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**Egyptian Government's Control of Media for Crowd's Manipulation: A
Comparative Study between Nasser'S and El Sisi's Strategies**

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Dedication

We dedicate this work to our beloved families

A special feeling of gratitude to our loving parents for their love, patience and sacrifices, who have been nicely our supporter until our research was fully finished,

We also dedicate this dissertation to our sisters and brothers who have supported us throughout this process. We will always appreciate all what they have done for us,

We dedicate this work and give special thanks to our lovely friends

And to all the people we love...

Maroua and Djihad

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Abstract

The authoritarian regime that ruled Egypt since the abolition of the monarchy was due to the failed democratic transition in Egypt. It started with the military coup of 1952 by the Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and it was brought back again with 2013 coup led by Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, after a short-lived democratic experience with the election of Mohamed Morsi. This work is a comparative study between the strategies adopted by both Presidents Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi using media as a tool to enhance their image, legitimize the military rule, manipulate the masses, and eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood and any other opposition. This study uses media discourse analysis and political historiography to shed light on the focal role of media and propaganda to influence and maneuver public opinion according to the regime.

Keywords: Abdel Nasser, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Military Regime, Media, Propaganda, Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt.

Résumé

Le régime autoritaire qui a gouverné l'Égypte depuis l'abolition de la monarchie était dû à l'échec de la transition démocratique en Égypte. Cela a commencé avec le coup d'État militaire de 1952 par les Officiers libres sous la direction de Gamal Abdel Nasser, et cela a été ramené avec le coup d'État de 2013 dirigé par le lieutenant-général Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, après une expérience démocratique de courte durée avec l'élection. de Mohamed Morsi. Ce travail est une étude comparative entre les stratégies adoptées par les présidents Abdel Nasser et El-Sissi utilisant les médias comme un outil pour améliorer leur image, légitimer le régime militaire, manipuler les masses et éliminer les Frères musulmans et toute autre opposition. Cette étude utilise l'analyse du discours médiatique et l'historiographie politique pour mettre en lumière le rôle central des médias et de la propagande pour influencer et manœuvrer l'opinion publique selon le régime.

Mots-clés : Abdel Nasser, Abdel Fattah El-Sissi, régime militaire, médias, propagande, Frères musulmans, Égypte

المخلص

كان النظام الاستبدادي الذي حكم مصر منذ إلغاء النظام الملكي سببا في فشل التحول الديمقراطي في مصر. بدأت مع الانقلاب العسكري عام 1952 من قبل الضباط الأحرار بقيادة جمال عبد الناصر ، ثم عاد مرة أخرى مع انقلاب عام 2013 بقيادة الفريق عبد الفتاح السيسي ، بعد تجربة ديمقراطية لم تدم طويلاً مع انتخابات محمد مرسي. هذا العمل عبارة عن دراسة مقارنة بين الاستراتيجيات التي تبناها كل من الرئيسين عبد الناصر والسيسي باستخدام الإعلام كأداة لتعزيز صورتها ، وشرعية الحكم العسكري ، والتلاعب بالجمهير ، والقضاء على الإخوان المسلمين وأي معارضة أخرى. تستخدم هذه الدراسة تحليل الخطاب الإعلامي والتأريخ السياسي لإلقاء الضوء على الدور المحوري للإعلام والدعاية للتأثير على الرأي العام ومناورته وفق النظام..

الكلمات المفتاحية: عبد الناصر ، عبد الفتاح السيسي ، النظام العسكري ، الإعلام ، الدعاية ، الإخوان المسلمون ، مصر.

List of Abbreviations

SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

RCC: Revolutionary Command Council

UAR: United Arab Republic

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General Introduction

Re-writing history becomes an urgent need to create more authentic one far away from any oppression, bias, and in very objective way. In Egypt using media by authorities played a decisive role in shaping the state's political system and promoting its ideologies. Embedding the foundation of military rule in Egypt was based on strategies that both Presidents Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi adopted to ensure their long term rule. Limiting media and imposing heavy censorship on the content produced to audience, which established conducted masses.

Abdel Nasser was a national hero with unprecedented achievements as an Arab leader. Besides, media was the strongest tool in Abdel Nasser's hand to influence people and conduct public opinion according to his goals, his speeches and strong personality contributed to raise his popularity. Governmental media and military regime were the prominent legacy of Abdel Nasser that deeply rooted in the Egyptian ruling system. Nasser's heritage continued with his successors. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi made use of media to strengthen his policies which shaped a military regime in the Egyptian state. Furthermore, El-Sisi's leadership, personality, and influence on masses led to shape the image of the strict president as it is portrayed in Egyptian media.

The aim of the study is to investigate to what extent media was used by Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi as a tool to varnish leader's images and to justify the actions taken by both regimes against the Muslim Brotherhood who has always represented the opposition party against both presidents.

The Middle East and North African countries had endured what is known as the Arab Spring which was a democratic uprising to change the political system in states such as Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Yemen Sudan, and Egypt. The latter was known by the domination of

military rule and its opposition with the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, president Abdel Nasser created the path towards the militarization of the state which president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi followed by bringing back the military control over the state using various strategies to embed his ideologies in the Egyptian mind set.

There have been many studies that discussed the military rule, the Muslim Brotherhood, but little was written about the difference or similarity between Nasser's and El-Sisi's policies. Most of the available literature and researches on Nasser's era are related to his legacy and concerned with his strategies, ideologies, and decision making that still affect today's Egyptian society. 'Egypt under Nasser' by Peter Johnson was an article that tackles the governance of Abdel Nasser from toppling the monarchy until the 'setback' of 1967, which was an overall document about Abdel Nasser's rule. It also sums up all his policies, decision, and reforms at home and abroad that shaped Egypt.

On the same path there are many literatures that dealt with Abdel Nasser's relation with the Muslim Brotherhood such as the article 'Brother in Arms? The Egyptian Military, the Ikhwan, and the revolutions of 1952, and 2011' by Anne Alexander which is concerned with the military regime interaction with the Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers) in post revolutions of 1952 and 2011 to understand the nature of that relation. All Nasser's successors were military men except Morsi who was the first civilian elected president. This democratization did not last unfortunately since El-Sisi came to put an end to this experience.

Dina Tawfic Abdel Fattah a researcher who conducted a thesis about Egyptian presidents' speeches in times of crisis: Comparative analysis at American University in Cairo, which tackles a comparison between three presidents' speeches who are Nasser, Mubarak, and El-Sisi, the study aims to analyze the role of president's speeches in manipulating facts, evading responsibilities, and failed policies. Moreover, the use of public speeches to influence

the people's minds and hearts, especially in times of crisis which people are in need to know the stability, or instability of the state.

An article which is conducted by Sara Tonsy and Aly el-Raggal about How Did Sisi Reproduce Authoritarianism in Egypt? explains the coup of 2013 and its nature, and then discusses the militarized state ruled by president El-Sisi's who used different strategies to come to power. In addition to the important role of the mandate for the reconstitution of authoritarianism which embedded his position in power. El-Sisi frankly declared that "the late president Nasser was lucky because he used to speak and media on his side". Therefore this research tends to examine the way media was used by both governments to investigate the differences and similarities between the strategies used.

To understand to what extent Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi are different or similar in their strategies using media it is needed to answer the following research questions:

1. How did Abdel Nasser succeed to control masses and what was the role of Media at that time?
2. How did El-Sisi's policy made use of Media and in fighting the opposition "Muslim brotherhood"?
3. What are the differences and common points between the policies adopted by Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi?

In order to answer the previously mentioned research question, this research shall use the qualitative research method to investigate the political system in Egypt through political historiography. In order to understand the timeline of events, data was collected and analyzed in form of texts, images, speeches, audios, and videos recordings. This study shall use media

discourse analysis method to clarify and understand the media discourse and its impact on people. This work implies political history from different political events and tackles both Presidents Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi's policies. The historical method enables researchers to evaluate the authenticity and accuracy of source materials through logical induction. In addition to using the comparative method to compare between the governing periods of both presidents and their use of media to embed their military rule.

This research is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will explain how Abdel Nasser came to power after a military coup against the monarchy, an act that paved the way to the military rule to be a political system adopted by the state since then. It exposes how Nasser managed to dominate people and to propagate his ideologies using media. This chapter tends also to cover the Nasser's use of media to against the Muslim Brotherhood that led to their elimination from the political arena.

The second chapter will study the post-era of toppling Morsi after the Arab Spring. The coup was led by Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who brought the state under the military again after it witnessed the first successful democratic experience after Mubarak. El-Sisi made use of media to spread his policies and to convince people of the legitimacy of his government. Thus, it will investigate the mediatic strategies used by El-Sisi to crack down the Muslim Brothers who shaped the opposition party in Egypt.

The third chapter is a comparative study between both presidents' strategies in terms of military rule and dealing with "Muslim Brotherhood" opposition. It also tends to compare between the use of propaganda through films, newspapers, and economic projects for political reasons. The third chapter differentiates between the populist effect on crowd consciousness of Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi to entrench their hegemony in the state.

Chapter One:

Nasser's Exceptionalism in Media

Introduction

Understanding history and its validation relies heavily on the events' implications that extended to this day. The pivotal events in Egypt such as the abolition of monarchy and proclamation of the republic in 1952 by the Free Officers a military group affected formation of the government. Whether it was a revolution or a coup d'état, it became off track of its declared objectives. Egypt is considered as a democratic republic that guarantees the exchange of power through election, and invoked to a constitution and laws to run the country. Egypt, however, turned out a military state governed by a group of officers who helped to overthrow the monarchy. From that time Egypt had started a new era under the military rule which began with Gamal Abdel Nasser and sustained with his successors.

The success of the officers made them in direct confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood who enjoyed wide acceptance and good reputation in Egypt especially after their participation in the war of 1948 against Israel. They also supported the revolution's goals to develop economics. The Muslim Brotherhood became a threat to Abdel Nasser and its disposal was a necessity through disbandment of the military wing of the group and framing-up to alienate them and get rid of any opposition.

Since Gamal was well aware of the importance of media, he appointed officers such as Anwar El-Sadate as chief editor of EL Gomhoriya (Republic) newspaper and made people like Tharwat Okasha a minister of culture. From the moment of Nasser's possession of the printed media and radio he launched his propaganda and dissemination of falsehoods to control the masses.

This chapter tends to explain how Abdel Nasser came to power by toppling king Farouk and adopting the military regime to run the new era of Egyptian history. Moreover, it investigates the interaction between the Free Officers which seized the power in 1952 and

Muslim Brotherhood as an ally during Mohamed Naguib term and as a rival during Nasser's presidency. In addition, the chapter examines how Abdel Nasser and his government manipulated the masses using media to spread a certain type of ideas amongst accepting military rule as the perfect option and fighting opposition that enabled Gamel Abdel Nasser tightening the grip on people's thinking.

This chapter uses qualitative approach, historical method and, discourse analysis in order to investigate, analyze and evaluate Abdel Nasser's ideologies impact on the newly independent state and people's perception using media.

1.1 The Free Officers' Military Coup and the Road to Power

The drastic changes caused by revolutions or civil wars during the old times in many countries drove thinkers and scholars to start asking about the typical form of government. Amongst, there were James Hobbes and John Locke who adopted opposite stances concerning the 'state of nature'. Hobbes and Locke started questioning the suitable form of government that preserved convenient relation between the governor and the governed that called 'social contract'.

While Hobbes believed that state of nature is chaotic 'nasty, brutish and short' he insisted on supreme authority in which people partially will give up their freedom in exchange of stability and protection to ensure security (Shea). 'Absolute power corrupts absolutely' in which Harrington objected to Hobbes and he argues that rotation in office prevent any kind of oligarchy (Cotton 401). However Locke believed that state of nature is state of freedom in which people act according to their will without restriction and government rules through consent of the people, protects their natural rights (Shea). These philosophies raised a controversial question about what is the suitable governing method and to what extent should

people permit the government and laws to restrict their freedom in return for the stability, security and protection.

Several people believe that the revolution is the solution to change their unpleasant conditions, according to Rubin “If enough people believe that the revolution is necessary to fulfill their cherished values and destroy traitors and heretics, then the dictatorship is a representative government” (539) and this is what happened in many uprisings such as Egypt in 1952. Britain declared Egypt an independent state in 1922. It was a nominal independence, because Britain continued its existence and control on different important zones in Egypt naming the Suez Canal. After the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian army against Israel in 1948, Egypt was in a miserable situation, firstly, from corrupted monarchy, and, secondly from the British occupation. Sayed-Ahmed mentions that “most of the young officers showed signs of bitter discontent” (70), which announced the officers’ intention to make the change sooner and eliminate the monarchy.

In late 1940 and the beginning of 1950, Egypt was suffering from poor living conditions, social inequality, feudal system, and the corruption of the British-backed monarch. The status quo warned of potential upheaval. In 1949, Egypt witnessed the emergence of the Free Officers’ group. Sayed-Ahmed states that the American embassy in Cairo concluded that according to the Free Officers “only an army can save Egypt, and it should assume the largest role in the coming renaissance” (70).

Sayed-Ahmed exposes that before the coup, there was a rapprochement and contact between the members of the Free Officers and the CIA (72), and he adds that “For the U.S neither the king nor the monarchy as the regime was viable for western needs or demands in Egypt” (61). The balance of power changed after the Second World War and America emerged as a new hegemonic power. The U.S needed to impose its ideology through policy of

containment on the postcolonial states in a form of aid. In addition, America was afraid that Egypt would fall into communism. Sayed-Ahmed mentions that The U.S realized that there is possibility of coup d'état in Egypt and it concluded that the group of officers was about to impose itself upon Egyptian political life, (71) and America viewed that no one would serve its interests in the region except the military establishment (73).

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers seized the power in a bloodless coup d'état. The army officers organized the coup, however, its success depended on the help of the U.S that prevented the British troops to interfere and considered this revolution as an internal affair (Sayed-Ahmed 95-96). Sayed-Ahmed adds that according to U.S “any foreign intervention would be disastrous”. The aforementioned information confirmed that U.S containment policy in Middle East started with Egypt as philanthropic responsibility and credited the success of the Free Officers coup d'état.

