



People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Larbi Tebessi University - Tébessa
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of Letters and English Language



The U.S. Politics and the Film Industry: The Role of Hollywood in Bush's "War on Terror"

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Letters and English Language in
Potential Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Literature and Civilization

Candidate:

AMARA Souraya
FAIZI Ahmed
NECIB Fairouz

Supervisor:

KHEMMAR Naim

Boards of Examiners:

President: Ms. BOUAZIZ Amina
Supervisor: Mr. KHEMMAR Naim
Examiner: Mrs. BRAHMI Halima

(MAA) Tebessa University
(MAB) Tebessa University
(MAA) Tebessa University

2019/2020

Dedication

We would like to dedicate our work to our loving parents who unconditionally love us, support us, and gave us moral lessons and discipline from an earlier age, and helped greatly shape the persons we are now.

To our supervisor who was the guiding light every step of the way towards the completion of this work.

For our beloved family and friends, and for all the ones who made the completion of this research an enjoyable and unforgettable worth experience.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Allah who gave us the strength, patience and will to finish this work and praise to Allah whom without his guidance; we wouldn't get to this stage of our life.

We would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to our beloved parents who have always been there for us not only during this year but ever since we've opened our eyes to this life, and with the very first breath we've taken.

We want to express special thanks to our brothers and sisters for their encouragements and support and our regards to all our dear friends and colleges.

We also wish to tremendously thank our supervisor Mr. Naim Khemmar as he provided help, guidance and especially patience during the preparation of this dissertation.

Abstract

Many Hollywood narrative films bear in the background a hidden charge of cultural and political orthodoxy and revisionism. These films target large audiences to primarily entertain them but on another level, they greatly influence them in shaping their political vision of social facts. This research aims at unveiling the subtleties with which the Hollywood film industry shapes unconsciously the U.S. political ideologies, nationally and internationally, and how Hollywood films psychologically affect viewers. It also discusses the nature of the relationship between Hollywood and the US administration and their use of film to promote their internal and external policy. Hollywood's popularity around the world became the channel through which the US administration formulate and shape people's political perspectives. It became the main means to spread the "Global War on Terror" cry that George W. Bush launched in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Washington DC. This study discusses the overwhelming role of movies on being part of the US Foreign Policy after the 9/11 events. We conclude with the undeniable fact that Hollywood was an extension and a backbone of the 9/11 war on terror and its subsequent engine, the new American domestic and foreign policy ideology. .

Key Terms:

U.S. political Authorities, psychology, Hollywood movie industry, ideology, propaganda, war on terror, geopolitics, Islamophobia.

ملخص

تحمل العديد من أفلام هوليوود السردية في الخلفية شحنة خفية من المعتقدات الثقافية والسياسية. تستهدف هذه الأفلام جماهير كبيرة للترفيه عنهم في المقام الأول ولكن على مستوى آخر ، فإنها تؤثر عليهم بشكل كبير في تشكيل رؤيتهم السياسية للحقائق الاجتماعية. يستكشف هذا البحث الطرق التي تبني بها صناعة السينما في هوليوود الأيديولوجيات السياسية للولايات المتحدة محليا و دوليا، وكيف تؤثر الأفلام الأمريكية على الجمهور من الناحية النفسية. كما يناقش طبيعة العلاقة بين هوليوود والسلطات السياسية الأمريكية وكيف تستخدم حكومة الولايات المتحدة صناعة السينما كأداة دعائية للترويج لسياساتها. إن شعبية أفلام هوليوود في أنحاء العالم أعطتها دورا مهما في صناعة وتشكيل وجهات نظر الناس السياسية لا يمكن إنكاره بأي شكل من الأشكال وبالتالي قد ساعدت في نشر الأيديولوجيا الجيوسياسية الأمريكية وحملة الحرب على الإرهاب العالمية التي شنها جورج دبليو بوش عقب الهجمات الإرهابية على مركز التجارة العالمي و على واشنطن في 11 سبتمبر 2001. تناقش كذلك هذه الرسالة الدور الهائل للأفلام في كونها جزءا من السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية بعد أحداث 11 سبتمبر. و أخيرا نستنتج الحقيقة التي لا يمكن إنكارها أن هوليوود كانت امتدادا وعمودا فكريا لحرب 11 سبتمبر على الإرهاب ومحركها لنشر الفكر الأمريكي والسياسة الداخلية والخارجية للحكومة الأمريكية.

الكلمات المفتاحية:

السلطات السياسية الأمريكية ، علم النفس ، صناعة أفلام هوليوود ، الأيديولوجيا ، الدعاية ، الحرب على الإرهاب الجغرافيا السياسية ، فوبيا الإسلام .

Résumé

De nombreux films narratifs hollywoodiens portent en arrière-plan une charge cachée d'orthodoxie culturelle et politique et de révisionnisme. Ces films s'adressent à un large public pour le divertir principalement mais à un autre niveau, ils les influencent grandement dans l'élaboration de leur vision politique des faits sociaux. Cette recherche vise à dévoiler les subtilités avec lesquelles l'industrie cinématographique hollywoodienne façonne inconsciemment les idéologies politiques américaines, aux niveaux national et international. Il aborde également la nature des relations entre Hollywood et l'administration américaine et leur utilisation du film pour promouvoir leur politique interne et externe. La popularité d'Hollywood dans le monde est devenue le canal par lequel l'administration américaine formule et façonne les perspectives politiques des spectateurs. Cela a été aussi le principal moyen de répandre le cri de la «guerre globale contre le terrorisme» que George W. Bush a lancé au lendemain des attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001, contre le World Trade Center et Washington DC. Enfin, cette étude examine le rôle grandissant des films dans la politique étrangère américaine après les événements du 11 septembre. Nous concluons avec le fait indéniable que Hollywood était l'extension et la colonne vertébrale de la guerre contre le terrorisme du 11 septembre et son moteur ultérieur, la nouvelle idéologie de politique intérieure et étrangère américaine.

Mots clés:

Autorités politiques américaines, psychologie, industrie cinématographique hollywoodienne, idéologie, propagande, guerre contre le terrorisme, géopolitique, Islamophobie.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC:American Broadcasting Company

BFC: Biograph Film Company

CAIR: Council on American-Islamic Relations

CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency

DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DoD: Department of Defence

DVD:Digital Versatile Disk

ELO: Entertainment Liaison Office

FBI: The Federal Bureau of Investigation

HBO:Home Box Office

HUAC: House Un-American Activities Committee

IMP: Independent Motion Picture

IR: International Relations

LA:Los Angeles

MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MPPC: Motion Picture Patents Company

NATO:North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBA:National Basketball Association

NSA: National Security Act

NSS: National Security Strategy

NYMPC: New York Motion Picture Company

NY: New York

NYPD: New York Police Department

OWI: Office of War Information

PR: Public Relations

Sci-Fi: Science Fiction

SDI: Strategic Defence Initiative

SDPA: Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs

SEALs: Sea, Air & Land

TNCs: Transnational Corporations

UN: United Nations

USA: The United States of America

U.S.: The United States

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTC: World Trade Centre

WW2: World War Two

Table of Contents

Dedication	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Abstract	iii
ملخص	iv
Résumé	v
List of Acronyms	vi
Table of Contents	viii
General Introduction	1
Chapter One: Hollywood, Psychology, and the U.S. Politics: A Historical and Theoretical Background	6
1.1. The Cinema: A Brief Historical Review.....	7
1.1.1. Hollywood’s Humble Origins	8
1.1.2. Hollywood’s Rise to Dominance	9
1.2. The Psychology of the Film.....	11
1.2.1. Perception and Cognition of Scenes	12
1.2.2. The Cultural Influence Strategy of Hollywood and its Storytelling	13
1.2.3. The Psychological Impact of Movies on Individuals and Societies.....	17
1.3. Cooperation between Hollywood and Political Authorities.....	19
1.3.1. Hollywood Ideological Stances: Cultural Imperialism, Globalization, and Americanization	19
1.3.2. The Politicization of Hollywood.....	25
1.3.3. The CIA and Pentagon in Hollywood.....	32

1.4. Hollywood's Involvement in the War Efforts	38
Conclusion	43
Chapter Two: Hollywood and the "War on Terror"	45
2.1. Terrorism: Some Perspectives	46
2.2. The September 11 th Terrorist Attacks: Facts and Media Coverage	48
2.3. The Bush Doctrine, the "War on Terror," and Foreign Policy	55
2.3.1. The Presidential Rhetoric of the "War on Terror" and the (Re) Creation of Reality after 9/11	57
2.3.2. Post-9/11 Imperialism	60
2.3.3. Framing the War on Terror.....	63
2.4. Hollywood and Post-9/11 Bush's Foreign Policy.....	65
2.4.1. Mirroring Terror: The Impact of 9/11 on Hollywood.....	67
2.4.2. Post-9/11 Hollywood.....	68
2.4.3. 9/11 Arrives on the Screen.....	72
2.5. The Invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.....	74
2.5.1. The Cinematic Treatment of the Iraq and Afghanistan War.....	76
2.5.2. Hollywood, the "War on Terror," and Islamophobia	78
2.5.3. Re-Constructing Islamophobia: the Post-9/11 Representation of Muslims in Hollywood Film	80
Conclusion	82
General Conclusion.....	82
List of Works Cited.....	89

General Introduction

One of the manifestations of the power of the United States in the last century and a facet of its cultural imperialism is its movie-making sector, popularized as Hollywood. Hollywood, which started as an entertainment tool destined primarily for the working class and immigrants seeking a sense of unity in a period of increasing union membership in the beginning of the twentieth century eventually ended up very popular among the other classes of society, the middle and upper classes. Hollywood, thus, primarily helped forming a sense of national unity inside the United States, but it also helped beautifying the image of the country outside.

Being an art and a means of human expression, the cinema is connected to the social, economic, cultural, and political structures of the American society. Yet, perhaps the most interesting of these is the relationship between US politics and Hollywood. The very apparent side of this relationship is that while Washington, D.C. provides a source of appealing and intriguing plots for screenwriters in Hollywood, the latter offers possibilities of glamour and fame to politicians. For some, Hollywood can even be a bridge to politics. Ronald Reagan, an actor coming from Hollywood, became the 40th president of the United States in 1981, and the incumbent president, Donald Trump, became famous through hosting producing reality TV shows.

The other, perhaps more practical, side of the relationship between Hollywood and politics involves one of the most important departments in Washington, D.C., the Pentagon. The Pentagon had long established strong ties with filmmakers in Hollywood, and, in 1948, it created the Entertainment Liaison Office. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created its own liaison office in 1996.

The declared objectives of these liaisons offices is “to project and protect the image of the United States Army” in the entertainment environment. Yet, insiders and observers say that the relationship between the Pentagon and Hollywood transcend the mere “image projecting and protecting” into polishing and rebranding. The movie *Top Gun* produced in 1986, an example of the collaboration with the ministry of defence, aimed at rebranding the image of the U.S. Navy, after its defeat in Vietnam, and attracting new recruits.

The liaison offices allow Hollywood producers to use and access military equipment and facilities. They also provide advice and expertise to directors and screenwriters. In return, filmmakers present their scenarios to the liaison offices for review; very often, screenwriters are asked to omit, add, or rewrite passages. In 1979, Francis Ford Coppola refused the script modifications required by the Pentagon and preferred to shoot his movie about the Vietnam War, *Apocalypse Now*, in the Philippine and hire military equipment, including helicopters, from the Philippine government.

People in the United States sometimes call their capital a “Hollywood for ugly people” referring to the hypocrisy of politicians and their acting side. Insiders and observers, on the other hand, go much further describing the ties between Hollywood and Washington as strategic; Jack Valenti, the former chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) did not hesitate to claim that “Washington and Hollywood spring from the same DNA.”

