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Nuclear Weapons: the US-Iranian Relations from 2008 to 2020.

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Dedication:

Every challenging work requires self efforts as well as guidance of elders especially those who were very close to our heart. I dedicate this dissertation work to

My Grandfathers and my Grandmother's Souls

My Grandmother, Wanassa

My Lovely Parents

Who always picked me up on time and encouraged me to keep moving,

Ahmed Seghire (Djamel) and my queen Zoulikha

My Brothers

Oussama, Med Amine and Wafi KOssai

My Dear Teacher, Bouaziz Amina

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As rains start by a drop, as miles start by a step.

With the blessing of ALLAH, the prayers of my parents, and the support of my beloved ones

Here I am

Today completing my academic career with graduation, I dedicate this work to:

My dear parents "Abdelbaki & Malika" May ALLAH Bless them

My sister "Soumaya"

My supervisor "BOUAZIZ Amina"

My best friend "Hadjira" & my work mate "Chayma"

To all teachers, to everyone who said you can,

Hoping that this will be the beginning of successful career...

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Abstract

Throughout history, the US-Iranian relations went through different stages; the most remarkable one was characterized by enmity and raised tensions. When talking about the tensioned relations, it is necessary to mention the Iran nuclear program as a key player. In 2008, particularly since President Barack Obama took office, he strove to improve the relations and elevate them into another level of negotiations and agreement by adopting a policy that emphasizes the importance of negotiation in order to reach solutions that satisfy both nations. Soon, events got changed when President Donald Trump took office, particularly; after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and adopting a policy of maximum pressure by imposing tougher sanctions against Iran. Therefore, tensions started to escalate resulting to negative effects not only on the two nations but also at the regional and global levels. This work tends to investigate the foreign policies of US and Iran through the two terms of Barack Obama and Donald Trump in relation to the Iranian presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, shedding light on Iran's nuclear profile and emphasizing on the main decisions like the JCPOA and its importance and effect in the direction of the relations. The study also tends to highlight various reasons that led to tensions as well as their effects on different fields.

Résumé

Les relations américano-iraniennes sont passées par différentes étapes; le plus remarquable était caractérisé par l'hostilité et des tensions accrues. Lorsqu'on parle des relations tendues, il est nécessaire de mentionner le programme nucléaire iranien comme un acteur clé. En 2008, notamment depuis l'entrée en fonction du président Barack Obama, il s'est efforcé d'améliorer les relations et de les élever à un autre niveau de négociation et d'accord en adoptant une politique qui met l'accent sur l'importance de la négociation afin de parvenir à des solutions qui satisfont les deux nations. Bientôt, les événements ont changé lorsque le président Donald Trump a pris ses fonctions, en particulier; après le retrait des États-Unis du JCPOA et l'adoption d'une politique de pression maximale en imposant des sanctions plus sévères contre l'Iran. Par conséquent, les tensions ont commencé à s'intensifier, ce qui a eu des effets négatifs non seulement sur les deux pays, mais également aux niveaux régional et mondial. Ce travail tend à enquêter sur les politiques étrangères des États-Unis et de l'Iran à travers les deux mandats de Barack Obama et de Donald Trump en relation avec les présidents iraniens Mahmoud Ahmadinejad et Hassan Rouhani, en mettant en lumière le profil nucléaire de l'Iran et en insistant sur les principales décisions comme le JCPOA et son importance et son effet dans le sens des relations. L'étude tend également à mettre en évidence diverses raisons qui ont conduit à des tensions ainsi que leurs effets sur différents domaines.

ملخص

مرت العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية بمراحل مختلفة على مر التاريخ أبرزها تميزت بالعداء والتوتر المتزايد. و بالحديث عن العلاقات المتوترة، من الضروري ذكر البرنامج النووي الإيراني كسبب رئيسي. في عام 2008 ، خاصة منذ تولي الرئيس باراك أوباما الحكم ، سعى إلى تحسين العلاقات والارتقاء بها إلى مستوى آخر من المفاوضات والاتفاق وذلك من خلال اعتماد سياسة تؤكد على أهمية التفاوض من أجل التوصل إلى حلول ترضي كلا البلدين. سرعان ما تغيرت الأحداث عندما تولى الرئيس دونالد ترامب الحكم وخاصة بعد انسحاب الولايات المتحدة من خطة العمل الشاملة المشتركة وتبني سياسة الضغط بفرض عقوبات أشد على إيران. هذا ما أدى إلى تصاعد التوتر و أدى كذلك لترك آثار سلبية ليس فقط على البلدين ولكن أيضًا على المستويين الإقليمي والعالمي. هذا البحث اعتمد التحقيق في السياسات الخارجية للولايات المتحدة وإيران خلال فترتي باراك أوباما ودونالد ترامب مع نظيريهما الرئيسين الإيرانيين محمود أحمدني نجاد وحسن روحاني ، البحث يلقي الضوء على الملف النووي الإيراني ويؤكد على القرارات الرئيسية مثل خطة العمل الشاملة المشتركة و أهميتها وتأثيرها في اتجاه العلاقات. البحث أيضًا اعتمد تسليط الضوء على الأسباب المختلفة التي أدت إلى التوترات وكذلك آثارها على المجالات المختلفة.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEOI: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

ACTU: Atomic Center of Tehran University

DNSPD: Draft National Security Presidential Decision

EU3: The European three “the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.”

FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization

JCPOA: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IFCA: Iran Freedom and Counter Proliferation Act

IRGC: Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISIS: Islamic State in Syria and Iraq

ISPI: Istituto Per Gli Studi Politici di Internazionale (Institute for International Political Studies)

IUST: Iran University of Science and Technologies

MWT: Megawatt

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

P5+1: the UN Security Council Five Permanent Members (the USA, Britain, Germany, France, China +Iran)

RTZ: Restricted Traffic Zone

TNRC: Tehran Research Center

TRR: Tehran Research Reactor

UNSC: United Nation Security Council

WMD: Weapons of Mass Distraction

Basij: a volunteer parliamentary organization operating under the IRGC.

Calandria: a cylindrical vessel through which tubes pass, especially one forms part of an evaporator, heat exchanger, or nuclear reactor.

Eurodif: European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium is subsidiary of the French company Orano, which operates a uranium enrichment plant established at the Tricastin Nuclear Power Center in Drome.

Operation Ajax: covert operation by the US CIA in collaboration with Pahlavi dynasty to overthrow Mohammad Mosadeqh and consolidate the power to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

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Introduction

In the mid-twentieth century, the United States and Iran were allies, and the US support for Iran was part of its strategy to monopolize oil production. Soon, however, this friendship did not last for long; rather, it turned to become a hostile relationship characterized by complexity, ambiguity, and escalating tensions. In view of these conditions, there have been major changes in the foreign policies of the two countries, each to preserve their own interests. The US strategic interests towards Iran have received widespread awareness, particularly, its geopolitical state in the Middle East as it overlooks the Strait of Hormuz; the bind between the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean by which approximately 40% of the world's oil production passes. The Silk Road linking Europe and Central Asia gave Iran's location a considerable value. Another interesting feature is the country's geopolitical links with the Caspian Sea, the Central Asian region, and the Caucasus; especially, after the discovery of energy sources in the Caspian Sea. Consequently, Iran had become a strong competitor to America that threatens its national security and regional interests as well.

Relations during the Shah reign were generally good as the US considered Iran as its policeman in the Middle East. However, the Shah Reza Pahlavi was dreaming of a westernized Iran, hence, he preserved the US interests over years through granting a US concessions and military assistance in his country. But after the Coup of 1953, relations changed; after the operation "Ajax" succeeded in overthrowing Mohammad Mosadeqh the Iranian prime minister who worked for oil nationalization and insisted on political and economic independence from the US and the British Company. The Coup of 1953 set the platform for the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Hostage Crisis aiming to end the US interference in the region.

An additional event that sorely affected the diplomatic relations between the two sides was the 11/9 attacks and the United States President Bush's labeling of Iran as part of the axes of evil. Therefore, President Bush insisted on the strategy of pressure of sanctions rather than trying to create a dialogue and utilize the diplomatic relations. After years of hostility, President Barack Obama succeeded in achieving a high level of negotiations with Iran; aiming to curb Iran's nuclear profile, on the other side, Iran aimed at lifting and removing the sanction imposed by the US.

In the context of nuclear relations, the Shah was motivated by developing nuclear program by which Iran may achieve independence and modernization through emulating western ideas. At the beginning, the US contributed in developing the Tehran Research Reactor TRR in the 1970s, then; after the Islamic Revolution, Iran reached a high level of nuclear technologies and collaborations with the US were ended. Foreign policies after that were affected by the escalation and the de-escalation of tensions; the most remarkable was with the Obama Administration that managed to reach a high level of negotiations with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Administration, and that of Trump's that had audacious decisions.

This research investigates the US-Iranian relations and the history of Iran's nuclear program. It highlights and analyzes the foreign policies of presidents: Barack Obama (2008-2012 and 2012-2017), Donald Trump (2017 to present), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and Hassan Rouhani (2013 to present). Additionally, the study analyzes the effects of the ascended tensions on security.

In the light of the tangled US-Iranian relations as well as Iran's continuous pursuit of developing its nuclear program; this study raises questions like: to what extent are the US-Iranian relations affected by Iran's nuclear profile? Can the Islamic Republic' pursuit of nuclear weapons influence the decision makers and the foreign policies in the United States

and Iran? To what extent can the Iran nuclear program endanger the US interests in the Middle East? Besides nuclear programs; are there any other reasons behind the US-Iranian tensions? And, additionally, how do the continuing conflicts and the embarking tensions affect the regional and the global security?

This research is significant in determining the role of Iran's nuclear profile in directing the US-Iranian relations. Considering that tensions between a world superpower and a country that is attractive geographically and geopolitically in addition to its ambitions to develop advanced nuclear facilities would direct the nations into disastrous decisions that may influence the regional and the global security.

This research aims at contributing to the study of the political and the economic relations between America and the Islamic Republic in the following years, by adding important data that can be used as platform for further studies. Likewise, it will highlight other different aspects, besides Iran's nuclear program, and investigate their aftermath on the global and the regional security.

In order to achieve the main objectives of this dissertation, variety of methods were conducted. Initially, the historical method that was adopted to study the US-Iran history and to determine the cause-effect patterns as well as employing events from the past to examine the current situation. The mixed method was also used; first, the qualitative research used in the descriptive method to understand the nature of the conflict between a world superpower and a regional strategic country and to obtain stronger understanding of the foreign policies in both nations fundamentally among 2008 and 2020. The qualitative method was conducted through interviews with experts like University teachers, and it was used in document analysis like: "governmental reports, books, articles, and working papers," Observations; mainly the non-participating observation by using videos, interviews; created to explore thoughts,

experiences, and views of people specialized in political science and international relations. Second, the quantitative method was used as a form of a questionnaire in order to collect data from a sample of population, mainly University teacher, scholars, and experts in Political Science and Foreign Policy. Due to the population chosen to answer the questionnaire and the interview, the questions were written in Arabic version because it is their mother language, and they were translated to English. Translation and interpretation was also used in videos. The quantitative analysis was used to assess and transform data included in the questionnaire into statistical and numerical graphs.

Researchers, historians, and politicians have conducted variety of studies to investigate the US-Iranian relations. Recently in 2011, Nathan Champan Lean and Jalil Roshandel in a book entitled *Iran, Israel, and the United States: Regime Security vs. Political legitimacy* illustrated the US-Iranian history and America's role in Iran's conflicts; hence, the evolution of the relationship was elucidated. Another work of R.K. Ramzani *Independence without Freedom: Iran's Foreign Policy* was conducted in 2013. Ramzani in some levels discussed the reasons behind the US misunderstanding of Iran's foreign policy and stressed the factors that drove Iran's behaviors in the world politics. In 2016 *Iran's Nuclear Program and International laws: From Confrontation to Accord*, Daniel H. Joyner provided valid analysis to Iran's nuclear program since 2002. Besides, *Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order*; Shireen T. Hunter provided in-depth study of Iran's foreign policy and its relations since the Islamic Revolution. Moreover, in 2010, Donette Murray in his book *US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution* debated the US foreign policy towards Iran especially after the 11/9 attacks and Iran's role in the War on Terror.

Over Iran's nuclear program, Bernd Kaussler wrote *Iran's Nuclear Diplomacy: Power Politics and Conflict Resolution* in which he examined the core of negotiations over Iran's

nuclear program. As well as Lixingiang Jin who wrote: “Analysis on Obama Administration Policy Adjustments of Iranian Nuclear Issues” in 2018. In this article, the Obama administration towards Iran was illustrated over nuclear policy objectives. On the other hand, in *Post Vote Iran: Giving Engagement Chance*, Sanam Vakil in the forth chapter “Under Pressure: US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump” demonstrated the standards of President Trump’s policies towards Iran. Then, in 2019, Ryan L. Hill reported in *Nuclear and Rogue: Rethinking US strategy towards North Korea and Iran* that America adopted a strategy to alert and prevent countries that seek nuclear weapons as the case with Iran. Hill sought that the US should pursue a strategy that balance between Soft Power and Hard Power.

From the other hand, Maaïke Warnaar wrote *Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Actions* in 2013 by which he argued that the foreign policy behavior can be better understood in the context of regime’ foreign policy ideology which is affected by the aftermaths of the Iranian Revolution. In a journal article entitled: “Iran’s Basij Force: the Mainstay of Domestic Security,” Hossein Aryan discussed the large military arrangement “the Basij” and its role during Ahmadinejad Presidency. Further, Iran’s nuclear program was examined by researchers like David Marcel Sip who conducted a Master Thesis: “Respect in the Context of Iran Nuclear Deal” in 2018, he focused on Ahmadinejad era by using constructivist approach to highlight the importance of respect for Iran during nuclear negotiations. The Iranian foreign policy was also discussed by Rodger Shanhan in *Iranian Foreign Policy under Rouhani* and Alan Dershowitz in *the Case against Iran Deal: How Can we Now Stop Iran from getting Nukes?*

Due to its significance to security and stability; this topic has been of interest to many researchers, politicians, scholars and analysts. Avery Elizabeth Hurt wrote: *Viewpoints on Modern World History: US Iran Relations* in which iconic images of the long term history were presented. Also, Waleed Alsharkawy posted a video entitled “المؤامرة الكبرى على العالم

العربي” “ the Great Conspiracy against the Arab World” in which he analyzed the US benefits from keeping Iran’s role in the Middle East insisting on the conspiracy theory and the political deception. Moreover, Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution, in interview with Hari Sreevasan discussed the escalated tensions between the US and Iran mainly after the Trump Administration withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed a new round of economic sanctions on Iran.

While working on the dissertation, several problems emerged that somehow negatively affected the research process; the most influential one was the Covid 19 pandemic that rocked the world in general and disrupted the direct contact between the researcher and the supervisor in specific. Further and above, the lack of the appropriate modern technologies to conduct this research electronically, especially the weak flow of the internet in the region that slowed down the research process. Besides, the questionnaire did not find high turnout from specialists in political science and international relations, thus, the number of participants did not exceed 30.

Although the US-Iranian relations are long standing and Iran’s nuclear program has ancient roots that goes back to the 50s of the last decade (1950), however, this study deliberately examines the US-Iranian relations from 2008 to the present day 2020 under the purpose of investigating and analyzing the foreign policies of the two countries: in the US; the administrations of the former president Barack Obama to the current president Donald Trump, and from the Iranian side; from the administration of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the administration of president Hassan Rouhani by highlighting the important decisions and the impact of the tensions of the global and the regional security. For the spatial limits, due to the nature of the research; the geographical focus was on: the United States, Iran, and the Middle East region as Iran located in important position geographically and geopolitically.

The scope of this research is ordered in three main chapters. The first chapter entitled “Historical Background to the US-Iranian Relations”; this chapter is divided into two sections, the first section deals with the Ancient Relations and the second section dealt with Relations after the Islamic Revolution. In this chapter the focus is on the major significant events that characterized the US-Iranian history as well as the evolution of Iran’s nuclear program.

The second chapter entitled: “Investigating the Foreign Policies of the United States and Iran from 2008 to 2020”. It is divided into two sections as well; the first section deals with investigation of the foreign policies of the United States from President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump shedding light on the importance to sanctions, negotiations, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Meanwhile the second section highlights the Iranian Foreign Policies from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Hassan Rouhani.

The last chapter entitled “Investigating the Effect of the Tensions between the US and Iran”. It is divided between the embarked tensions and their effects, as well as highlighting the US conspiracy theory and political deception against the Arab world.

Chapter One:

Historical Background to the US-Iranian Relations

1.1 The Early History: before the Islamic Revolution

1.1.1 Introduction

During the ninth Century after the advent of Islam, the modern Persian language had emerged. In 1501 the Shah Ismail I became the first leader of the Safavid dynasty and a state religion had been declared. Later on, from 1571 to 1629 the Shah Abbas I reorganized the army and built the first diplomatic links with Western Europe. In 1794 Mohammad Khan Qajar discovered the Qajar dynasty. Next in 1907, initiation of constitution restricted the leader's powers. Furthermore, in 1935 the country's authorized name was "Iran" ("Iran Profile Timeline...").