1.1.1 Accomplishment without Plan

After they took power with relative ease, Nasser and his officers' friends started a new era in Egypt's history and nation-building. At first, the Free Officers appointed General Mohamed Naguib to be their figurehead due to his respectful career and high rank, while the real leader was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Free Officers set six goals for their Revolution, in which Gordon states “battling imperialism and its Egyptian fifth column; abolition of feudalism; breaking up monopolies and the domination Of foreign capital; application of social justice; strengthening the military; and founding a ‘sound’ democratic system” (Nasser's Blessed Movement, 6).

Nonetheless, Nasser and his fellows had no clear vision or plan of the new Egypt. The Professor of History at Stanford University Joel Beinin states that “the revolution had no coherent economic policy or political ideology”, that confirms that Free Officers motive was

to abolish the monarchy without pre-plan. Gerges adds that for “Nasser and his army comrades had no preconceived master plan beyond this point” (78). This information was confirmed by Nasser’s closest journalist Mohamed Heikal who points out that the Free Officers “lacked a road map and were clueless about the future” (Gerges78). Moreover, Gordon states that “the officers spent the following two years trying to define the aims of that revolution” (Nasser’s Blessed Movement 4).

In January 1953, the Officers outlawed the political parties and declared the three years transition-period of martial rule (Gordon, Nasser Hero of Arab Nation 42-43), led by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), then in June 1953 officers announced Egypt a republic, and appointed Mohamed Naguib as president. There was a rift between Nasser and RCC on one hand and Naguib on the other hand. While Naguib was insisting on democracy and ‘elected civilian government’, in which the army should return to its barracks (Gerges 80). Nasser had a different point of view, according to Gerges “Nasser wanted to establish a dictatorship under his control that would allow him to engineer social reforms and change” (81), this confirms that the intended goals of revolution deviated from its track and became Officers’ goals. Gerges continues that “Nasser believed that liberal capitalist democracy is inappropriate for Egypt” (81). Nasser self-proclaimed to be the one who most know the state interests even if his decisions were against democracy.

The inconvenient relation between Nasser and Naguib pushed the latter to resign in February 1954, but after public pressure he returned as president and called out to restoration political life, until he was place under home arrest by RCC in November 1954 after accusing him conspiring with the Muslim brotherhood, while Nasser took the office (Mcnamara 25). Nasser had spared no effort to preserve power by getting rid of any dissenting of his decision, even the ones who helped him in the military coup such as Mohamed Naguib.

1.1.2 Media of the Military Republic

Nasser's first step to rule Egypt was tightening control towards the new state, Arif accentuated that "through manipulation of history, Nasser sought to achieve a dream that directed his choices since his early days" (26). Since he took power, Abdel Nasser knew that controlling media is equally important as seizing power. Gordon declares that the official history of the new Egypt will be constructed according to the Free Officer's desires and interests, and he adds that "They learned quickly to manipulate the press, where they published glorified accounts of their backgrounds and their take-over, and fabricated the role of troublesome opponents" (Nasser's Blessed movement 9). In the same path as Gordon, Arif explains that "according to Michel Foucault, knowledge is constructed and dominated by power, and exercising control over both knowledge and power is what defines all that is 'normal'" (9). The government's first important step was to monopolize knowledge and exploited information according to its interest.

Rami Khouri in his article Please Spare Us the Gamal Abdel Nasser Imagery that it is known for everyone that the first one who brought to Arab governance the military rule, and ministry of information was Nasser (Khouri). From the moment Nasser took the helm, he appointed his friends officers on the main functions of the state. Khouri notes that "the establishment of a ministry of information under Nasser was equally degrading to Egyptian and Arab citizens, because it acted like an Orwellian monster that sought to control what every citizen heard, saw and read in the national media". Evidently, since his early days in power Abdel Nasser policies aimed to reduce or even eliminate the media freedom, according to El Shaer media helped "to mobilize people behind the government policies and ideologies" (1).

Nasser did not allow any ideas, or writings except the ones that glorify him, and the Free Officers' revolution, El Shaer mentions that "Nasser's nationalization of the press marked the end of its freedom, professionalism, and excellence" (1). Nasser sought to impose full control over the new Egypt, and nationalization was urgent need. Hanen Badr states that "he established a new media house called Al-Tahrir, which published the Al-Gomhoriya (Republic) newspaper, and by 1960 Nasser nationalized all media under the pretext of protecting stability and serving the interests of republic" (219). Undoubtedly that controlling media was the cornerstone of Nasser's authoritative regime.

1.2 Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood

In 1928 came to existence the group of the Muslim Brotherhood by the leadership of its founder Hassan El-Banna. The beginning of the group was apolitical, in which Breuer mentions that the group's first aims were devoted to charity and religious reform (1). However, during the late 1930, the Muslim brotherhood society changed its direction and adopted a political tone (2). In 1948 the government banned and dissolved the Muslim Brothers and its Secret Unit which was the military wing of the group that fought beside the Palestinians in the Israeli- Palestinian war on the backdrop of suspicion terror activities, assassination attempts and caches of bombs and explosive that police found in their possession and what the government interpreted as proof that the group was planning revolution (2).

The humble start of the Muslim Brothers' society turned from small religious group into the most influential opposition in Egypt. Zollner declares that the group "grew quickly from local circle in Ismailiyya to an Islamist mass opposition" (Muslim Brotherhood 10) with great influence Muslim Brothers gained a lot of support mainly from the middle class and evolved into political pressure movement (12). Despite of El-Banna's assassination and

dissolution of the movement, however, Zollner accentuates that “the Muslim Brotherhood survived in an environment of tactical and retreat and secrecy” (16).

After Nasser and the Free Officers carried power in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood with their new leader El-Hudaybi declared his full support of the revolution and the Free Officers. Gerges points out that although they had different points of view concerning the state ruling system because both had different ideologies and backgrounds, Gerges exposes that “the Officers and Muslim Brothers who carried out the coup had much in common and might easily found a common ground to run the government” (77). In spite the fact that there was evidence that some of the Free Officers were members of the secret military wing of the Muslim Brothers such as, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Khaled Muhi al-Din that was written in the memoirs of Muhi el-Din himself. However, Gerges states that “the Free Officers and Muslim Brothers never reached a consensus on a common and inclusive vision of what post-colonial Egypt would be” (77). This marked the beginning of the crack between Nasser and the Muslim Brothers’ relationship.

In January 1953, while the RCC dissolved all political parties, the Free Officers asked the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the new government’s formation (Zollner, Muslim Brotherhood 30). As an influential group, The Muslim Brothers were offered some ministers in the cabinet under Mohamed Naguib (30). Nevertheless, the Free Officers broke the promises and did not give the Brothers the ministers they agreed upon, and in January 1954 the Muslim Brothers were dissolved by the RCC (34). The Officers refused to share power with political actors that the regime considered as threat to their rule and adopted Unitarian regime to preserve their power.

1.2.1 The Manshiya Incident

On October 24, 1954, in Manshiya square where Gamal Abdel Nasser was subjected to an assassination attempt when he was delivering a speech about the evacuation treaty with Britain that guarantee the Egyptian full independence and sovereignty (Scharfe). The main accused in the incident was the Muslim brotherhood. The alleged attempt of assassination Nasser's life on October, 26 1954 signaled the beginning of the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Zollner, Prison Talk 413). The 'bittersweet connection' between Nasser and the Muslim Brothers turned sour.

To protect their coup, the Free Officer believed that they are the most worthy to rule Egypt that is why Gamal Abdel Nasser's state according to El-Shaer was "characterized by autocratic leadership, as he exercised an Iron fist policy in dealing with his opponent" (1). Because of the Free Officers indecision and the lack of political order to lead the state in the forthcoming phase of re-establishment of the sovereignty made the Muslim Brothers' ideology Stronger due to the latter broad audience. Nasser ordered arbitrary sentences against the Muslim Brothers. In military tribunals some of Muslim brotherhood members were sentenced to death such as Abdel kader Awda, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, Yousef Talaat and Al Hodaybi whose death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Thousands were prisoned while the rest succeeded to escape the country (Zollner, Prison Talk 413). The amount of persecution and arrests against the Muslim Brothers comparing to the failed alleged assassination is summed up that Abdel Nasser took the advantage to eliminate any potential confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood that may threaten his authority.

There was a controversy about the group's involvement in the assassination attempts or it was staged. Zollner mentions that "There are in fact indications that the attempt was instigated in order to create an opportunity to ward off the Muslim Brotherhood as well as

Nasser's opponents within the RCC" (Muslim Brotherhood 37). She adds that a lot of experts saw that Abdel Nasser the only one who gained from the incident, she states that Muslim Brothers "had no reason to jeopardize its position through confrontation with the RCC" (37).

1.2.2 Nasser's Charisma Effect

Nasser says 'Raise your head fellow brother', the end of colonialism has come' (Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution). Nasser's charismatic colloquial speeches and rhetoric had a deep influence on people. He captured the mind and the heart of the Egyptian and Arab people. Sharara and Arabi state that "Much of his success is generally due to his nationalist ideology, charismatic character, and passionate voice" (86). Ajami adds that "the picture of Nasser that emerges from Heikal's account is of a nationalist rebel searching for dignity and alternative in the world political system" (42). Nasser wanted to build the image of the great leader personality that impossible to be recreated through using his gifted charisma.

Nasser had a strong effect on the Egyptian and Arab Psyche. Abdul Rahman al-Kawakabi writes:

Western man is a hard-headed materialist. He is fierce to deal with; he is by nature inclined to exploit others, and is ever ready to revenge himself on his enemies. In contrast, Arabs and Moslems are morally motivated and are governed by the kindness of heart, compassion, and mercy, which they often misplace. They are gentle and kind even to their enemies (quoted in: Rubin 536).

The incident of Al Manshiya and how Abdel Nasser kept talking while shooting had a deep effect in people who became sympathizers, and his speech becomes ever more impassioned: "O free men, let them kill me where I stand!" (Scharfe). And added: "Dear

liberals, please stay where you are.....I would sacrifice my blood and my life for you” (El-Faqih). After the incident, Nasser emerged as fearless leader that would sacrifice his life for the dignity of his people.

1.3 Nasser’s Media

It is known that Egypt is the pioneer and the leader of media in the Arab world. After its formal independence media in Egypt enjoyed freedom of the press in spite of the continuation of the British military presence (Lavie and Yefet 144). Even the constitution’s law of 1923 that Lavie and Yefet mention was “prohibited the preventive censorship, suspension and banning of newspapers” unless threaten the social order or attack the king (144).

The onset of radio broadcasting in 1920 impose no restriction, however, later the state started to impose constraints on radio station private ownership keeping it under its control afraid of any political disorder (Lavie and Yefet 144). By the coming of the Free Officers radio programs in addition to cinema and even songs were under the service of Nasser’s policies and ideologies in order to control and direct the public opinion. For that reason, media flourished during Nasser’s rule. Diong mentions that the radio for example was obtainable even within the lowest class and, she adds that it was “mostly state-owned or heavily regulated by state” (41).

In a largely illiterate society the radio was perfect tool to reach all strata of society. The Voice of the Arab radio program according to Boyd was “established itself as an enthusiastic medium for revolutionary propaganda” (647). Radio broadcasting was dedicated to Nasser’s long speeches that spread his ideas of Pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism. Abdou states that “From the heart of Cairo, Sout al-Arab (the Voice of the Arab) was broadcasting the revolutionary ideas of Nasser’s regime 18 hours each day, in millions of homes across the

Middle East and North Africa” (Sawt Al-Arab Radio: Nasser’s Paradox of Unity). The Voice of the Arab radio program played a major role to spread Nasser’s thoughts at home and abroad.

Music and particularly patriotic songs such as *Ihna AL she’b* (we are the people) by Abd El Halim Hafiz is perceived by Diong as manipulation tool, she states that songs “manipulated to promote politicized sentiments to enable Nasser to intensify the spread of his Pan-Arabian ideology” (43). Remarkably, Abdel Nasser wanted songs that glorify him in the name. For example Umm Kulthum sang after the Manshiya incident, “Gamal, you are the example of patriotism, and our national holiday is when you survived Al-Manshiya incident” (Al-Faqih), while Abdel Halim sang *Ya Gamal ya Habib el Malayin* (Gamal, Beloved of Millions) in the sixth anniversary of revolution, Alahmad mentions that songs “act as an anthem to provide encouragement and enthusiasm, especially for the Arabs’ victory during the Suez War in 1956, praising Nasser and his accomplishments” (12). There was around 1217 songs that hollowed Nasser and his ideologies (Arabi and Sharara 89). These songs were performed by the most famous singers such as Umm Kulthum, Abd El Halim Hafez who were the artistic voice of the regime.

Because Nasser’s Egypt was a one voice state, Nasser nationalized even the private audio production sector such as the company of Misrphon owned by the singer Mohamed Fawzi and turned its name to ‘Sawt al Qahira’ (The voice of Cairo). According to Frishkopf For Nasser, “acquiring the means of recorded audio production provided more than economic control for he recognized the ideological value of music media very well” (46). Nasser’s statist socialism and nationalization of his recording studio was behind fawzi’s illness and death. Nasser went further and monopolized even singers’ voices such as Umm Kulthum in which Frishkopf confirms, and he states that “because of her ideological significance as a

symbol of pan-Arabism, and Egypt's importance in the pan-Arab sphere under Nasir's leadership" (47).

Cinema also had its role in Nasser's Egypt, the censorship on the content turned the cinema into a tool to direct audience through using themes such as Arab unity and condemnation of the monarchy, Arif indicates that "introducing a politically conscious cinema engaged in the process of cultural discovery. In turn, this revolutionary cinema became an integral part of the initial stages of nation-building, acting as a vehicle of the new ideology" (22). A film like *Rodda Qalbi* (Give me my Heart back) was a criticism of the monarchy and praised revolution (23). Films also were subjected to censorship and oriented according to the state's vision.