Those strategic ties mean that Hollywood would support and echo the official political discourse coming from Washington especially when it comes to what politicians see as national security. Certainly, politicians know the power of the image as a propaganda too and they always try to keep it under control. In 1947, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, created in 1938 to investigate alleged anti-American and disloyal activities among citizens and companies, investigated Hollywood film industry circle and charged ten

screenwriters and producers for having connections with Communism. The ten were blacklisted by the film industry, and later hundreds of more actors and screenwriters were boycotted over mere suspicions. Many of these were obliged to leave the country while others used pen names to continue screenwriting.

Accordingly, Hollywood participated in the war efforts demonizing the Germans during WW2, and after the war ended, the Soviets assumed the role of the villain on Hollywood screens as the Cold War propaganda intensified. The end of the Cold War, it seems, left Hollywood with no preferred villain until the year 2001. The 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Centre Towers in New York offered the nation a new foreign enemy, and President George W. Bush, offered Hollywood a new villain, Muslims, after he embarked on his “War on Terror.”

Therefore, this dissertation investigates the relationship between US politics and the film industry in general taking Hollywood’s portrayal of Bush’s “War on Terror” as a case study. The study tries to understand the interplay and interaction between Hollywood’s actors and Washington, D.C.’s politicians. The dissertation’s main hypothesis is the biased and partial Hollywood’s portrayal of the “War of Terror.” In other words, this research postulates that Hollywood, like it always does, supported Bush’s official propaganda and became a tool of it justifying his military interventions abroad and downplaying the strategic reasons behind these interventions.

This study draws its importance by its attempt to understand the power of the image in politics. In a world of increasing conflicts where countries compete for access to natural resources and markets, governments are more aware than ever before of the utility of the image as a tool that can serve their interest and shape public opinion. Peoples, on the other hand, ought to understand how the filmmaking industry, Hollywood especially, functions so that they do not fall for its propaganda.

The research methodology is mainly qualitative relying on a descriptive analysis of a number of sources coming from politicians as well as from specialists of the movie industry to understand the mutual interplay between the two worlds of politics and entertainment. The research is also historical tracing the evolution of the relationships between politics in the United States and the cinema since the inception of this latter. Consequently, the research compares the probable mutual influence during the different major conflicts the United States took part during the last century, mainly WW2 and the Cold War.

Many studies, old and new, especially by sociologists and political scientists have been published. Sociologist Margaret Thorp in her *America at the Movies*, published in 1939 and mainly concerned with the impact of cinema-going culture on the social habits of Americans, dedicated a part of her book to examine the role of movies in popularizing political ideas and the relationship between political propaganda and censorship. In *Power and the Glitter*, published in 1990, Ronald Brownstein tries to pin down the dynamic interplay between politicians and the show industry. Brownstein claimed that Hollywood is getting more influential in the political sphere in an era of image.

If Brownstein focused on the increasing role of Hollywood in politics, Steven Ross, on the other hand, in his *Movies and American Society* published in 2002, traced the increasing influence exerted by politicians on Hollywood during the twentieth century. Donald Critchlow and Emilie Raymond, in their work *Hollywood and Politics: A Sourcebook*, published in 2009, offered a selection of primary sources dealing with the mutual interplay between Hollywood and politics in different realms like elections, public policy, and political propaganda.

This dissertation is divided into two chapters. The first chapter reviews the historical and the theoretical background linking the cinema industry and U.S. politics. First, the chapter traces the evolution of the cinema into becoming an industry presenting the major milestones

in this evolution. Second, the psychology of the film is explained along with the psychological and cultural impact of Hollywood on individuals and societies. Third, collaboration between Hollywood and political authorities is investigated. The ideological stance of Hollywood, its politicization, and its relationships with the Pentagon and the CIA are scrutinized. Last, the chapter reviews Hollywood's portrayal of WW2 and the Cold War and censorship in relation to military and political events.

The second chapter investigates the role of Hollywood in George Bush's "War on Terror" and its consistency with the U.S. foreign policy. The chapter first reviews the phenomenon of terrorism before and after 9/11, then it sheds light on the September 11th terrorist attacks and their coverage in the media and their reception in the American society and worldwide. Third, the chapter tries to define Bush's "War on Terror" in relation to his post-9/11 foreign policy, also known as Bush Doctrine. Fourth, the chapter attempts to show the impact of the 9/11 attacks on Hollywood and the arrival of these attacks on Hollywood's screen. Fifth, Hollywood's portrayal of the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq is examined with an emphasis on two movies: *Zero Dark Thirty* and *Fahrenheit 9/11*. The appearance of the increasing Islamophobia on Hollywood's screen is also investigated.

Chapter One:

Hollywood, Psychology, and the U.S. Politics: A Historical and Theoretical Background

Hollywood, the cinema capital, is the largest film industry not in the United States of America only but in the whole world. Hollywood movies and all they convey reach people all around the world to contribute to their perception of the United States and the world. Portrayals produced by Hollywood, distorted or accurate, spread throughout the world to develop in people's minds into beliefs and stereotypes. The content of these movies and the way it is portrayed is influenced by many factors and realities including the social and political ones.

Since its creation, Hollywood has functioned as "a two-way mirror" allowing the world to discover American and American to see themselves. In this global world, filmmakers eventually were using movies not only to consolidate the myths and the shared values that make up the American citizen but they were also exporting these values to the world glamorizing the society of capitalism and the culture of consumption (Zhakova 1).

As an industry whose raw material and product is culture, academics in the arts and humanities study it to examine the mechanisms underlying the perception of films by viewers, how they are influenced, and to what effect. The psychological mechanisms underlying the influence exerted by films on the audience are important as perceptual cognition is used to support the perception of the world and the interaction with events in the real world. Politicians, through the media, tend to employ events, traumas especially, to target people's unconsciousness to manipulate and direct them into adopting desired positions.

Most of the time, movies transcend the limits of entertainment purpose to social, cultural, and political purposes. Movies are the product of a social and political context that eventually construct meanings and deliver messages. Therefore, it can be argued that the

film industry and ideology are inseparable. Politicians in the United States know the power of the film and have always tried to use this power to serve their particular goals and rally people and institutions around their agendas.

1.1.The Cinema: A Brief Historical Review

At the beginning of the twentieth century and as a direct consequence of the invention of “still photography” the “moving pictures” were born first to imitate real life through animated images. These moving pictures soon found in the United States of America a fertile land to prosper and develop into imagination and creativity. Then the question arose of how to use them to cope with the increasing social demand and need for entertainment in a post-industrial society (qtd. In Hammoudi 4). Consequently, cinema or as it is called the seventh art was born and soon businessmen saw in it a new profitable business opportunity. Most of the cinematographic productions then were comedies: “small story-oriented sketches with a moral” such as those of Charlie Chaplin or Buster Keaton. This cinematic era was called “the silent era” (Hammoudi 4).

The success of those short films opened the door to further experiments and thus was developed the techniques of movie making which enabled the filmmakers to produce and make longer films. Later on, the sound was added to films which gave a new dimension to this art and helped it to become more popular inside and outside the United States. These developments made the movie business feel the need to build an industry in order to sustain this new activity and ensure its profitability (Hammoudi 4). Thus, evidently came and evolved into the making of Hollywood and paving the way to establish the greatest empire of film industry which began with humble origins that will be discovered next.

1.1.1. Hollywood’s Humble Origins

The movie industry had already been flourishing for years with films being produced all over America when New York became its center (qtd. in Bahn 18). In 1910, the Biograph Film Company (BFC) from New York rented an acre of downtown Los Angeles and began to film one-reelers. One of those among the very first film shot in Hollywood was titled *Love among the Roses* (Bahn 18). Virtually, all aspects of American cinema changed dramatically during the 1910s. At the beginning of the decade, the film industry was dominated by the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC), also known as “the Trust.” Movies were short, typically around fifteen minutes, and exhibited primarily in nickelodeons (qtd. in “American Cinema in the 1910s”).

Later on, one group of studios, including Universal, settled around the Sunset Boulevard in Hollywood, but the citizens brought in a zoning ordinance to prevent more studios being built with the result that Hollywood never the center of film production, contrary to popular belief. It remained a quiet attractive suburb with only one policeman, who usually stood at the corner of Hollywood and Vine. Movie people came in to rent hotel rooms or to buy houses and eventually the suburb gave its name (Hollywood) in popular parlance to the whole film-producing area and to the movie industry in general (Bahn 19).

Around 1914, Hollywood’s cinematographic real history started when several movie companies established on the East Coast decided to settle in the West, more precisely at Hollywood, to escape the monopoly imposed by the MPPC which forced them to pay a weekly tax of two dollars for the use of their patented projector. Shortly after, Hollywood studios asserted themselves as leaders of the moving pictures industry and dictated their rules adopting the capitalist economic model of the country (qtd. in “American Cinema in the 1910s”).

Later, the one-reel or 1000 feet of film became the standard film length at most studios, and the years 1908 to 1914 became referred to as the “one-reel era;” the distribution and

exhibition sectors were structured accordingly. Consequently, the cinema was developing into an industry (qdt.in Malraux 101) which can be observed today more than ever before.

The US cinema has asserted itself as the first artistic mode of expression and a thriving system in the United States destined for a large audience. Hollywood became the epitome of movie production which is equated with the highest grossing films in the entire world, breaking the local barriers to reach out all corners of the world exhibiting among other things the American way of life.

1.1.2. Hollywood's Rise to Dominance

By the 1920s, the domain of movie making was America's fifth largest industry and continued to prosper with the introduction of different innovations into becoming one of the most significant tools for entertainment in the 20th century. Motion picture which referred to the tools and the art that made the picture in motion and that was an innovation in its time developed to include various needed devices; hence, motion picture came to mean the machinery and devices as well as the art (Balio27).

At the beginning, movie production did not require much effort and preparation. Initially, films were merely a display of casual events that lacked appropriate plots and settings. However, when their lengths increased and special effects became popular producing them needed more money and preparation. Hence, the development of the studio system in which planning and production of movies needed to be executed carefully.

One of the pioneers in establishing the studio system in the 1900s was Thomas Ince. In 1910, the former stage actor was given a chance by the Independent Motion Picture (IMP) to direct his first film, and the following year the New York Motion Picture Company (NYMPC) offered him the opportunity to direct a multi-reel film in Edendale, California where Ince wrote, directed and cut his first film. Thus, the initial steps in creating a studio system started (Straiger 1).

With the introduction of the sound, the American movie industry became more influential. By 1927-8, the conversion to sound in the industry provided an additional boost to the market, therefore, strengthening the position on which dominant Hollywood studios already stood. The “Talkie Boom” or the introduction of sound films was remarkably powerful that it was propagated as “Depression-proof” by the collapse of Wall Street in 1929, all because theatre revenues and studio profits reached unprecedented records by 1930s. (Smith 220)

However, the industry did not escape the calamities of the depression. In the period of 1930-1933, the impact was disastrous; revenues from theatre admissions fees went down from \$90 million to only \$60 million per week, and the total business fell from \$730 million to \$480 million. Theaters around the country were shut down and by 1935 only 15.300 were operational out of 23.000 in previous years. The outcome of this period was that different production companies followed the path of low-cost movie production which led to the appearance of B-movies (Smith 220).

The production of B-movies was the industry route to prevent tragedy in the United States and it proved vital to the studio system. All of the major corporations that were integrated in 1930s were specialized in A-class movie production; however, producing B-pictures allowed their studios to keep afloat. This type of production ensured companies’ contrasts of personnel to operate on a regular basis in order to develop talent and to test new genres, and surely maintain the flow and supply of products (Smith 221).

Starting from the 20th century, Hollywood became America’s and the world’s major movie producer. Today, the American film industry produce the most commercially successful movies in the world. It generates yearly several hundred movies and billions in revenues.

1.2.The Psychology of the Film

At the time of the first kinoscope and cinema exhibitions in 1894-1895, thanks to devices such as the phenakistoscope, zoetrope and praxinoscope, moving images had been popular for decades. Just before this time, theoretical psychology turned to defining the processes underlying the mind's function. Psychologists of perception started researching apparent movement of experimental visual stimuli under controlled conditions because considered moving stimulus to be intriguing cases in human perception or as part of the research of psychological aesthetics created by Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Wundt. With the publication of Hugo Münsterberg's *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study* the kick-start of the film's psychology was given (Tan 2).