The 1800s marked a peaceful relationship between Iran and the United States. And in 1883 the United States has appointed its first political messenger to Iran. The Iranian desire to split up from the Anglo-Soviet dominance was the turning point leading to the US-Iranian friendship, and to support Iran, the US, an upcoming world superpower at the time, was seen as the prospect third-party that may have affect Iran's liberation from the British and the Russian dominance. Furthermore, this close friendship has its political gains for America since Iran shared the borders with the enemy of the United States during the Cold War. The friendship of both nations reached its climax when the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi rose to power in Iran. Iran became an American ally against the Soviet Union and was considered as the solid rock of the US in the Middle East. Another changing point in the history of their relations was on the year 1953, after the elections of the Iranian prime minister; Mohammad Mosadeqh, on April 25, 1951(Lean and Roshandel 122-123).

For two years, Mohammad Mosadeqh showed a great interest on several dialectical issues including the oil nationalization in which he argued on the need to eliminate the power of the British company, as well as the importance of achieving an Iranian political and economic independence, emphasizing on the oil revenues that could combat poverty. On the other side, the 1953 US elections of President Dwight Eisenhower brought new policy views towards Iran. After months of debating over the fears from a governmental breakdown and a rise of the communist party in Iran, Eisenhower agreed on cooperating with Britain to overthrow Mosadeqh. The summer of 1953 marked the operation Ajax, and after two attempts was successful removing Mosadeqh. Then, the Shah of Iran took power. After the coup 1953, the Irritative Islamists and the Anti-US tensions began to flare setting the platform to another two events besides the coup of 1953 to change the US-Iran relations; the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Hostage Crisis (Alvandi 14-15-16-17).

In 1941, Britain and the Soviets forced the Shah Reza Pahlavi, the ruler of Iran at that time, to resign his throne because they saw him as sympathetic to the Nazi government in Germany. Then, his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi succeeded him. The allied forces were able to take up Iran and exchange munitions to Russia in order to return the Nazi existence in Iran in 1951; mainly after the assassination of the Iranian premier Ali Razmara, who was oriented to the west, the new prime minister Mohammad Mosadeqh delivered to the parliament of Iran a program to nationalize the country's oil assets. After many years Mosadeqh worked on restricting the foreign policy interests in Iran and limiting the Shah's dominance ("Chronology of the US...").

In June 1963 anti-government rampage took place in Iran, these riots were not supported by the followers of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeqh, whose regime has been collapsed by the "Royalists" approximately ten years before. They were supported by the "Elements of Black Reaction". Then there were Ayatollah Khomeini of Qum, Ayatollah Qumi of Meshed,

and Ayatollah Mahalati of Shiraz were religious figures known as the leaders of the riots. They were thrown into prison and they have giving their word not to interfere in the state's affaires. Many things started to take place in the state of Iran (Ramzani 9).

In 1964 Mohammad Reza Shah armed Iran and did his best in making Iran one of the most powerful military forces that control the world in his period. His main target was to have a Great Civilization and named his white revolution first the "Shah's Revolution," then "the People's Revolution." Mainly in 1964 an agreement had been signed with the US in order to take back the advantages of foreign surrender in Iran. It has been described by ayatollah Khomeini later on as: "the Document for the Enslavement of Iran" (Ehteshami and Zweiri 7-8).

In the same year, 1964, Khomeini has been banished to Turkey due to his censure, the Shah's status of forces bill which make the US grant its military personal diplomatic resistance to grimes committed on Iranian territory. From Turkey, Khomeini moved to Iran in 1965 and resides there until 1978. In the same year, 1978, Baghdad forced Ayatollah Khomeini to quit Iran due to the dangerous circumstances in the town ("Chronology US-Iran...").

1.1.2 US- Iran Nuclear Relations

In the 1950s, the development of the Iranian nuclear technology became a motivation to the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi for sake of achieving strength and independence in Iran. As the case with many Middle Eastern countries, Iran has seen itself weak mainly because of the exploitations done by the Westerners. More specifically, the Iranians felt themselves and their country weak mainly after 1953 when the Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosadeqh, was overthrow. As consequence of this weakness, the Iranians felt the need to do their best in order to protect the country against aggressive superpowers. By developing

nuclear program, the Shah believed that Iran could modernize itself and separate from the history of exploitations. Therefore, instead of revolting against western ideas; the Shah sought to emulate them believing that westernization and modernization are synonyms (Afkhami, et al.).

By the process of modernization, Iran could join the ranks of the world superpowers. Then, in 1956, the Atomic Center of Tehran University was instituted by Iran. The developments of Iran nuclear program was continued throughout the 1970s. With the oil export trade money was not a problem, for the Shah, he was ready to invest the unlimited resources in the nuclear energy program of Iran. With the collaboration between Iran and the US, as well as China, Brazil, Japan, and other countries, the relations between Iran and the US were generally good by the friendship of the Shah and the US President, Nixon, who considered Iran as the regional policeman in the Middle East (Joyner 4-5).

The United States provided the Tehran Research Center (TNRC) with a little five MWT Research Reactor (TRR) charged by Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in 1967. By the end of the century; mainly in 1973 the Shah revealed determined programs to equip 23.000 MWE of nuclear force in Iran. Then, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has been formed. Moreover, during the following five years different nuclear technologies connected agreements with foreign provisioners have been ended by Iran, it invested in education and training for its personal benefit. Iran spent a lot in several investments with different countries surrounding the world in relation to the nuclear deal. In 1976, it paid one billion dollar for a 10% support in Eurodif's tricastin uranium enrichments plant in France and 15% stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. Furthermore, in order to buy uranium yellowcake from South Africa, Tahran has signed a 700 million dollar contract and dispatched technicians abroad for nuclear studies and researches. Reaching the 1979

Revolution, Iran had touched an important level in nuclear technologies (“Iran’s Nuclear Program...”).

1.1.3 Iranian Nuclear Deal

The Iranian Nuclear Deal was an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and a group of world forces pointed to drop the Middle Eastern countries’ nuclear weapons program. The agreement was based on Iran’s acceptance to remove its stock of average-enhanced uranium by 98%. As a part of the agreement, Iran also accepted to only enhance its uranium up to 3.67 %. The deal set that Iran’s abidance would lead to perceive reassurance from the US, European Union, and the United Nation Security Council on all nuclear-connected economic authorizations. The world powers who signed the agreement were: Islamic Republic of Iran, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America, Germany and the European Union (Jacobs).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is expected to prevent Iran from getting atomic weapons. On the off chance that completely implemented, the physical imperatives and confirmation arrangements of this complete atomic understanding will adequately forestall Iran from delivering fissile material for atomic weapons at its pronounced atomic offices for in any event 10 to 15 years. During this period, the arrangements of the JCPOA—alongside proceeding national knowledge endeavors—improve the probability of recognizing any Iranian endeavors to fabricate undercover offices to create fissile material, hence assisting with preventing Tehran from endeavoring to do as such. More than 10 to 15 years, the physical requirements on fissile material creation at announced offices and a large portion of the specific confirmation and implementation arrangements of the JCPOA terminate. By then, Iran could extend its atomic capacities inside a couple of years to make more down to earth choices to deliver fissile material for atomic weapons, regardless of

whether at pronounced or mystery facilities. Genuine creation of atomic weapons would abuse Iran's shields concurrence with the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA), the JCPOA, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The understanding represents no limitations on what the U.S. or then again different nations could do in that condition. The focal atomic constraints of the JCPOA are physical limitations on Iran's capacity to create fissile material for atomic weapons (either isolated plutonium or improved uranium) at its proclaimed atomic offices (Samore, et al. 4).

1.2 Relations after the Islamic Revolution

1.2.1 The Islamic Revolution

In January 1979 the Shah was forced by the unrest to exile. Therefore, after returning to Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini effectively undertakes power. Along with 15-member Islamic Revolution Council, a provisional government was set in order to govern and Iran was announced as an Islamic Republic on the first of April (Allen et al. 8). The Iranian Revolution or the Islamic Revolution made a significance transformation from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's absolute monarchy to an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a revolution leader and Islamic Republic founder. The revolution started in January 1979 ending up with approving the new theocratic constitution in which the supreme leader of Iran became Ayatollah Khomeini in December 1979 ("the Islamic Republic of Iran...").

Homa katouzian pointed out that "the 1979 revolution was a characteristically Iranian Revolution," in which the state was opposed by the society whereby various ideologies were represented and mainly dominated by those with Islamic tendencies as: Islamic, Democratic-Islamic, and Marxist-Islamic, and others with the Marxist Leninist tendencies like fada'i, Tudeh, Maoist, Trotskyist, and others. The conflict between the two tendencies taken together was probably more severe than the conflict between groups from different tendencies; Islamic

and Marxist-Leninist for instance, yet overthrowing the Shah was the objective behind uniting all the tendencies together. The Modern Middle Classes' supporters and the mass of the population who were not strict ideologically to any of the tendencies were strongly behind removing the Shah as a single objective and any attempt to compromise was considered as betrayal. Furthermore, legends would have grown as how the liberal bourgeoisies had stabbed the revolution in the back as ordered by their foreign masters if any settlement had been reached short of the overthrow of the monarchy (Katouzian 20).

1.2.2 The Hostage Crisis

On November 4, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic student's followers stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and took over 52 American hostages demanding the returning of the Shah from receiving medical treatments in the US to face trial in Iran. Thus, the tension between the two nations rose because of the hostage crisis (Frazee).

On November 4, 1979, Iranian activists regard the United States embassy in Tehran roughly kidnapped seventy Americans. This fear based oppressor act set off the most significant emergency of the Carter Administration and started an individual difficulty for Jimmy Carter as well as the American individuals that endured 444 days ("Iran Hostage Crisis Fast..."). President Carter subscribed to the sheltered return of the prisoners while ensuring Americas inclinations and distinctions; he sought after an arrangement of restriction that put a higher incentive on the lives of the prisoners than on American retaliatory force on securing his own political future. In addition to the cost of patient discretion was incredible, however President Carter's activities carried opportunity for the prisoners with America's respect protected. The hostage crisis contributed in Carter's loss of the 1980 presidential elections ("Jimmy Carter and the Iranian...").

In a 1953 power conflict with his prime minister, the Shah increased American help to forestall nationalization of Iran's oil industry. As a byproduct of guaranteeing the US a consistent graceful of oil, the Shah got monetary and military guide from eight American presidents. Right off the bat during the 1960s, the Shah declared social and monetary changes however would not concede wide political opportunity. Iranian patriots denounced his US bolstered system and his westernization of Iran. During revolting in 1963, the Shah broke down, stifling his resistance. Among those captured and banished was a well known strict patriot and severe adversary of the United States, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Somewhere in the range of 1963 and 1979, the Shah burned through billions of oil dollars on military weapons ("The Iranian Hostage Crisis").

The genuine cost of military quality was the loss of famous help. Incapable to continue financial advancement and reluctant to grow popularity based opportunities, the Shah's system fallen in insurgency. On January 16, 1979, the Shah fled Iran, never to return. Furthermore, the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini came back to Tehran in February 1979 and whipped mainstream discontent into out of control hostile to Americanism. At the point when the Shah came to America for a disease treatment in October, Ayatollah prompted Iranian aggressors to assault the US. On November 4, the American embassy in Tehran was overwhelmed; its representatives kidnapped and the prisoner emergency had started ("The Hostage Crisis...").

However the goal from the hostage-taking was not only about the Shah's medical care; rather it was about ending the US interference in the Iranian affairs and breaking from the Iranian past, and it was also about raising the intra and international profile of Ayatollah Khomeini. The hostages were mainly diplomats and embassy employers; 13 of them, "mostly women, African Americans and non American citizens who were subjected to the oppression of the American society" were released after a period of time, and other 14 hostages were sent

home after developing health problems. The majority remained under force closure. Neither the economic sanctions as taking over the Iranian properties in the US nor the diplomatic maneuvers had an effect on the anti-American stance of the Iranian President Ayatollah Khomeini. Thus, the hostages were never being injured, otherwise they were exposed to a set of terrible and insulting treatments as being paraded in front of TV cameras and jeering crowds blindfolded, not allowing them to speak nor to read, and rarely have the permission to change their clothes (“Iran Hostage Crisis...”).

Throughout the crisis, the hostages experienced fearful thoughts about their destiny, they did never new whether they were going to be killed, or set free. Approximately 444 days after the crisis took action and few hours after the inaugural address was delivered by President Ronald Reagan, the hostages were set free on January 21, 1981. In this context, the US 1980’s elections was affected by the constant coverage of the media to the crisis serving as a demoralizing backdrop. The incapability to solve the problem made president Carter looks like a weak leader despite the fact that his intense emphasized mainly on bringing the hostages home, consequently he was kept away from the campaign trail. Thus, Ronald Reagan, republican candidate took advantage of carter’s difficulties and his complain staff negotiated with Iran in denying these allegations, he defeated Carter one year and two days after the crisis began (Collins 28).

In 1980 January, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr became the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A major nationalization programs were the starting point of his government and in July 1980 the exiled Shah died in Egypt because of cancer (“Iran Profile-Timeline...”).

1.2.3 Shift in Attitude after the Islamic Revolution and the Hostage Crisis

After the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s nuclear program was affected by a spectacular shift in attitude. The Shah Western submission that emasculated the country was rejected by

the Islamic revolutionaries. Relations between the two nations worsened and tension escalated mainly after the Hostage Crisis of 1979. Consequently: all nuclear collaborations were ended up, Iran faced financial sanctions, and its assets were frozen by the US. In 1981, the newly elected U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, emphasized on the fact that the hostage crisis demolished any possibility of nuclear collaboration (Joyner 5-6-7).

The Iranian foreign policy was affected by the Islamic Revolution whereby its major concerns were overthrowing the pro-western and secular oriented governments and therefore supporting resistance movements in the Middle East. Consequently; Iran rejected a policy of maintaining honorable relations with western countries especially the US and Israel, hence, it followed an anti-US and pro-south foreign policy (Rakel 186).

After the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini and the new revolutionary government objected further developments of Iran's nuclear program since it was considered as a source of Western technologies. Moreover, the entire nuclear program was under review as announced by the new head of the IAOI, Fereydun Sahabi, then, all nuclear projects rather than the Bushehr reactor would be canceled and the deal with Kraftwerk for the fulfillment of the Bushehr reactors dissociated. Later on, when Iran faced a shortage in the electricity, it went back to nuclear power. Iran tried to manage its disputes with Kraftwerk until they arrived to an agreement to complete the Bushehr reactors. Additionally, Iran started negotiating with France again. When the Eurodif refused to refund the 1\$ billion Iran had invested in it, an agreement between the French company and Iran was reached. In the deal, Iran would be equipped by 35,000 tons of equipments and 50 % of the needed fuel to the reactors (Joyner 5-6-7).

1.2.4 The Iran - Iraq War: “8 Years War 1980 to 1988.”

In the context of the US-Iranian relations it was mentioned in: *Becoming Enemies: US-Iran relations and the Iran-Iraq war 1979, 1988* that an enemy, as defined in Webster, is: “one that seeks the injury, overthrow, or failure of opponent.” in which the basic of US-Iran relation during the Iran-Iraq War is described. The war then is considered as the bloodiest of the end of the twentieth century. On September 22, 1980 Iran was attacked by the American Allies, Saddam Hussein, preventing Iran from winning the war with Iraq. By the end of the desert trench like war fare in August 1988, a huge number of Iranians and Iraqis had died, more than a million were wounded, and both nations arrived to the point of collapse (Blight, et al. 4).

In the consensus view, Saddam Hussein invasion of Iran was part of his strategy in playing superior role in protecting the Gulf region security as well as to secure and legitimize his rules in Iraq given to the increasing threats among Iran’s neighbors after the revolution (Parasility 52). The invasion set the platform for a war that in decades following would take control over the Persian Gulf Politics. Soon, the conflict became the bloodiest resulting thousands of casualties and deaths in both sides (Brands 319).

For the Iranian leadership the war was not only with Iraq, rather it was a war with the United States as well in which it was and still called “the Imposed War” that is underwritten by money, equipment, and knowhow of the United States, thus the objective was totally distracting the Iranian Revolution and replacing it by a docile regime to America’s desires. The prospects of an Iranian victory in the war were regarded by the Carter and Reagan Administrations as “a Middle Eastern Armageddon” as it used by former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Richard Murphy in chapter three of his book. Washington sought that the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf might be disrupted or even

stopped and that the continued viability of Israel might be at danger since it serves as an ally for the United States in the region, if the Iraqis were defeated by the Islamic Radicals in Tahrān (Blight, et al. 4).