Many scholars such as Ajami who suggests that "the value of Nasserism may ultimately be purely psychological and symbolic and an altogether different 'currency' might be needed to evaluate its achievements and the role it played in contemporary Arab society" (42). Nasser's great image emerged in a critical period in which most of Arab countries were under colonialism. The impact that Abdel Nasser created on people's perception through his exceptional personality needed to be evaluated from psychological aspect. Having the same opinion as Ajami, Dekmejian points to "the 'peculiar spiritual bond' between Nasser and the masses, arguing that any appraisal of Nasser's ideology, institutions and processes must be analyzed from the psychological perspective of the Egyptian and Arab people" (quoted in: Arif 25). Nasser as an anti-colonial leader and Arab unity advocator succeeded to originate a unique relation with the masses. Nasser with his unprecedented achievement made him an exceptional figure that symbolizes people's aspiration of strong and independent state under his leadership.

1.3.1 Suez Crisis and Nasser's Popular Victory

Although Egypt was an anti- communist, Johnson explains that the conditions of Dulles' pacts "drove Egypt to buy arms from Czechoslovakia" (5). The fear of communism penetration in the region made the U.S come up with a new deal. America offered to finance the High Dam (Essad Elaali) which was Nasser's national project of hydroelectric power station. Later America withdrew from the deal and Nasser's answer had been the nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 which was owned by international group. Abdel Nasser's decision was reckoned with. Beinlin mentions that "His announcement electrified the Egyptian people, the Arab region, and the entire third world". Saadedine Ibrahim, an Egyptian political activist, in Aljazeera website says "It was fantastic, we went down to the streets, it was late at night, it was summer... streets were full of demonstrations, joy, people cheering... it was like a festival, it was like a feast, a moment of victory again" (Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution).

Britain, France, and Israel refused Nasser's decision of the nationalization of the Suez Canal because it threatens their interests in the region and launched what is known as the 'tripartite aggression' against Egypt on October 29, 1956. After the aggression Nasser said "We feel that we are strong, we feel that the world has changed," and he adds:

They want to insult us? Well, we can also insult them...can't our papers also insult the Queen and their Prime Minister" and adds that "We shall build up industry in Egypt and compete with them. They do not want us to become an industrial country so that they can promote the sale of their products and market them in Egypt (4 Historical Speeches by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser).

One understands that Nasser's enthusiastic tone fills the masses with pride and dignity.

America wanted to maintain its image as a peacekeeper in the region as the U.S was concerned about Soviet involvement and refused to support the allies militarily (McDermott 142). Consequently, the western allies and Israel were forced to withdraw after American and Soviet pressure. Britain and France were humiliated and lost their prestige while Nasser and despite its military defeat, the Suez canal was a political success for Abdel Nasser that helped to increase his popularity which skyrocketed and he emerged as Egyptian as well as Arab world leader. Beinun adds that “Egypt emerged from the war unbowed and control off the Suez canal”. The Suez crisis enabled Nasser to receive a wide Arab recognition at the expenses of western influence.

Rubin points out that Nasser was an overambitious leader, and he states that “the Arab military officers who seized power in the name of the people promised to solve everything. The new regimes intoxicated people with visions of victory, renaissance, and revenge” (Rubin 542). However, after Nasser came to power he did not fulfill his claimed goals. Gerges adds “While the Palestine war in 1948 persuaded Nasser of the imperative of Arab collective security, Suez converted him to the cause of Arab nationalism as a shared destiny and identity,” (189) Nasser made the best use of the Suez crisis to serve his Pan-Arabism ideology.

No one would describe this period of Egyptian history better than the writer Tawfik El-Hakim. Despite el-Hakim was supporting Nasser during his reign, he criticized him after his death. In his book, *The Return of Consciousness* Tawfik exposes Nasser’s propaganda, charismatic leadership, and powerful speeches. El-Hakim says “when he delivered a powerful speech and said about [the United States] which had the atomic bomb that "if they don't like our conduct, let them drink from the sea, “he filled us with pride” (20) El-Hakim adds:

Whatever the fact, those glowing images of the accomplishments of the revolution made out of us instruments of the broad propaganda apparatus with its drums, its horns, its odes, its songs a, and it's filmed. We saw ourselves as a major industrial state, a leader of the developing world in agricultural reform, and the strongest striking force in the Middle EastNo one argued, checked, verified or commented. We could not help but believe, and burn our hands with applause (28).

Nasser gained huge mass support due to his key components in which Rubin mentions that “charismatic leadership, ideological demagoguery and populist reform” (543). Although the restoration of the Suez Canal was with the help of the U.S diplomacy, however, Nasser gained prestigious status.

1.3.2 Nasser’s Propaganda

1.3.2.a Heikal, the Egyptian Goebbels

During the Second World War, Hitler had Goebbels as a propaganda promoter while in Egypt Nasser had Heikal. Heikal started his career as journalist covering battle of El-Alemein in Egypt during the second world war, then the Greek civil war and the Syrian coup d’état and later the Palestinian war in 1948 where he met a group of officers of whom Gamal abdel Nasser. In 1951 Nasser met Heikal again to start a friendship flourished through years of Nasser’s reign. After the Free Officers coup, Heikal became the master propagandist, speechwriter.

First, Heikal was appointed editor-in-chief of Akher sa‘a (Last Hour), and later in 1957 at the Al-Ahram daily (The Pyramids). Heikal’s close relation with Nasser, enabled him to become a propaganda tool to the ideas and visions of authority, according to Hassan

“Heikal blurred the line between the role of a journalist and that of a politician”. In Nasser’s Police State, Hassan mentions that “Critical voices were muted, the military junta was sacrosanct, and Nasser was fortified as a national hero”. Rather than being faithful in delivering the news and stripping from any opinion of biasing, Egyptian newspapers with the supervision of Heikal were serving the interests of Nasser and amplifying his achievements. Heikal’s close tie with Nasser made so many think that Heikal was the man who wrote Nasser’s *Philosophy of the Revolution* (Gerges 79).

The most significant speech was written by Heikal when he crafted the message of Nasser resignation after the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian army against Israel in 1967, in which Heikal coined the name of ‘Setback’ to describe the defeat that would be much less shocking. While the Egyptian army subjected to annihilation, the Egyptian newspapers were celebrating such as El-Massa’a (The Evening) declares that ‘Shoot Down 43 Enemy’s Planes’ and El-Akhbar entitles ‘Our Forces are Penetrating inside Israel’ intoxicating people with fake news and false victory. On June 9, 1967 Nasser’s sombre tone during his emotional and sensational speech of resignation saying that “I have decided to step down completely and forever from any official position and any political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses to fulfill my duties as any other citizen” (Hassan).

Despite of the tremendous military loss in which eighty percent of Egyptian armed forces were destroyed and eleven thousand died in only four days (Gordon, Nasser Hero of Arab Nation 108). Besides, Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights and West Bank were taken by Israeli forces, the setback media succeeded to mobilize people to streets demanding him to stay in power, newspapers Akhbar al-Youm (Today’s News) entitled ‘The People Say ‘No’. Gordon also suggests that the demonstration that went down streets demanding Nasser to stay recalled the RCC resignation that provoked the masses to congregate against Mohamed Naguib and against establishing a democratic ruling government. Gordon insists on that

Abdel Nasser was a populist leader with a weak political order that play on tickling the people sentiments (Nasser Hero of Arab Nation 110). No one can deny the popularity that Abdel Nasser had; however, so many believe that the demonstration was staged. Short time after his speech “Nasser's political organizers skilfully set about arranging even larger mass demonstrations of support. These were crowned a few hours later with the announcement that he would stay in office after all” (For 18 Years Nasser had almost hypnotic power in his leadership of Egyptians).

1.3.2.b Unity with Syria

The nationalization of the Suez Canal was a significant event in Egyptian history and Nasser's image as an anti-colonial hero and the leader of the Arab nation. The first step towards Arab unity was when Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Nasser eagerness of his Pan- Arabism ideology resulted in the newly formed state. According to Gerges, he was told by the inner circle of Nasser that “Nasser was sceptical about the merger between Egypt and Syria” (189), but the UAR turned to be another ambition that strength Abdel Nasser's propaganda as the Arab world leader. His confidant Heikal admitted that Arab unity was a dream until Abdel Nasser came and made it true (Gerges 190).

The idea of Arab union was deeply believed by El-Baath party in Syria since years before Abdel Nasser coming to power, Palmer mentions that “Support for the concept of Arab unity has traditionally been strong in Syria” (50). Syrian ruling elite were in need of charismatic leader and viewed that in Abdel Nasser. They insisted on Nasser as the savior and the solution of the Syrian internal turmoil, Gerges declares that “Syrian politicians offered their country to Nasser on a silver platter” (189).

In 1958, the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria became a reality under the leadership of Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian newspapers celebrated the Union as a

successful accomplishment of Nasser's idea of Pan Arabism. Al Gomhoriya newspapers entitled 'the president announced: No Regionalism No Sectarianism...Union and Solidarity', while Al Ahram declared 'Great State Arose in the East'. Songs also were a part of this Union. Numerous songs were produced with torrid enthusiasm for the union propaganda such as 'the hour has come for the revolutionary work, for the struggle of the free', 'I swear by her sky and her sand...that never shall the Arabian sun vanish', 'the Great Homeland' and 'Every Arab Brother is my Brother' and many others.

A period of three years was enough for UAR to collapse (1958-1961). Nasser started an autocratic rule, Abdou he mentions that "Nasser began to eliminate the Baath party from power after a year of outward partnership; and by the start of 1960, many Baathists were alienated from governance. Political parties were banned entirely" (Why did the United Arab Republic fail). According to Palmer "the Syrian elites felt that they were being relegated to secondary positions, and that the Egyptians were trying to run the whole show." (54-55). Short lived UAR did not take into consideration that the Union needs more than just a shared language, religion, history or culture, but a common ground in politics and economy to run the union effectively which showed that the aim of this union was a pure propaganda that Nasser used to widen his ideology of Pan-Arabism. The mutual accusations between Nasser and el Baath party participated in the decline of the UAR. While Syria seceded the UAR, Egypt remained under the name of UAR until 1971.

1.3.2.c The Missile Propaganda

Nasser's ambition to lead the Arab world boosted him to start missile development program. Nasser in one of his speeches on December 1960, he said that "if Israel can make an atom bomb, we can also make an atom bomb" (Levite and Landau 54) and he adds that "Our atom bomb is our unity and our faith in our country" (54). Abdel Nasser cares more about the

political benefits of the project than the project itself because his aim was the propaganda that represented him as the ultimate leader of the Arab world. Sirrs mentions that “Nasser was more concerned with the political atmospherics surrounding his missiles than their military value” (122).

Israel was concerned about the missiles development program. Sirrs explains that “Cairo’s missile tests and military parade elicited a strong Israeli response that included assassination, intimidation, and an information operations campaign.” (57). Assassination attempt forced many scientists to flee. Nasser did not provide any education to the future Egyptian rocket scientists rather; he preferred to obtain German scientists (202). Nasser aimed to gain a wide recognition from the missile program rather than developed real effective weapons.

According to Sirrs Nasser’s missiles were belittled by American agents who viewed that these missiles were useless metal structures for military parade show (193). In every anniversary of revolution the missiles were shown in streets. The role of the missile program was another propaganda that met the people aspirations and magnified Nasser and the military rule. Egyptian newspapers played an important role to support Nasser’s propaganda. Al Akhbar newspapers entitled that ‘Arabic Missile can Reach Tel Aviv if it launched from Cairo’. Al-Kaher (conqueror) and Al-Zafer (victor) were the names of the Egyptian missile that according to the Egyptian newspapers were intended to reach ranges of 600 kilometres.

The General lieutenant Saad Eddin Shazly admits that “the performance of these weapons was abysmal” (quoted in Sirrs 161). He adds that “apart from the destructive power of its warhead, Al- Kahir was medieval” (162). During the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 Nasser's missiles Al- Zafer and Al- Kahir were useless. Brugge states that “while Egypt may have launched some missiles during the early stages of the war, they proved to be of no military

consequence” in addition to a scandalous defeat, the six days war of 1967 marked the beginning of Nasser’s popularity decline.

Conclusion

By his accession to power, Gamal Abdel Nasser and his military friends managed to control media. Nasser knew that media is key promoter of his policies to legitimize his military coup, autocracy, and military state, as it served as a tool to control masses.

Abdel Nasser and Muslim Brotherhood relationship varied between a successful partnership to access power, to confrontation and, later to detention of the Muslim Brothers to eliminate any opposition that may threaten his authority.

Gamal Abdel Nasser monopolized power in order to achieve his vision of independent Egypt. However, towards the achievement of his objectives, Nasser abolished democracy and replaced it by authoritarian regime ruled by military system that enabled him to control the state bodies.

Through media propaganda Abdel Nasser succeeded to spread his ideologies such as Pan- Arabism and turned his military failure into accomplishment like the Suez Canal crisis. His charismatic personality, patriotic speeches, and songs that were dedicated to him made Abdel Nasser the absolute leader of his nation. Despite Nasser’s ideology success in Egypt and abroad, however he distorted his career with demagoguery.

Chapter Two:

El-Sisi and the Re-Militarization of the State

Introduction

In late 2010 and early 2011, the various forms of uprisings and protests that erupted across the MENA countries had led to conventional events in the region changing from autocracy to democracy created a wave of what is called the Arab spring. It started with the Jasmin revolution in Tunisia. People in the Arab countries adopted a popular slogan which is “The people want the downfall of the regime”. Thus, on January 25th, Egyptian Revolution broke out President Hosni Mubarak submitted his resignation by abandoning his presidential position and his government, and then his deputy, Omar Suleiman, was appointed as the country's president, and all presidential powers were ceded to him. After Mubarak stepped down, a new era began in Egypt, with new elections that call for democracy.

