal since he held reign.

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