Shireen T. Hunter in her work: *Iran's Foreign Policy in Post Soviet Era* sought to explain the points of view towards the Iran-Iraq War in relation to the United States interests. T. Hunter indicates that many Middle Eastern and some outsider analysts, argue that the US encouraged the 1980's Iraqi invasion for Iran. there are two main factors supporting the analysts theory: First, the early 1977 rapprochement between the US and Iraq; and, second, the changing views of the Carter Administration's Senior Members, a remarkable view of Zbigniew Brzezinski for Saddam Hussein as "a potential counter weight" to president Khomeini and as a force for granting expansionism for the Soviet Union in the region (Hunter 39-40).

Moreover, some other analysts believed that Brzezinski and Saddam Hussein have met in Amman before the invasion and it had been assured by Brzezinski that the Khuzestan separation from Iran would not be opposed by the US it was written by Robert Parry that General Alexander Haig noted in a 1981 memo that the permission to start a war against Iran was confirmed by president Carter through Fahd, then prince, later king. Additionally, the United States used Iraq as an attempt to punish Iran for the Hostage Crisis. T. Hunter also provided some arguments for the US support for invading Iran, therefore, the US and other countries did not condemn Iraq's aggression once Iran was attacked by Iraq as the noticeable remark given by M. Lando; Western leaders did not make any indignant speeches nor called a US embargo as the case with invading Kuwait ten years later, however, the US adopted a policy of neutrality until 1982 (Hunter 39-40).

July 1988 marked the end of Iran-Iraq War once Iran accepted a ceasefire agreement along with Iraq after Geneva negotiations under the UN aegis. The Iranian President Ayatollah Khomeini died in June 3, 1989 and in the following day president Khamenei was appointed as the new supreme leader. Then in August 1989, Ali Akbar-Rafsanjani becomes the new Iranian president. Meanwhile in November, approximately 567 million dollars of frozen Iranian assets are released by the US. In the following years, 1990, Iran's position from the Kuwait invasion by Iraq remains neutral until they resume diplomatic ties in September 1990 ("Iran Profile-Timeline...").

1.2.5 The 9/11 Attacks

On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked by four airplanes hijacked by less than 20 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group, Al- Qaeda. The main targets of the attacks were: the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City that were hit by two planes, and the Pentagon outside Washington, DC. That also was hit by a third plane; meanwhile the fourth plane was crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The terrorist attacks of September outcome was approximately 3,000 dead people, and the attacks helped in defining the George W. Bush administration ("September 11 Attacks...").

Figure 1: Map of the Flight Paths on the September 11, 2001 Attacks.

Source: <https://www.quora.com/why-did-the-attacks-on-9-11-happen>

The 9/11 attacks led to re-examining the strategy of defense of the USA and recognizing the horrifying prospects of nuclear weapons under the control of irresponsible actors. Ryan L. Hill reported in *Nuclear and Rogue: Rethinking US Strategy toward North Korea and Iran* that The rogue states, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, turned to be the main focus of the United States where they were seen as “a volatile mixture of aggressive behavior and nuclear intentions” (1). Therefore, the American strategy to fight this danger aimed to achieve two objectives altogether; first, alerting the nations’ behaviors and bringing them to compliance with the international standards, and second, prohibiting and disarming their nuclear programs.

These intertwined goals are the ambitions of the United States in which it continues to militate for till today. The hard power strategy, in consequence, has proven counterproductive as well as ineffective, pushing the states towards weakening soft power tactics and

nuclearization. The US should pay attention to the non-proliferations as most urgent goals and follow a strategy to balance and achieve soft and hard power instead of achieving the two objectives as they are one (Hill 1).

The terrorist attacks revealed the fact of the vulnerability of the American society, the shocking consciousness of insecurity resulted profound changes in the US political culture which led to dramatic changes in US foreign policy. “ the social context created by 9/11 and the Bush administration’s framing of the new reality facing the United States are therefore critical variables necessary to an understanding of the course of American foreign relations since then.” (Schonberg 69).

The US cannot forestall every terrorist attack, but it is vastly improved prepared to deal with the future fear monger dangers. The US knowledge has moved its needs from country states to transnational on-screen characters and had configured itself to meet the new threats. The insight activity that prompted the fruitful strike on container laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, AL-Qaeda’s position have been crushed, its abilities debased, not just as consequence of US insight, military, and unique tasks but particularly as a result of uncommon global participation among the world’s security administrations and law authorization associations. America’s way to deal with AL-Qaeda has been centered on pulverizing the association, not going up against its belief system. From the beginning, forestalling further terrorist attacks came first; likewise America beat on AL-Qaeda’s operational abilities, not its convictions, which were to a great extent excused as obsession, however military force alone does not do the trick (Jenkins and Godges).

1.2.6 Axis of Evil

Donette Murray in his book *US Foreign policy and Iran: American-Iranian relations since the Islamic Revolution* demonstrated that a proposal for diplomatic engagement was

contained in a Draft National Security Presidential Decision (DNSPD) initiated by the State Department Officials. The result was a rigid opposition within the administration and in the early 2002 was exposed to a supplemental blow, when a massive tonnage of arms on-board of the ship *Karin A*, was interrupted on the way to Palestine. The administration, informed by Israel that the Islamic Republic had sent the weapons, rejected the submission or the response to Khatami's requests and offers to share information gleaned from the authorized investigation. It was contemplated by the US media whether the trick to undermine the Iranian president, eliminate any convergence, and snatch some glory as champions of the Palestinian cause has been contrived by the opposition factions in the regime or the revolutionary guards (Murray 123).

The White House regardless to the Clinton administration position, concluded that Khatami was not powerful in particular rather it was duplicitous or far outside the regime inner circle to be useless. Either side, officials at the Tokyo Donor's Conference for Afghanistan were in no mood to respond to the Iranian overture when delegates from the US were approached and told about the Iranian hopes to confirm again its desire to cooperate on Afghanistan and the will to improve its relations by discussing other obstacles. The Iranian violations started to be under the spotlight of the Pentagon's media, specially its support to AL Qaeda. Despite the fact that President Bush remained noncommittal, he insisted that America support the Iranian help in bringing stability to Afghanistan (Murray 123).

From the beginning of Iran's nuclear activities, there has been a preoccupation of the US administration under George W. Bush. In the 2002 State of the Union Address President Bush announced Iran's pursuit of WMD, its domestic repression, and its support for terrorist groups and described it as part of the 'axis of evil'. Iran's nuclear program was part of the wider array of dangers imposed by Tehran including terrorism and efforts to thwart the US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush called for internal discussions over several

approaches to deal with these diverse threats; from regime change to sanctions to diplomacy (Singh 107).

1.2.7 Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

During the 1970s the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty was ratified by Iran aiming at granting an IAEA detection of the leaking of nuclear material to the use of nuclear weapons rather than peaceful purposes, in addition to detecting undeclared nuclear activities and material (“Iran’s Nuclear...6). Iran was a unique signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The Shah finished up an IAEA shields understanding in 1974. After the 1979 transformation, progressive pioneer Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at first contradicted an atomic program as a Western-situated relic of the government. But Iran and Iraq both accomplished mystery atomic work during their 1980 to 1988 war (“A History of Iran’s...”).

In August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, then-U.S. media spokesperson for the NCRI, announced that Tehran was concealing two key atomic plants; one in Natanz to improve uranium, the other in Arak to create plutonium. These fissile materials could be fuel for regular citizen power reactors, at the same time, the crude material for nuclear bombs. The exposure set off the present Iranian atomic debate and Iran turned into a unique concentration for the IAEA (Gerami and Goldschmidt 1). The UN office, which is situated in Vienna, gave 30 reports between June 2003 and September 2010 on Iran’s atomic program and its clandestine exercises going back to the 1980s. Tehran at first gave participation well beyond normal protections, permitting reviews of non-atomic locales (Albright and Stricker 4-5-6).

In 2002, the Iranian nuclear activities were uncovered in public by the National Security Council of resistance of Iran. Therefore, Iran was threatened with referral to the UN Security Council after violating its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Then,

negotiations between Iran and the EU3s (the UK, France, and German) had started resulting two successive deals: the Tehran Statement in 2003 and the 2004 Paris Agreement. However, neither the Tehran Statement nor the Paris Agreement stuck. In August 2005 Tehran rejected EU3s last offer and the UN seals were removed from Tehran uranium conversion equipment. And in 2006, the IAEA Board Governors found guilty Iran's violations of its safeguards agreement and transfer it to the UN Security Council (Singh 107).

In any case, on September 24, 2005, the IAEA's official board discovered Iran in rebelliousness with the NPT because of disappointments and penetrates of its commitments to conform to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, in particular for concealing a wide scope of vital atomic work; The load up offered Iran time to answer significant IAEA questions, and to make key researchers accessible for interviews. It, likewise, approached the Islamic Republic to suspend uranium advancement. Although Iran's moving to advance, the board settled on February 4, 2006 to take the issue to the UN Security Council for conceivable corrective activity. The Security Council forced four rounds of assents to compel Iran to suspend uranium improvement, permit harder examinations, and coordinate completely with the IAEA (Adler).

In 2006, it was announced by Iran that developments at Natanz centrifuges would be resumed. And in February, Iran's case was referred to the UN Security Council. Shortly after, the implementation of Tehran additional protocol would be stopped as announced by Tehran. In 2007, Iran escalated back its collaboration with the IAEA, when the agency was told that the government would stop corresponding with a fraction of the subordinate arrangements for its IAEA safeguards agreements (Jahanpour).

In the beginning of March 2007, Iran contended that it was only engaged with the abidance of the former notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements in which Tehran

was required to provide layout information for a new facility approximately 3 months before it introduced the nuclear material into the IAEA. Based on Tehran decision of 2007, it also argued that its failure to report the agency before September 2009 that a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, Fordow, has been constructed near the city of Qom was consistent with the safeguards obligations. In 2009, it was demonstrated by the IAEA legal advisor that the failure of Tehran to introduce the reactor's design information is inconsistent with the subsidiary arrangements obligations. Moreover, if Iran determined to build other nuclear facility without providing information to the agency, this may also be considered as violation to the safeguard agreement. Up to November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, some of the information at least were provided by Iran to the agency ("Iran's nuclear program... 8-9-10").

By September 2010, Iran kept on improving uranium and resisted the Security Council on grounds that it had the option to the full scope of regular citizen atomic work under the NPT. Apart from this, after President Hassan Rouhani came to office in 2013, Iran entered atomic dealings with the world's six significant forces - Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States. In 2015, mediators arrived at a last atomic arrangement that limited Iran's atomic exercises in return for sanctions help. The understanding remembered arrangements to widen the IAEA's observing exercises for Iran and the office was liable for confirming Iran's consistence with the arrangement. Iran and the IAEA also marked a different Roadmap to explain remarkable issues on Iran's atomic exercises, explicitly the conceivable military elements of its atomic program (Adler).

In 2016, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano conveyed an announcement affirming that Iran had finished the important preliminary strides to begin the execution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This prepares for the IAEA to start confirming and checking Iran's atomic related responsibilities under the understanding; as mentioned by the United

Nations Security Council and approved by the IAEA Board. At that point in 2017, the IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, stated that Iran has expelled overabundance rotators and framework from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in accordance with its atomic related duties under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Next in 2018, Iran is executing its atomic related duties under the JCPOA, as the IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, had told the Agency's 35-part Board of Governors. While the 2019s, in his introductory explanation to the Agency's Board of Governors, Yukiya Amano gave a report on the Agency's check and observing exercises in Iran At long last. On March 9, 2020, the IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi approached Iran on Monday to coordinate quickly and completely with the IAEA and give brief access to areas which it has would not allow Agency investigators to visit (" IAEA and Iran ... ").

1.2.8 The Failure of Bush Administration

The US-Iranian relations were over undermined under the administration of George W. Bush. The president's most scandalous failure was in 2002; after mentioning Iran as part of the axis of evil. In order to get Iran to alternate course and surrender its pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Bush Administration resorted to implement the pressure of sanctions rather than trying to create a dialogue after utilizing the diplomatic efforts (Gregg II).

The US priorities in the Middle East were decided to be reconfigured by the administration of George W. Bush in which, in Lebanon, the US and the Sunni Saudi Arabia's government had a collaboration in a secret operations aimed to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that backed Iran. The Iran nuclear file was treated in separate from the role of Iran in Afghanistan and Iraq. On one side, President Bush agreed on ambassadorial talks over the internal security issues in Iraq, including providing solutions about the tension between the Sunni and the Shiite communities. Meanwhile on another side he refused to engage in a dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue (Jahanbegloo 1-2).

Chapter two:

Investigating the Foreign Policies of the US and Iran from 2008 to 2020

2.1. Investigating the Foreign Policies of the United States from President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump

2.1.1. The Obama Administration

2.1.1.1. The US Foreign Policy under the Administration of Barack Obama

It was openly predictable that a sea-change in the foreign policy of the United States would be expected by the 2008 elections of Barack Obama. The diplomacy of the United States persisted to be informed by a realist mindset at a time when the presidency of Barack Obama emphasized the neutral tendency of President Bush Administration and one more time adopted the international institutionalism (kaussler 74). In June 2009, the celebrated speech 'New Beginning' in Cairo followed the 2009 Nowruz address by Obama to the government and people of Iran invited for a new amendment of the mutual understanding and relations between the West and the Muslim world. The change rhetoric and pragmatism in diplomacy engagement was reflected by both speeches and a vast framework of engaging with Iran was set up. President Obama expressed his desire to speak clearly to the Iranian leaders that despite the fact that both nations have serious differences, his administration was committed to diplomacy to pursue constructive ties among the United States as he continued to address the Iranian leaders about the US desire about the Islamic Republic to take its rightful place through peaceful actions rather than terror and arms (Obama 00:01: 26 - 00:03:19). In the autumn of 2009, the US met with the Iranian officials in the first high-level meeting since the

Islamic revolution as a result of a private message sent to the Iranian supreme leader from president Obama (kaussler 74).

The Obama Administration preferred to concentrate more on the specific terrorist actors showing the desire to deal with terrorism politically rather than ideologically. That is why in the 18 months in office, Obama referred to Al- Qaeda much more than his predecessor George W Bush. John Brennan, Obama's Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor, set forth the most clear and official justification for disposing the concept of War on Terror saying that 'terrorism' and 'terror' were not the enemies because, as Americans, they refused living in fear. Moreover, the 'jihadists' or 'Islamists' were not the foes because there was nothing Islamic in murdering innocent people. This misconception would be religious leaders defending a religious cause; meanwhile in fact, they were nothing but killers, including murdering a huge number of Muslims. This message attempted to separate the war on terror from a war against Islam in order to prevent the granting of religious rightness to terrorism as well as preventing the credibility to the idea of America's fight against the Muslim world (Laidi 66-67).

This idea was also included in Obama's famous speech in Cairo, in June 2009 in which he clarified his desire for a new beginning between Americans and Muslims based on common interests as well as mutual respect. However, perceptions will not be changed suddenly; therefore, Arabs believe that undermining the Muslim world is one of the priorities of the United States' policy in the Middle East. Although Obama made huge efforts, the structural perception of the role of the United States in the region remains highly negative (Obama).

According to the US Think-Tanks articles and several presidential declarations by Obama, the administration would have some convenient modifications rather than basically

changed the policy structure of the former government. Obama considered that the long term competitors, such as Syria and Iran, can be efficiently dealt by the Hawkish Diplomacy based on military, economic, and political strength. In particular, regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Obama sought that increasing the pressure on the major trading partners of Iran in addition to the strict penalties imposed on it would increase the cost of Iran nuclear plan. Therefore, the goals of the US foreign policy would be achieved (Jin 19-20).

Moreover, in order to adopt with the joint dangers and promote the common security, relevant mechanisms, partnership, and needed alliance would be rebuilt as promised by Obama. And globally, the US would persist to struggle in order to get the Chinese, Russian, and other countries' support and, on the other side, strengthening its relations with Germany, France, and Britain. In February 2009, Obama indicated in a letter sent to the president of Russia that the government of the United States would abandon deploying its prevail missile safeguard system in the Central and Eastern regions of Europe if Russia support the US in prohibiting Iran from nuclear weapons' development. On September 23, 2009, Medvedev; in a visit to the United States clarified that sanctions, in some cases, were inevitable despite the fact that their efficiency was hard to produce. Thus, it was accepted by Russia that the former trade and the adjustments of the policy achieved preliminary results (Akbarzadeh 399-400).