. Many candidates have been competing for the presidency, but Mohamed Morsi won the presidential elections with 51.73%. Thus, making him the first civic president in Egypt's history. However, Morsi's power in presidency did not last for long. As on July, 3rd, 2013 Lieutenant-General Abd El Fattah El-Sisi announced the removal of President Mohamed Morsi in a coup d'état. He suspended the work of the constitution and cut off the broadcasting of several media outlets. Also, El-Sisi appointed President of the Constitutional Court Adly Mansour to head the country. After almost one year of toppling President Morsi, and then Adly Mansour's rule, there were presidential elections which resulted on June, 6th, 2014, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi became the president of Egypt.

Historically, media played a major part in Egypt's political history, its revolutions and uprisings. In the contemporary time media is much known with its apparently concurrent upholding to the current regime and an exaggerated depiction of the illustrious hopes concerning the new president. It is linked to a persistent propensity to discredit the Muslim Brothers, in addition to a campaign to denigrate the activists of the 25th January (Abdulla).

This chapter deals with the period after the overthrowing of President Morsi in a coup d'état. The work sheds light on the role of media and how it is used by authorities to influence the masses. Basically, the use of talk shows and news played a huge role in changing the path of democracy by the popular president El-Sisi. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood image has been shaped according to the Egyptian media coverage, especially that president El-Sisi uses different policies against the opposition party. This chapter follows a qualitative approach using political history and discourse analysis in order to analyze how President El-Sisi uses media, especially talk shows and news to manipulate the masses and the different strategies used by the Egyptian state against the opposition in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular.

2.1 Toppling Morsi and the Arab Spring

The regime of former President Hosni Mubarak was known for corruption, unemployment, injustice and oppression, in addition to the fact that during his rule, the emergency law was activated. All these factors stirred in the hearts of Egyptian citizens that they should rise and not surrender to such tyrannical regimes. But during the last period of Mubarak's rule in 2006, a meeting was held in order to vote to re-activate the emergency law, as it was in all the previous years. According to Rutherford, on April 30, 2006, the Parliament decided to re-activate the emergency law in order to resume working by it and by a large majority vote. The law gives the president exceptional powers to restrict citizens, forbid public gatherings, and issue decrees with little accountability to Parliament or the people, but the law prevents liberties and freedom of expression. (52).

This law can be described as a suppression tool to control the people of any country. In an article written by Kristen Chick, published in the Christian Science Monitor in which she claims "Egyptian businessman Khalid Said died during what witnesses say was a

brutal public beating by police officers on June 6 in Alexandria. His death has ignited protests in Cairo and Alexandria and demands for justice have spread like wildfire on blogs and social networking sites” (Chick). Therefore, his murder can be regarded as a result of using the emergency law and giving police officers the right to use their power under any condition without respecting the people’s freedom. Furthermore, Kristen Chick adds in her article describing the negative impact of activating the emergency law which she states “police brutality and torture continues to be widespread in Egypt, where an emergency law that grants wide powers to security forces has been in place for nearly three decades” (Chick). His case murder was the first spark of the revolution, thus the activist Wael Ghonim created a page on Facebook which witnessed a widespread on social media ‘We Are All Khaled Said’, in order to protest against Egyptian police torture and financial corruption (Alaimo).

A conversation took place on CNN coverage between Wael Ghonim, an internet activist and CEO of Marketing at Google MENA, to CNN's Wolf Blitzer in which Ghonim stated “If you want to liberate a government, give them the internet.”(Rao) Ghonim emphasized on the role of social media at the period of uprisings and protests, thus Facebook was used to organize the timing of uprisings, Twitter helped to let people cooperate with each other through posting short hashtags, and YouTube had an important role in filming the events of the revolution and spreading everything to the whole world (Bhuiyan). The January 25, revolution was the beginning of the Arab Spring and calling for democracy in Egypt. The revolution broke out against President Mubarak’s regime; it was supported by Parties from the Egyptian opposition such as the Muslim Brothers who announced their will to participate in the protests. Besides, other social groups created by the youth on Facebook, or Twitter like the Facebook page ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ which played an important role in promoting social media. Therefore, it was the end of Mubarak’s regime and appointing

Vice President Omar Suleiman until new elections are held (Unrest in 2011: January 25 Revolution).

After a year from stepping down former President Hosni Mubarak, the Supreme Committee for Presidential Elections announced the agenda of the 2012 presidential elections. Subsequently, on June, 24, 2012, it declared the victory of Mohamed Morsi, the candidate who represented the Muslim Brotherhood part in the presidential elections with 51.73, thus he becomes the first civic elected president in the country in democratic elections. Morsi encountered many difficulties in his term, he was accused by Brotherhoodization of the state, and this accusation was a result of the new governor's movement which includes seven governors as members of Muslim Brotherhood, thus bringing the share of governors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic political parties supporting them, thirteen out of twenty-seven governors.

The people started protesting and asking for new early presidential elections, this latter protests were coupled with the emergence of two different movement with different principles which are "Tamarod" movement supported with more than 22 million signatures against Morsi's rule; on the other hand, Tajarod movement which gathered 26 million signature supporting to president Morsi. Though the rejection and pressure that Morsi faced he went out on July, 2, 2013 in his speech defending the principle of legitimacy. However, Morsi's speech was considered as defying the Egyptian people rejecting its survival, ignoring the army's deadline, and confirming that it repeated the last speech of ousted President Hosni Mubarak on the evening of February 10, 2011, by stressing his unwillingness to cling to power, and to remain in office to protect the constitution and the will of the people (The military coup against Morsi in Egypt).

On July, 3, 2013 Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi declared the removal of President Mohamed Morsi, suspended the constitution, and appointed the Head of the Supreme Court, Counselor Adly Mansour to run the country. In addition to what have been said and announced at channels and newspaper Mohamed Morsi was held at an undisclosed location for several months and orders were issued to arrest 300 members of the Muslim Brotherhood. El- Sisi's act was described as a coup d'état by many countries around the world; however, other Arab countries were neutral to what happened in Egypt except Tunisia and Yemen who denounced the military coup (The military coup against Morsi in Egypt).

2.2 The Use of Talk Shows and News to Influence the Masses

After the coup d'état "military coup" on President Morsi, the Egyptian authorities led by Lieutenant-General Abd El Fattah El-Sisi have constrained and limited the right to express and freedom of speech and dominated the narrative concerning media in Egypt (Abdulla). After 33 day from his inauguration as the country's president, El-Sisi in his speech states that the late leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was lucky, to have the support of media on his side (How did the Egyptian media) El- Sisi's speech emphasizes his will and desire to control media, because it was the tool of the falling of Mubarak's regime, and it was the one which paved the way to create the struggle between Morsi's supporters and their opponents. Thus, media is regarded as a promoter of revolution and allowing Egyptian citizens to participate in such revolution and let their voices heard.

Consequently, media can influence the masses, it has such important role that President El-Sisi was clever enough to manipulate his people's minds and thoughts, more precisely Noam Chomsky in his book *Silent Weapons for Quiet War* has spoken about various strategies to control the masses, Chomsky argues

The strategy of distraction which is to divert public attention from important issues and changes determined by the political and economic elites, by the technique of flood or flooding continuous distractions and insignificant information. Distraction strategy is also essential to prevent the public interest in the essential knowledge in the area of the science, economics, psychology, neurobiology and cybernetics. Maintaining public attention diverted away from the real social problems, captivated by matters of no real importance. Keep the public busy, busy, busy, no time to think..... (Silent Weapons for Quiet War).

This strategy demonstrates how El-Sisi made his people believe that Egypt is under a threat and the military is the one who is capable of saving and protecting the state. However, the country witnessed the Arab Spring and a coup d'état which led to chaos, thus the army took advantage of such situation to distract the people and convince them that they should support the army.

Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi became President of Egypt in 2014. His success and his coming to power is regarded as a revolution that resulted with a democratic presidential election by his supporters, as it was portrayed in Egyptian media. More precisely, El-Sisi dominated media through the official channels. On April 11, 2017, El-Sisi issued a decision, considered by some to be the nationalization of media, to form the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, headed by one of its most prominent supporters, former Syndicate of Journalists Makram Mohamed Ahmed with 12 others as members. In the same month in which the council was formed, the editor-in-chief of Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper (privately) and the editor of the newspaper's headline, which was published in its first edition, referred "the state mobilizes voters to vote on the last day" to the Syndicate of Journalists for investigation into the publication of the headline accusing the state of mobilizing, as the resolution put it. He also decided to compel the newspaper to post an

apologia to the National Press Authority, and to sign a fine of 150,000 pounds (How did the Egyptian media).

The same thing was repeated with "Masr Al-Arabiya" website, where it was fined 50 thousand pounds, after it quoted a translated report from the American newspaper "The New York Times" entitled "Egyptians Are Marching for the Elections for 3 Dollars" Then, few days later, an editor-in-chief was arrested. Journalist Adel Sabry's website, who is languishing in prisons as of this writing. Only ten days after the inauguration of the council, specifically on the 20th of April 2017, a code prepared by the council's officials for media standards and press coverage was revealed, those standards considered by many to restrict freedoms and the citizen's right to know. Among them was: "The obligation not to broadcast, publish, or Broadcasting the course of operations, security or military positions, or plans, adhering to official data regarding the numbers of martyrs and wounded, and the results of operations," which means excluding unofficial accounts of these events (How did the Egyptian media).

2.2.1 DMC, the Official Television of the State's Voice

In 2016, two years after president El-Sisi took power, talk began about the establishment of a new network of channels called 'DMC'. Ahmed Hafez, a journalist in Al-Ahram, pointed out in an article on his social media page that 'DMC' is an Egyptian satellite channel network that includes about ten channels, but the scheduled launch will be in late September or early next October with only seven various. These channels target all segments of the people, political, sports, social, women, children and youth. And it will indirectly be the voice of the state and a wall against any foreign media (Arab or international) that attack Egypt, as Hafez likened it to the Egyptian Al-Jazeera channel, especially since the current Egyptian media is all very local, and failed to address the outside (Hafez).

Journalist Hafez to Al-Ahram stated that the initial number of funding for these channels will be one billion pounds. All equipment and studios will be European-style, and Hafez added in his article that DMC Sports will buy all sports championships 'exclusively' and it will compete Al Jazeera Sports in buying African championships. As for the financing of these channels, it will be by businessman Tariq Ismail, who is not very well known, because he does not like to shed light on him, which is what is needed because the people no longer believe what has been broadcasted recently, in addition to that businessman Tariq Ismail owns the 'D Media' company for media production. And controls the majority of ads and owner of Radio 9090 (Hafez)

Hafez indicated that no broadcaster who worked with a previous regime or had media suspicions or had political positions would appear on its screen in order to have relative credibility when speaking and defending the state, and thus he could address any group so that he would not be hated, and most of the broadcasters in it are young people who entered the media New and quite successful. Rami Radwan, Iman Al-Hosry, Ibrahim Fayek and Ashraf Abdel Baqi were among the first to be included in the list of employees in this group (Hafez). In his interview with Noon Post, writer and analyst Mr. Al-Rabwa indicated that the work strategy is different in these channels, while the workers are nominated and selected, and then they are formally informed that they have been appointed to the channel, but usually the channel is not the one who chooses the workers, but rather through job applications as is customary, as the situation was told that workers apply for work, then these applications are sorted and those who have been settled are contacted, but here the situation is different (DMC Channels: Intelligence TV).

Journalist Hafez described DMC as Al-Jazeera with an Egyptian logo, an Egyptian identity, and an Egyptian tongue, as for the real owner of these channels, and the first and last controller of what is presented in them, some sources indicated, as will be mentioned

later, that the Military Intelligence was the one who planned to establish these channels to be the new voice of the state, and the official spokesman for the regime and its president, away from other platforms that have lost their credibility in masses lately (DMC Channels: Intelligence TV).

2.2.2 Egyptian Media Company toward Eagle Capital Company

The attempts to control media began in a direct way, through close businessmen; The Egyptian Media Company which businessman Ahmed Abu Hashima its owner, who bought a number of media institutions, before being bought by the intelligence-owned company, Eagle Capital, headed by former Minister of Investment Dalia Khorshid and the wife of Central Bank Governor Tariq Amer (Hamed). Most likely, the Egyptian Media Group was created in 2016 by businessman Abu Hashima, who was close to the state apparatus. Despite the lack of information concerning this group, it became the largest media conglomerate from 2016 to 2018 in Egypt. It has two television networks named CBC and ON, it also owns five print and digital outlets, in addition to a video platform which is called Dot Masr, and concerning the advertising and marketing sector it has seven companies (The Egyptian Media Company).

Eagle Capital has acquired Abu Hashima's stake in the Egyptian Media Collection, which owns the ONTV network and a large number of Egyptian media companies. Eagle Capital for Financial Investments LLC, presided by Dalia Khorshid, the previous Minister of Investment, is a private equity fund held by the Egyptian General Intelligence Apparatus, which was recently established to manage all of the agency's civil investments. In a large number of partially or wholly owned intelligence companies. According to a statement by a former executive of the Abu Hashima group of companies, the latter's share of 'Egyptian Media' never exceeded a limited number of shares, as Abu Hashima became the media front

for the Egyptian Media Company, as for the controlling share of the company, its ownership belongs to the General Intelligence Service, and under the deal, he became the owner of all the shares of the Egyptian Media Group, a holding company that in turn owns, along with the “On TV” network, six newspapers and news sites, the largest of which is the “Youm7” website and newspaper, two companies for dramatic and cinematic production, and seven media advertising services companies, and a security and guarding company (Bahjat).

2.2.3 Drama and Cinema under Synergy Company

Tamer Morsi established a Company under the name of ‘Synergy’ in 2003. The company was known at first in the advertising field, which was titled ‘Synergy Advertising’, and then started to attain television production, along with television programs, advertisements and music videos (Synergy Art production ‘Tamer Morsi’). As is well known during the Ramadan season Synergy was content to produce one or two works, especially during the previous years of 2012 and 2016, however the real control of television drama began with the 2016 Ramadan season which is the same year that Egyptian media gained the deal by owning 50% of Synergy’s shares, again it produced seven series in 2016, amongst ‘Abu Al Banat,’ starring Mustafa Shaaban, ‘Al Qaiser,’ starring Youssef Sharif, ‘Mamoun and his Partners,’ starring Adel Imam, ‘Al Tabbal,’ starring Amir Karara and ‘Red Sulfur’, ‘Seven Souls’ and ‘Birth Certificate’ from different dramatic Championships (Ramadan and abdel Salam).