The first part of this masterpiece explored how film characteristically depicts the dynamics of the basic psychological functions studied by experimental psychology, particularly perception, attention, memory and emotions. Wundt trained Hugo Münsterberg and William James appointed him to lead Harvard's experimental psychology laboratory. Importantly, Münsterberg was also an avid cinemagoer as his study of his time's theatrical movies as an asserted filmmaker shows (Tan 3). Münsterberg shared the enthusiasm of his contemporaries and viewers, still now, for the wonder of moving pictures and their apparent truth. He described the film experience as an "unparalleled inner experience that takes our minds into a peculiar complex state due to the simultaneous character of reality and pictorial representation" (Münsterberg 24).

Regarding the perception of movie scenes, Münsterberg argued that the scope of cinema is seen without the spectator taking it for real, the motion is perceived not without the mind of the spectator adding the consistency of smooth motion to simply see a sequence of positions. For instance, apparent movement of stationary lines is in fact "superimposed on motionless images by the mind's action" (29). Attention in the cinema, according to Münsterberg, makes the mind concentrate on details that acquire an unusual vividness and become the focus of our

impulses and emotions close-ups objectively this weaving “of the outer world into our minds” (39). In addition, attention in their target is characterized by a sequence of subsequent changes. Shifts are generated by specifics of the scene or action made prominent by spatial set-up, especially the actor’s expression (gestures and movements), and mobile framing. Memory is used to recall events that were presented in the film earlier at any moment.

Just as attention and perception make an instrument of the imagination, memory allows for the fusion of physically separated events in our consciousness. Munsterberg suggested that imagination turns what viewers see into their own felt emotion: the fear, pain and the excitement “that spectators are going through is actually projected onto the screen” (Munsterberg 53). He, however, introduced a distinction between what would be called today emotions based on empathy with characters on the one hand and emotions that react to the scenes which they are in.

1.2.1. Perception and Cognition of Scenes

The mental inputs can go far further than visible motion, i.e., the perception of smooth motion from one frame to another. The cognitive revolution introduced the concept of mental representation as a key to understanding the relationship between, on the one hand, sensory experiences from the world and, on the second hand, the responses of the people to it (Tan 4). In the late 1970s, the film’s psychology as a sub-discipline of academic psychology really took off. The broad agenda of Munsterberg, which was dispersed through isolated studios of mainly movement experience, regained general acclamation. This was due first since the 60s to the booming supply and consumption of moving images via media, television and computer-generated imagery. Second, the cognitive turn in experimental psychology has renewed interest in perception and cognition as it happens in natural ecology (Munsterberg 54).

Moreover, according to James Gibson, the perception of motion pictures involves a complex optical flow exactly the same as that which an observer would have when present at the filmed scene. The film portrays the world in the scenes tailored to that setting. The camera's view field becomes the optical array to the spectator (298). Hence, because of its immersive ability, the film is a medium reputed for its potential to enhance the response to emotional stimulus. Moreover, the nature and background of the emotional experiment in highly immersive cinema remains to be investigated (qtd. in Visch et al.1443). The experiment itself is at the same time emotionally arousing attractive, since all intensities of emotion are fairly small. It may also be against expectation; more complex cognitive processes are not impeded (qtd. in Visch et al. 1444). For example, high immersion may cause audiences to wonder what exactly one feels, and what kind of film one is watching. Additionally, audiences can adopt an entertainment attitude towards presentation, and use the difference between fiction and reality in an emotion-regulation strategy based on analytical coping and planning with probably overwhelming emotions (Koole 14).

1.2.2. The Cultural Influence Strategy of Hollywood and its Storytelling

Nowadays, most of the world's peoples know a lot about American culture; most of them glorify America because of its historical experience as the first nation to be built on democratic institutions, freedom of choice and respect for human rights. Simultaneously, Americans promote this common belief in American culture in order to win other cultures' admiration. "The picture goers are Americanized. They talk America, think America, and dream America. They are temporary American citizens." remarked the *London Daily Express*, in 1927.

Storytelling is used as a type of intellectual weapon at the service of communicators, marketing officials, administrators, politicians, etc. It is focused on the ability to get people to buy into a project or product in a scenario by enhancing the viewer's emotional side.

Accordingly, the world's audience had become consumerist immediately after watching films, for example, the trend of consuming low-carbon food in American films sparked the rise of global consumer brands such as McDonald's, KFC, pizza, etc (Maisuwong 2). Hollywood, thus, succeeds in selling America and the American culture to the rest of the world which make them view it as an idealistic society that is free from errors. (qtd. in Ali Ibbi 94).

Hollywood film, which has become the best American cultural means of mass communication, it has also effected the film industries in many countries; this process is called Hollywoodization. Hollywood affected the Asian film industry which adopts its style of production, its dressing, or even imitate its name like the Indian Bollywood (Ali Ibbi 95). Despite these "powerful universalistic forces," it is impossible to ignore the American and national component of Hollywood filmmaking. Hollywood has also based cinematic influence upon the national culture of the United States" (Cowen 77).

In most instances, Hollywood has influenced the film industries around the world to fit in with its mold. Most films with settings outside the US will in one way or the other have a taste of America (Ali Ibbi 95). On the other hand, argues that the foreign exploitation of entertainment products is an important element in the development of entertainment content in Hollywood, which is often produced and distributed at a deficit in the states (Weinberg). Maisuwong advocates that America is being viewed as the world's only superpower. In addition, Hollywood film is a cultural product in which America is once again trying to imperialize the world by using a soft tool so that America can sell its culture to any other state in the world (4).

In his article, "How the Global Box Office is Changing Hollywood," Tom Brook described Hollywood as an octopus with ten globe-wide tackles. Hollywood's success as a global brand did not come overnight; it has evolved over a long time (Ali Ibbi 97). Americans are good at making films and, more importantly, they are really good at selling them out. The

success of Hollywood didn't happen because they made films for everyone-it happened because they could persuade you that the film was meant for you (Burrowes).

Hollywood is an American tool, and Hollywood's access to the world is America's access as well, and while the global society is regarded as globalized, it is subtly Americanised (qtd. in Ali Ibbi 98). Maybe global cinema does exist, but it does not exist in the place of American cinema. What we define as global cinema really is nothing more than a modern Americanization of culture (Burrowes). In the context of how Hollywood promotes American culture and the strategy of influence it adopted; culture, in particular Hollywood films, is one of the cornerstones of this endeavor. A byword for the American dream Hollywood helps to glorify the virtues of the American way of life, to promote major industrial products and to build and enhance a positive national image" (Bi). In addition, he continued to point out that Hollywood films aim to construct a national image characterized by freedom, equality, prosperity and other positive aspects. Storylines reflect values such as "freedom" and "equality". Instead, Hollywood films are crucial cultural objects that give a peek into American cultural and social history; the manner in which such films have shaped people's culture around the world is a major concern. "The success of the American movie has led other nations to fear that their own cultural identity would be contaminated, somehow altered by this influence of Hollywood" (Burrowes).

In sum, Maisuwong argues that Hollywood film is a mass communication because its story is easy to understand and simple. Some people see films as harmless and no serious thought is required when watching films. In addition, he states that movies are a cultural force worldwide and they are crucial in shaping visual perspectives. People see films visually, they are exposed by motion picture to the film, and thus people will always see their lives visually through their fantasy based on what they saw in the films. He added, "For certain people the culture and ideals found for Hollywood films often trigger action and thinking to change. It

appeared, for example, that America was the worst during world wars, but after watching the world wars movies; some other countries were bad, killing others brutally and cruelly. In fact, this is the picture American films continue to implant in the minds of the majority of the world's peoples that America has always been the target of terrorism, the most brave nation with its army, the winning side of all tales, and the protector of minorities and the world as a whole (6).

Maisu Wong ends with the argument that democracy appeared to be America's main philosophy as commonly occurs in war movies. Democracy has to be given and war has been about winning independence. Moreover, most films portrayed America as the world's best nation with benevolence, morals and ethics. Furthermore, Hollywood films show that during world wars, America was the only nation that remained neutral and tried to ignore the war but at the end, when the wars became more violent and brutal and spread through many nations around the world, America became the hero who declared war against the enemy of liberty and helped those nations that were invaded. It turned out to be the case only after watching Hollywood films; some people believe that freedom will bring peace and demand more freedom to their lives, and therefore need more wars and fighting (7).

1.2.3. The Psychological Impact of Movies on individuals and Societies

Propaganda is a pejorative term that is used with regard to any film that purposefully aims to convince an audience towards particular values and beliefs. On that, Derzyan Tatev elaborates:

Truly, all movies pass a range of concepts, which have an effect on people but not all have that intentionally. Some of them implement state order, and spread state-friendly characters, values, and behavior. But to better understand the impact of films one more clause needs to be clarified: Films don't always carry out state order more concretely, but their effect on individuals remains strong. Culture's function is not in resolving the

issue but in informing the public about the nature of a particular issue. As a representation of culture and entertainment; film affects a viewer; regardless of whether or not it specifically had such a target. (35)

The film as a major component of the mainstream arts depicts and represents the principles of the society in which it was made, which may result in certain damages. And although it may be apparent at times, this cycle of formulating one's worldview is typically consumed unconsciously by way of assumptions about life being depicted in the film. In his book *Hollywood's Reel of Fortune*, Ted Baehr warns that the mass media, especially film and television, are not only the most powerful communication devices ever conceived, but are also the most omnipresent in modern society. They plant strong emotional images in our minds, guide our purchasing and control our lifestyles while rediriging our hopes and dreams (39). He illustrates his own point of view by going back to 1942 when *Bambi*, a Disney animated drama movie, was released. Baehr reports that the year before the movie was released, the total amount of deer hunting in the United States was \$9.5 million. Yet after the horrific scene in *Bambi*, showing Bambi's mother being shot by hunters, America's deer hunting business dropped to \$4.1 million. It may sound like a trivial example, but it shows how powerful the movie is and how huge is its influence on the American audience and the rest of the world.

The most important aspect of movies which enables them to be used as propaganda means is their capacity to have a hidden, unnoticed influence on individuals. Typically the effect is sensual from the consciously manageable sector, which helps bypass critical thought (sensual resonance emerging). Sensual resonance makes it possible to circumvent psychological security on a conscious level, which attempts to protect against ads, propaganda and any sort of brainwashing. Here is the sensual resonance required, since its first rule is: Man should be influenced on a sensual level, not on a conscious level.

Baehr added that “as a strong socio-psychological tool, movie helps get rid of the previous day’s tiredness, anxiety and phobia. One should not say the movie helps to escape everyday problems but definitely after watching; one returns to the appeased society”. Whatever the movie’s content, it may alter any view or opinion, beginning with marriage and love, to the government’s image. Propaganda is “therefore effective at a subconscious stage, and also uses the enormous impact of movies on individuals” (40).

The Bolshevik Revolution was the first to realize the great impact films would have on societies with Lenin saying that “of all the arts; the most important for us is cinema.” (qtd. in Lenin). Cinema is not only an expressionistic aspect of culture, representing the importance and philosophy of people regarding their society, but also an instrumental aspect of culture, thus showing people how they should behave and thus serve as a morality’s monitor. As a result, cinema plays a positive role in society in providing entertainment to enhance information and knowledge that enhances people’s awareness of urgent social issues and creates sociability and/or catharsis. On the other hand, cinema plays a negative role in society – promoting incorrect values, creating social and sexual violence and crime, fleeing reality into a dream world rather than facing life's problems, encouraging the adoption of harmful role models and encouraging skepticism about social institutions (“Social Impact of Cinema” 174)

1.3. Cooperation between Hollywood and Political Authorities

Various aspects of the relationship between Hollywood and politics had been explored by scholars in history, cinema, and media studies. During the 20th century, Hollywood films and entertainers within the industry have affected national politics, impacted cultural constructions of American identity, and influenced social change as well. Regional, state, national and international political control, decision taking, and agreements influenced and

transformed the industry. As reported by the Institut National des Hautes Etudes de la Defense et de la Justice research group in France:

The collaboration between Hollywood and the political authorities took on various forms quite early on and everyone saw in this tacit agreement, a win-win relationship: for example, the producer could get army equipment (aircraft carriers, submarines, archival images, etc.) provided the films glorify the army in return, exalt heroism, patriotism and insidiously incite young people to join the army.