As Iran acted a constructive role in Iraq, an 'opening dialogue' with Iran was under the encouragement of Obama. He argued that the Iranian influence in the region strengthened the war in Iraq and added that the nuclear ambitions of Iran symbolized a real danger to the US, Israel, and the international security. In a presidential debate; the president said that the nuclear Iran would be a 'game changer.' Moreover, in an earlier speech, Obama encouraged tough sanctions to prevent the Iranian program of uranium enrichment and believed that the use of military forces was an unlikely solution; therefore starting a war against Iran would be a profound mistake. During a debate in dealing with the Iranian case, Obama declared that the

administration of George w. Bush's threats of war "should have never started" (Tiwari 19). In contrast to Bush Administration, Obama emphasized on engaging Iran in tough and direct presidential diplomacy without any preconditions, and focused on the right, as the US president, to meet with anyone at the place and time of his choice under the conditions of keeping the US safe (Castiglioni 2).

On the 25 September, 2009, Obama along with the prime minister of Britain, Gordon Brown, and the president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy declared that a second uranium-enrichment facility has been being constructed secretly by Iran near to Qom. Marc Vidricaire, the spokesman of the IAEA said that on the 21st September the agency was informed by Iran about the facility's existence, but according to the intelligence officials of America; it was confirmed by Iran only after knowing that the US had discovered it (Cordesman and Toukan 12).

On October 1, 2009, the proposal to fuel the TRR launched by the US and backed by the IAEA was principally agreed on the p5+1 and Iran, it was entailed in the proposal that the major 3.5 % enriched- uranium being exported by Iran in return for approximately 3.5 % fuel to the TRR. Then, On May 17, 2010, a common declaration issued by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran tried to refresh the TRR fuel swap proposal, but it was rejected by France, Russia, and the USA; thus the declaration failed addressing the Iranian enrichment to 20 %. Moreover, the 1929 resolution of June 9, 2010, adopted by the UN Security Council prevented the nuclear capable ballistic missile tests and sanctions against Iran expanded. In 2011, the p5+1 had a meeting with Iran in Istanbul and on May 8, according to the Russian state-atomstroyexport: a leading Russian engineering company of State Corporation on construction of nuclear power facilities abroad; successful reactions were achieved after the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant started operations (Davenport).

Obama was given the power by the law of the United States to sanction foreign banks of US allies if they would fail in decreasing their imports of Iran's oil. Consequently, the Iranian oil sales decreased and its economy intensively declined. In 2013, secret talks started among Iranian officials and the US upon the nuclear issue. At a time when President Hassan Rouhani was elected, soothing sanctions was the only step to achieve an improvement of the Iranian relations with the world and its economy. Therefore, Obama and Rouhani spoke in a high level phone call on September 28. Then, on November 23, secret talks between Iran and the six major powers; the USA, Britain, Germany, France, and China resulted in a temporary treaty called the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) under which Iran promised to restrain its nuclear work in condition of limiting the sanctions (Ekmanis and the world staff).

2.1.1.2. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action


After several years of negotiating, an agreement aimed at restraining the nuclear development in Tahrán in return for removing sanctions in phases. The agreement was signed by Iran and the UN five permanent members in addition to the European Union and Germany under the leadership of the US. The final version of the document was in July, 2015; it was unofficially known as the nuclear deal and officially named The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which five annexes were included in 159 pages (Haines).

In a "Statement by the President on Iran", President Obama said that the two years of negotiations brought about an achievement that several years of hostility did not. The US along with its international partners achieved a long term, thorough agreement with Iran in which nuclear weapons would be curbed from being acquired by Iran. He insisted on the fact that the deal would explain the US diplomacy's ability to achieve the real meaning of change, therefore making the country and the world more secure. He added that the danger was about the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other countries mainly in the Middle East; the most

volatile region in the world. The deal prevented Iran from generating the raw material needed for a nuclear bomb through prohibiting it from producing weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Another consequence was removing the two-thirds of the Iranian centrifuges storing them under international supervision. The president also said that, under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran did not have the authority to pursue nuclear weapons. Additionally, sanctions imposed on Iran were going to be relieved if Iran showed its desire to implement the deal; but if in case of violation, all sanctions would return back to place (Obama).

On the 16th of January, 2016, it was verified by the IAEA that the needed steps has been achieved by Iran under the deal that guarantee the peacefulness of the Iranian nuclear program. Since October, Iran had reached many steps; first, approximately 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium were shipped outside the state. Second, Two-thirds of Iran's centrifuges were disassembled and removed. Third, the Calandria; a cylindrical vessel through which tubes pass, especially one forming part of an evaporator, heat exchanger, or nuclear reactor, was taken away from its heavy water reactor and loaded it with concrete. And then, an unprecedented arrival to Iran's supply chain and nuclear facilities were provided. Since those steps were completed, the next phase under the JCPOA can be started by the International Community and the United States, this meant that sanctions imposed on Iran would be gradually removed. Yet, a variety of US sanctions would stay in place. Some of the remaining sanctions were; Sanctioning traditional weapons and missile technologies, sanctioning terror list; recognizing Iran as sponsor of terror, anyone who had a connection with Iran's support of terror would be under sanctions, the Iranian development of ballistic missile as well as censorship of the human rights would be targeted by an authority, and Iran would be sanctioned if it tried to destabilize regional activities as the case in Syria and Yemen ("the Historic Deal.....").

Figure 2: The Impact of the JCPOA on the Time needed to build a Nuclear Bomb



Source: "The Iran Nuclear Deal: what you need to know about the JCPOA."

URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal>

2.1.2. The Administration of Donald Trump

2.1.2.1. The US Foreign Policy under the Administration of Donald Trump

In 2017, the output of the elections of Donald Trump was a radical change in the US Foreign policy. Before, when he was a candidate, he described the 2015 nuclear deal as mentioned by Garrett Nada as "the worst deal ever negotiated." Thus, his first priority would be dismantling the deal and once he entered office, his administration took severe posture towards Iran. After mentioning Obama's failure to respond to Tehran's violating acts like supporting terrorism and transferring weapons, Michael Flynn said that the administration then was putting Iran on notice. Trump also added that his administration would continue in a way where violence, terrorism, and Iran's nuclear break out was the predictable conclusion (Garette).

In President Trump's remarks on his strategy towards Iran he demonstrated that he ordered a strategic review of the United States towards rogue regimes in Iran by which Iran would never acquire nuclear weapons. He added that the Islamic Republic is the major sponsor of terrorism globally as well as it develops missiles that threatens America and its allies. Additionally; the regime was responsible for the aggressive acts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. To stop Iran's violence acts and joint dangers; strong economic sanctions must be applied ("Remarks by President...").

In the late 2017, approximately 93 Iran-related entities and individuals had been sanctioned by the US. The deal had survived, inconstantly, during Trump's first year. On January 27, citizens of seven Muslim-major countries were banned, as ordered by Trump, for approximately three months. Then, on the 29th January, a medium-range ballistic missile was launched by Iran's test. This act did not violate the JCPOA; rather, it was not consistent with the 2231 UN Security Council's Resolution. Consequently, an emergent UN Security Council meeting was called for to raise its concerns. Therefore, new sanctions were announced on February 3. After several additional sanctions, the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act was signed by Trump on August 2 (Garette).

The efforts of pragmatic engagement of president Obama was replaced by the traditional longstanding US policy of Iranian inclusions in November 2016, elections of Donald Trump to the White House. Thus, the orientation of US policy towards Iran was set again. Inclusion has always been Washington's go-to Iran policy in the absence of real diplomatic relations with deep ideological differences that separate Washington and Tahrán. This move comes amongst the interconnected conflicts in the region including numerous actors and goals; as fighting against ISIS, AL-Qaeda, Civil War in Syria, Turkey and proxies, Yemen War, Iraq, and tensions between Iran and Saudi-Arabia where the US-Iranian prospect confrontation has grown like they have opposing objectives in almost the fields. And then, the

JCPOA has been put in danger. Moreover, Trump's policy, while not unexpected, in the light of this regional climate, and after reflecting the hopes that the nuclear agreement could result in turmoil in the relations between the two countries and bring Washington to a dangerous and direct collision path (Vakil 79).

Donald Trump has threatened that if the congress and the US allies failed in amending the agreement, he would cancel the US participation in it. As announced by Trump, the US treasury was ordered to impose new sanctions on the (IRGC) as a state that supported terrorism in the region, although the IRGC was not designated by the state department as a terrorist group. The other signatories of the JCPOA, as response to Trump's speech, pledged their commitment to the deal. Moreover, Federica Mogherini insisted that the president has many powers, but not the power to terminate the deal in addition to the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano who state that the agency finds out that Iran was abiding by its obligations (Nasralla). The only supporters of Trump were: Israel and Saudi-Arabia. In the days preceding Trump's speech, the European diplomats who seek to insure the JCPOA feared the possibility of a deal collapse by Trump. But, after they were notified that re-imposition of sanctions by the congress would not be called by the president of the US who noted that amendments to legislation that would contain limitations on ballistic missile and curb Iran's nuclear program under the JCPOA was drafted by the leaders of the congress and in case of violating the restrictions, sanctions would be instantly imposed (Beaumont, et al.).

It was indicated by Trump that his administration might shift beyond the strategy of standard containment. In which pressure on Tehran would be increased through a new set of sanctions beside statements of hostile from the cabinet members. Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, declared that the US policy towards Iran responded to its regional dominance, including their ability to develop nuclear weapons, and worked to support some Iranian elements that

would lead to a peaceful transition in that government. Thus he suggested that changing the regime was under check as “policy option.” This was also repeated by James Mattis, Secretary of Defense. Tension had further increased when the Iranian citizens banned the travel of the US President. In 2017, the administration of the United States reaffirmed Iran’s docility with the agreement coercing the US president to renew the nuclear sanctions concessions and institutionalizing the contradictory Iran policy. Despite labeling the nuclear deal as the worst, new sanctions have been imposed on Iran by congressional republicans backed by the president. Since 2017, sanctions against supporters of the Iranian ballistic missile program has been expanded, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was denoted as a terror sponsor state as well as supporting the regime of Bashar AL Assad in Syria along with Russia. After passing these sanctions, economic pressure on Tehran will be increased and inspect the readiness of all parties to preserve their adherence to the JCPOA beside broader regional goals. At the time Tehran expressed its willingness and commitments to the deal, Washington’s tougher policy and transformation in tone uncovered the profound of mistrust that divide both capitals (Vakil 86-87).

In 2016 presidential elections, Iran’s regime and the JCPOA was criticized by Donald Trump, while candidate, complaining that the Iranian nuclear program is limited for a fixed period of time and as mentioned by Elie EL Hadj; the deal was stigmatized by Trump as “the worst deal ever” (109) that failed to prevent the ballistic missile development and gave Iran 100 dollar billion unexpected gains used in fund for weapons and terror across the Middle East. On May 8, 2018, president Trump declared that the US will be pulled back from the JCPOA and sanctions against Iran are going to be restored in order to isolate it from the global financial system (ELhadj 109).

The JCPOA has been always stigmatized by Donald Trump and threatened a withdrawal of the United States. President Trump declared in a speech in October 2017 that

the deal was the worst and most one-sided cooperation the United States went through. Further, the president claimed that, in some occasions, the agreement was violated by Iran as the case of overriding the frontiers of 130 metric-tons of heavy water. While lately, Iran has not succeeded in meeting the US anticipations in the advanced centrifuges operation (Maslen 28).

In defense of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Trump administration's critics have presented abundant reasoning in which the suspicious hypothesis of the anti-JCPOA position is highlighted. The deal was defended by the senior adviser of the US negotiation team, Robert Einhorn, assuring that it accomplished the fundamental goals that restricted Iran from earning nuclear weapons. The majority of the nuclear experts around the world had shared this view and criticized Trump's decision. Those experts sought that the deal has been glorified as a landmark achievement in which Iran's nuclear program was retreated. Moreover, Iran's nuclear back-out ability was wrapped by the JCPOA so two-thirds of Iran's centrifuges were secluded, approximately 97 % of its enriched uranium stockpile was eliminated, and the essence reactors that could have produced weapons-grade plutonium was damaged (Entessar and L. Afrasiabi 64-65).

Antonio Guterres, the UN secretary general, has also defended the deal as international disarmament. The UN secretary general was demanded to set annual report on Iran's compliance to the deal. Starting in July 2016, all the reports confirmed Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. After the US withdrawal from the deal, Guterres expressed his regret at the relapse for global security caused by the decision of the US president ("Guterres Describes JCPOA..."). In October, 2017, the US congress received a letter from approximately hundred American nuclear scientists insisting on the protection of the JCPOA. The scientists' views were taken by major of retired US admirals and generals who signed a letter to the US

president urging him to protect the deal which the US national security interests benefitted from (Entessar and L. Afrasiabi 64-65).

The Trump Administration withdrew of the US from the JCPOA assured that the US broad- range concerns about Iranian behaviors was not addressed and Iran's developments of nuclear weapons would not be constantly prevented. The administration policy was illustrated by senior administration officials as the implementation of "maximum pressure" on Iran at the economic level, first, to coerce it to negotiate the nuclear agreement in order to manage the United States' broad-range concerns. And, second, to reject Iran incomes in progress its strategic capabilities or interfere in the region. The fact that the policy was intended to fuel the economic unrest in Iran was denied by the administration officials. After pursuing the maximum pressure policy, including tougher sanctions more than it was before the deal, tensions have risen significantly (Slavin).

There were key developments that heightened tensions; first, on April 8, 2019, the IRGC was designated by the administration as (FTO). Second, the designation claimed that the IRGC supported transferred, trained, guided, and directed terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, Kata'ib, and AL-Ashtar. Third, on May 2, 2019, aiming to drive the Iranian oil exports to zero; Trump ended US sanctions exceptions for countries that purchase Iranian oil. Then, on May 3, 2019, under the (IFCA, P.L. 112-239) two of the seven waivers were ended by the administration. Two days later, it was reported that attacks against US personals or illustrations by Iran or its allies. Then, on May 24, the congress was warned by the administration of immediate foreign military sales and suggested export licenses for direct commercial sales of articles of defense, training, weapons and equipments with more than eight billion dollar ("US-Iran conflict...").

The Saudi Arabia, Israel, UAE, and Bahrain supported Trump's decision when he withdrew the US from the JCPOA. The Israeli Prime Minister claimed that the nuclear agreement paved the course for Iran to develop its nuclear program; hence, it would be able to produce nuclear weapons in present. He added that by the agreement, Israel and Iran were closer to war. The Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf region as well welcomed Trump's decision claiming that Iran was state sponsor of terrorism and all neighboring countries had to cut their ties with it (khan 83).


2.1.3. Obama's Administration and Trump's Administration

To be chosen President of the United States, a competitor must make a story that both reverberates with and convinces the electorate. Gardner recommended that "pioneers accomplish their adequacy primarily through the tales they relate" and that there are three kinds of initiative stories: Ordinary, Innovative and Visionary. The contrasts between the 2012 and 2016 U.S. Presidential races are extreme. As the 2016 political race was one of abnormal and sudden minutes as contrasted and the more agreeable and average political decision in 2012, this investigation contrasted the tales of Donald Trump and the 2012 appointment of Barack Obama. Results from the 2012 political decision found that Obama's story was one credited to an Innovative pioneer. Tests discovered huge and noteworthy contrasts between competitor inclination and story validity and whether the narratives roused the respondents to cast a ballot. Nonetheless, for the 2016 political decision,, the two up-and-comers had creative stories, and this may clarify how one applicant won the famous vote, while the other got most of constituent votes (Levine).

Despite the fact that Tehran did not express its readiness to engage with the Administration of Barack Obama over the nuclear issue, but in some ways, tensions decreased dramatically. Meanwhile when President Trump took office; his administration's policies

towards Iran were completely rejected by Tehran due to Trump's language of threat (Mousavian and Mahmoudieh).

Figure 3: Diagram of the points of View towards President Obama Administration and President Trump Administration



When collecting opinions about the evaluation of the presidency terms of the US president: 16 people thought that the administration of president Barack Obama was good and 5 people thought it was bad. Moving to the administration of Donald Trump, 18 have said it is bad meanwhile 3 voted for good. Therefore the majority agreed that the Trump Administration was worse than the Obama Administration.

2.2. Investigating the Iranian Foreign Policy towards the United States

2.2.1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Presidency (2005-2013)

2.2.1.1. The Iranian Foreign Policy towards the US under the Administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

While Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency of Iran in 2006, Washington prepared to join external nuclear speeches with Iran in order to verify Iran's suspension of nuclear enrichment. In December, 2007, The US confirmed with high confidence Iran's development of nuclear weapons since the fall of 2003, when it stopped weapons' development. Then, in 2008, the US President George W. Bush sent an official who belonged to the Secretary of the State Bill Burns, to participate in nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva. A year later in 2009, Iran's leaders received a new declaration from the American President Barack Obama, who asked them to "unclench their fist" and convince the West that they were not seeking to create a nuclear bomb. In the same year, Iran's secret uranium-enrichment site at Fordow, near the Shiite Muslim holy city of Qom, was discovered by Britain, France and the United States. But Iran replied that it mentioned the site to the UN nuclear watchdog before. From 2009 to 2012, this period marked nuclear negotiations between most prominent powers and Iran. In 2012 the US-Iranian officials started private negotiations related to the nuclear matter (Mohammed).