In Ramadan 2017, the number increased to nine series, whereby Synergy produced two other shows that determined to be presented outside the Ramadan season. Moreover, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation started its interventions concerning Ramadan drama at the same year of 2017, thus it issued a report on what it called the excesses of Ramadan series (Ramadan and Abdel Salam). Synergy monopolized the production of TV dramas, in

addition to being an integral part of the Egyptian Media Company, which makes it obsessed with the dramatic competition, especially during the Ramadan seasons.

In a report published in the New York Times by journalist Declan Walsh stated that president El-Sisi is broadening his iron fist with regard to the drama production sector, which shapes the image of Egyptian society in the country in particular. As is usual in the holy month of Ramadan every year, Egyptians enjoy watching various series, which have a large budget that attract the Egyptian citizen to follow several dramas starring the country's top actors, which revolve around various topics including miserable melodramas, police work and epics sweeping historical. However, according to the report, the hugely popular Ramadan series are subject to stifling controls and restrictions. Directors and actors say El-Sisi officials dictate scripts, set wages, and cut them. In addition to the confirmed news that a production company linked to the army has taken command of several biggest shows. Filmmakers were given instructions related to the topics, themes, and stories that they ought to follow such as discrediting the banned Muslim Brotherhood and even praising and commending the military and police. And concerning the ones who do not stick to the standards, they will not appear on air (Walsh).

2.2.4 El- Sisi's Strategy to Constrain the Press

The Law 180 of 2018 which sets the press and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, it is approved by the House of Representatives on July 16 with a two-thirds majority of its members, which is one of the most serious legislation threatening freedom of expression in Egypt, to the extent that the press group called it the 'press execution law' (How did the Egyptian media). Thus, the Official Journal Issue 34 "biss (H) on 27/8/2018 issued the Law 180 of 2018 regulating the press and media and the Supreme Council for

Media Regulation which announces the following articles amongst the Third Article that stipulates:

It is prohibited, in any way, to censor Egyptian newspapers and media outlets, and to confiscate, suspend or close them. An exception may be made for imposing specific censorship on it in times of war or general mobilization. In this case, the Supreme Council may issue a decision to control copies of the paper newspaper, or to delete or block the material in violation of the censorship instructions in the event that it is published in an electronic newspaper or a website, or to stop its re-broadcasting in the media outlet. Those concerned may appeal the decision issued in this regard in front of the Administrative Court (The Official Gazette).

This article will make matters more difficult for journalists' work, while every word that is published is reviewed and monitored, which is contrary to freedom of expression. In addition to, the Fourth Article which stipulates:

The press institution, the media outlet, and the website are prohibited from publishing or broadcasting any material or advertisement whose content contradicts the provisions of the Constitution, calls for violating the law, violates the obligations contained in the professional code of ethics, violates public order or public morals, or incites discrimination or violence. Racism or hatred. The Supreme Council, for considerations required by national security, may prevent publications, newspapers, media or advertising materials issued or broadcasted from abroad from entering Egypt, circulating or displaying. The Council shall ban the circulation of publications or pornographic material, or that exposes religions and religious sects in a way that disturbs public peace, or

that incites discrimination, violence, racism or hatred. Everyone concerned may appeal this decision before the Administrative Court (The Official Journal).

The press has a specific law that binds it to specific laws that cannot be bypassed, but with regard to what this article stipulates, it defines the content of published topics in a format that serves the interests of the state and so that it does not harm the image of the state in any way, and this is what gives the Supreme Media Council the right to amend, prohibit or Stop any unwanted post. Therefore, this two issued articles constrains the freedom of press; however, the second Article does not stipulate things that would hinder and retard the right of expression which announces “The state guarantees freedom of the press, media, printing, and paper, visual, and electronic publishing” From this standpoint, this is considered an infringement on the freedom of the press and the right to express opinions.

2.2.5 Some Examples of Talk Shows

Amr Adib in his program ‘The Story’ talks about the project of the Egyptian countryside development, which would change the lives of many Egyptian citizens, according to him, they are the ones who make up 70 percent, and such projects should be considered (02:00 minutes Amr Adib: The Egyptian state is biased towards the poor... Look what Egypt is doing). However, what was circulated on several Egyptian sites and media channels was a project like all the projects that are being talked about at length and it does not return any local production to the state or to citizens, and the evidence is that Egypt has entered into several crises and the Egyptian pound currency has fallen.

‘Al-Hayat Al-Youm’ program with Tamer Amin, who is broadcasting in Egypt, in an interview with him about the achievements of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, saying that he is very surprised by the people who do not see the achievements of President El-Sisi and

his projects, and added that he is surprised by the people who did not see the rhythm that happened during the years of 2015 and 2016, which corresponds to the rhythm of ten years ago (23:43 minutes: Joe Show -episode 01- the secret behind Joe Tube disappearance and the achievements of the president)

The achievements of Mr. Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi were discussed in many media channels and programs. Imad El-Din Hussein, editor-in-chief of Al-Sharrouk newspaper, told Al-Ghad channel, which hosted him on the “Saa Min Masr” program, that after the resignation of Colonel President Hosni Mubarak, there were no major powers And then there were authorities during the Brotherhood’s rule, which he described as a catastrophic period for the Egyptian state by all accounts, but from June 30th, 2013 after the military coup, until the adoption of the constitution in December 2014, Egypt did not have any constitutional institutions, and from this pulpit The constitution has been completed, meaning that the Egyptian state has a constitution, a parliament and a president of the republic.

In addition to the core idea that the foundations of the state have been provided, which is something that is considered extremely important, but the people, do not take this matter seriously as if it has already happened, but Egypt was actually threatened, and not because of conspiracies, but the threat lies in the disintegration of society from the inside, lack of confidence, increased polarization, poverty and corruption, which are considered dangerous factors that constitute internal disintegration and thus provide state institutions and revitalize state institutions and the main and the three main things to the main road map, which is the constitution, then the election of the President of the Republic, and then the election of Parliament, in addition to the installation of the main organs of the state (01:52 minutes: Egyptian journalist: Reviving state institutions is El-Sisi's most prominent achievement).

According to the previously discussed videos, it is noticed that the achievements of president El-Sisi which made a demagogue in all media sites cannot be logically considered as great achievements as it is said. Thusly, having a president, a constitution and a parliament are necessary elements for the establishment of the state, and it is certain that these basic elements must be available in any state, but it cannot be said that these are achievements, because by talking about projects and achievements, there have been no talk about having Recruitment contests ,or opening new job positions; for example, carrying out development ,or energy projects that benefit the state, but the Egyptian media is drumming and honking everything that the president declares, and it is praised on most television channels and talk shows.

2.2.6 The Media that Opposes El-Sisi's Regime

Egyptian journalist Moataz Matar who has a program under the title 'With Moataz' which is broadcasted on Al Sharq channel from Turkey, Matar is known of his opposition to the Egyptian state, especially after the coup d'état of 2013. The return of Turkish-Egyptian relations in 2021 led him to stop broadcasting his program until another time, however it was expected that his program will be stopped, Matar added, Whoever says that stopping my program is a victory for Egyptian diplomacy, this is very funny, and a completely shameful scene. And despite everything he started broadcasting from London and continues to reveal the facts and comment on what is happening in his country Egypt (Ahmed Ramadan).

Mohamed Nasser presents his main talk show "Egypt Today" on Makameleen Channel from Turkey. Through this program, he attacks the Egyptian military regime and criticizes the government of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. On his Twitter account, Nasser said on Thursday, 2021 "Today I announce it clear that I will be absent from all communication sites, not at my desire, but the circumstances are no longer hidden from anyone" His speech came

as a response to what has been posted in news, as for Al-Arabiya.net, the Turkish authorities demanded that Moataz Matar, Muhammad Nasser, Hamza Zobaa and artist Hisham Abdullah to stop their media activities, whether on satellite platforms, social networking sites, and YouTube from their territories. Where the Turkish authorities instructed the “Makameleen” satellite channel to stop any programs criticizing Egypt, while other instructions were issued to the “Al-Sharq” and “Watan” satellite channels to prevent broadcasting any programs or interventions that criticizes Cairo (Abdel Hamid).

‘Joe Show’ is a satirical political program in which Youssef Hussein sheds light on what happened to some Arab media outlets affiliated with some political regimes through the contradictions and paradoxes they deal with in their programs (The Programs). Youssef began his activities with a video broadcasted on July 2013, in which he defended the late president Morsi, to launch later on a channel on You Tube under the name of “Joe Tube”. Then Joe moved to Al Araby TV Network in 2016, and resumes his program's career with his current new name "Joe Show". Egypt, as he continues criticizing the current regime under the leadership of President El-Sisi in a comic and sarcastic manner (The cynical ‘YouTubers’...).

2.3 Rabaa Al-Adawiya Massacre

Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square is the place where the supporters of former President Mohamed Morsi agreed to hold a sit-in until their demands will be achieved that President Mohamed Morsi gets back to power as a legitimate president. The issue became more insistent for them after the speech of General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, after the June 30th demonstrations. Rabaa Square - or as some call it the Rabaa al-Adawiya sign - is considered one of the high-end areas in Nasr City in Cairo, and its fame has increased recently because it has become a competitor to Tahrir Square, and even a symbol used by defenders of

legitimacy. A sign bearing the name of this square appeared after the army and police forces dispersed a sit-in by supporters of legitimacy in it by force (Rabaa Massacre).

Human Rights Watch accused senior Egyptian officials of having likely committed "crimes against humanity." Rabaa al-Adawiya protests and sit-in left hundreds dead in what Human Rights Watch called "one of the largest single-day killings of protesters in recent history" At least 817 people were killed in Rabaa Al-Adawiya alone, according to the New York-based human rights organization, in a report issued to coincide with the first anniversary of these bloody events, but human rights activists say that the number may be much higher (Rabaa Massacre). Despite these horrible crimes that happened in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square the responsible of this massacre have not been charged or prosecuted including Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who has not been charged by any organization neither the United Nation Organization, nor the Amnesty International. Besides, this massacre affects democracy as a whole as it is considered a violation and prejudice of the democracy and freedom of citizens.

After almost one year of a series of uprisings, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi decided candidacy for the 2014 presidential election. Unquestionably, he won it and become the president of Egypt on the 3rd of June 2014 with 96, 91%. However, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's speech on July, 3rd, 2013 when he stated his unwillingness to candidacy for the presidential elections 'I will not run for the presidency and I will not allow history to write that the Egyptian army acted for personal interests', claiming that what happened is not a coup d'état, it is rather a revolution towards democracy and reforming the country (Abu El- Ela). But, El-Sisi did not keep his words proving to the Egyptian people and to the whole world that what he did is a military coup.

2.4 The policy Adopted by El-Sisi against the Opposition “Muslim Brotherhood”

The Muslim Brotherhood have always been a part of the Egyptian state, they ruled and had higher positions in the country, and thusly they had and still have different principles that are ruling ‘In The Name of Islam’, yet this expression means a lot, there are so many things that lies behind it. Ousted President Morsi was one of the members of Muslim Brotherhood, he ruled for only one year, and then he was toppled by President El-Sisi. Subsequently, El-Sisi’s policy towards the opposition was like a distortion and misrepresentation to the image of the Muslim Brotherhood, more precisely Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in dispersal case was regarded as cleaning Rabaa al-Adawiya Square from terrorists and protecting state security.

In order to perpetuate the image of terrorism and terrorists from the sit-in, hundreds of opponents of the coup are still being tried on charges of calling for non-peaceful sit-ins, endangering the lives of citizens, and killing members of the police and army during the dispersal of the sit-ins. The most prominent lies recounted by the Egyptian media were “the transfer of light and heavy weapons to the sit-in headquarters, and even chemical weapons, a war council, torture of some infiltrators from journalists and secret informants, jihad of marriage, the presence of widespread diseases among the protesters, as well as child trafficking (This is how the Egyptian media played).

In addition to that Al-Masry journalist, who is affiliated with the security services, Ahmed Moussa, showed a video claiming that he entered heavy weapons, while there is nothing in the video to confirm his allegations (This is how the Egyptian media played). The Seventh Day website published a video clip accompanied by the protesters during the dispersal process, and claimed that the sit-in contained shields, weapons and ammunition; although the video did not show anything of the sort (This is how the Egyptian media played).

So, the Egyptian authorities wanted to show that there were terrorists in Rabaa Al-adawiya and what happened was a self-defense by the army to protect the state from any danger or terrorism.

However, these statements contradict everything that happened on the day of the dispersal of the Rabaa sit-in, because by referring to Al-Jazeera videos that filmed the massacre moment by moment, it cannot be said that the demonstrators had weapons and so on, as the demonstrators were in a position of self-defense, in addition to that they used stones as a tool to attack the tanks, planes, and weapons that rained down on them. So these statements are nothing but a distortion of the reputation of the Muslim Brotherhood and discrediting them in the media and accusing them of having terrorists among the Rabaa Al-Adawiya demonstrators at the time.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was asked about the events of the dispersal of the Rabaa sit-in during his attendance at the “Ask the President” initiative within the activities of the “Hekayat Watan” conference, where, according to the president, the Rabaa Square sit-in protesters are responsible for the start of the assault on the security forces. In addition to what was reported by “Al-Masry Al-Youm” newspaper, where the president stated that it was necessary to refer to the statement on July, in which no one was arrested or abused, and he added that we left people in Rabaa until after Eid, more than 45 days. And those who used their means told me in the month of Ramadan Please do not do anything, so I told them that they should sit for a few days instead of a day and not to go outside the Raba’a area. El-Sisi claimed that the ‘Brothers’ are the ones who have weapons and want to cause explosions, but if they want to live in peace no one of them will be exposed to them (El-Sisi's first comments about).