Between the First and Second World War this collaboration worked very well, enabling the production of several films that magnified the army.

1.3.1. Hollywood Ideological Stances: Cultural Imperialism, Globalization, and Americanization

Films can now be recognised as the mirror of society and thus its reflected cultural product. In his essay entitled “The Little Shop girls Go to the Movies,” from his book *The Mass Ornament Weimar Essays*, Siegfried Kracauer states that “films are the mirror of the prevailing society” (291). Kracauer essentially describes the relation between movies and the society’s dominant class. Later he suggested a more “symbiotic” relationship in which movie and community are mutually dependent. Furthermore, movies are produced for many reasons and the criteria for film production are based on the needs and demands of the audience; “the more essential thing it is to fulfill the needs of those audiences,” and as a direct result the “prevailing” society encourages it to flourish and become successful (307).

The movie’s philosophy is located predominantly within a particular culture and is therefore generated from cultural values. Hence, in doing so, ideology is the cornerstone of the movie; it enforces cultural values, beliefs, and social and political atmospheres. The notion of ideology is hidden, making it difficult to define because it is still possible to interpret it from different perspectives. In his book *What Is Ideology*, Terry Eagleton identifies the concept ideology as “ideas which help legitimize a dominant political power”

(1). As can be noticed, ideology is used as a reasonable method by which the dominant force claims particular issues based on pre-conceived views which help people to understand. At the same token, in her book *Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts*, Susan Hayward argues that the ideology represents the way a country is perceived (192). For some Marxist intellectuals likewise, ideology is a concept imposed by the ruling power over the rest of society. In the Marxian tradition, Marx and Friedrich Engels defined ideology initially as “the concepts of the dominant class” (qtd. in Kellner 2). Moreover, Douglas Kellner advocates that Hollywood movie, like American society, should be viewed as a contested terrain, and that movies can be described as a struggle of representation over how to build a social world and everyday life (1).

Douglas Kellner and Michael Ryan observed epic fighting between liberals and conservatives in mainstream Hollywood throughout the decade in their readings of 1970s’ films with more progressive voices being marginalized, of the kind that was sometimes heard in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As the decade progressed, conservative films became increasingly popular (e.g. *Rocky*, *Star Wars*, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* and *Superman*) indicating that conservative’s sentiments grew in the public and that Hollywood nurtured those political trends (qtd. in Kellner 4). He notes that even the most socially important movies, such as films by Jane Fonda, *Network* and other films by Sidney Lumet and others, presented individual approaches to social problems; thus also strengthens the conservative appeal to individualism and attacks statism (4).

Consequently, Hollywood movies of the decade permitted one to participate politically the coming of Reagan and the new Right power by showing that conservative longings were increasingly common within the cultural heritage and that movie and popular culture were attempting to help establishing a cultural framework more hospitable to Reagan and conservatives than to embattle liberal (Kellner 12).

To sum up, movies are considered a source of success dependent on cultural viewpoints. The principal role is to communicate political messages. The Hollywood movie industry therefore forms the public opinion and affects the way people think and changes their attitude, not in the United States only but all around the world greatly contributing to what is called cultural imperialism.

The ability of movies to penetrate national borders without being noticed make the perfect tool of the new colonialism which is based on cultural, political, and economic dependence instead of physical presence of troops. "Little by little, our cultures are being reduced to nothing. These technologies do not have a passport or a visa but they affect us and shape us," remarked Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a Burkinabé historian.

Maisuwong has described cultural imperialism as a more accepted culture's supremacy over other cultures, that is, cultural imperialism is a soft means of colonization (2). The audiences around the world are strongly influenced by Hollywood ideologies being conveyed through movies. "In the early phases of cultural imperialism, scholars primarily based their focus on nation-states as principal actors in international relations. They imputed rich, developed, and Western nation-states with innovations and deeds by which they transmit their cultural values to developing world's poorer and weaker communities" (Kraidy).

In the post-World War 2 global imperialism theories arose under different names including "neo-colonialism," "economic imperialism," and "soft imperialism." It has acquired several other labels over the years, including "media imperialism," "structural imperialism," "cultural dependency and synchronization," "electronic colonialism," "ideological imperialism," and "communication imperialism" (Livingston). Such theories that explain cultural imperialism originated in the 1960s and became popular in the 1970s. Such works promoted the founding of international organisations, such as UNESCO, aimed at researching and monitoring global flows of knowledge (Livingston).

Since the end of Second World War, the discourse on American cultural influences has developed from a paradigm of “communication and development” and the ideology of modernization to one of “cultural imperialism” and perspectives of dependence. Although a “post-modernist” stance has arisen, it is also changing and so much of the discourse remains focused on cultural imperialism and notions about mechanisms of dependence (Sreberny-Mohammadi 296). Cultural imperialism is also described as a “soft power,” an amazing instrument that mostly legalizes US security and sovereignty. The soft power points out the concern of whether the cooperation should be multi-faceted for the US. This potential came true through American democratic information and the appealing influence of state institutions and international institutions (Layne 58).

Hollywood cinema, the “key source of America’s soft power” (Hyden 111), shows different characteristics when it comes to addressing a subject as well as technologically and technically compared to other cinemas. Hollywood represents the modern life and the evolution that they represent in the world cinema. Hollywood, which includes innovation on its own visual appearance and trade terms, acts as a defender of the politics of the US government. Particularly in the films about the military and historical events, the themes of the films carry the characteristic purpose of the foreign policy of the United States. It is, moreover, an effective implementation of public diplomacy in which American culture is introduced. America is admired and has transparent, interactive, pluralist, nationalist and free American values against the individual institution (Nye).

Global Hollywood films are quite well known by most people in other countries. Most of them value Hollywood films as a witness to mobile and innovative culture and appreciate Hollywood’s success. According to many people, the United States is the synonym of power. Hollywood films that touch every corner of the globe not only are famous because of many factors involved but the nature of the products mesmerizes people as well (Rugh 7). Thus, to

merge Hollywood films along with the target audience in several TV channels helps ease the telling of America and it is considered as a foreign policy activity that represents the America superior position.

In an era of shrinking distances, it is important to explore the dimensions that globalization can create. In his book *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, Manfred Steger devotes three different chapters to include three distinct aspects of globalization: political, Cultural and Ideological. Cultural globalization is seen as a process of increasing and developing cultural flows which extend throughout the globe (Steger 69).

The act of unity between diverse cultures is no longer news to the world, ever since the advent of global media, in a way or another. Initially, innovations including the telegraph (1840s), underwater cables made it possible to gain attention for foreign media outlets on what is happening around the world by the mid-nineteen century. This fact could only help in the rise of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) which in turn provided a forum for a global market that depended heavily on new media technology, film industry and radio broadcast by the twentieth century. Therefore, steps for globalized media certainly took place (Rathee 4). The globalization of culture encourages other nations to promote their cultures and presumably dominate. There are hundreds if not thousands of local cultures across the globe; nevertheless, those domestic cultures do not emerge at the global scale where only the strongest prevails.

Prevailing of the American culture is thus referred to as Americanization. The term may relate to the mechanism by which people of foreign descent within the United States adopted the American way of life. In the dawn of the twentieth century, authorities planned programs in order to train foreign-born American inhabitants for active participation in citizenship. Therefore, the newly American residents had become a part of the “melting pot” and intended to embrace the American ideals, regardless of ethnicity and cultural background.

The process which tries to overwhelm competing processes is the approach that can be relied upon as an attempt to describe Americanization. Of course, since the name is derived from the word “America” it illustrates how firmly the operation is connected to the nation. In addition, cultures across the world react in different ways to the Americanization process; these domestic feedbacks may embrace, reject or even change the phenomena. Nevertheless, global acceptance of Americanization tends to define it, and this is by reshaping the context (Beck 35)

Furthermore, there are a number of American imperialistic processes which can also be known as the cause behind the Americanization power. First, the global popularity of the U.S industrial power managed to prove the nation as an economic outstanding example in the aftermath of the Second World War. Second, the cultural dimension, the promoting and selling of American products abroad; Hollywood movies, cola, jeans and NBA Basketball popularity abroad show the cultural role of the nation. Last but not least, the military actions in Europe, Asia and the Middle East under the banner of promoting democracy establishes the USA as a world giant (Beck 36).

1.3.2. The Politicization of Hollywood

In the historical process, Hollywood works effectively in the offices and commissions for the foreign policy of the US. In this regard, the Office of War Information (OWI) is considered as an integral part playing a great role to reach foreign audiences via Hollywood films (Dizard 27). Another cooperant in the field is the CIA which argues that they started to shape collaboration with Hollywood in 1990s in order to boost the agency’s reputation on film and TV business. Hollywood seems to be the only source from which people may obtain knowledge about the CIA (Jenkins 32). Hollywood collaborates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S (MFA), the CIA, as well as other public institutions. Hollywood and

Washington are much like lovers who argue at home from old times but they are firmly together before everyone else (Bayles 123).

The American film industry exports contribute to the success of the U.S. internationally developing consensus worldwide which is a good tool besides diplomacy not only for the advantage of business but also to establish global domination. American cinema, like the U.S diplomacy, applies the carrot and stick policy by Hollywood's stars in Washington (Bayles 123). The United States attacks its audience by using this application as a price and penalty technique with the norms embedded in its cinemas and expands its effecting zone and create a threat asserting its economic and military progress. In other Words, films are a foreign policy weapon that is exhibited to other nations as a reward and punishment.

The American political movie has represented a significant part of Hollywood's production since the early 1930s. The genre has been qualitatively important instead of quantitatively substantive, but it has acted as a constant and increasingly ubiquitous mirror for twentieth – and now early twenty-first century American community, reflecting those values, ambitions, crises, unrest and misconceived notions of the wealthiest, most compelling and most technologically advanced country throughout the world history, the superiority of American movie from the dawn of the sound era has effortlessly mirrored America's assumption of global hegemony (Coyne 19).

Hollywood released the first political movies of the sound era when the US was still in the midst of the Great Depression; David Griffith's *Abraham Lincoln*, produced in 1930, starring Walter Houston was a hagiographic treatment of the America's sixteenth head of state's life. A cycle of political narratives had been witnessed during the year 1932, both comedies (*The Dark Horse* and *the Phantom President*) and melodramas (*Washington Masquerade* and *Washington Merry-Go-Round*). All these movies captured the mood of a

nation which felt that its political as well as its economic system was in the grips of severe malfunction.

Political solutions and national solutions lay in the governance of respectable, sincere, downright-speaking citizens led by horse sense, legitimate nationalism and enforcing worries for “the little guy” in the face of “special interests” was the common theme. In fact, it is possible to explain the 1932’s political movies as emotionally prescient (if ideologically incoherent) votes for Franklin D. Roosevelt in the presidential election (Coyne 20).

Political movies are attempting to convey ideologies; in short, the ideals, beliefs and identity that are tied up in the philosophy of American creed. Hollywood has always taken its part very seriously in this regard. It was often seen as the defender of democracy and was an active member in the controversies that engulfed American political life. Certain debates have indeed been triggered by the tone and content of certain movies sometimes (*The Birth of a Nation, JFK, Fahrenheit 9/11*) while at other times cinema has been caught up in discussions about the simplistic analysis or “dumping down,” of standards and beliefs (*Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, Dr. Strangelove, Air Force One*) that have apparently been obtained from popular films; the last list, nevertheless, also illustrates the degree to which the political class particularly are less fascinated of the critiques, ironic part or sarcasm directed at than of true quality of cinematic displays like these (Scott 19).