The elections of June 2005 were the ninth presidential election in Iran, which came with a new different Iranian authority that was not similar to Mohammad Khatami leadership. Although Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ruling of Iran marked with a continuous pressure on both the regional and the universal levels, there were quick political advancements in the foreign policies of Iran and its territorial relationships during Ahmadinejad Presidency. Even if the president Mahmoud had an executive power to run after Iran's relations with the rest countries of the world, the power was still restricted. This restriction was not only at the

national stage, but at the international one as well, especially after the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and the several political tensions between Lebanon and Syria, which made Iran end up with indefinite allies in the Middle East (Ehteshami and Zweiri XV).

The basic internal power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the Basij, which was a large military arrangement with multiple roles, it acted as the eyes and the ears of the Islamic authority, it was found everywhere in Iran. It was informed by order of Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. There were large smuggling webs under the control of the Basij and IRGC; they smuggled weapons, oil, goods to consume and technology into and out of Iran (Aryan).

Furthermore, the President Ahmadinejad in his first speech at the United Nations tackled the concept of religion and its importance in the country and the whole world. As mentioned by David Marcel Sip in "Respect in the Context of the Iran Nuclear Deal" Ahmadinejad defined justice in an explicit way by saying that: "Justice is all about equal rights, the correct distribution of resources in the territories of different states, the quality of all before the law and respect for international agreements. Justice recognizes the right of every one to tranquility, peace and dignified life. Justice rejects intimation and double standards" (27). This definition highlighted two explanations, a justice applied within one society and a dignity and respect for the universal law. On the top of that, Mahmoud was a religious leader, he believed in the ideologies of the Islamic Revolution, he was influenced by religion even in his foreign policy. In his speeches at the UN he focused on mentioning "Muslims" rather than "Islam" not as the previous leaders' speeches of Iran. The Iranian's deep belief in "Islam" made them develop nuclear bombs to destroy Israel (Sip 27-28).

2.2.1.2. Ahmadinejad Negotiations

The US-Iranian relations during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and George W. Bush terms did not reach a high level of agreements. Ahmadinejad supported the negotiations mainly about the nuclear program with the United States; his support was contrary to supreme leader Ali Khamenei's decision that was against any diplomatic or economic relations with the US. But the 2003 US invasion of Iraq brought Iran and the US closer to each other which made the United States recognize the regional power of Iran. In May of 2006, the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sent a letter to the President of the United States, George W. Bush proposing convocation to tackle the Iranian nuclear program. In the same year exactly in the month of September, Ahmadinejad defied Bush to a discussion at the United Nations, but they ended up with unclear compromise on the important problems (Milinski 5).

The 2008 election of Barack Obama was a turning point in the American foreign policy because Obama announced a meeting with Iran as one of his program platforms. Ahmadinejad sent a message to the new president of the US congratulating him upon winning the elections, although the Iranian stood still constant. Additionally, a question had been asked to a senior Iranian diplomat about possible talks between the US and Iran, he answered that their idea of negotiation was mutual respect. They had to know by then that their will could not be imposed on Iran. The negotiations were meaningless if Americans' attitudes did not change. If America was not arrogant, an answer to Mr. Ahmadinejad congratulatory letter to President Obama would be sent. Manners dictate that when someone saluted they might be answered back. From Iranians' perspectives the election of Obama brought no change in policy or behaviors as well (Sharp 4).

2.2.2. Hassan Rouhani Presidency (2013- to present)

2.2.2.1. The Iranian Foreign Policy towards the US under the Administration of Hassan Rouhani

In 2013, Hassan Rouhani became the new president of Iran, who was elected in order to build good relations with the rest of the world to improve the country's economy, which could be reached by alleviating sanctions. On September 28, Presidents, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, spoke by phone in the highest level connection between the two nations. Next on November 23, Iran accepted to stop its nuclear work in return for restricted sanctions relief after a temporary agreement between Iran and six world forces: the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. Two years later, on July 14, another agreement was between the six world powers and Iran, the deal called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to ease Iran of US, UN and EU sanctions, which was known as the Iran Nuclear Deal or Iran Deal, it was an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in Vienna on July 14, 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 together with the European Union. Apart from that, on January 16, 2016, Exchanging of prisoners had been announced by both the US and Iran; four Americans were freed in Iran in return for at the minimum seven Iranians. Most of them were dual US-Iranian residents, who were waiting for court in the United States (Mohammed).

Hassan Rouhani, the successor of Ahmadinejad has been a piece of the tip top of the Islamic Republic from the beginning. Conceived in 1948, he served in various arrangements being an individual from the assembly of specialists since 1999, and being speaker of parliament on a few events, he haggled with the Western powers with respect to Iran's atomic program. Besides, like practically all individuals from the tip top, he played many roles to do *ijtihad*, to offer expressions on law dependent on Islamic lawful convention and reason. In

2013, he applied to run for administration, out of 680 up-and-comers eight were permitted, the all around associated Rouhani among them. Hassan Rouhani was particularly a system insider; he was associated with the hostile to Shah Development in the number one spot up to the 1979 unrest. He served on the Supreme Defense Council during Iran-Iraq war; he was likewise the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and has been a long serving individual from the Expediency Council, a key body that exhorted the supreme leader (Sip 35).

Rouhani had no enthusiasm for consummation or even changing Iran's Islamic arrangement of government, regardless of whether a few reformers backed his political race as president; what Hassan benefited from was the way that was his antecedent. Whereas previous president Ahmadinejad was angry and parochial, Rouhani was increasingly collegial and friendly. Rouhani has utilized his first year in office to improve the Islamic Republic's picture in the worldwide network and to depict himself also, his legislature as being prepared to manage the West. His bureau was brimming with clergymen with cutting edge degrees from Western colleges, in reality; his bureau had more individuals holding PhDs from the US colleges than did president Obama's. This should not imply that they were advocates of Western social qualities, yet having lived in the West they had a greatly improved comprehension of Western view of Iran than a large number of their ancestors (Bastani 2).

Nonetheless, while Rouhani's international strategy approach contrasted especially in style that of Ahmadinejad's, the point of the two has been to augment Tehran's impact on the local as a center international strategy objective of the Islamic Republic's since its origin. In outside undertakings, Rouhani's opportunity of activity was vigorously surrounded by the supreme leader's authority, just as the critical impact employed by the Iranian Progressive Guard Corps, it was not only that he should rival other amazing bodies for the ear of the supreme leader whose view was definitive on key approach questions. Rouhani was not a

result of the IRGC; he tried to lessen not just the nearness of its ex-individuals in government and territorial legislative issues, but also to reign in its business exercises, especially where government contracts were concerned. Besides, organizations possessed by, or those firmly associated with the IRGC profited by sanctions, Iran's financial segregation has seen these organizations benefit from sanctions busting or has permitted them to fill the space in the Iranian economy once involved by private (Sip 35).

2.2.2.2. Nuclear Deal and United States Relations

Figure 4: Map of Iran Nuclear Program under the JCPOA



Source: "Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details."

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33521655>

In January 2016, the IAEA confirmed that Iran finished the important strides under the Iran bargain that guaranteed the quietness of Iran's atomic program. The locations were; first, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant; located 160 miles Southeast Tehran and it was considered to

be the oldest, largest and the only facility in which researches and development activities could take place. Under the JCPOA, Iran was obliged to reduce the operational centrifuges from 19,000 to 5,060. Second, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant located in the Great Salt Desert near Qom. Under the deal, Fordow turned into a center for technology and nuclear physics. Third, Arak Nuclear Power Plant, Iran's nuclear industry's symbol, located in the Southwest of Tehran and it was the platform of negotiations. Operations on the Arak raised the concerns about building nuclear weapons. Fourth, the Parchin Military Complex that was Iran's center of munitions, located in the Southeast of Tehran. Under the deal, the IAEA was allowed to have an access to the facility in October 2015. Another facility was the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the first civilian nuclear power plant built in the Middle East. And Darkhovin situated in the South of Ahvaz in the Southwest Iran. Darkhovin was meant to be the first entirely domestic reactor project of Iran ("Satellite Imagery...").

The atomic arrangements all by themselves spoke to a critical improvements in US-Iranian relations in that the different sides had been in profound and drawn out up close and personal exchanges just because since the relationship separated in the outcome of the insurgency. However, regardless of whether the arrangements succeeded, there was little possibility of relations between the two nations normalizing immediately given the profound verifiable doubt and significant contrasts on contemporary local issues, for example Syria. Also if the atomic dealings flopped then US-Iranian relations would become increasingly fierce (Shanhan 5-6).

Iran presumably would get the bomb. It had previously test-terminated rockets fit for focusing on the whole Middle East and a lot of Southern Europe. Furthermore, it professed to have 40,000 suicide volunteers anxious to send fear mongering even atomic psychological warfare against its foes. With atomic limits, the Islamic Republic of Iran would right away accomplish the status of superpower which Iraq strove for. Nothing already on the table

would stop Iran. Approvals are paper fights to an oil rich country. Diplomacy had just fizzled on the grounds that Russia and China were playing with sides, damage; pay off even death of atomic researchers might be postponed yet would not keep Iran from turning into atomic force that left military dangers and at last, military activity. Mulling over military dangers, they were so far originating from two sources: the US and Israel (Dershowitz 83).

2.2.3. Ahmadinejad's Administration and Hassan Rouhani's Administration

According to investigation by the ISPI Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, an Italian think-tank, it would be unjustifiable to keep in mind the previous president as an ultra-conservative who just turned to forceful talk against Israel. Mr. Ahmadinejad, in fact was moreover the lawmaker, who beneath weight from universal financial bodies, upheld appropriations to a few fundamental merchandise as petrol aiming to light the enduring Iranian economy (Pavesi).

In addition, agreeing to the ISPI, Mr. Ahmadinejad was among the most drivers after a long time of stalemate of the reactivation of atomic transactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with the UN Security Council's P5+1. Hence, inspite of that Ahmadinejad certainly was a more forceful pioneer, like Mr. Rouhani who permitted too the practicality of survival, valuable for the financial liberation of the nation. In 2013, Mr. Rouhani condemned the activities of the Nazis and the persecutions during the Holocaust. But both presidents were aggressive leaders, they permitted the pragmsim of survival and open the economy of the country to the world (Safdari 4)

In an interview with Abdelmoumen Abdelaziz, doctor and lecturer at the Algeria 3 University specialized in Political Sciences and International Relations. When asked about his evaluate of the US-Iranian relations in light of the current presidential term of Donald

Trump, the American President and Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian President. He stated that The United States imposes economic sanctions on Iran and suffices with it. Its current goal is to maintain the status quo.

Chapter Three:

Investigating the Effects of the Tensions between the United States and Iran

3.1. Reasons behind the Escalated Tensions

3.1.1. Views on the Nature of the Relationship

In the context of the US-Iranian relations, the first question about its nature was answered by sample of 29 people. 55.2 % responded that there are common interests, 44.8 % said that there is consistent enmity between them, and they ignored any possibility of friendship. Based on these statistics, it can be concluded that the nature of these relations is of common interests and enmity to protect those interests. Meanwhile, while trying to verify a hypothesis about the hidden friendship; the majority of 44.8 % answered with a yes, 24.1% answered with a no, and the rest were confused.

In the interview conducted with Dr. ABDELMOUMEN Abdelaziz, when inquired about his general views on the prevailing US-Iranian relations since he is specialized in Political Sciences and International Relations; he said that initially, the US-Iranian relations are subjected to a set of interactions within the international system; these interactions are based on a realistic theory that proceeds from two basic points: strength and interest. The interest here is a relative matter related to the strength of the state and its position within the international system in the sense of the American orientation towards the Middle East, from the point of American hegemony and from the point of spread across the continent, to achieve that hegemony it requires to deal with all political units according to the nature of each goal the state wants to achieve, where Iran wants to achieve the benefit from its position. Secondly, from an academic point of view; the American-Iranian Relations are not the result of uranium enrichment, but rather the Cold War and what happened previously in history because that uranium enrichment for Iran is strength, not threat.

The US-Iranian relations are built on the basis of interest and that interests are determined by each country. Then, he described the nature of the relationship according to the official statements of both countries, clear hostility, as described earlier by Donald Trump and Barack Obama “the rogue state” (i.e. the country that poses a threat to global security), and as for Iran, when describing the USA as an enemy country that threatens its national security. Returning back to history, Dr. Abdelmoumen highlighted the Iranian Revolution by confirming that it was supported by the USA in 1976 in order to serve its interests later on in the 20s. This is called strategic planning 50 years ago attached to the National Security Report, because, the Iranian system is well developed as Iran did not depend on the Western technology. Hence, it was unable to be hacked by the US only with the help of the IAEA. It can be said that the support of the Iranian Islamic Revolution by the United States is one of the reasons for the current tension in the relationship.

He added that there should be concentration on the idea of feedback. It says that relations were good since the Iranian Islamic Revolution that was under the blessing of the USA, and returning back to the American intervention in Iraq in 2005, the USA allowed the Iranian penetration in Iraq, and this indicates that there is an agreement regarding the Middle East on the one hand, and the elimination of American interests in the region remains one of the reasons on the other hand. And when spoken about Iran’s disregard of America’s desire to stop the Iranian nuclear program he said that the reason lies in Iran anxiousness from the other, and among its rights is to find solutions that preserves its security, which is the nuclear weapon, from its point of view the imperative to possess nuclear weapons that guarantees the survival of its security and its international system. Therefore, all what can be said about the nature of the relations is that Each two countries within an international system are governed by a set of interactions that are actions and reactions, whether negative or positive, and are determined by the interest and strength of each country.

3.1.2. The Escalating Tensions

Inside, making sure about the atomic arrangement and improving US-Iran relations are President Hassan Rouhani's two major accomplishments, which he would like to use in advance to get re-elected on May 19. In spite of the executions of the arrangement, its effect on Iran's economy and Iranians' daily lives is not perceptible. Iranians, who in the most recent couple of years put every one of their desires for a superior financial circumstance on the atomic arrangement, are currently confronting a heightening talk from the upgraded US organization. Notwithstanding this, Rouhani has vowed to additionally improve Iran's relations with the West and even to evacuate the rest of the approvals, as methods for welcoming outside venture into the nation and making unmistakable monetary change (Mousaviane 2).

The prompt consequence of the rising strain now between the US and Iran is that it subverts Iranian conservatives, including Rouhani's Administration. Which put all their political capital in action to the current month's races, it is progressively hard for Rouhani to offer the arrangement to voters currently gives Trump's talk. Moreover, Trump's international strategy and the eventual fate of the Iran arrangement will assume a noteworthy job in Iran's presidential political race. From one viewpoint; there is Rouhani who is attempting to persuade voters and console the universal network that the continuation of moderate government in Iran for the following four years will bring about more coordination of Iran in the worldwide framework and improve Iran's economy. Then again are the hardliners attempting to change the result of the political decision by scrutinizing the intangible aftereffect of the arrangement considering raising strain among Iran and the US, but it is also questionable that the main opportunity to diffuse the pressure between the West and Iran in the long haul is for the conservatives to remain in power (Hurt 107-108).

According to Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institute, the tensions between the US and Iran raised mainly after the decision of Donald Trump to exit The Iran nuclear deal and with the decision to put down Iran's oil exports to zero. What is important is the public signal and what is going on rather than the military signals. Realistically, the majority knows that Iran has been responsible for a number of attacks against Americans' presidents and regions, 1000 troops in Iraq have died in relation to terrorist organizations in name of the religion created by Iran. She further mentioned that Iranians are prepared to make the US pay the price of pressure that Washington and Tehran pass through these times. In addition to the economic sanctions which play a big role in the rising tensions between both nations, Iranians recognized that Iran will gain a little from the nuclear deal especially after the American pressure ("Rising Tensions between...00:00:00-00:03:59").

When asked about the probability of getting broad concessions from Iran, people responded with the rate of 58.6% agreeing that the UOS withdrawal from the JCPOA would result to a broader concession from Iran. Meanwhile 41.4% of them disagreed. Then, when asked about the "maximum pressure" policy ordered by Trump and its effects on the Iranian policies; 86.2% of them agreed that the policy was a result of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and that will help to pressure Iran to change its policies to fulfill the American desires, however, 13.8% of them did not agree.

Since President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, tensions between the US and Iran have been steadily heightened. Washington formally initiated its pressure expedition against Iran on May 21, 2018. The campaign endeavored to pressure Iran to adapt to international standards through sanctioning Iranian industries, businesses, and individuals. On May 2019, another country's military had been formally categorized as a terrorist group when the IRGC was blacklisted by the United States. In response, the US was designated as

sponsor of terrorism when the President Hassan Rouhani signed a bill that proclaimed all US troops in the Middle East as terrorists (Cherkawi).