In an article written by Rasha Abdulla which she mentioned that according to the media scholar Adel Iskandar in Georgetown University who noticed that the Muslim Brotherhood are portrayed as a different group with an extremist ideas and principles, media scholar Iskandar claims “By and large, the majority of the Egyptian press is marching to the tune of the military . . . willfully and with conviction. . . . If you’re with the Brotherhood, it’s as if you’re a separate breed of Egyptian”. Besides, he added that amongst the songs that had been popular on the airwaves for some time was under the title “We Are a people; They Are Another,’ categorizing the Muslim Brotherhood and its sympathizers as a different people” (Abdulla). The Muslim Brothers were regarded as another part which shapes the opposition of the state; they were categorized aside from the Egyptian people as they have the desire to divide the country.

Some talk shows dealt with leaked conversations, which described the Muslim Brotherhood and other activists supporting them as traitors, spies, and agents of foreign countries. But, these conversations do not confirm what was circulated that activists from the April 6 Youth Movement, Mohamed El-Baradei, the ousted Vice President Morsi, and activist Wael Ghonim, owner of the “We are all Khaled” page that they are not loyal to their homeland, Egypt (Abdulla). However, all these events were built to distort the image of the Muslim Brotherhood and the activists of the January 25 revolution.

Conclusion

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s success in dominating media has come over years, from the beginning El-Sisi’s strategy was following Nasser’s path, when reviewing the first chapter it is regarded that there are much common points within El-Sisi’s strategies. Consequently, manipulating the masses and influencing his people’s thoughts was through the

Re-formation of the Supreme Media Council, the nationalization of media in 2018 in which he passed laws that limit the press freedom.

El-Sisi's policies went so far, because the Cinema, Drama, and the artistic production was all headed by the General Intelligence which owns Synergy Company for Artistic Production, and also, the Egyptians media company that moved to the state property under the name of Eagle Capital which is owned by Former Minister of Investment Dalia Khorshid. Mainly these acts can be regarded as a real domination of the Egyptian media.

Muslim Brotherhood have shaped the opposition party since El-Sisi came to power, they become described as terrorists that threaten the state security. In addition, they were blamed by the Egyptian media that there were terrorists from Muslim Brotherhood organization during Rabaa Al-Adawiya sit-in dispersal.

Chapter Three:

Comparative Study between Abdel Nasser's and El-Sisi's Policies

Introduction

Media played a vital role to entrench military rule in Egypt for seven decades. From Nasser to El-Sisi media was the tool to manipulate the masses and cover their legitimacy deficit through media that would shape public opinion consolidating the military republic agenda. Nasser has used various strategies that are previously mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation which can be described as the monopolization of media; he succeeded in extending his control over all aspects of the state, especially the great influence he left on the Egyptian people, who they consider an unparalleled president. Since decades Egypt was under the military leadership, it was ruled by several presidents such as Anwar El-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and lastly President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who is still in power, in addition to Mohamed Morsi who was the first civic president. El-Sisi has been known as the successor of Abdel Nasser, as he has mentioned a quote in many of his speeches that the late leader Gjamel Abd Nasser was lucky, because he used to speak and media on his side. It seems more likely that president El-Sisi has much in common with the late president Abdel Nasser, especially concerning media manipulation.

This chapter tends to discuss the different and similar points that both President Abd Nasser and El-Sisi have in common, this study is going to be conducted using the comparative method in addition to the media discourse analysis method.

3.1 Normalizing the Military Rule through Media

In the Arab world and here the case Egypt, the military control is always paired to patriotism, sacrifices, and faithfulness. After their coup the Free Officers believed that they expelled the colonial power and corrupted monarchy as a result they most deserve to run the country using propaganda that participated to entrench this idea and tightening on media

freedom. Nasser managed to politicize the army and engaged the military generals and officers in ministries and civilian posts.

It was clear that Abdel Nasser wanted to appoint officers in a civilian posts to preserve and protect his position as head of the state. In order to legitimize his decision, Harb explains that Nasser appointed officers technocrats who continued their studies in different disciplines in the late of 1950s to hold positions on industrial and financial enterprises under state control, in addition to the prominent ministries such as Interior Ministry and War Ministry (279). In 1962, Foreign Ministry for example, Harb points to that “of 100 top positions, 72 were occupied by officers” (279), Nasser government wore the military uniform and the alleged goals of the coup became personal goals of Nasser and his officers.

Sequestration and nationalization of agencies and private sectors were among Nasser’s hallmarks regime. In order to manage these agencies, the government hired technocrats, engineers, and economists who had higher education in Anglo-Saxon universities in positions of directorships. According to Harb, although the civilians were more in number comparing to offices, concerning this point Abdel Malek clarifies that, “in essence the purpose of the regime was the creation of a managerial class (*tabaqata l-mudirin*) that would constitute no challenge to the military rulers” (280).

Egypt during Nasser’s reign was a security state par excellence. The political participation, religious organisation, civil society organisation, and media were either banned or directly controlled by the government. Harb confirms that “editorial boards of press organizations (finally fully nationalized in 1960) such as *al-Ahram* and *al-Hilal* were controlled by officers” (279). Restrictions on the freedom of press in Nasser’s Egypt reached its peak, and heavy censorship was applied on media. On the same path, Basyouni declares that “the Revolutionary Command Council spokesman said that the revolution would rely on

editors consciences and on their sense of duty to make fair and just decisions about what to publish and what to withhold” (10). Moreover, the press messages that were directed to masses were limited in number and content (12) in which will serve the authority’s agenda.

The regime was known for its crackdown on dissent and critics, it was a Unitarian regime where people cannot oppose or criticize the authority. In newspapers each editor in chief was supervised by an officer, Basyouni states that “was placed in every newspaper in an effort not just to censor news and views, but also to re-educate journalists in the new policies which the Free Officers were proposing for the country” (10). In 1954, Nasser’s Egypt tighten the noose on freedom of expression, Crabbs states that the government intended to purge press syndicate and closing political newspapers, while establishing pro-regime ones such as El-Sha’b (the people) and El-Gomhoriya, in addition to dissolving all pre-existing political parties since 1953 to prevent any potential counter-revolution (392).

On the other hand, Since president El-Sisi took power in 2014, he paved the way to the military in order to be part of the state, not only protecting and providing safety to the people as a whole, but ruling and being part of the political life; therefore, politicizing the army to come to power and to be accepted "Normalized" by the people. Consequently, Bolliger, Elmenshawy, and Weilandt argue in their research that “Messages reinforcing the idea that the military is the only source of news about the military appeared repeatedly in the media” (Bolliger et al. 09). This decision changed the path of realities, because the military wanted to limit the news in order to have only one voice heard which is the state's voice led by the army.

Bolliger, Elmenshawy, and Weilandt in their research *The Military, the Media and Public Perceptions in Egypt* have talked about how the army wanted to constrain the news related to it; moreover, in October, 2013 the Journalist Ahmed Abu Dera’a was charged of

“intentionally spreading false news about the military,” and also, it was reported that there were a fight between militants and military's challenges in Sinai. Dera'a was given a six-month suspension sentence by a military tribunal. Though, the releasement of Ahmed Abu Dera'a, his suspension lead him to be no more a reporter, hence his case sent a powerful message to the media community to only output information on Sinai that are forwarded by the military (Bolliger et al. 09).

El-Sisi's proposal in his speech on the removal of Morsi regarding the establishment of a Media Charter of Honor confirms his desire to extend his control over the media, as this charter guarantees freedom of media; respects professional rules, credibility and neutrality; as it advances the homeland's top interests (Egypt army chief). Thus, the charter reinforces El-Sisi's regime in which he stated in a meeting with a group of newspaper editors, the meeting focused on the content of newspapers that are published with the aim of distracting and destabilizing the security of the state, as El-Sisi claims, adding that journalists should avoid covering issues of freedom of expression or pressure for democratic reforms. He commented on the headlines of the newspapers, “No voice is louder than freedom of expression” which El-Sisi considered it a tool to distort the image and prestige of the state, which would cut off the livelihood of many Egyptians who depend on tourists for their livelihood. But in fact, El-Sisi's goal was to silence the opposition and divert topics to focus on plans to fight corruption and poverty, while there are several journalists who were arrested. Al Jazeera stated that they were arrested just for doing their work, and this contradicts democracy, which proves El-Sisi's allegations about silencing and exile everyone who opposes his authoritarian regime (Egypt's El-Sisi tells media not to push).

During post-military coup of 2013, the military used the Carrot-and-stick approach in order to direct the people's thoughts and ideas and lead them to media content which is monopolized by the militarized state. In a research conducted by Bolliger, Elmenshawy, and Weilandt who have discussed a method which is used by the military to manipulate the masse; they argue "Methods employed to control public communication range from gentle 'strategic guidance' to censorship, repression and imprisonment. These efforts to control public opinion are supported by a series of legal tools which are conveniently moulded to suit the needs of the authorities. Additionally, the military embraces public relations tools and new communication technologies in order to talk directly to Egyptian people" (Bolliger et al. 12).

El-Sisi has made many changes concerning the neo-governors movement for five times in which the last one was in August 2018, each time the neo-governors movement witnesses an increase in the number of generals as governors (Ahmed). Hence, The Official Journal published the decision of president El-Sisi about appointing a large number of generals, or rather, most of them were generals, and five doctors were appointed out of 27 governors. Besides, the deputy governors who are from the category of generals (Al-Gali). Thus, the movement became militaristic, political analyst Izzat al-Nimr told Arabi 21 that the governors movement is one of the revealing images of the coup mentality and El-Sisi's style of managing the state," noting that "the appointment of governors is based on several goals, the first of which is to appease the generals to exercise power and gain, and the second thing is to secure the positions are to remain in the service of the authority, and finally, so that no clever or deceptive person appears among them and deviates from the stupidity and ignorance of the head of authority in Egypt (Ahmed).

The military sought to shape its public image as saviors of the country in which they represent the only path towards democracy that the Egyptians strove for it. The role of the Egyptian army can never be denied, especially the military martyrs who suffered for the

safety of the people and their aim to keep peace and democracy in the state. In a research conducted by Bolliger, Elmenshawy, and Weilandt who claim that “The military has relied on media to create, maintain, and spread this narrative, as well as to send key messages to support it” (Bolliger et al.18). The Egyptian Armed Forces realized the importance of public perception and the power of communication, in an attempt to preserve its image as a “people’s army”; reach out to the Egyptian youth; and be perceived as the protagonist, savior and defender of the revolution, the military embraced new communication tools as well as new communication strategies towards media channels (Bolliger et al. 18).

3.2 Muslim Brotherhood: The Opposition Party

From apolitical group and socio-religious actor to the most influential group in Egypt, the Muslim brotherhood succeeded through, coffee shops, and newspaper, and in steadfastly to reach all society classes to propagate their ideology that ‘Islam is the solution’ according to its founder Hassan El-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to bring back Egypt to ‘purist Sunni Islam’ (El Sharkawy). El Sharkawy also mentions that “Gamal Abdel Nasser, had short-lived membership within the Brotherhood because of its extensive infrastructure”, however, this did not dissuade him from eradicate the organization after the inconvenient relation between Nasser and the Muslim Brothers the ensuing Free Officers’ coup in 1952 about the government ruling system.

Since Abdel Nasser took power he makes sure to disband all political parties as his first step towards maintaining his authoritarian rule. The menace posed by Muslim Brotherhood on Nasser’s regime -especially after the failure of their alliance after the coup- made him moved against the organization by accusing them an attempt on his life known as Manshiya incident which was tapped by Nasser to clear off the Muslim Brothers.

According to the main idea of Naomi Klein's the Shock Doctrine that man-made or natural calamities may create an exceptional state of emergency that paves the way to opportunism, which means that "the exploitation of national crises (disasters or upheavals) to establish controversial policies, while citizens are too distracted (emotionally and physically) to engage and develop an adequate response, and resist effectively" (Spencer). What happened in Manshiya incident whether it was orchestrated by Nasser or not, he exploited the opportunity to eliminate Muslim Brotherhood to legitimize his persecution actions against the organization.

Media in Nasser's tenure played pivotal role to tarnish his opponents and enhance his ideologies. By the 1960s the emergence of television was another regime tool to direct masses that Abdel Nasser managed to nationalize it in order to serve his orientations and politics, allowing no private channels openness (Lavie and Yefet 145). As an example the members of Muslim Brotherhood trial was broadcast in 1965 for months. In 1970, the narrowing phase of Nasser's domination on media crowned by establishing of Egyptian Radio and Television Union that enable the government control the content of its tools of influence (Lavie and Yefet 145).

The Supreme Council of Armed Forces sought with various strategies to shape a terroristic image about the Muslim Brotherhood whom were blamed and accused of destabilizing the security of the state. Accordingly, to a personal interview conducted by author Mohamed Elmenshawy in March 2014, an expert on Egyptian media who chose to stay unnamed said that "Egypt's major talk shows adopted a survival strategy based on appeasing the military by aggressively promoting all kinds of negative press about the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi, including stories and accusations that are far-fetched or impossible" While such strategies as hosting anti-Morsi and political opponents without giving the Brotherhood any opportunity to defend their positions. In addition to the

events of Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda Square, which were imagined as the actions of the Brotherhood and that “organized assassinations” were carried out and “torture rooms” were operated, but all these statements are considered accusations against the Brotherhood, especially in order to shade the events of Rab’a (Bolliger et al. 10).

Otherwise, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi said that the Muslim Brotherhood will not have a role in the Egyptian scene during his time in power, stressing that the people of Egypt will not accept their return, because the Brotherhood's ideology is not viable and collides with it. In an interview, published by the Kuwaiti daily Al-Shahed newspaper on Friday evening, El-Sisi accused the Muslim Brotherhood of leading chaos in many Arab countries, such as Yemen and Libya, explaining that the so-called Arab Spring came because of a wrong reality with a wrong treatment. The Egyptian government classifies the group as a "terrorist", and has banned its activities and seized the assets of a number of its affiliates, and holds it responsible for many armed attacks that claimed police, army and civilian casualties in Egypt during the past five years (El-Sisi: There is no role).