Democracy and liberalism are two such norms that have consistently been repeated in Hollywood political movies from the very beginning, but which provide theoretically opposing sources of inspiration for the American system that are not usually teased out in cultural medium as straightforward as cinema (Scott 20). Henceforward, it is worth keeping in mind that specifically political movies have appeared to be produced in periods dominated either by presidents who advocated radical activism, and whose policies numerous movie makers have embraced (Franklin D. Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Bill Clinton), or by

conservatives, whom many film-makers distrusted, interpreting civil liberties to be under threat (Richard Nixon, George W. Bush). Yet during one incredibly rich but tumultuous era in the history of Hollywood, political movies seemed to be mainly in an abeyance, and the prominent figure on the political stage in the early 1950s was not the actual president (Coyne 25).

Ian Scott advocates that “Hollywood’s slip into the world of politics was neither a commercial godsend nor a fully-fledged ideological investment.” Political consciousness initially raised its head; not just with the movies mentioned before but also in other categories too, notably the gangster movie. The concept of “federal authority, and of in-fighting at local and state level among political machines,” managed to give an accurate tone to the *Public Enemy*, *Little Caesar* (both 1931), *Scarface* (1932), and later *G-Men* (1935) and *Angels with Dirty Faces*. The latter two films also signified a spin for Hollywood as the decade wore on, shifting their attention towards authority and the “reinstatement of law and order” instead of the glorification of the street thug’s lifestyle (42).

Michael Coyne states that the pinnacles of promise of American life are represented in the US presidency. The citizens of the United States demand a new agenda to pursue a new, or reaffirm, leader every four years, and that democratic process is filled with basically the same mythic optimism that strikes at the core of several classic American films: the belief that one good man make a significant difference.

The entire presidential election process and the presidency itself make a significant part of America’s popular, as well as political culture. Presidents, notably in this “telegenic and telecentric era are just as much consumers as they are purveyors of the American popular culture.” Little wonder that the presidential race; America’s biggest gift to any American citizen, has enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with Hollywood films – America’s greatest gift to the rest of the world (Coyne 41).

“Vote for me and I will bring the values of the common man to bear in Washington D.C.” (qtd. in *Bob Roberts*). One might be forgiven for tempting to think that the quote from Tim Robbins’s 1992 movie matches up Hollywood election films with many several forms of political movie. For the line may seem to indicate that campaign films often seek consensus in the nuanced and dynamic world of election campaigns and eventually political representation (Scott 80).

Michael Coyne advocates that the political movies of the early 1960s were basically hymns to unity that convinced American citizens that whatever crises threatened the US, reasonable and sincere patriots somehow will grid the country back to safe haven. The edgy paranoia which had wrenched in *The Manchurian Candidate* at the subconscious of Bennett Marc had become the powerful ideology of the political movies of the 1970s. *The Manchurian Candidate* and *Seven Days in May* concluded with reaffirmations by the progenitors of the production of the political thriller in the 1970s. The American political movie had, similarly, along with many other genres in Hollywood, long portrayed the United States as a nation of unprecedented destiny. It has been evident in Mr. Smith’s discourse and imagery, the 1930’s *Lincoln* movies, and *Gabriel Over the White House*’s unilateral declaration of global disarmament.

Coyne proceeded “that corruption in the US should triumph and rise, of all places, betrayed the American dream. If democracy and freedom in America could be betrayed or subverted they could be destroyed anywhere – America, the Beautiful Land of the Free and Shining City on a hill, became a central conspiracy” (168).

In the 1990s, Post-Cold War Hollywood produced an intriguing array of films partly reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s genre of spy and paranoia thrillers and partly predicted future incipient forms of surveillance culture and institutional power at work in American society in the 2000s. Although it was to perceptions of Hollywood’s political discourse, the

revived phenomenon did not begin on film, but on television during the decade. The all-conquering *Fox TV* hit, *The X-Files* (1993-2002), paved the way for a slew of copycat films and series that attempted to tap into at least part of the mix of alien abduction by the creator Chris Carter, Sci-Fi adventure, arbitrary mystery and most relevant here, conspiracy theory and cover-up. *The X-Files* was the template for a combination of what we could call “political Sci-Fi” texts that took hold in the period like *Independence Day* to *Dark Skies* via the comic *Men in Black* and *Serious-minded Signs*. More than nine series, it is fair to assume that the show has become so ubiquitous in *Western TV* culture that it has built up a loyal audience and fan base which has made the series one of the most watched, written and spoken about in decades (Scott 114).

“Don’t ask what your country can do for you; you don’t have to fear anything but fear itself, if you can’t bear the heat, get outside the kitchen, live free or die, and finally, read my lips” (qtd. in *Thomas Jefferson*). Ian Scott argues that the political films recaptured a succession of styles and premises played in other eras during much of the 2000s. At the same time, however, they also mirrored on the change and differences between films from the post-9/11 Bush era and those from the post-Cold War Clinton years. How the two eras altered, influenced and transformed Hollywood depictions of domestic politics in particular is worth discussing and tells us a significant amount about the industry’s shifting focus in these years as well as the well-founded explanations for resentment against politicians and public life more broadly in the United States (223).

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 are one of the world's most broadcasted events. This is the most devastating moment in the American history. It is significantly considered a turning point in United States political strategies that contributed to what is known as the “War on Terror.” In addition to cinema, the 9/11 attacks have had a significant impact on American social and political life. At that time, the attacks had been the subject for Hollywood films. As

a direct consequence, a strong cooperation between cinema and politics was formed. According to Molloy and Tzioumakis, the enduring link between politics and cinema in which movies have kept playing a role in the transmission of political messages is shaping the collective memories of past incidents and informing future political agenda (1). The writers discuss other facets of Hollywood's connections with politics. Furthermore, the external threats have become one of Hollywood's political priorities, as the political climate had an impact on film production and preferred it even more to the ongoing political cycle. Hollywood has thus been an instrument for the change of social, economic and political circumstances of America.

The American Army is an important inspirer of Hollywood film industry. In the wax of propagation, Hollywood and the American army are always continuing their ties and are put on a secure basis. Relationships have been improved in a year with the Global War on Terrorism, Pentagon and Disney / ABC and a series of 13 stories have been made in this period on the lives of soldiers battling terrorism. Jerry Bruckheimer (*Pirates of the Caribbean, Black Hawk Down, Pearl Harbor and the CSI Show*) and Bertram and Munster's *Amazing Race and Cops* take over production of the show (Winseck 426).

As a reaction to the disaster, the 9/11 subsequently offensive attack became Hollywood movies' main concern. Hollywood, on that basis, called on the US government to step in by making emblematic films dealing with the matter. The well-known Italian writer Umberto Eco claims that 70 percent of people's information comes from watching films. Eco believes that films establish a close connection between the cinema and war which is known in the world as "cinema wars" (qtd. in Raza). In addition, he stated that American film depiction "is to conquer geopolitics and legitimize their barbaric militarized behavior in the eyes of their own people." This kind of films is known as a safety device.

In this regard, Hassan Raza notes that the “American cinema is used by intelligence agencies as a medium from which public opinion can be manipulated and its unique myths about wars and their outcomes propagated.” The film “American Sniper” is one example of portraying the Iraq war with confirmed figures and the American casualties. Hence, depictions of Hollywood movies are a very strong tool to win the interest and participation of people in political events (Raza).

In short, Hollywood is a powerful propagation war used by the United States to keep the world onto its own side (Evera 11-12). It is a US foreign policy strategy that forms belief and dominant views on society that raises America and exalts its face, that tells foreign policy without looking at the level of education and culture, that brings national benefits and American values into the international arena, that propagates according to America’s benefits, that forms public opinion. That once in a while they comply with the interests of the Armed Forces and the CIA, because they have gained credibility by concentrating on their goals and therefore having the policy which America follows gained legitimacy (Aydemir 80).

1.3.3. The CIA and the Pentagon in Hollywood

Hollywood and the American government have always been connected. Washington D.C, has long been a source of interesting plots for movie-makers and LA has been a generous provider of glitz and glamour to the governing elite and the political class in particular. It is hard to believe of a time when America’s most famous intelligence agency was not at the center of the attention and imagination of the American people. Newspaper headlines and television broadcasts are today packed with stories of kidnapping programs and secret prisons, water boarding and unmanned spy drones, not to mention the conveyor belt of conspiracy theories that are now an undeniably real part of the CIA’s public image complexion.

Hollywood has played a significant part in the frenzied media coverage currently attracting from the CIA. Through major new franchises such as the *Bourne* series or the recent success of the adventures of Angelina Jolie in *Salt* (2010), to more docudrama-oriented depictions in *The Good Shepherd* (2006) and *Fair Game* (2010), CIA intrigue storylines reigned in the twenty-first century with the immense popularity of the spy genre during the Cold War. In short, the CIA today has assumed mythical proportions and inspired a veritable media industry (Willmetts130).

Jeffrey Jones says that the CIA, surprisingly, has not always held such a high profile with the media. When attention is turned back to the agency's early history, from its establishment in the 1947 National Security Act (NSA) up to the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, it is surprising how seldom its operations captivated public attention; this lack of interest was definitely not a result of the CIA's relative inactivity. By comparison, intelligence historians frequently characterize the 1950s as the "Golden Era" of covert action by the CIA, with clandestine coups instigated in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, to name just a few of the most prominent examples. Nevertheless, for all these seminal moments in the history of covert action, the role of the CIA was largely unreported by the American media" (Foran). With example, in a study of *Time* magazine's extensive coverage of Mossadig's ousting, Foran reveals that "the CIA provided only one oblique reference, which was not itself the admission of the CIA's participants. While late to this game, the CIA is now an integral part of it" especially that it established its Entertainment Liaison office in 1996.

The CIA has, however, had an informal partnership with Hollywood which goes far further back. John Rizzo, who served as the CIA's acting general counsel for the first nine years of the "War on Terror", and was therefore greatly involved in the agency's brutality, extraordinary rendition and drone strike programs, writes honestly on the relationship with

Hollywood in his recent book *Company Man* and as a person who has worked at the CIA for more than three decades he wrote:

For a long time, the CIA has had a special relationship with the entertainment industry, devoting considerable attention to fostering relationships with Hollywood movers and shakers – executives of studios, distributors, directors and actors of great name. There are full-time officers assigned to this account, which is not exactly a dangerous task but one that occasionally produces its own strange moments (150).

On the lucrativeness that can be drawn from this relationship, Rizzo reported a veteran CIA liaison with Hollywood who told him in his early years at the agency (1970s) that:

These are people who have made a lot of money essentially making make-believe things. Many of them, at least the smarter and more self-conscious ones, knowing what they're doing makes them incredibly wealthy but they're also ephemeral and insignificant in the wider scheme of things. We are therefore open to supporting the CIA in any way they can, perhaps in equal parts because they are truly patriotic and it has become a taste for real-life drama and excitement . . . and their influence and reputation globally can be important – it gives people and places abroad entry. State officials want to meet with them and get acquainted with them (151).

Everywhere, except in areas where the US government usually does not have access, their film crews get free rein, and they can be the face of a message from the US that will reach international audiences as long as the audience does not know it comes from the US government (Rizzo 160).

After the Soviet Union fall, and more recently the 9/11 attacks, the agency has actively tried to rebrand itself to combat past negative portrayals and explain its changing role in the security landscape of the US. Tricia Jenkins argues that Hollywood has historically presented the CIA as a “rogue agency that operates unchecked, as killers bent on murder, as people who

lack morality or who operate on morally ambiguous grounds, and as an organization that is disorganized and buffoonish” (30). Hollywood was met with excitement when the secret organization opened its doors to Hollywood, and the 9/11 attacks created an obsession among film directors with the agency, so much so that since then CIA officials have been in high demand (Barret et al. 75). This convergence resulted in a series of television dramas such as *The Agency* (2001-2003), *JAG* (1995-2005), *Alias* (2001-2006), *24* (2001-present) and *Homeland* (2011-present), as well as various films such as *Bad Company* (2002), *The Recruit* (2003), and *Zero Dark Thirty* (2012), in which the CIA exercised its influence and rebranded itself (Kumar and Kundnani 82).