Later, in May 12, acts of vandalism destroyed four oil tankers off the coast of Fujairah, outside the Hormuz strait. Although it was not clear who was the responsible for the attack, the US accused Iran. On May 24, additional US troops were deployed in the Middle East to counter perceive the Iranian threats, and as a reaction, Iran stigmatized it as “extremely dangerous,” however, it was not willing to go to a war against the US. Then, a new level of tension was marked on June 2019, when US military drone was shot down by Iran saying it entered Iran’s airspace near the strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, the US insisted that the drone was in an international airspace. One day later, president Trump was about to bomb Iranian soil, but instead, he imposed a new round of sanctions (Khalel).

When asked about the probability of America’s depleting the Iranian wealth, Dr. Abdelmoumen rejected the idea. However, he argued that The USA does not deplete Iranian fortunes because Iran is the only one responsible for its wealth, and the national income depends on these fortunes, such as selling oil and gas. From this argument it may be concluded that the US sanctions are imposed in order to weaken Iran’s economy and consequently it will be easy for the US to control the Iranian policies.

According to Meg Kelly, Washington Post Fact Checker, the rising tensions between the US and Iran started to take place essentially with Trump’s administration on 8th May, 2018. When he put down Iran’s sanctions and asked it to stop developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group, declared that there is a real unbalance about the military strength between Iran and its neighbors in the region, in order to compensate for these shortcomings, the Iranians have developed two defensive strategies, one is the ballistic missile program and the other one is a

regional policy. Meg concluded by saying in other words as the US adds economic pressure Iran is pushing back developing the nuclear program, it is an interrelated relation between them (“Mirza 00:00:21-00:07:15”).

On September 6, 2019, another pledge was broken by Iran intending to provide sanctions relief in exchange for limiting its nuclear program and Iran worked on speeding up its enrichment by providing advanced centrifuges. The decision was defended by Zarif who considered it a response to the American economic terrorism as well as pushing Europe to provide economic exception from American sanctions. In reaction, on the 23rd of September, President Trump called for a new agreement but President Rouhani emphasized that there will be no negotiations until the US president lifted the sanctions. On November 5, it was announced by the government of Iran that a Uranium gas would be injected into centrifuges therefore the decision was considered as a provocative move. In response, Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, warned that the US would make decisive reactions if Iran or its proxies attack a US base and harm its interests. The 23rd of December marked American airstrike attacks on Iranian backed groups in Iraq and Syria, yet in response, the American embassy in Baghdad was attacked by a group of protesters. These events led directly to escalating the tensions, accordingly, the killing of the leader of Iran’s Quds Force: Qassem Soleimani, in a US airstrike (Finnegan, et al.).

Concerning the US withdrawal from the JCPOA; 62.1% from the sample disagreed with the Trump decision and 37.9% agreed. Therefore, it can be clearly noticed that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA was a wrong decision that in a way resulted disastrous outcomes. Moreover, when asked about the aftermath of the withdrawal; the option of military confrontations was completely rejected, 58.6% said that tensions may return as it was before the agreement, and 41.4% expected that Iran would re-develop its nuclear program without limitations or commitments. Many have expressed different ideas and expectations, first; a

doctorate degree university teacher specialized in international studies with a UN simulation certificate sought that the focus should be on the realistic theory, especially the “offensive realism” because the international system is moving around this theory which says that the United States is a world power with regional interests, thus; it would not allow other powers to appear and threatens its interests.

Not only the United States, but, all regional powers would not allow the emergence of new nuclear powers in the world. Another one presented two scenarios: in case the democrats win against Trump; Iran may return to develop its nuclear program. And, if Trump win a second term presidency; it would be difficult to do so without direct military confrontations. Hence, it can be concluded that history is repeating itself, and Obama efforts in negotiations leading to a deal that limited the uranium enrichments and Iran’s nuclear program as well as reducing the sanctions imposed against Iran are now being ignored by the Trump Administration that have already canceled the agreement.

Among the theories that explain the international interactions within the international system, there is the Realistic Offensive Theory that has proven its usefulness in explaining political phenomena or various interactions within the international system, meaning that the primary effective international system in it is the state and the rule is the war and peace is the exception . It also states that the state possesses two bases, which are interest and power, meaning that the state seeks to achieve its interest by possessing power in all fields to achieve its underlined goals, because this theory does not allow new nuclear powers to exist in the world.

3.1.3. The Assassination of Qassem Soleimani

On January 3, 2020, the commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Forces, Qassem Soleimani, was killed in a drone strike near Baghdad International airport conducted

by the United States. In a statement on killing of Qassem Soleimani, the Pentagon claimed that, as ordered by Trump, military of the United States took crucial defensive actions to keep safe US personnel abroad. Consequently, the Iranian Supreme National Security Council stated that the US government will take responsibility for the outcomes of the criminal act. Furthermore, on January 5, Trump warned to hit Iranian targets in case Iran make attacks on US citizens and attacks (Aksüt).

In a statement by the president on Soleimani's death, Donald Trump stated that the US military, under his direction succeeded in killing Qassem Soleimani, the number one terrorist in the world as described by Trump. He argued that Soleimani was planning attacks on American diplomats and military personnel. In the context of terrorism he clarified that the US policy is not ambiguous, therefore, terrorist groups will be illuminated as long as Americans are put in danger. Additionally, the IRGC and the Quds Force were responsible for murdering and injuring hundreds of Americans mainly in the attacks on US targets in Iraq, including the death of an American citizens and the injured of servicemen besides the assaults to the US embassy in Baghdad. For the last 20 years, the Middle East was destabilized by Soleimani's acts of terror, thus, the action of assassination should have been done long ago emphasizing that the act was done to stop rather than to start a war. Finally, he argued on the fact that the interests of good people will be always the pursuit of the United States ("President Trump Statement...00: 00:18- 00:04:30").

When predicting the aftermath of Soleimani's assassination, 82.8% did not agree with the option of military conflict and 17.2% sought that it is much predictable. In case of military confrontations, it was believed by approximately 48.3% the newly spread pandemic "Covid 19," to some extent, prevented a devastating war since both sides are preoccupied with their internal affairs. A minority of 27.6% considered the corona virus as a conspiracy theory therefore tensions raised. Finally, 24.1% believed that it did not affect.

3.1.4. Iran's Retaliation to the Death of Qassem Soleimani

In response to Soleimani's assassination, President Hassan Rouhani tweeted on January 8th that without the assistance of General Soleimani European capitals would be in great danger. He emphasized that Soleimani has been always fighting against terrorist groups like: AL-Qaeda, ISIS, and AL-Nusrah. He guaranteed that Iran will take revenge by expelling all US forces out of the Iran (@HassanRouhani).

From a geopolitical point of view, retaliation from Iran was not surprising. Logically, Tehran had to somehow retaliate to the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, but, where, how, and when was not clear yet at a time. Then, fifteen short-range ballistic missile were launched by Iran against two military bases in Iraq. Through this attack, Tehran showed its willingness to defend its security even against the most powerful military in the world. A vigorous message was sent to the US Public Union including that tensions will remain high as long as Donald Trump remain president and the probability of a war breakout will remain possible. The message on the other hand encouraged the Iranian allies in the Middle East showing that Tehran does not fear fighting to protect them. Hence, the attacks clearly showed Iran's vengeance to Soleimani death successfully in contrast to what experts' identifications of Iran's decision makers as "mad mullahs" who can curb themselves (Czulda).

By the attacks' two goals were achieved; Iran predisposition and military strength, but simultaneously the US soldiers did not get harmed. Iran's ability to launch its missiles without resulting casualties was rational demonstration of power; nevertheless, if aiming to harm the American forces, Iran would rather have attacked the US embassy in Baghdad or its troops in Bahrain. Reasonably, the decision makers of both sides have to consider the difference a manageable crisis and an open war, hence, no side will benefit from a full-scale confrontation. On one hand Iran consider that triggering a war against the US might be the end

of the regime, and on another side, for Trump, an open war with the Islamic Republic would cost him losing his chances for re-elections. This hypothesis clearly shows that the decision makers' statements are completely different from their plans (Tabatabai).

When asked about the reasons behind the ascending tensions; 25 from 29 people have answered this question. When analyzing their answers, it was founded that the majority 44% agreed that the development of Iran's nuclear program was the main reason, however, 28% sought that it goes back to the establishment of the Islamic Republic and Iran's independence from the US interference. Moving to the third hypothesis, about America's desire to protect its interests in the Middle East through Iran as it locates in important geographical and geopolitical position, here; 24% supported the idea. Finally, another suggestion appeared by the support of 4% was about the tensions caused by the media. In the same context, other opinions were expressed and other reasons were presented. One example was: Iran's relentless pursuit of hegemony in the Middle East, especially the Gulf States, in order to control the Strait of Hormuz and use it as geographical and geopolitical card to pressure Washington and on the other hand to support resistance movements starting with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic jihadists as well as supporting forces that opposed the policy of American hegemony as the case in Venezuela and Cuba.

Another example appeared in the Iranian threats to Israel, its cooperation with Venezuela on energy, its friendship with Russia that endangers the security of Saudi Arabia, the US ally. Therefore, since the United States considers the Saudi Arabia as its policeman in the region, any threat to it would endanger America's interests. Finally, one has said that tensions may be the results of Iran's interference in Iraq and targeting American bases in Iraq and other regional countries, hence; the Islamic Republic is crossing the limitations in playing its role as strategic region.


Dr. Abdelmoumen sought that The reasons headed the situation between both countries into exacerbation at the regional and the international levels are: the Iranian nuclear file, the current US policies toward Iran which are just a siege, the US economic sanctions imposed on Iran and the policy that Iran adopts toward the Strait of Hormuz as well, and the Syrian and the Iraqi files. In addition to US use of Iran to control the Middle East, which has created tensions within the region, such as the race for armament; the acquisition of the necessary weapons to desist from the regional dependency, it creates a host of hostilities, as religious sects, to dismantle and fragment them. Then, he added that Common interests are restricted to the Middle East region and the international issues: Iraq, the Palestinian issue, ISIS, etc.

3.1.5. The Conspiracy Theory and Political Deception in the Middle East

The analysis of Walid AL- Sharkawi, teacher at the faculty of politics and economics at Beni Suef University in Egypt, explained the conspiracy theory and political deception can be explained throughout three major points. Before explaining, he deliberately tackled some presidential statements and threats on both sides. But, the most controversial issue is Trump's failure to target Iranian ships in the Gulf region as long as he threatens to do so. On the other hand, the Iranian missile did not target the American forces and the Israeli positions since they considered Israel as their primary enemy in the region. From this perspective, it is possible to reach three evidences that assert the use of the political deception in the region. First, when focusing on the scene in the Middle East, Iran has been always used by the US as a tactic to intimidate countries do not agree with Iran as a Shiite doctrine in contrast to the other countries with the Sunni doctrine such as: Saudi Arabia. Additionally, due to Iran's high armament ability in sending long-range and short-range missile as well as its role in the conflict in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, therefore, the Middle Eastern

countries need to resort to a strong ally in order to deter Iran. Consequently; as long as Iran exists, the Middle East needs the US to stop the Iranian role in the region. Second, weapons sales worldwide; according to statistics, the US is the first country in terms of arms sales, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is the first in terms of purchasing in order to confront Iran. Hence, as long as tensions escalate in the region, arms sales are constantly rising, and ending the Iranian role in the Middle East costs the US huge economic losses. (“AL-Sharkawi, 00:01:12 - 00:04:30 translated by the researchers”).

The interests of the USA are not closely related to Iran because there is influence from the allies (Russia and China), and every country wants to achieve its interests through another state. In addition to the arrangement that is related to the Middle East region, the USA does not base its interests only on Iran, but on the Middle East region as one entity because its main purpose is achieving its goals by eliminating its interests.

Figure 5: list of arms importers from the United States.


Source: Infographic: the World's Largest Arms Suppliers.

<https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.statista.com/chart/amp/17316/share-of-global-arms-exporters-by-country>.

Relations between Iran and the Saudi Arabia went in different direction especially after the Second World War. The behaviors of both nations were affected by George Washington's policies in the Middle East. Henceforth, the US had a significant impact on the developments of their relations. After the Iranian Revolution, the Saudi-Iranian cooperation was ended up. During Bush's administration, the crisis over Iran's nuclear program escalated; the Saudi Arabia was aligned with America in order to counter Iran's regional influence. Prior to the Arab Spring, Saudi-Arabia and Iran were competing over influence in the Middle East, leadership in the Muslim world, and most importantly the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the rival is over Arab and Persian, Sunni and Shiite, and significantly the

geopolitical and the regional influence in protecting the Middle Eastern countries (Ahmadian 135-137-138).

Figure 6: Arms Exporters to the Saudi Arabia



Source: Saudi Arabia: the World's Largest Arms Importer from 2014-2018.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2019/05/saudi-arabia-world-largest-arms-importers-from-2014-2018-1905512140945972.html>

The statistics above clearly demonstrate that the United States and the Saudi Arabia are very close partners in terms of arms exports and imports. The US is the first in terms of arms supply at most to the Saudi Arabia; the first country in the world to export. Hence, the later mentioned arguments supporting the US conspiracy theory and political deception in the Middle East might be defended through these statistics showing that keeping Iran in the region and increasing its intensity with the Middle Eastern countries is among the US economic interests.

When asked about the presidential statements both in Iran and the United States and the extent to which they are applied in reality; the majority of 65.5% corresponded that the statements have no relation to reality, 10.3% agreed, and 24.1% did not support neither sides. There has been always an ambiguity concerning the reasons the US abstention from attacking Iran and ending its role in the region, majority of 86.2% agreed upon the option of America's desire to protect its interests in the Middle East, meanwhile 13.8% agreed on the option of fears from Iran's nuclear program. Under the same circumstances, the interests of the USA are not closely related to Iran because there is an influence from the allies (Russia and China), and every country wants to protect its interests through another state.

Based on the Functionalism Theory, which says that the cost of war and the volume of economic exchanges prevent a war from occurring; meaning that the USA does not conduct wars within the coalition forces in partnership with NATO, Canada, Australia, and the Gulf states. These countries have interests with Iran and they will not allow war with that image that is portrayed to us. Entering the USA a war at the present time threatens the occurrence of a third world war, which will inevitably lead to the destruction of the world due to the development of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction.

3.2. The Effects of Tensions

3.2.1. General View on the Regional and the Global Security

The impacts of tensions would clearly appear within the Middle Eastern neighboring countries. Throughout history, Iran has gained its dominance in the region through spreading its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon that is considered as the bridge between Iran and the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, in case of a proxy war between Iran and the United States; Syria and Iraq could end up as a battleground. One example can be Soleimani's assassination that had place in the Iraqi territories which led the Iraqi parliament to sign a bill to expel the

US troops from the country. In reaction, president Trump threatened to impose severe sanctions against Iraq in case it applies its decisions of expelling the US troops. Iraq would be endangered economically, leading to unfavorable effects on the Danish exports (Smestad).

It has always been confusing whether Iran's development of its nuclear program enables it to control the region or not. When answering this question, 51.7% thought of the possibility of controlling the Middle East by progressing nuclear program, however, 43.8% did not support the idea. In the context of the tensions' effects on the global security; 82.8% think that the embarking tension would certainly affect the global security; on the other hand, a minority of 17.2% think that tensions have no effects. Regionally, 96.6% believe that tension will affect the Middle East region and only 3.4% believe that it does not. In another context, when asked about people who considered Iran as sponsor of terrorist groups the sample was divided into 3 categories; 42.9% believed that Iran is backing terrorist groups, 35.7% disagreed, and 21.4% answered "perhaps."

3.2.2. Effects on the US 2020 Presidential Elections

Since the United States is on its way to the 2020 presidential elections; an issue about the effects of President Trump decision of killing Soleimani's on his candidacy. When asked about it, 62.1% supported the idea that Trump's decision to kill Qassem Soleimani will positively affect Trump's candidacy in the presidential elections as he gains the support of the anti- terrorism groups. Then, 37.9% think that this decision would have negative effects when considering Trump's impulsive decisions that may lead to disastrous conflicts. When predicting the aftermath of Soleimani's assassination, 82.8% disagree with the option of military conflict and 17.2% think that it is much predictable. In case of military confrontations, it was believed by approximately 48.3% the newly spread pandemic "Covid 19," to some extent, prevented a devastating war since both sides are preoccupied with their

internal affairs. A minority of 27.6% consider the corona virus as a conspiracy theory therefore tensions raised. Finally, 24.1% believe that it did not affect.

When discussing the tensions' effects; Dr. Abdelmoumen views that the failure to take action is in itself a reaction. The USA in all its stages did not break its relationship with Iran, and cutting ties remains an option for the decision-maker. This decision does not come from Iran because it is the weak eastside, but by the USA. Despite the worsening events between them, especially after the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the relations between both countries did not end; insisting on the fact that the Iranian nuclear programs is a guarantee of its survival in the Middle East.