SCAF has not only shaped an image of terrorism about the Muslim Brotherhood, rather they created a sense of fear and intimidation from the Brotherhood, thus describing them as spies and foreign hands (Bolliger et al. 12), in which the brothers were portrayed as willing to divide the state; therefore, “fears of foreign conspiracies’ which their objective the division of the Egyptian state. (Bolliger et al. 18). In addition to that Morsi’s uncompleted term was described as there is uncertainty in Morsi’s eligibility, competence, and intransigence that are meant to lead the country to a division, and endangering the pathway of the state to an economic demolition, thus increasing the polarization and making the state Islamist in which Islamization means chaos and anarchy in the whole state (Dorsey 02).

3.3 Media Projection: Films and politics

From a tool of entertainment, the cinema turned into a mouthpiece of the regime vision that revolve around the prowess of the military and the corruption of the monarch that glorify the Free officers revolution. Rowan El Shimi in her article Propaganda of shattered dreams: Remembering the films of July 23 she mentions that “under the newly appointed President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s luminous cinema industry was used as a tool to educate the masses, show them how to be good citizens in a new, modern society, and to reinvent the nation’s identity” (El Shimi). Cinema managed to reconstruct audience identity socially and culturally in accordance with regime orientations. It is undeniable that the cinema flourished during his reign in return to serve the interests of the government.

Cinema did not spare of nationalization by the 1960s, Nasser realized the importance of such soft power that enable to crowd people around a particular believes and ideas. In no way of criticism, the current regime and in order to maintain its stabilization, cinema scrutinized in Nasser’s Egypt, the script content exposed to censorship and films subjected to politicization (Helal 5). The only criticism which is allowed in films were against the former corrupted monarchy and its feudalists that were the reason behind the peasants’ suffering and social injustice (Helal 5), Cinema turned to be a nation-building tool that deconstruct the tradition of the precedent rule (5), and constructing pro-military one.

According to Gordon and Fisher the overlapped relation between cinema and politics led to create a new civic identity that matched with the new social and cultural order of Nasser’s phase (Hollywood on the Nile). Celebrating the revolution and criticising the former regime was the core idea of Nasser’s regime films. The condemnation of the feudalists was embodied in Youcef Shahine’s film of *The Earth* in 1970, Helal mentions that the film “glorified an old peasant struggle against oppressive landlords” (5). Films draw attention to

the poor peasant and lower caste to shed the light on Nasser's land reform relating positive elements to the current regime. Another prominent work praised patriotism and celebrating the revolution of 1952 was Ahmad Badrakhan's *God with Us* (1954-1955). El Shimi declares that "the film *God with Us* can only be described as a pure Nasser-loyalist movie" that legitimized the Free Officers Revolution. However, undeliberately the prosperity of the social changes that the revolution brought with in its first years made it well-accepted in cinema. The defeat of 1967 and its repercussion on social and political led to creation of critical film which the authorities banned some of these films such as *The Case 68* about the reasons of the six-day war defeat (Samak14).

While, the vision of the head of the Egyptian regime, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, was manifested in controlling the media and cinema industries. In a few years, Synergy Company for Artistic Production, owned by the Egyptian intelligence service, imposed its complete control over the Egyptian drama market, and the intelligence company tended to monopolize film production. The company announced a new set of films with huge budgets that include big stars, including the movie *The Spider* by Ahmed Nader Galal, and the movie *Al-Aref* by Ahmed Alaa El-Deeb. During 2019, Synergy Company's control of the film market in Egypt appeared through the production of a group of films that attracted first-class stars (How did El-Sisi tighten).

After the head of the coup in Egypt, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, praised the movie *The Passage* which was released on 2019, the 46th anniversary of the October 1973 war, as a military drama about the Egyptian army during the war of attrition. El-Sisi honored the heroes of the movie *The Passage* during the Armed Forces' educational symposium (Maghawar). The film tells how the Egyptian will was able to transform the loss into determination and confidence in the hearts of the Egyptian soldiers, and was inspired by the details of the setback with a new motive and enthusiasm to achieve victory and revenge against the enemy.

Regarding the name of the Passage, the film describes the battle of the Passage in which the Israeli enemy detained a number of Egyptian soldiers, and the Israelis spread the difficulty of the Egyptian army entering that area, which was not impossible for the men of the armed forces who were able to save their colleagues from the clutches of the enemy (*The Passage* movie is a true story).

The events of the film *Al-Aref* revolve around cybercrime through the story of the young Younes who lives with his wife and infant daughter in an apartment in the center of the country, and with a desire to obtain money, he robs a bank via the Internet, so he enters into a struggle around criminal gangs. The movie was shot in four countries on three continents Egypt, Italy, Bulgaria, and Malaysia with an action style and it was released in 2021 (Raafat).

The movie *The Spider* revolves around Hassan (Ahmed El-Sakka), who dedicates himself to avenging a large gang of drug dealers. The tour guide, Laila (Mona Zaki), gets involved with him, to share his revenge on the gang, led by Dhafer Al-Abidin. After the release of the movie in 2022, it is regarded that there is nothing new in *The Spider*, a movie that mixes comedy and action (Abdel Razek).

However, it seems like the core of Egyptian cinema is directed towards praising the army and police, also the subjects discussed in movies are centered only about the military which shapes the power of the state. In addition to that movies are shot in different countries, with more focus on places, action movements and movie music, thus neglecting the content of the movie which seems that the Egyptian cinema is competing Hollywood. But, the Egyptian reality does not match with such movies in which giving a different image about Egypt that the citizens themselves have never approached to.

3.4 Propaganda of Economic Projects

After their coup, social justice was among the Free Officers program that would strengthen the relationship between the authority and the poor. Land Reform was a national project that Abdel Nasser declared in return for popular support. Jackson points to “Nasser delivered this dignity directly to the Egyptians by handing out land deeds in person” (5). This shows Nasser on the side of the poor and he came to bring social justice and finishing the exploitations of the feudalism system. Basyouni states that “the press during Nasser's era served to create the revolutions heroes and to defend their policies and programs that in most cases met the needs of the poor majority of peasants and workers” (12).

Additionally, the land reform reduced the political power of land-owning feudalists. The equality of land redistribution is indisputable, however the way it was implemented imperfectly. The historian Ezzedin Omar published an article on Aljazeera website mentions that when Nasser fragmented the lands between small peasants which led to low output according to Mohamed Naguib who objected the reform because he viewed that Agrarian reform should be gradually implemented (Al-Jazeera). This concludes that the aim of Nasser behind that reform was propaganda to gain wide acceptance to the new regime.

There was a doubt about the capacity of Nasser’s government to manage the private properties after nationalization. Because of their military background the Free Officers had no expertise in economic matters (Tignor 261). Mabro suggests that “nationalization is ultimately a political action related to Nasser's persistent drive for hegemony” (quoted, in Waterbury 78). Tignor states that “Many inexperienced and frankly incompetent military officers occupied important seats on the boards of these firms” (Tignor 270). In addition, Waterbury supposes that decisions of Nasser were impromptu without any plan to operate after

nationalization because its aim was attainment of political benefits. In the same path Abu-Odeh adds that:

In its early stages, the public-sector-based development achieved high rates of economic growth. However, this quickly changed for reasons related to the nature of the economic tasks undertaken: overambitious developmental programs not matched by local capacity; distribution considerations taking precedence over growth ones; the fragmentation of the public sector into bureaucratic factions, clientelist networks and personalist cliques (Abu-Odeh 359).

The socio-economic reform that Abdel Nasser brought was undoubtedly necessary, however, comparing to the huge economic changes, the country achieved a little progress due to breaking ties with the western world (Tignor 271). Abdel Nasser cared more about the political benefit that would raise his popularity and gaining masses support. Ranko states that “however, it would soon grow more difficult for the state to provide extensive welfarist measures, and thus affected the state’s alliance with the poor” (49). Despite his military defeats, Nasser succeeded to obtain public support thanks to his socio-economic agenda. Whilst El-Sisi’s major national projects that have been discussed a lot and for years since he took power. Are they really projects that have been completed under the pretext of developing the country, returning the benefit to the Egyptian citizen, increasing profits, providing jobs, raising the domestic product and improving the economic situation because of the crises that the country has faced? Or are they empty, sterile projects without goals and financial and economic profits that are promoted through media in order to establish the idea that the army is the one who will build and raise Egypt’s economy, thus achieving the demands of the militarized state at the expense of the spirit of the Egyptian citizen, who hopes one day to improve situations.

Promises and hopes talked about by the Egyptian government and its President El-Sisi in the hearts of citizens, as the Egyptian citizen seemed to lose confidence in those promises that have not yet seen the light. “We have lost confidence, and when the president prepares or the ministers of the economic group speak, no one listens.” These were the words of an Egyptian farmer in a mass transport vehicle to Al-Jazeera Net correspondent in response to what the Egyptian media circulates daily about “giant projects” that succeeded, and ‘historical achievements’ It's done, and a ‘brilliant future’ awaits everyone (Al-Suhaili).

Ashraf Dawaba, a professor of finance and economics at Sabah Al-Din Zaim University in Istanbul, believes that government projects are local consumption and a lack of awareness, adding, If there are real projects, the role of the state is primarily to provide the appropriate environment for the launch of the private sector .Dawaba explained in his speech to Al Jazeera Net that the state's development role is in projects that the private sector cannot undertake, but when it went to projects, it chose projects that did not add value to the domestic product," citing the example of the Suez Canal branch and the administrative capital, and considering that their burdens are large on the economy without development, but with debt. Dawaba asked, How many citizens have these projects created jobs for? Is there an improvement in people's livelihood? (Al-Suhaili).

Recently, the hashtag “Seek Egypt has stayed where?” topped the lists of the most popular topics in Egypt, recording more than 20,000 tweets since its launch on Thursday evening, November 21, 2019. Interacting with the label talked about the decline in the purchasing power of citizens and the suffering of poor class as a result of what they described as the great rise in prices and the collapse of the pound. They described the government's policies as contradictory, and questioned the usefulness of the projects implemented by the government, saying that they are based on discrimination between groups of people (Have El-Sisi's projects changed).

A similar futile project is the Rod al-Farag suspension bridge, which President El-Sisi inaugurated on May 15. It was built by the Engineering Authority of the Armed Forces in partnership with the local construction company, the Arab Contractors. A media campaign promoted the bridge, which it described as the largest suspension bridge in the world, and portrayed it as an achievement that turned into the talk of the whole world. Other examples include the construction of the country's largest mosque and church, and the new administrative capital that El-Sisi inaugurated in January 2018. The inauguration of the church was portrayed as vital for Egypt's Copts. Moreover, the mosque was named Al-Fattah Al-Alim in an apparent reference to the president. These projects also include the construction of the tallest tower in Africa and the largest museum in the world dedicated to a single civilization (Mandour).

Some of these projects may have benefits, especially building such great museums, mosques and churches which give the state a prestigious look, but Egypt is facing a number of pressing infrastructure pressures, including the restoration of railways, which carry an average of 1.4 million passengers a day, and are now outdated and dilapidated. In this context, it should be noted that 300 million Egyptian pounds (\$18 million) have recently been allocated to railways, while an annual investment of about ten billion Egyptian pounds (\$602 million) is needed. In 2017 alone, railways experienced 1,657 accidents, an increase of 33 percent in recent years (Mandour).

3.5 Nasser's and El-Sisi's Personality Characteristics and Leadership

It is indisputable that Nasser's gifted charisma is the key element of his success to influence the masses by touching their sentiments and captivating their mind. Sandra Mackey indicates the relation between Abdel Nasser language and his charisma:

Gradually Nasser developed into a hypnotic speaker who combined neoclassical Arabic with the language of the man in the street and the peasant in the fields and added to them the chatty confidences of a father speaking to his family. As a result, he became the accomplished master of the spoken word, the most successful Arab communicator of modern time (quoted in Dorraj 297-298)

The combination of language styles that Nasser tended to use made him closer to all social varieties. Through his colloquial language, passionate voice, and magnetic leadership he managed to mobilize people around him. According to Gustave le Bon in his book *The Crowd as a Study of Popular Mind* crowds are influenced mainly by “image produced by the judicious employment of words and formula” (61). This is identically to Nasser’s rhetoric endowment that was an effective tool that managed his success as a leader.

As ‘Brilliant Orator’ Nasser made himself a symbol of nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and anti-colonialism. Nasser’s speeches about Arab unity and his hatred towards colonial powers fuelled the emotions of masses who were dreaming about united Arab nation. Pan-Arabism according to Dekmrjian is as “a part of the psychic make up of every Arab” (quoted in Bowie 153). However, the dream of united Arab nation did not last for long and collapsed after the unity failure with Syria and the demoralizing defeat of 1967 (153).

Nasser was an iconic leader of Arab world who through his revolutionary rhetoric set himself up as a hero and the savior of the Arab nation who succeeded to expel the colonialism and dispossess Egypt from the feudalists. With his domestic policies he strengthened his populist image via his socio-economic and political agenda that had considerable impact in his popularity. Khamis and Fowler mention that redistribution of property and nationalization

of the private sectors and, most notably, eliminating all vestiges of colonialism from Egyptian life (3).

On the other hand, Psychology, media and political sociology experts agreed that the speech of Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the resigned Egyptian Defense Minister and a candidate for the presidency of the Republic, was characterized by emotional appeal and addressing the conscience of the masses more than focusing on the language of firmness and strength that he was accustomed to during his previous speeches. According to psychologists, El-Sisi was keen to enjoy a great deal of humility and self-confidence, accompanied by a simple speech to win emotionally simple citizens, and he also focused on addressing the national conscience. Professor of Psychology at Benha University, Mohamed Kotb, says that Field Marshal El-Sisi used emotional appeals more than the language of force to make an impact on the recipient's sentiments through low voice and short words, as well as calm and deliberation, and using clear and simple sentences (Al-Zawawi).