The story of the relationship between Hollywood and the Pentagon is not that different from the Hollywood-CIA story. The U.S. military has supported Hollywood in producing war movies for nearly a century. The Department of Defence provides filmmakers for cheap in military hardware and workers, but the DoD has the opportunity to change script in exchange. Many different political interest groups often feel that there is a political agenda in Hollywood. Many accuse Hollywood of having a political agenda and some accuse Hollywood of serving the wealthy. There is one little recognized driving factor affecting military Hollywood films, however. A large number of films have been influenced by the long-term collaboration between the US military and the film industry. For nearly a century, Hollywood’s military has helped to create epic war movies by supplying filmmakers with expensive military equipment and personnel for little money (Zhakova 1).

This cooperation enables the Pentagon to change unsatisfactory scenes and characters to create a positive and dignified image of on-screen US armed forces. Such agreement is based on a DoD clause, which states that the DoD will endorse a feature film if it helps the military or if it is in the national interest. One of the four conditions for securing DoD funding is the ability of the film to boost recruitment. While there is no law preventing the DoD from

carrying out a public relations campaign, such public relations activity can be detrimental to the public as it could misrepresent and exploit their world view. As Senator James Fulbright said in the introduction to his book on the operation of the DoD's Public Relations, "it would take an extra volume, and somebody more skilled than I in the field of public opinion communications to study the influence these activities of the Defence Department had on our way thinking as a nation" (Zhakova 4).

The strong bond between the DoD and the movie industry has a long history of reciprocal exploitation. The two industries have tried to find a way to utilize each other almost from the very beginning of the existence of film. The DoD could give something they could not resist to filmmakers: a cheap way of making spectacular film. Filmmakers, in return, could give the pentagon excellent public relations (Suid 173), so films with a huge audience are a key factor in achieving good PR. In addition, by offering the movie makers what they wanted, the DoD could monitor their image on the screen to the maximum (Zhakova 5).

The Pentagon sponsored the first film to win an Oscar, *Wings* (1927). At that point of view the DoD's relationship with the film industry was strong. The partnership reached its height during the Second World War, when Hollywood became a governmental tool for the war effort. An Entertainment Liaison Office (ELO) was established in 1948 as part of the Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs (SDPA) assistant office. Since then it has cooperated productively with the movie industry on a significant number of films (Zhakova 5).

Since the Vietnam War the relationship between the U.S. military and Hollywood changed profoundly. At the very beginning of their partnership until the mid-1970s, the DoD often negotiated minor changes in motion pictures, approving most of the requests. The public perceived the US military services as a glorious, invincible force capable of protecting national security interests around the globe. However, the conclusion of WW2 has become the culmination of the prestige and prosperity of the military. Until then, the positive

perception by the public of the American military forces and military films telling good stories about the army complemented each other. The Pentagon dealt mainly with requests to assist films that depicted the military in a positive light (Zhakova 5-6).

Nearly every military movie produced before the mid-1960s received DoD approval; that is what is normally called the DoD-American movie industry's "traditional partnership" era. Thus, during this time, researching the symbiotic relationship between the military and film industries will focus on the process of gaining approval and assistance, and exploring how mutually beneficial this process has been. This sort of relationship prevailed until the mid-1960s, when the negative image of the Vietnam War and the military services first appeared in the scripts and then on the screen (Zhakova 6). Lawrence Suid reveals the comprehensive history of the relationship between Hollywood and the Pentagon in his book *Guts and Glory* (2002). Suid argues that after the Korean War, viewed as a failure of leaders, during the 1950s "the military maintained its aura of invincibility; spear led by its fleet of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and SAC bombers." Suid recognizes, however, that "the 1960's were totally different" and that "the strong anti-war campaign and Vietnam War escalation initiated, if not reinforced the derogatory picture of the armed services" (174).

By the late 1960s, the anti-war and anti-military movement was high in the academic circles, not just on the streets. In the 1970s, Senator J.W. Fulbright wrote the *Pentagon Propaganda Machine on DoD Public Relations Activity*. The book was an update of the Senator's December 1969 speeches he gave on the Senate floor to raise public awareness of the DoD PR activity. It was a time when the glamorized and unbreakable portrayal of the American Army became a killing machine and the DoD was viewed as a cynical and bloodthirsty engine (Zhakova 6-7). This is the moment that the unclouded Pentagon-Hollywood partnership had come to an end. The DoD Public Relations office was suddenly filled with scripts far from depicting the U.S. military as heroic and formidable – something

that never happened before. A new phase of the relationship between the two industries began: the period of selectivity of the Pentagon in approving scripts and the significant rejection of the scripts that portrayed the armed forces in a negative picture (Zhakova 7).

It was during the 1960s that the involvement of the DoD film liaison office peaked: the main criteria for assistance were drawn up, the strategy of the Pentagon towards collaboration with filmmakers was defined and the rules of the game were developed. Members of the office also moved to LA to be closer to Hollywood. The more films that negatively portray the military appeared on the screen, the closer the Pentagon needed the film liaison office to ensure the Armed Forces' positive image. The mid-1970's was the lowest point of the DoD-Hollywood partnership. Except for the *Green Berets* (1968), the Pentagon sponsored none of the popular films about the Vietnam War. The DoD sought to make concessions to the filmmakers to boost the reputation of the military, but the filmmakers were not able to compromise. Nevertheless, more and more movies were provided with DoD assistance during the 1980s. With the new, more positive views of the armed services during the Vietnam War movie makers were able to collaborate with the Pentagon as for the amount of assistance requests has been increasing for the last two decades. War movies have remained a popular genre with the Vietnam War replaced by the wars that followed (Zhakova 13).

The leading expert in the field the past of Hollywood's relationship with the pentagon Lawrence Suid, a military historian, film biographer, author, and television consultant, has written numerous books on the history of Hollywood film assistance from the pentagon. *Guts and Glory: The Making of American Military Picture in Film* is the most detailed. The author's key argument is that such partnerships were often mutually beneficial. The book traces the history of collaboration between the film industry and the DoD beginning with *Wings* in 1927, moving through Vietnam War and Cold War films and ending in 2002.

To conclude, the relationship between the two institutions is characterized as a mutually beneficial process in which the Pentagon gets a good PR and the filmmakers get the chance to make amazing movies at a low cost. Studying numerous film texts thus shows that the DoD is meant to educate the public about the U.S. armed forces and improve recruitment by providing assistance to movies. Whether this is censorship or reciprocal exploitation, it is necessary for the film audience to be aware of the Hollywood-Pentagon relationship.

1.4.Hollywood's Involvement in the War Efforts

The major contribution Hollywood made to the war effort was moral. Many of the films made during the war were mobilizing patriotic cries which asserted a sense of national aim. War-year action movies stressed patriotism, group effort and the importance of human sacrifices for a greater cause. By the early 1940s, though the relationship between Hollywood and Washington had changed drastically, in ways that today seem unimaginable. As the small yet thoughtfully curated exhibition explicitly shows, the U.S. War Information Office claimed that “the film industry could help win the war and released a manual to instruct movie-makers on how best to mix art and politics without being educational” (Horn).

The Office of War Information manual exports deliver one of the most persuasive displays on show. Read today, the recommendations of the government sound like script notes from a recent grade in film school.”Alternatively, Horn argues that audiences do not want to listen to lectures, says one memo. In fact, Horn claims that “they [the audience] want to connect with the characters they see on screen. They react coldly to being told to do something, but they are strongly influenced by being shown.” He goes on to say, “another OWI dispatch prompts filmmakers to remind viewers of the Merchant Marine’s” unsung heroes “and not to forget Bataan’s” calm, smiling “nurses.” Another indicates that statements about civil rights would help to mobilize support for the war. And for the African-American

soldiers it was reported that “the Negroes have a true, legal and permanent chance of improving their democratic status and no chance at all under a dictatorship (Horn).

In December 1941, when the United States went to war, Hollywood did likewise. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, studio managers, movie makers, actors and directors realized that films were necessary to boost the morale of soldiers overseas and Americans at home. The Roosevelt administration asked Hollywood to ask themselves, “Is this picture going to help win the war?” It took time for U.S. troops to build up their forces to go on the offensive, and the same was true for the film industry. Integrating a private-owned industry with government regulators and censors in a democracy has not been so easy, but just as the U.S. military went from early defeats to springing victories, so did the film industry – sometimes in vivid Technicolor (Margasak).

Roosevelt called the film theatre a necessary and productive part of the war effort. According to a quotation from the extinct Motion Picture Herald from March 1942, echoed by Thomas Doherty’s book *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture and World War 2*. The Second World War and Hollywood’s role will have a place in the new exhibition where visitors will see how the American experience was reflected and shaped by sport, music and entertainment (Margasak). Furthermore, when the United States got involved in the second World War, Hollywood “changed golden slippers for GI boots, and making people believe in reality,” said a review of the book *Film Lot to Beachhead*. Theatre owners funded bond drives in their lobbies, provided free seats to war bonds purchasers, and built scrap metal and rubber containers. However, nowhere was the effect bigger than on the screen. Newsreels, real military combat footage, informative film clips, cartoons and full-length features all did tell America’s story at war (Margasak).

In the past, presidents like ex- Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan seemed to understand that geopolitics of the Cold War could be compiled and recreated in filmic contexts. As

President Reagan portrayed the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” critics were able to find thinly disguised similarities to the Star Wars franchise. The Soviet leadership as the mythical “Darth Vaders” and their army were characterised as the storm troopers of the last day. Yet awkward, despite heavy Soviet defeats against Nazi German forces in the Second War, it seemed to fit comfortably with a presidential narrative filled with references to “freedom,” “forces of evil,” and a “battle” for the world’s future and to top it all a so-called Strategic Defence Initiative SDI (including a space-based arms system) was called Star Wars (Dodds).

The Russians were portrayed as villains during the Cold War era, and the films continued to serve as anti-communist propaganda. Movie narratives addressed the morality of democracy and capitalism and yet promoted the dictatorship of the Soviet Communists. Science fiction films in the 1950s were mostly mythologies about various aspects of Cold War politics. The movie *Invaders from Mars* was described as communist spies. The U.S. emerged as the world’s superpower after the fall of the Soviet Union; it needed another enemy to legitimize its dominance and power. On that, Tony Shaw in his *The Cold War of Hollywood* states:

Historians have initiated to place the role of the Cold War in the American movie industry in a broader international context, by, for example, emphasising Hollywood’s determination to distribute American values in line with the wishes of the American State Department. Nevertheless, this celluloid “cultural diplomacy” still has to make major inroads into conventional Cold War historiography, whereas only a few academics took the lead from the disclosure of cooperation between Hollywood – State Department to look for possible links during the conflict between the movie industry and other government agencies. (1)

In comparison, the occupation of Japan was a transformative event. The United States reform efforts –cultural, economic, and political - have been strong and far-reaching. Defined

as “one of the most radical experiments in the world” by political scientist Susan J. Pharr. The American studios created a series of war movies that portrayed the Japanese as sly, malignant, implacable and unfeeling enemies (Kitamura 41).

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, a media-wise president took the United States of America into World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt was eager to make cinema a significant part of government propaganda in the war effort. A number of different government agencies have been established to this end, but their unorganised activities have resulted in an apparent need for war propaganda into movie. Upon the establishment of the War Information Office in June 1942, the government announced its intentions to interfere at nearly every point in the movie-making process (Burns 5).

Nevertheless, Tom Burns says that the heads of the Hollywood studios remained afraid of government intervention in their lucrative business, which turned out to be an unjustified fear, since Lowell Mellet, coordinator of government movies, assured them that the Hollywood film was one of our most successful means of educating and entertaining our people and must therefore remain censor-free. “He permitted the filmmakers to use their own judgment when deciding on film content” (Blum 24-25).