3.2.3. Effects on the Oil Prices

Due to the developed countries' quest for industrialization, oil will continue to be the world's first energy source. However, sanctions imposed on Iran decreased its crude oil exports by approximately 80% particularly after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. In response to the US imposed pressure, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the recent events in the Middle East worsened the situation; therefore, in order to secure its transit, through the Strait of Hormuz, the US fleets were deployed in the Persian Gulf. To solve this issue, Iran should adopt bilateral policy by engaging other parties as well as reviewing its relations with the neighboring countries by choosing cooperation rather than conflict because the economic situation in the region depends mainly on the stability. Here; a constructive step must be taken by the US because when isolating Iran, it will continue to threaten to the US interests in the Middle East as well as the regional and global security (Sayin 50-51).

The United States is the largest producer of shale oil, however, it needs a high cost to extract it unlike oil in Saudi Arabia in which the cost of producing is lower, therefore, the US

interests is to keep the oil prices high in order to achieve its goals, and, due to the oil consuming power, America needs to stock with inexpensive oil. From another hand, America's control of the oil prices contributes to pressure the Chinese economy since China is one of its biggest economic enemies. In sum, Iran helps in controlling oil through the Strait of Hormuz by which about 40% of the world's oil production passes. Therefore, the outbreak of conflicts between Iran and the United States will lead to pressure ships carrying oil to result higher prices, meanwhile, when need to lower them, America decrease the tensions and allow Iran to sell oil in the world market by which it results some kind of dumping and lower prices (AL-Sharkawi, 00:04:30-00:06:56. translated by the researchers).

After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and Trump re-imposition of severe economic sanctions against Iran, tensions raised. In case those sanctions do not decrease, and culminate a situation of military conflict between both countries, the Iranian economy is going to be negatively affected by a complete collapse as well as it could somehow affect the global economy. Military confrontations had proved the extensive impact of war at the economic level. Since Iran's economy represents 1.2% of the Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), therefore, the global economic growth will reduce by 0.3% in case Iran's economic output shrinks to 25%. However, what globally matters is the impact of conflicts on the soaring oil prices when considering Iran's position of the Strait of Hormuz by which one fifth of the world's shipped oil pass through. In case the Strait of Hormuz is being cut off by Iran; the oil prices would climb to approximately 150 dollars per barrel resulting global inflation and countries that rely on energy imports will be negatively affected (Smestad).

Conclusion

The US-Iranian relations are not new subject to deal with, this dissertation discussed, investigated, and understood the nature of the US-Iranian relations; in terms of foreign policies and nuclear weapons highlighting Iran's nuclear program in particular. It analyzed the major acts of the two nations towards one other. This research went deeper into studying policies of the two nations based on the examination of the presidency terms in both nations; the US administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump in relation to the Iranian Administration of, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani.

Because of Iran's strategic position and its impact on the Middle East as well as its constant pursuit of nuclear program development is fit for creating material required for atomic weapons, the United States has stood prepared to practice all alternatives to ensure that Iran does not develop its nuclear program nor construct an atomic weapon since the emergence of new nuclear power would certainly threaten not only its interests in the region but the interests of its allies as well like the case with Israel.

Since President Obama took office, his administration has been searching for opportunities to engage with Iran with discretion. In a video sent to Iranian individuals two months after winning the elections, saying that the United States has real contradictions that have developed after some time. He further added that his government was currently focusing on discretionary power that tended to the full scope of the issues presented, and to seek after beneficial relations between the United States, Iran, and the global network.

Such diplomacy has resulted in a nuclear deal with Iran, which has put certain limitations on Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, the JCPOA did not prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program nor it ended the US sanctions; rather the deal resulted in gradual lifting of sanctions in condition of placing the Iranian nuclear program under the

IAEA check as a step forward to improve relations. However, the perception in Iran that Tehran defeated the US by maintaining a nuclear program will need to be addressed in the near- and long-term. Countering Iran's hegemonic ambitions, which may embolden as a result of the nuclear deal, will be part of the challenge to limit Iranian power and preserve America's regional interests in the Middle East.

To save a perceived leverage in the Middle East where no nation's military abilities overpowering outmatch those of others in the area, the US must create a procedure that incorporates trouble imparting to provincial partners, alongside upgrading the military capacities of those partners to fortify their capacity to make sure about the area. With its Middle East partners, the US must discover approaches to guarantee that the atomic arrangement will not encourage Iran's destabilizing exercises and compromise their security. Regardless of whether that be through outside military deals and preparing or expanding US maritime nearness in the Gulf, the US sought to depict itself as a worldwide force that is eager to secure its inclinations and accomplices in the Middle East.

However, Washington should do as such by adjusting to the current worldwide condition. The US sought to embrace the economy of power principle, as expressed in the US Protection Strategy Review that at whatever point conceivable, the United States is going to create inventive, ease, and little impression ways to deal with accomplish its security destinations, depending on works out, rotational nearness, and warning abilities. Noticing that with decreased assets, wise decisions should be made in regards to the area and recurrence of these operations. It should be noticed that a littler impression ought to incorporate a more grounded U.S. oceanic nearness in the Gulf area to look after America's responsibility to its local partners by countering fierce radicalism and destabilizing dangers. Building up the safeguard abilities of Gulf partners, while actualizing the job as a seaward balancer, would permit the U.S. to effectively take part in a Middle East clash just when the level of influence

and American interests are in peril, while continuously building the militaries of its local partners to shape an equalization to contain unfriendly powers like Iran and its partners.

Setting greater duty of local security on America's Middle East partners has a few increases. It will permit Middle East states to show their capacity to ensure for themselves against state and non-state on-screen characters, which will give long haul security regardless of what America's impression is in the locale. In addition, more weight sharing could lessen the potential for a rival to mount different little incitements intended to drive the United States more than once into costly activities to expand forward- sent powers, or what was known as the cheat-and-retreat strategy utilized by Saddam Hussein during the 1990s.

All through the Middle East, the United States should save its vital interests while searching for chances to improve the area's emergencies in a post-JCPOA world. The United States has exhibited its national force in the past in the Middle East through one-sided and multilateral activities and should keep on doing as such in a developing security condition that includes an increasingly persuasive Iran and that's just the beginning duty of GCC states. To counter Iran's destabilizing territorial objectives and impact, it is vital for the United States to remind the religious government in Tehran that the US stays focused on securing its inclinations and partners in the Middle East to guarantee long haul territorial security.

Though the US-Iranian relations were mainly affected by Iran's development of its nuclear program; other reasons of tensioning the relations arose. The US Conspiracy Theory and political deception are key players in directing the relations, thus, the United States' main problem with Iran may not be the development of nuclear program because, as a world super power, America can prevent it. Consequently, the US will benefit from raising tensions in the region as it guarantees the selling of its weapons to the countries that are in hostility with Iran, like the Saudi Arabia, the first arms importer in the world. In addition, the tensions' impact in

the oil prices is a winning card for the US. Due to the oil consuming power, America needs to stock with cheap oil; therefore, America's control of the oil prices contributes to pressure the Chinese economy since China is one of its biggest economic enemies. Regarding Iran's role in controlling oil through the strait of Hormuz; the outbreak of conflicts between Iran and the United States will lead to pressure ships carrying oil to result higher prices, meanwhile, when need to lower them, America decrease the tensions and allow Iran to sell oil in the world market by which it results some kind of dumping and lower prices.

Finally, we ended up with different new interpretations from several people around the world, mainly after the use of the questionnaire and the interview. This research has a profound impact on the society because it tackles a recent international case, which was unsolved and considered as one of the most interesting problems. Despite of all the implicit and the explicit problems between the US and Iran, the interest is the motive of their relations. The door is open for other studies and researches in dealing with the US-Iranian relations and the development of nuclear weapons due to its daily updates in many fields.

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Appendix A

استمارة استبيان خاصة بجمع الآراء حول العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية.

نحن الطالبتان بجامعة العربي التبسي كلية الآداب و اللغات الأجنبية قسم اللغة الانجليزية تخصص أدب و حضارة بصدد تحضير مذكرة لنيل شهادة الماستر بعنوان: " السلاح النووي: العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية 2008-2020."

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سيستخدم هذا الاستبيان من اجل جمع آراء مختلفة حول العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية. الرجاء منكم

الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة بدقة و شفافية، و نحيطكم علما أن معلوماتكم سوف تستخدم لأغراض البحث العلمي. وشكرا على مساعدتكم.

إشراف الأستاذة:

بوعزيز أمينة

إعداد الطالبتين:

بكي شيماء

بوحنياك أسماء

السنة الجامعية: 2020/2019.

البيانات الشخصية:

الوظيفة:

أستاذ جامعي

طالب جامعي

البلد:

.....

الجامعة إذا كنت طالب أو أستاذ:

.....

الشهادات الجامعية:

دكتوراه

ماستر

شهادات أخرى:

.....

التخصص:

.....

العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية:

1 - ما هي طبيعة العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وإيران؟

- عداء مستمر

- صداقة

- مصالح مشتركة

2 - هل يمكن اعتبار إيران العدو الظاهر والصدیق الخفي لأمريكا؟

لا

نعم

3 - ما هو السبب الرئيسي لتوتر العلاقات بين البلدين؟

- قيام الجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران و استغنائها عن التدخلات الأمريكية

- تطوير البرنامج النووي الإيراني

- رغبة أمريكا في حماية مصالحها في الشرق الأوسط عن طريق إيران كونها تتمحور في موقع

جيوسياسي و استراتيجي مهم

في حال وجود أسباب أخرى اذكرها

.....

.....

4 - ما هو تقييمك للعلاقات بين البلدين في الفترات الرئاسية التالية:

- خلال فترة حكم الرئيس باراك اوباما:

سيئة

جيدة

- خلال فترة حكم الرئيس دونالد ترامب:

سيئة

جيدة

5 - إلى ماذا يرجع سبب عدم هجوم أمريكا على إيران و إنهاء دورها في الشرق الأوسط؟

- عدم قدرتها على مواجهة إيران و تخوفها من البرنامج النووي

- الرغبة في حماية مصالحها في المنطقة

6 - إلى أي مدى تدعم قرار الرئيس الأمريكي دونالد ترامب من سحب الولايات المتحدة

الأمريكية من اتفاقية خطة العمل الشاملة المشتركة "JCPOA"؟

مؤيد معارض

7 - بعد انسحاب أمريكا من خطة العمل الشاملة المشتركة. ماذا تتوقع في السنوات القادمة؟

- عودة إيران إلى تطوير برنامجها النووي دون الالتزام بأي بقواعد

- مواجهات عسكرية بين البلدين

- عودة التوتر إلى فترة ما قبل الاتفاقية

توقعات أخرى

8 - ما مدى احتمالية أن يكون الانسحاب الأمريكي من خطة العمل الشاملة المشتركة فعالا في

الحصول على تنازلات أوسع من إيران؟

مرجح غير مرجح

9 - ما هي نتيجة ممارسة سياسة الضغط الأقصى و العقوبات المتجددة الناتجة عن انسحاب

أمريكا من اتفاقية العمل الشاملة المشتركة؟

- الضغط على إيران من اجل تغيير سياستها حسب الرغبات الأمريكية

- الضغط على إيران سيزيد من نسبة الشعب المناهض لأمريكا

10 - نظرا للتطورات الحاصلة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، ما هو الدور الذي يمكن أن يشكله

البرنامج النووي الإيراني؟

- أهمية بالغة في حماية المنطقة

- خطر كبير على امن المنطقة

- لا يشكل أي أهمية

11 - إلى أي مدى يؤثر قرار الرئيس الأمريكي دونالد ترامب باغتيال قاسم سليمانى على

الانتخابات الرئاسية في أمريكا؟

- يؤثر بالإيجاب كونه يكسب دعم الفئات الراضية للجماعات الإرهابية

- يؤثر بالسلب باعتبار القرارات المتهورة التي يمكن أن تؤدي إلى قيام حرب بين البلدين

12 - ما مدى احتمالية نشوب صراع عسكري بين الطرفين عقب اغتيال قاسم سليمانى؟

احتمال ضعيف

محتمل جدا

13 - إذا صحت احتمالية الصراع العسكري، ما هو دور جائحة كورونا في هذا الوضع؟

- منع الطرفين من الدخول في حرب من خلال انشغال كل بلد بشؤونه الداخلية

- لم يؤثر و تواصلت التوترات في الارتفاع

- زاد من حدة التوتر باعتباره مؤامرة سياسية

14 - هل تنطبق الأقوال والتصريحات الرئاسية في كلا البلدين عل الواقع؟

- تنطبق

- مجرد تصريحات ليست لها علاقة بما يحدث في الواقع

15 - هل تطوير البرنامج النووي الإيراني يمكنها من السيطرة على دول الشرق الأوسط؟

نعم لا

16 - هل تؤثر التوترات المتصاعدة بين البلدين على الأمن العالمي؟

تؤثر لا تؤثر

17 - هل تؤثر التوترات المتصاعدة بين البلدين على الأمن في منطقة الشرق الأوسط؟

تؤثر لا تؤثر

18 - هل تعتبر إيران دولة داعمة للإرهاب؟

نعم لا لا اعلم

Questionnaire to Collect Opinions about the US-Iranian Relations

In the context of preparing a dissertation for obtaining a Master degree, we, students at Larbi Tebessi University, faculty of Letters and Foreign Languages, department of English, specialized in literature and civilization are preparing a thesis for a master degree entitled: “Nuclear Weapons: the US-Iranian Relations from 2008-2020.”

This questionnaire is conducted as to collect people’s views towards the US-Iranian relations. We hope you answer the questions below accurately and transparently. Be sure that your information are going to be used only for the purpose of scientific research. Thank you for your contribution.

Students:

BEKKAI Chayma

BOUHNİK Asma

Teacher:

BOUAZIZ Amina

Academic Year 2019/2020

I/ Personal information:

Occupation:

University student

university teacher

Country:

.....

University:

.....

University Degrees:

Master Degree

PhD

Other degrees:

.....

Specialty:

.....

II/ the US-Iranian Relations:

1- What is the nature of the US-Iranian relations?

Eternal enmity

Friendship

Common interests

2- Can Iran and the United States be considered the enemies and hidden friends at the same time?

Yes No

3- What is the main reason behind the escalating tensions between the two nations?

- The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its revolt against the US interference.

- Developing Iran's nuclear program

- The US desire to protect its interests in the Middle East as Iran located in strategic geopolitical position.

- In case of other reasons; mention them:

.....

4- What is your assessment of the relations between Iran and the US in the following US presidential periods:

- During the Obama Administration:

Good Bad

- During the Trump Administration:

Good Bad

5- The US did not attack Iran nor ending its role in the Middle East region, for what reason is that?

- The inability to confront Iran and the fears from the nuclear program.

- The desire to protect its interests in the Middle East.

6- To what extent do you support the Trump decision of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA?

Support Oppose

7- What do you expect after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA?

- Iran's re-development of its nuclear program without limitations.

- Military confrontation between the two nations.

- Tensions re-escalated as it was before the deal.

Other expectations:

.....

8- How likely is the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to be effective in obtaining broader concessions from Iran?

Possible Impossible

9- What are the side effects of the maximum pressure policy and the renewed sanction resulted from the US withdrawal from the JCPOA?

- Pressure Iran to change its policies according to the US desires

- Pressuring Iran may increase the anti-Americanism groups

10- Due to the progressing events in the Middle East, what role can the Iranian nuclear program play?

- Its importance in the protection of the region

- It threatens the Middle East security

- No role

11- To what extent does the Trump decision to assassinate Qassem Soleimani affect the presidential elections in the United States?

- Positive effects by winning the support of the anti-terrorist groups
- Negative effects when considering the reckless decisions made by Trump that could lead to a war

12- After the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, how likely are military confrontations between the two sides?

- Bearable Improbable

13- In case of military confrontations, what is the role of the Corona Pandemic in this situation?

- Preventing a war since each side is preoccupied with its internal affairs
- It did not affect and tensions continued to escalate
- Increased tensions through considering it as conspiracy theory

14- Are the presidential statements in both countries applied in reality?

- Yes No

15- Does the development of Iran's nuclear program enable it to control the Middle Eastern countries?

- Yes No

16- Do the embarking tensions affect the global security?

- Affect Does not affect

17- Do the embarking tensions affect the regional security?

- Affect Does not affect

18- Is Iran considered a state sponsor of terrorism?

- Yes No I don't know

Appendix B

مقابلة مع الدكتور عبد المؤمن عبد العزيز

في إطار تحضير مذكرة لنيل شهادة الماستر الموسومة ب: السلاح النووي: العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية 2008-2020. تم إجراء مقابلة مع الأستاذ الدكتور عبد المؤمن عبد العزيز أستاذ محاضر بجامعة الجائر 3 اختصاص علوم سياسية ودراسات دولية و الحائز أيضا على شهادة محاكاة برنامج الأمم المتحدة، حيث كان الهدف من المقابلة هو إضافة معلومات و بيانات مختلفة لموضوع المذكرة، وقد تم اختيار الأستاذ عبد المؤمن عبد العزيز كونه خبير في مجال السياسة والعلاقات الدولية. علما أن معطيات المقابلة سوف تستخدم فقط لأغراض البحث العلمي.