Professor of Political Sociology at Helwan University, Gamal Abu Shanab, believes that El-Sisi was characterized during his speech with wisdom, balance and recourse to logic by speaking in a calm voice and in clear sentences that carry signs and messages with understandable connotations that the ordinary citizen can easily perceive. Abu Shanab adds to Al Jazeera Net that the speech was balanced and spoke in a manner that did not carry an exaggeration in addressing the masses and did not talk about broad ambitions because he knows the size of the responsibility and the size of the crisis he is facing. His right hand is raised on its edge, and this indicates that he is able to make a decision. For his part, Abdullah Abdel Halim, Professor of Arabic Language at Helwan University, says that when we examine El-Sisi's speech, we find that he is linguistically sound and applies the concept of Arabic rhetoric and addresses many sectors and not one in short, balanced, expressive and influential sentences at the same time (Al-Zawawi).

Body language expert Sayed Amin says that El-Sisi's appearance during the speech in military uniform gives an indication of his great adherence to the army until the last moments of his leaving it, and that facial expressions expressed a desire to seek everyone's help for him, and the tone of voice was low to confirm that he came out of the leader's cloak Resolute military to wise politician. However, El-Sisi's appearance can be interpreted in another way, in which wearing the military uniform means strengthening the idea that the military is the basis and the power of the state; moreover, delivering to the Egyptian people the message of "I am your leader, I am your savior, and I will bear the burdens of this country and handle all responsibility". On the one hand Amin adds to Al Jazeera Net that El-Sisi appeared during the speech exhausted and humble as if he was carrying a heavy burden with his feeling that he was starting to take responsibility for an entire people, not just the army. But, the president duty is known and must be achieved that he must take responsibility of his country and it does not necessitate to be talked about in media. Amr Hassan researcher at the Faculty of Media at Cairo University confirms that broadcasting the recorded speech reduced the power of its influence on the masses who used to hear El-Sisi through live broadcasts on many occasions, and that the beginning of the speech witnessed a discrepancy between the sound and the image, so the movement of the lips appeared before the sound, which caused Some distraction for the recipient (Al-Zawawi).

Furthermore, the position of the American, Indian and Egyptian president at the China summit is a shameful and humiliating position in history. Because of the act of the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who appeared with such childish and opportunistic behavior, when he lowers his head and goes from a distance until he obtains the "honor of peace" over Obama, and the shameful and humiliating result is that neither Obama ,nor the Indian president paid attention, but rather the American President had a quick handshake per second with him, while Obama enjoys a long and interesting conversation with the Indian

president, as if El-Sisi is working for the Indian president. Another position to El-Sisi which put him in a controversial situation with the Speaker of the Japanese Parliament, when the Speaker of Parliament completed his speech and finished his time, El-Sisi came to talk, and extended his hand in order to say hello to the “Japanese Parliament Speaker”, but he left him without giving him any attention (Is he really a leader?).

Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, during his speech at the United Nations, where he spoke most of the word in the colloquial language, which he is accustomed to the Egyptian people. His speech was limited to a justification for his coup against the legitimate president, and for waging war and accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood, without declaring this, which was explained by political analysts, as a feeling of “guilt” and a sense of “insufficient.” , where he frequently repeated during his speech the word fighting terrorism, as is the case in all his speeches in Egypt, and he also repeated in his speech that he “represents all Egyptians” more than once, referring to the military that is the only power that is meant to rule the state. Besides that his speech lasted for about eighteen minutes. As for El-Sisi, he accompanied hundreds with him, to encourage him, which actually happened inside the hall with loud cheers, which analysts interpreted as “lack of self-confidence”, because he knows very well the image formed about him in the outside world, and that what he did is a coup, and he has no fans From the Egyptians, he took fans to prove the opposite” (Five differences between).

However, El-Sisi receives great media support from government TV channels, and many private satellite channels that are keen to present his image next to the image of the late leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and say that he is the only person who can eliminate terrorism and lead the country towards stability and economic prosperity, which earned him more of popularity. (Who is Abd El-Fatteh El-Sisi).

3.6 The Effect of Populist Leadership on Crowd Consciousness

In no room for criticism or opposition, where every word heard or read is subjected to filtration and censorship in accordance with 'the cult leader'. In Nasser's Egypt the press owned by government in which they controlled the news' content in proportion of regime agenda, Basyouni states that "the psychological atmosphere makes it difficult for the newspaper columnists to voice criticism of the government" (12).

The proliferation of patriotic songs (watani songs) which enjoyed popularity among the masses were touching the sentiments that reinforced the spread of Nasser's ideology of Pan- Arabism and nationalism (Abdelmoez 303). The impact that these songs according to Gilman was by their ability of "moving listeners by playing on their emotions on a mass-media scale, and thereby inspiring them to commit one act or another" (quoted in Abdelmoez 309). The intentional aim of these songs was "to inspire support for the military regime by playing on playing on their emotions on a mass-media scale, and thereby inspiring them to commit one act or another" (quoted in Abdelmoez 309). The intentional aim of these songs according to Abdelmoez was "to inspire support for the military regime by playing on and evoking the nationalistic emotions of its listeners" (309).

With the advent of television by 1960 the patriotic songs such as Al-Watan al-akber (The Greatest Homeland) started to air on TV after it was broadcasted only from radio (Abdelmoez 304). In addition to recruiting cinema, radio, and television at his service, Nasser's propaganda also took a religious character, Dorraj points out "Nasser is known to have used the Al-Azhar mosque to address the masses. His portraits in Cairo and provinces were adorned by the slogan "Allah sent him to help our country" (297). Exploiting religion for specific interests indicate that in Nasser's era even religion took a political flavour.

Abdel Nasser was perceived by the majority of his people and the Arabs as the legendary leader that cannot be replaced. Ironically enough the poet Ahmed Fouad Negem who was arrested in Abdel Nasser prisons and his mother came to visit him, said that her eyes were red as she was crying for days when he enquired about the cause, she told him that her sadness was due to Abdel Nasser's death. He exclaimed with disclosure: "are you crying for death of the person who jailed your son?" She answered with grief that "the tent pillar has fallen" (0:32-1:29 testimony of the poet Fouad Negem) metaphorically means that the country without him would fall and associated pillar with Nasser power that preserve the country. The effect that Nasser created around him was upstare and deeply rooted on people psyche.

In a video published on You Tube and on many Egyptian channels, in which president El-Sisi went out in Cairo square with his team security, as it was portrayed El-Sisi's main conversations were with poor people who are struggling for their livelihood. His first stop was with a man selling fruits on the road, who suffers from a disease in his leg, in which the president was so kind and generous that he bought some fruits from him and ordered to send him as an urgent case to have his operation, effectively the man has been taken care of, the stages of his treatment were published on internet (01:26 min The human president.. El-Sisi stops his car to treat a fruit seller at the state's expense and responds to the demands of 2 others).

But despite all this, the position of El-Sisi while he was talking to the man ,as he stayed in his car circled by the security men, without allowing no one to approach to the president less than two meters; therefore, it seems more likely that it is only for the sake of propaganda no more than that, the president was in touch with the most marginalized class in order to lead those kind of people to believe in him, to praise the army, and to affect in

people's minds and thoughts. Thus, delivering the message that there is only one voice heard which the military is.

Joel W. Abdelmoez who published an article at university of Cambridge in which he argues:

Patriotic songs were used to influence masses perception, in which people react with such songs and often revolve around concepts of peace and national unity, and commonly praise martyrs, particularly those from the military and police forces. Many of the music videos of contemporary patriotic songs have a strong military theme and use footage of the armed forces in action (Abdelmoez 301).

Such patriotic songs have a great impact on increasing the enthusiasm of the masses that interact, especially when the subject touches the country, sovereignty, patriotism and populism. This appears as a result of the fact that the Arab peoples, as a group different from the rest of the peoples, think about passion, fear and sacrifice for the sake of the safety and security of the country. And this is what El-Sisi has exploited, and those who want the people to accept military rule as the right way for the establishment and success of the state.

As it is written in Joel W. Abdelmoez published article at university of Cambridge who claims that

Patriotic songs have enjoyed mass popularity, especially since the 2013 ousting of Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, and the return of a military officer, former field marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, to the presidency in 2014. One of the most popular songs in support of the new military regime is the song 'Teslam al-ayadi' (2013), meaning 'May the hands be safe', or idiomatically 'Bless these hands (Abdelmoez 301).

Among the songs that gained massive popularity around the Egyptian people, “Teslam al-ayadi”, which expresses the people's confidence that the army will lead the country to safety again, after the overthrow of Morsi and the election of El-Sisi as president of Egypt in 2014.

Conclusion

After his coming to power; Nasser was keen to monopolize the media by nationalizing newspapers, radio, television and cinema to propagate his ideologies and mobilize the masses. Media was credited in promoting for military role and its national projects, and misrepresentation of opposition. Nasser’s charisma and rhetoric was additional key element of his success as Arab leader. Controlling people’s consciousness through media was the main goal of regime’s agenda.

After his success in overthrowing president Morsi, El-Sisi tightened his iron grip on the aspects of the state, in which his first step was discrediting the opposition “Muslim Brotherhood”, and then monopolizing the media through using the pretext of that the state is endangered by foreign hands and parts who are willing to divide it, thus the Egyptian people are meant to believe in only one voice which is the militarized state under the leadership of El-Sisi. He manipulated media by creating images about the army and portraying it as the savior and leader of the state. His personality influence on masses can be interpreted into two different views, in which El-Sisi’s rhetoric and charismatic personality may have shaped the image of generous, confident, and calm president; on the other hand it can be conceived as not being able to convey his voice to his people and interact with them, because of his low tone and childish way of talking which experts claimed that it is a strategy to influence masses perception.

General Conclusion

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were mostly ruled by authoritarian political systems; however, the Arab Spring of 2011 was an opportunity for them to shift from autocracy to democracy. Egypt for example witnessed many revolutions throughout its history. In the case of Egypt, replacing monarchy by a republic state in 1952, and then toppling president Morsi in 2013 did not achieve the right transition and produced a new form of authoritative regime.

The military regime that Abdel Nasser brought to Egypt in its onset was to bring prosperity and justice after years of colonial oppression which later revealed to be another form of repression. Monopolization of power, and preventing all political forces to manifest themselves played great role to permeate and consolidate the military rule in the main functions of the state that explains why all Egyptian presidents were from the military establishment From Nasser to El-Sisi except Morsi who came by election. Nasser founded a political system protected by military power which enabled all his successors to tighten the grip to preserve this legacy.

Militarizing the state was not enough for Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi to ensure their rule, they were looking for more soft power to cover their legitimacy deficit after their coup d'état to mobilize masses. Nationalization of media was the first step towards its monopolization by the state. Using media propaganda by both presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi as a prominent tool to support their rule and enhance their image was the main common point characterizing their governance. The narrowing phase on media during the former president Abdel Nasser and the current one El-Sisi are much alike enabling the regime to promote their internal and external policies, and even harnessing the cinema for their personal gain to attain public recognition. This action helped to draw the image of the

hero who appeared at the right time to save the country from the conspiracies. In spite of the huge differences between the traditional media and the new one media still manipulate masses.

The relationship between Muslim Brotherhood and military regime in Egypt started since their collaboration to overthrow the monarchy and access power. The peaceful period between the Free Officers and Muslim brothers did not last long and their relation turned into violent confrontation that varied between arrest campaigns, life and death sentences against the group leaders and exiles for other members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The suppression of the Muslim brotherhood continued with Nasser successors. By the January revolution in 2011 and the Brotherhood accession to helm through election in 2012, the democratic experience failed which brought the state back to square one. Moreover, eradication of Muslim brothers and any opposition was an urgent need for both presidents after their accession to power to avoid any confrontation that may threaten their position. Propaganda is used to tarnish their reputation to alienate them from political scene.

Finally, Nasser was the founder of the military regime and he represented the historical transition from monarchy to republic that shaped the current Egypt. What makes El-Sisi more like Nasser over the other presidents Mubarak and El-Sadat are the strategies they adopted or El-Sisi intentional imitation of Nasser to revive the image of the legendary leader? Evidently, El-Sisi considers Gamal Abdel Nasser as a role model and follows his footsteps. While Nasser lost Sinai in 1967, El-Sisi gave up Tiran and Sanafir. Besides, Nasser fought the opposition and destroyed it and El-Sisi so did and built more prisons. Both Presidents monopolized media and depended on national projects to rise their popularity. Finally, while both presidents engaged the military in political life, the military during El-Sisi became even a source of food production.

This dissertation is limited to study the mediatic strategies used by both presidents and how they elaborated an orchestrated attack against their opponents with the Ikhwan on the top of the list. Most of the sources were payable, therefore one used what was available to give a holistic overview of the topic. In the same spectrum, other researchers may discuss the use of media for economic reasons in Egypt, study the causes of the Ikhwan vs. Government long-lasting quarrel, or even use psychoanalysis technics and discourse analysis to figure out the impact of Nasser's and El Sisi's speeches on people.

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Appendix

Figure A:

The repercussion after Muslim Brotherhood's accusation attempt on Nasser's life



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Figure C:

Arab unity became a reality



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Figure D:

Missile development program



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Figure E:

Six days war 1967



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[%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-](https://arabi21.com/story/1275557/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-1967-%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-)

[%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-](https://arabi21.com/story/1275557/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-1967-%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-)

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[%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA.](https://arabi21.com/story/1275557/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-1967-%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA.)

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Figure F:

Popular support of Nasser after the 1967 ‘Setback’



“!حرب 1967.. هزيمة في الجبهة وانتصار في الإذاعات” عربي21, 5 June 2020,.

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Accessed 7 June 2022.

Figure G:

Egyptian newspapers praise the army's overthrow of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi



<http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/790325.html>

Figure H:

The regime portrayed what happened as a battle between terrorists and security (Getty)



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Figure I:

Rabaa sign to support the victims of the massacre



<https://www.gettyimages.fr/detail/photo-d%27actualit%C3%A9/members-of-confederation-of-unions-of-civil-servants-photo-dactualit%C3%A9/483807211>