Conflict arose, however, because there was sometimes an unbridgeable gap between the agenda driven need of the OWI for what they consider as a far more optimistic portrayal of war problems in movie, which include attempts to change scripts and suppress pictures, and the need of the studios for an enjoyable product that would continue to make a huge profit (Burns 5). Besides civilian agencies, the armed forces, which had their own information sources and ways of exerting pressure, also had some impact on deciding the war movies content. Therefore, it is not shocking that most war movies managed to give the army a preferential treatment, as the cost of producing such a movie has often been considerable, and the credit of expensive equipment – even units of military personnel in the active service of

serving as movie extras – could imply huge savings. It is worth noticing that in almost every war film; the credits are explicitly available thanks to one or the other army (Burns 5-6).

In order to set government guidelines, the OWI released a pamphlet entitled “Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry” which recommended that the studios produce films under five general titles that could be summarized as follows: the first section, “Why We Fight,” called for movies to portray the nation's and its allies’ optimistic war goals, based on Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms -freedom of religion and speech freedom from want and fear. The OWI articulated its intention to avoid demonizing whole nations in the second part, “The Enemy,” but was still involved with impressing the enemy’s ubiquity on the public, and the risk of offering him support and comfort by passivity and skepticism. The third section, “The United Nations,” which related to the allies, proposed filmmaking that would effectively whitewash the dictatorial or undemocratic governments amongst the allied forces and prove that the war was won through a unified effort. The fourth section, “The Home Front,” stressed the need to downplay ethics, class and gender conflicts when presenting a united civilian front, in line with the need for national unity in the war effort. The fifth segment, “The Combating Force,” facilitated the production of movies about non-combat services along with battle weapons, and highlighted the multicultural nature of the military men in the more dramatic war movies (Koppes and Black 67-69).

Censorship, therefore, included not only changing movie narratives that were politically unacceptable but also indicating potentially contradictory images. Controlling or excising negative images was considered to be more effective than seeking to sell pro-war images, even though they were created abundantly. The effect of this kind of censorship was that “things that were unseen eventually had as profound an impact on American understanding of World War2 as things were seen” (Roeder 47). For instance, newsreels shown in movie theatres were also monitored: “pictures of unpleasant aspects of American life-gangsters,

slum areas, hopeless poverty” were banned (Koppes and Black 125). Burns notes that “no photo of a dead American soldier” could be diffused or published in newspapers because that such pictures would frighten “a nation still reeling under the constant onslaught of bad news from abroad during the early years of the war when it was believed that the Germans and the Japanese could win” (8).

Conclusion

The relationship between the cinema and politics in the United States is as old as Hollywood itself. From the first humble steps of the movie making art, politicians as well as film-making professionals, it seems, were aware of the potential and possibilities of cooperation between the two. Soon, what seemed as technical collaboration necessary for Hollywood as it searched to depict on its screens real life events and stories including stories of politicians and politics in the capital and stories of espionage and war turned to be a vital, sometimes lethal, relationship including not only politicians, but also the Department of Defence and the other different security agencies.

In this growing relationships, Washington provided plots for Hollywood’s scriptwriters and Hollywood allowed politicians to enter Washington, D.C.’s hall of glamour and fame and gave them more chances to get elected and promoted.

The creation of the liaison offices within the DoD, the Air Army, the CIA, among other departments and agencies, provided movies producers with access to military equipment and installations and with military advice especially on imitation real life combats and strategies. In return, Hollywood, through its screens, served what is was seen as the interests of the United States like rebranding the U.S. Army, polishing its interventions abroad, raising the morale of troops, and influencing public opinion.

Aware to the power of the image and its psychological impact on individuals and groups, the decision-makers in the United States explored this relation to the fullest. Starting

especially from the WW2, Hollywood became a key tool of propaganda in all the wars, interventions, and ideological conflicts the US entered.

As the twentieth century drew to its end, a new player made its entrance into the international arena; an unconventional threat coming not for states and recognized entities but from individuals, groups, and organizations using violence in their political quests. The series of terrorist attacks on the US interests abroad, like the 1998 attack on the US embassies in Dar Essalaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, culminated in the unprecedented 9/11 attacks on NYC and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. As expected Hollywood was to immortalize these attacks adding its pinch of salt and to accompany Bush's "War on Terror."

Chapter Two:

Hollywood and the “War on Terror”

Within weeks after President George W. Bush declared that the United States and its allies were to go on a “War on Terror,” observers started reflecting and making assumptions on the stance Hollywood would take towards this escalating situation and the possible role the entertainment industry and popular culture could play in Bush’s undertaking. In November 2001, for instance, a widely publicised Beverly Hills Summit was held in which leaders of movie and TV companies proposed offering their help and support to Karl Rove, the president’s special advisor (Stockwell 15). Considering the historical long record of cooperation between Hollywood and politicians, as shown in the first chapter, this deal was not unexpected.

When President George W. Bush co-piloted an aircraft in May 2003, landing on an aircraft carrier’s flight deck, observers saw in it striking parallels with *Top Gun* (Rich 85). One interpretation of *Top Gun* and its ilk is that the techno-thriller of the 1980s has been a common strategic reaction to the embarrassment of Vietnam’s failure of the 1960s and 1970s. Unable to beat Vietcong powers in South East Asia jungles, these movies and their actors with their “hard bodies” remarked Susan Jeffords played a redemptive role (115).

Similarly, Bush was trying to show himself as an epitome of a new generation of men fighting and defeating adversaries in new locations like the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia and even South East Asia. President Bush changed into his dark suit after passing in his flying suit and declared that the combat operations in Iraq were complete. The declaration which was made from on top an aircraft carrier positioned off the Californian

coast appeared to be rather excessively-optimistic, and to add an extra zest to the show, the aircraft carrier's control tower had hung a banner with the caption "mission accomplished."

As explained before, presidents and governments have promoted close relations with popular entertainment industries. It was understood that government shall facilitate, fund and occasionally discipline movie, radio and television products. The film business had political and economic utility in relation to the network of military-industrial-media entertainment, James Der Derian claimed. This can sometimes be for a price. Hollywood authors, producers, and actors who suffered the impact of Cold War "Red Scares" in the 1940s and 1950s could confirm the federal government's punitive position as they were insulted, imprisoned, and threatened for alleged "anti-American" activities (Robb 210).

The example of *Top Gun* and Bush's restaging of it indicate that geopolitics could be interpreted in a more co-constitutive context; thus, rather than simply considering popular culture like movies as "reflecting" or "representing" the real world of global politics in the Cold War, it could be seen as having a more co-productive role. Some see in the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq a quasi-war movie and the pursuit and later kill Osama Bin Laden as a "battle" movie in terms of characterisation, plot arc and denouement.

2.1.Terrorism: Some Perspectives

The formal study of terrorism began decades ago and was focused on the conviction that this form of political violence urgently needs to be understood and tackled. Research was then restricted to just a bunch of scholars and confined their set ways to approach the topic, leading to unexpectedly few insights (Ranstorp 3). The September 11 , 2001 attacks on America significantly expanded this community of terrorism scholars and empowered efforts for new and innovative strategies to research from several areas of study, heralding in what many have called a "second wave of terrorism research" (Pape 647). Amongst these recent publications there are also those which examine terrorism through the geographical lens.

There is a large collection of such geographically focused literature on terrorism covering a wide range of sub-literatures and research agendas that have yet to be fully recognized (Bahgat and Medina 38).

Approaching a socio-political issue, like terrorism, through a geographic lens leads to a broader comprehension not only of terrorists' locations and their actions, but also of spatial structures, social network interactions, social organizational operations and space and time changes. Social, political and other systems, as well as their agents, operate particular geographical contexts, through which they are investigated in socio-spatial or geopolitical domains. In these types of research the influence of location and location on activities becomes quite clear. For example, conventional statistical analysis attempts to classify relationships between cause and effect, but assumes that these relationships hold true across time and space (Bahgat and Medina 39-40).

Geographical viewpoints on terrorism do not seek to challenge or replace other theoretical explications, they are merely a means of testing theories. For instance, Ted Robert Gurr's theory of "relative deprivation" can be considered more common with proximity to comparatively affluent communities, which in turn can be checked with spatial analysis in support of the initial theory. Therefore it is important to consider geographical perspectives. The identity of terrorists and the groups they associate with have different explanations behind their motives, referring to the ideologies, ethnicities and historical circumstances of terrorists and their constituencies. Their choices and tactics may be based on geographical factors, or the geographic context that result in attacks. Even the effects of terror attacks can rely greatly on the geographical context in which these occur. Comprehending these geographical factors can give prior knowledge of future operations, supportive populations and strength/weakness in the terrorist scheme (Bahgat and Medina 40).

Professionally trained academic geographers have made a significant contribution to many social scientific topics and branches, though they have seldom been interested in the subject of terrorism in the past (Sidaway 357). This changed with the September 11, 2001, attacks on America that sparked nationalist movements in the US, increased the prevalence of terrorist activity and inspired new research funding (Richardson 225).

Undoubtedly, terrorism is linked to conflict-ridden, failed and weak states and regimes (Kittner 315). With the failure of the government to control all its territories, therefore, many writers grasp the concept of terrorism as related to those who are powerful enough to liberate or “acquire space” and strive for partial autonomy or secession (Rock). This type of terrorism is considered to be territorially grounded and related to land-owning. Many of these countries and separatist regions are marked by civil war, poor control of government and political groups (Bahgat and Medina 53).

2.2. The September 11th Terrorist Attacks: Facts and Media Coverage

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks marked a national tragedy for the US. Nineteen terrorists “hijacked four airliners and carried out suicide attacks on U.S. targets.” The hijackers crashed two planes into the north and south towers of the New York City World Trade Centre. In addition to the 3000 people killed in New York, 343 fire-fighters and paramedics, 23 officers from the NYPD and 37 officers from the Port Authority have lost their lives. When the third plane crashed into the western side of the Pentagon's military headquarters, killing 125 military personnel and civilian staff, passengers on the fourth plane were able to stop the final assault and crashed the plane into rural Pennsylvania.

According to official statements, the hijackers were supported and financed by the so-called Al-Qaeda: a terrorist organization headed by Osama Bin Laden that was allegedly acting in revenge for America's support for Israel, its participation in the Persian Gulf War and its continuing military presence in the Middle East.

September, 11th, 2001, was a day of unparalleled horror and pain not only in the history of the United States of America, but to people all over the world. Using airplanes as lethal weapons, terrorists targeted the very heart of the New York City financial district, the World Trade Centre's Twin Towers, as well as the Washington Pentagon, while a further attack on another iconic location on the US soil could be stopped by the passengers of United Airlines Flight 93. The effect of the destruction of the Twin Towers on an unsuspecting country was so large that there was – and is still – a widespread belief that 9/11 events were a turning point in history (Habermas 123). As a matter of fact, even ten years after of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 58 percent of Americans believed that the attacks profoundly changed the way people in this country lived their lives, and since 2001 there's been no decrease in the number of Americans who claim they have changed permanently the way they're living their own lives (Jones).

Many significant events in the course of history of transnational terrorism, like the Lockerbie bombing on 21 December 1988 with 270 human losses, seem quite minor compared to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 despite their significant effects. Likewise, the first terrorist assault on the World Trade Centre in New York in February 1993 or the bombings linked to Al-Qaeda in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 did not catch the same degree of attention and did not cause equivalent political, economic and social damage. In spite of the large number of casualties of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is surprising that the effect of these events has been so much greater, longer lasting and felt by so many people all over the world even to this day (Kreiger 1).

To explain this, Tim Kreiger suggests that “9/11 is marked by an extraordinary interplay of many contributing factors, in order to better explain the effects of the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism in general creates substantial costs for society which was true for 9/11. The cost component has many dimensions, varying from the loss of human and physical capital to a

decrease in life satisfaction due to elevated levels of fear. By 2011, nearly 40 percent of all Americans were still worried that they or their relatives might become victims of terrorism (Saad).