السؤال 01: كدكتور مختص في العلوم السياسية، ما هي نظرتك العامة حول العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية

السائدة؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: أولا، العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية تخضع لجملة التفاعلات داخل النظام الدولي، هاته التفاعلات تقوم على أساس النظرية الواقعية التي تنطلق من نقطتين أساسيتين هما: القوة والمصلحة. المصلحة هنا هي أمر نسبي يرتبط بقوة الدولة وكذلك مكانتها داخل النظام الدولي. بمعنى التوجه الأمريكي نحو منطقة الشرق الأوسط من منطلق الهيمنة الأمريكية ومن منطلق الانتشار عبر القاري لتحقيق تلك الهيمنة يفرض عليها التعامل مع كل الوحدات السياسية حسب طبيعة كل هدف تريد تحقيقه، حيث إيران تريد تحقيق المصلحة انطلاقا من موقعها. ثانيا، من وجهة نظر أكاديمية؛ العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية ليست وليدة تخصيب اليورانيوم بل الحرب الباردة وما حدث في التاريخ مُسبقا لأن تخصيب اليورانيوم بالنسبة إلى إيران هو قوة وليس تهديد. لذلك نستنتج أنّ العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية مبنية على أساس المصلحة وتلك المصلحة تحددتها كل دولة .

السؤال 02: كيف تستنزف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الثروات الإيرانية تحت ما يسمى بتوطيد العلاقات

الأمريكية الإيرانية؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: الو.م.ا لا تستنزف الثروات الإيرانية لأن إيران هي المسؤول الوحيد عن ثرواتها والدخل القومي يعتمد على هذه الثروات كبيع البترول والغاز.

السؤال 03: كيف تفاقم التوتر بين كلا البلدين على الصعيدين الإقليمي والدولي؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: الأسباب التي أدت إلى تفاقم الوضع بين كلا البلدين على الصعيدين الإقليمي والدولي هي: الملف النووي الإيراني، السياسات الحالية الأمريكية تجاه إيران والتي تعد مجرد حصار، العقوبات الاقتصادية الأمريكية المفروضة على إيران والسياسة التي تعتمدها إيران اتجاه مضيق هرمز والقضايا الإقليمية في المنطقة كالمف السوري والعراقي. بالإضافة إلى استعمال الو.م.ا لإيران كملف للسيطرة على منطقة الشرق الأوسط مما أدى إلى خلق توترات داخل المنطقة كالسباق نحو التسليح؛ اقتناء أفضل الأسلحة للتخلص من التبعية الإقليمية، لذلك تقوم بمخلق مجموعة من العداوات كالطوائف الدينية لتفكيكها وتجزئتها.

السؤال 04: ما الذي يمنع نشوب حرب بين الو.م.ا وإيران؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: هناك النظرية الوظيفية تقول أن تكلفة الحرب وحجم التبادلات الاقتصادية يمنع وقوع حرب بمعنى أن الو.م.ا تقوم بحروب ضمن قوات التحالف أي بشراكة مع الناتو، كندا، أستراليا ودول الخليج، وهته الدول لها مصالح مع إيران وهي لن تسمح بحرب بتلك الصورة التي تُصور لنا. دخول الو.م.ا حرب في الوقت الحالي يهدد بوقوع حرب عالمية ثالثة والتي ستؤدي حتما إلى دمار العالم نظرا لتطور الأسلحة خاصة أسلحة الدمار الشامل.

السؤال 05: متى يكون قضاء المصالح الأمريكية مرتبط ارتباط وثيق بإيران في منطقة الشرق الأوسط؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: مصالح الو.م.ا ليست مرتبطة ارتباط وثيق لأنه يوجد تأثير من قبل الحلفاء؛ روسيا والصين وكل دولة تريد تحقيق مصالحها عن طريق دولة أخرى.

السؤال 06: هل الثورة الإيرانية الإسلامية كانت سبب من أسباب توتر العلاقة بين كلا البلدين أو العكس، مع الشرح؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: الثورة الإيرانية الإسلامية دُعمت من طرف الو.م.ا سنة 1976 لكي تخدم مصالحها في الألفينيات وهذا ما يُسمى بالتخطيط الإستراتيجي منذ 50 سنة، مُرفقا بتقرير الأمن القومي لأن المنظومة الإيرانية جد مطورة لعدم اعتماد إيران على التكنولوجيا الغربية لذلك لم تستطع الو.م.ا اختراقها إلا بمساعدة وكالة الطاقة الذرية. يمكن القول أنّ دعم الثورة الإيرانية الإسلامية من طرف الو.م.ا سبب من أسباب توتر العلاقة حاليا.

السؤال 06: ما الذي يجعل الو.م.ا كدولة أولى في العالم تحتفظ بعلاقتها مع إيران رغم العداوة السائد بينهما؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: هنا نركز على نقطة مهمة هي التغذية الإسترجاعية feedback ، تقول أنّ العلاقات كانت جيدة بما أنّ الثورة الإيرانية سنة 1976 كانت بمباركة الو.م.ا، ولو نعود للتدخل الأمريكي للعراق في سنة 2005 سنجد أنّ الو.م.ا سمحت بالتغلغل الإيراني في العراق وهذا يدل على أنّ هناك اتفاق بخصوص منطقة الشرق الأوسط هذا من جهة، ويبقى قضاء المصالح الأمريكية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط أحد الأسباب من جهة أخرى.

السؤال 07: لماذا لم تتصاع إيران لرغبة الو.م.ا بإيقاف برنامجها النووي؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: لأن إيران تتوجس من الآخر، ومن حقها أن تجد حل يحفظ أمنها وهو السلاح النووي، من وجهة نظرها حتمية امتلاك السلاح النووي تضمن بقائها وبقاء أمنها ونظامها الدولي.

السؤال 08: ما هي النظرية الواقعية الهجومية؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: من بين النظريات التي تفسر التفاعلات الدولية داخل النظام الدولي توجد النظرية الواقعية الهجومية التي أثبتت نجاحها في تفسير الظواهر السياسية أو مختلف التفاعلات داخل النظام

الدولي، بمعنى أنّ النظام الدولي الفاعل الأساسي فيه هو الدولة والقاعدة هي الحرب، والسلام هو الاستثناء. كذلك تنصّ على أن الدولة تمتلك قاعدتين هما المصلحة والقوة، أي أن الدولة تسعى لتحقيق مصلحتها عن طريق امتلاك القوة في جميع المجالات لتحقيق أهدافها المسطرة، لأن هذه النظرية لا تسمح بوجود قوى نووية جديدة في العالم.

السؤال 09: إلى أي مدى تُعد إيران استثناء في العالم من خلال مواصلتها لتطوير السلاح النووي؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: إيران لا تُعد استثناء لأن النظام الدولي الآن سائر نحو التغيير منذ عشر سنوات إلى نظام متعدد الأقطاب بقيادة الصين والو.م.ا والصين كقوة ردع نووي الهند ويبقى المنصب الأخير بين البرازيل وتركيا، بمعنى أنّ التحول لا يسمح بظهور قوى جديدة ويبقى بالنسبة إلى إيران تطوير السلاح النووي هو حتمية بقائها.

السؤال 10: رغم تباعد القوى بين إيران والو.م.ا إلا أنها تربطهما علاقات عديدة، ما السر في ذلك؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: أي دولتين داخل نظام دولي تحكمهما مجموعة من التفاعلات التي عبارة عن أفعال وردود أفعال سواء كانت سلبية أو ايجابية، وتحدد عن طريق مصلحة وقوة كل دولة.

السؤال 11: ما هي طبيعة العلاقة بين البلدين، عداً أم صداقة؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: طبيعة العلاقة بين البلدين حسب التصريحات الرسمية للبلدين هي عداً واضح وذلك من خلال وصف كل من دونالد ترامب وباراك اوباما لإيران بالدولة المارقة: أي الدولة التي تشكل خطراً على الأمن العالمي، أما بالنسبة لإيران وذلك عند وصفها للو.م.ا بدولة عدوة لها ومهددة لأمنها القومي.

السؤال 12: كيف تُقيّم العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية في ظلّ فترة الرئاسة الحالية لكل من دونالد ترامب

الرئيس الأمريكي وحسان روحاني الرئيس الإيراني؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن : الو.م.ا تفرض عقوبات اقتصادية على إيران وتكتفي بها، هدفها الحالي هو المحافظة على الوضع القائم.

السؤال 13: ما هو السبب في عدم هجوم الو.م.ا على إيران وإنهاء دورها في منطقة الشرق الأوسط ؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: هجوم الو.م.ا على إيران أو إعلان الحرب عليها ليس بمرحلة وإنما هو خيار عند صانع القرار مثلا لخيارات الأخرى كالحصار الاقتصادي وفرض العقوبات، وصانع القرار يختار القرار بأقل تكلفة ممكنة.

السؤال 14: أين تكمن أهمية البرنامج النووي الإيراني في منطقة الشرق الأوسط ؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: البرنامج النووي الإيراني في منطقة الشرق الأوسط هو حتمية بقاء إيران وضماتها هو السلاح النووي.

السؤال 16: ما هي المصالح المشتركة بين الو.م.ا. وإيران ؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: المصالح المشتركة تقتصر في منطقة الشرق الأوسط والقضايا الدولية :العراق، القضية الفلسطينية، قضية داعش...الخ.

السؤال 17: هل إنهاء العلاقات بين كل من البلدين يؤثر على الأمن العالمي، وضّح ذلك ؟

الدكتور عبد المؤمن: عدم القيام بفعل هو في حد ذاته رد فعل، الو.م.ا في كل مراحلها لم تقطع علاقتها بإيران ويبقى قطع العلاقات خيار لصانع القرار، لا يأتي هذا القرار من إيران لأنها الأضعف بل من قبل الو.م.ا. رغم تأزم الأحداث بينهما خاصة بعد مقتل قاسم سليمانى إلا أنه لم تنتهي العلاقات بين كلا البلدين.

Interview with Dr. Abdelmoumen Abdelaziz:

In the context of preparing a dissertation for obtaining a Master degree entitled: “Nuclear Weapons: the US-Iranian Relation from 2008-2020.” An interview was conducted with Dr. ABDELMOUMEN Abdelaziz; lecturer at the Algeria 3 University, specialized in Political Sciences and International Relations, as well as holding a Simulation Certificate for the UN program. The purpose of the interview is to add different data to the subject. Dr. Abdelaziz was chosen as expert in the field of political sciences and international relations. Information given in the interview are going to be used only for the purpose of the scientific research.

Question:01 As specialist in Political Sciences, what is your general view on the prevailing US-Iranian relations?

Answer: Initially, US-Iranian relations are subjected to a set of interactions within the international system; these interactions are based on a realistic theory that proceeds from two basic points: strength and interest. The interest here is a relative matter related to the strength of the state and its position within the international system in the sense of the American orientation towards the Middle East region, from the point of American hegemony and from the point of spread across the continent, to achieve that hegemony it requires to deal with all political units according to the nature of each goal the state wants to achieve, where Iran wants to achieve the benefit from its position. Secondly, from an academic point of view the American-Iranian Relations are not a result of uranium enrichment but rather the Cold War and what happened previously in history because that uranium enrichment for Iran is a force, not a threat. Therefore, we conclude that US-Iranian relations are built on the basis of interest and that interests determined by each country.

Question02 : How does the United States deplete Iranian wealth under the so-called strengthening of American-Iranian relations?

Answer: The USA does not deplete Iranian fortunes because Iran is the only one responsible for its wealth, and the national income depends on these fortunes, such as selling oil and gas.

Question03 : How did the tension between the two countries increased at the regional and the international levels?

Answer: The reasons that exacerbated the situation between both countries at the regional and the international levels are: the Iranian nuclear file, the current US policies toward Iran which are just a siege, the US economic sanctions imposed on Iran and the policy that Iran adopts toward the Strait of Hormuz as well. The direction of regional issues in the region as the Syrian and Iraqi files. In addition to US use of Iran as a file to control the Middle East, which has created tensions within the region, such as the race to armament; the acquisition of the best weapons to dispose of regional dependency, it creates a host of hostilities, as religious sects, to dismantle and fragment them.

Question:04 What prevents a war between the USA and Iran?

Answer: There is a functional theory says that the cost of war and the volume of economic exchanges prevent a war from occurring, meaning that the USA does not conduct wars within the coalition forces in partnership with NATO, Canada, Australia, and the Gulf states. These countries have interests with Iran and they will not allow war with that image that is portrayed to us. Entering the USA a war at the present time threatens the occurrence of a third world war, which will inevitably lead to the destruction of the world due to the development of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction.

Question 05: When will the of American interests be closely linked to Iran in the Middle East region?

Answer: The interests of the USA are not closely related to Iran because there is influence from the allies (Russia and China), and every country wants to achieve its interests through another state.

Question:06 Was the Iranian Islamic Revolution a cause of the strained relationship between both countries?

Answer: The Iranian Islamic Revolution was supported by the USA in 1976 in order to serve its interests later on in the 20s. This is called strategic planning 50 years ago attached to the National Security Report, the Iranian system is very developed because Iran did not depend on the Western technology, hence; it was unable to be hacked by the USA only with the help of the IAEA. It can be said that the support of the Iranian Islamic Revolution by the United States is one of the reasons for the current tension in the relationship.

Question:07 What makes the USA as the first country in the world maintains its relationship with Iran despite the prevailing return between them?

Answer: The focus will be on an important point, which is the feedback. It says that relations were good since the Iranian Islamic Revolution 1976 was with the blessing of the USA, and if we return to 2003 after the American intervention in Iraq in 2005, the USA allowed the Iranian penetration in Iraq, and this indicates that there is an agreement regarding this Middle East region on the one hand, and the elimination of American interests in the Middle East region remains one of the reasons on the other hand.

Question 08: Why did Iran refused to submit to the US desires to stop the nuclear program?

Answer: Because Iran is anxious about the other, and it has the right to find a solution that preserves its security, which is the nuclear weapon, from its point of view the imperative to

possess nuclear weapons that guarantees its survival, the survival of its security and its international system.

Question09: What is the Offensive Realism?

Answer: Among the theories that explain the international interactions within the international system, there is the Realistic Offensive Theory that has proven to be useful in explaining political phenomena or various interactions within the international system, meaning that the primary effective international system in it is the state and the rule is the war and peace is the exception . It also states that the state possesses two bases, which are interest and power, meaning that the state seeks to achieve its interest by possessing power in all fields to achieve its underlined goals, because this theory does not allow new nuclear powers to exist in the world.

Question 10: To what extent is Iran an exception in the world by continuing to develop nuclear weapons?

Answer: Iran is not an exception because the international system is now moving towards a change from ten years ago to a multi-polar system led by China as a nuclear deterrent, USA, India and the last position remains between Brazil and Turkey, meaning that the transformation does not allow new powers to emerge, and for Iran to develop nuclear weapons remains the imperative of their survival.

Question 11: Despite the power divergence between Iran and the United States, they have many relations. What is the secret of that?

Answer : Each two countries within an international system are governed by a set of interactions that are actions and reactions, whether negative or positive, and are determined by the interest and strength of each country.

Question 12: What is the nature of the relationship between the two countries, hostility or friendship?

Answer: The nature of the relationship between the two countries, according to the official statements of the two countries, is a clear hostility, by describing both Donald Trump and Barack Obama of Iran as a rogue state (i.e. the country that poses a threat to global security), and as for Iran, when describing the USA as an enemy country that threatens its national security.

Question 13: How do you evaluate the American-Iranian relations in light of the current presidential term of Donald Trump, the American President and Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian President?

Answer: The United States imposes economic sanctions on Iran and suffices with it. Its current goal is to maintain the status quo.

Question 14: Why the USA did not attack Iran and end its role in the Middle East?

Answer: The US attack on Iran or declaring war on it, is not a stage, but rather an option for the decision-maker like other options such as the economic blockade and imposing sanctions, and the decision-maker chooses the decision at the lowest possible cost.

Question 15: Where is the importance of Iran's nuclear program in the Middle East?

Answer: The Iranian nuclear program in the Middle East is the imperative of Iran's survival and its guarantee is the nuclear weapon.

Question 16: What are the common interests between the USA and Iran?

Answer: Common interests are restricted to the Middle East region and the international issues: Iraq, the Palestinian issue, ISIS, etc.

Question 17: Does clarifying relations between the two countries affect global security, clarify that?

Answer: Failure to do an action is in itself a reaction. The USA in all its stages did not break its relationship with Iran, and cutting ties remains an option for the decision-maker. This decision does not come from Iran because it is the weak eastside, but by the USA. Despite the worsening events between them, especially after the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the relations between both countries did not end.