In addition, Sunstein claims that “terrorists are well conscious of the reaction of the general public to a terrorist attack, how “fear works and what its implications are” (121). Millions around the world could watch the New York incidents live on CNN and other Television networks as well as on the internet and radio, being real eyewitnesses to the fall of the Twin Towers. After watching for hours on end these very powerful pictures from New York, at least some of them must have imagined themselves to be victims of this attack. In fact, the idea that “it could have happened to me” usually triggers very intense feelings and empathy for the real victims (Kreiger 1-2).

What made 9/11 different substantially from prior acts of is that it has become part of collective memory due mainly to its live coverage on the Media, says Roberta Dessi:

In the transmission of cultural and national identity memory plays a vital role. The collective memory that the older generation transmits to young people through a variety of channels (...) affects their understanding of their cultural values and identity and their willingness to invest in them – with significant economic as well as political and social consequences. (534)

Dessi adds that it is possible that the respective transmission channels will affect the youth’s beliefs and at the same time strengthen the beliefs of those who experienced the actual events. For example, these channels include school textbooks, newspaper articles, TV and radio programmes, films, art, monuments, museums, commemorative rituals, plays, novels, etc. (538). The massive output of 9/11 narratives and images shows that it has truly become a part of collective memory.

The 9/11 terrorist assaults were startling global media incidents that overtaken public attention and gave rise to reams of lecture, commentary and writing. The aim of these media spectacles was to terrorize the United States to strike symbolic targets and to reveal a terror spectacle “Jihad” against the West and to weaken the American and global economy (Kellner 2).

Terrorism is not completely a new phenomenon. The word “terrorism” in contemporary political discourse is one of the most overburdened and disputed words. First used after the revolutionary period of the French Revolution to describe the “reign of terror,” the word was used in the 19th century to describe the violent activities of Russian revolutionaries. The Nixon administration used the term “terrorism” in the late 1960s to describe a wide range of activities and groups. It founded a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism in 1972 and subsequent American administrations continued to evolve departments and working groups to combat “terrorism” which had become a common labelling term for organizations that the American government or its allies were fighting against. Yet, throughout this era, the United States was often frequently accused of crimes against Vietnam civilians and elsewhere, as well as using force to interfere in politics in other countries, so that the word “state terrorism” started to appear on the surface, a concept most sometimes applied to Israel (Herman 153).

In 1993, Islamic extremists also linked to Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Centre in NY, giving a glimpse of the more dramatic attacks on September 11th. An American-born terrorist, Timothy McVeigh bombed Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 people and injuring more than 500. Then in 1998, the Bin Laden attacked US embassies in Africa and in 2000, a US submarine harboured in Yemen. Therefore, terror spectacle is a major element of the deadly game of modern politics and its agenda had been routinely used by the Bin Laden organisation to showcase terror.

However, the United States targets in its history and the very first foreign assault on the continental U.S since the 1812's war (Kellner 2).

The novelty of the terror spectacle of September 11 resulted from the combination of hijacking of aircraft and the use of aircraft to crash into houses, and destabilizing urban and economic life. The goals were symbolic reflecting global capital and American military power, yet had a material effect, disrupting the airline industry, companies in downtown New York, and the global economy itself through the closing of the US and other stock markets and subsequent downtown markets of the world. Indeed, as a reaction to the terror spectacle drama, there was an unprecedented shutdown in NY, Washington and other major cities across the United States, with government and business shutting down for the day and the airline network cancelling all flights. Wall Street and the stock exchange have been shut down for days, baseball and entertainment activities have been delayed, Disneyland and Disneyworld have been shut down and McDonald's have closed up regional offices and most major cities have been incredibly quiet (Kellner 3).

In fact, the 9/11 terror tragedy unfolds in a city that was one of the world's most media-saturated and played live on television a deadly drama. The videos of the planes hitting the WTC towers and their collapse were constantly transmitted, as if practice were needed to master a highly traumatic incident. The spectacle communicated the message that the US is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, that terrorists can cause great harm and that everyone can be subjected to a violent terror attack at any moment, including in "Fortress America." The pain, terror and death that a lot of people endure in violent and unstable circumstances in other parts of the world on a daily basis have been brought home to the residents of the USA. Unexpectedly, the insecurity and distress felt by many people around the world was also witnessed, in some cases for the first time, profoundly by American citizens. Consequently, the terror attack had material impacts, attempting to damage the US and global economy, and

psychological impacts, traumatizing a frightened country. The terror show has been broadcast across the global village, with the whole world watching the attack on the United States and NY attempts to deal with the attacks (Kellner 2).

Thus, terror spectacle utilizes horrific photos and montage to attract attention, aiming to catalyze unexpected incidents that will spread more fear across the domestic populations. The 9/11 terror spectacle looked like a disaster movie, leading Hollywood director Robert Altman to chide his industry for producing terror extravaganzas that could form a basis for spectacular terror campaigns. Is *Independence Day* (1996) the blueprint for 9/11, in which aliens targeted LA and NY, destroying the White House? The collapse of the WTC indeed had resonance of the *Towering Inferno* (1975) that depicted a high-rise building catching on fire, burning and collapsing, or even *Earthquake* (1975) that depicted the collapse of entire urban environments. For these two Hollywood disaster films, however, the calamity emerged from within the system, in the case of the first, and from nature itself in the second. In the September 11 terror spectacle, by contrast, the villains were foreign terrorists obviously committed to wreaking maximum destruction on the US and it was not certain how the drama would end or if order would be resorted in a “happy ending” (Kellner 3).

A “you are there” event brought live television coverage to the September 11 spectacle. The images of the planes striking the WTC, the buildings burning in flames, people jumping out of the window in a desperate attempt to survive the inferno and the fall of the towers and ensuing chaos created iconic images that viewers would not soon forget. The drama continued during the day with survivors being dragged out of the wreckage, and the tragic search for persons still alive and attempts to cope with the attack created resonant iconic images profoundly sewn into the minds of the spectators. Most people who witnessed the incident suffered from psychological traumas and hallucinations. (Kellner 4)

The terrorist attacks in NY were reported to be “the most recorded historical event” in a May 2002 HBO film “*In Memoriam*” which itself presented a collage of images gathered from professional news crews, documentary movie makers and amateur videographers whom in some cases put their lives in risk to record the incidents. Surprisingly, the Bush administration have took the same tropes with Bush of attacking the “evil” of terrorism, using the term five times in his first speech on the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and repetitively describing the clash as a battle between good and evil in which the United States would “eliminate evil from the earth,” “smoke it out and kill it.”

The semantically ignorant and dyslexic Bush administration often used western metaphors, calling for Bin Laden to be “dead or alive” and portraying the campaign as a “crusade” before it was told that this word held inflammatory historical baggage from earlier Christian and Muslim wars. Similarly, the Pentagon first called the war against terror “Operation Infinite Justice” until it was told that only God might dispense “infinite justice” and not that Americans and others might be bothered by a conflict that stretches to infinity (Kellner 4).

Propaganda was reproducing and distributing the terrorist attacks in America all over the world. The event’s devastating effects made the world an eyewitness. Through the screen’s eyes the world can see reality. These attacks were among the most broadcasted incidents in media history. According to Brian Monahan in his book *Shock of the News*, “on September 11, nearly everyone turned to some sort of media to gather information and track the unfolding events” (63). Broad media attention helped to support political plans. The American media shed light on the current political agendas of George W. Bush’s administration and the current security measures and in a tough time he is considered the key figure.

Broadcasting television thus enabled dangerous and extremist zealots to vent and circulate the most aggressive fanatic and at times lunatic views, creating consensus on the need for immediate military action and all-out war. The news networks themselves displayed logos such as “War on America,” “America’s New” and other provocative slogans that suggested the US was at war, and that only a military response was sufficient. Few cooler heads showed up on any of the major TV networks that repeatedly beat the drums of war day after day, without even relieving advertisements for three days straight, throwing the country into chaos and making sure there would be a military response and an armed conflict. Radio became even more frightening.

Unexpectedly, radio talk has oozed hatred and paranoia, promoting violence against Arabs and Muslims, nuclear response and world war. With the days went by, hyperdramatic music, nationalist blood and wall-to-wall terror hysteria and war propaganda became also mainstream radio news. Global Public Radio, Pacifica and some programs attempted reasoned conversation and debate; however, on the whole talk, radio became all propaganda, all the time. The United States later introduced a new foreign policy strategy and this is when the Bush doctrine was established.

2.3. The Bush Doctrine, the “War on Terror,” and Foreign Policy

George W. Bush was elected president in the aftermath of the Cold War era and during his 2000 campaign, he expressed his vision for United States foreign policy which backed similar realistic foreign policy strategies pursued by his father between 1989 and 1993 (Owens 31). He claimed that the U.S. should actively participate in international relations, and that the foreign policies of the United States would support American interests abroad (Daalder and Lindsay 39).

While Bush was not entirely opposed to American involvement, he criticized the lack of priority provided by the Clinton administration indiscriminate and the unjustified deployment

of armed forces in different regional conflicts. Initially, officials in the Bush administration were “assertive nationalists” and totally opposed to nation-building, especially when his process involved sending American troops overseas. He promised “a straightforward set of priorities for the American public based on a realistic evaluation of America’s national interests” (Daalder and Lindsay 39). Colin Dueck explains that President Bush initially hoped to restrict international engagement and that American influence in the multilateral institutions preferred by President Clinton, stressing strategic interests rather than ideological ones (147).

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Doctrine started to be revealed shocking both foreign policymakers and American citizens. This grand strategy was conveyed to the American people through the public statements made by President Bush and the National Security Strategy of 2002. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were quickly interpreted by the Bush administration as an act of war within a matter of a few hours; an alternate conception would have been to recognize the event as an international criminal act against humanity. Logically, the former interpretation leads to a response conceived as a war on terrorism (Snauwaert 121).

President Bush declared, “the deliberate and deadly attacks against our country which took place yesterday were more than acts of terror. It was acts of war” (Bush). It is mentioned in the latest US National Security Strategy that: “The United States of America is fighting a global war against terrorists. The enemy is not a single political regime or individual, or philosophy or religion. The threat is premeditated terrorism, politically motivated violence committed against innocent citizens” (The White House 2002).

The four main elements of the Bush doctrine are outlined by Robert Jervis: Democracy and Liberalism, Threat and Preventive War, Unilateralism, and American supremacy. Foreign policy academics broadly agree that the Bush doctrine required these four principles. The controversy arises when it comes to the degree to which these values influenced American

foreign policy and whether they represented continuity or a deviation from foreign policy norms (Quarantello 15). The Bush Doctrine of preemption can be fully grasped in at least two ways: first, it represents itself a fundamental change from a relatively noninterventionist, isolationist tradition, perhaps best summarized by the dictum, “don’t tread on me.” Second a continued manifestation of the tacit connection between American democracy and expansionism (West 12). Nevertheless, the Bush Doctrine does not stand on its own per se; it is tied to a huge shift in the American philosophy of international relations. On one stage it is a transformation from the containment philosophy of the Cold War to the preemptive philosophy of post-terrorism. It is part of a new international strategy of American global leadership on a more profound level (Snauwaert 123).

2.3.1. The Presidential Rhetoric of the “War on Terror” and the (Re)Creation of Reality after 9/11

For the exception of the vice-presidential running mate, the president is the only American official chosen by the country as a whole. As such, the rhetoric of the president is highly significant for the polity, even if it is on a strictly symbolic basis. Presidential comments are also a springboard for dialogue, unity or indignation at national levels. In his classic *The Rhetorical Presidency* Jeffery K. Tulis argues that “Woodrow Wilson transformed the presidency and the government by advocating an executive ruled by persuasion and an appeal to universal values” (104). Likewise, David Zarefsky makes the reasonable point that “while very comprehensive, some presidential rhetoric scholarship may take a somewhat simplistic view of how the language is used.” According to him, presidential rhetoric is not based on a strict sequence of cause and effect (608). Instead he suggests defining social truth is a core feature of presidential rhetoric (607). Emphasizing, the “impact” of that concept of social reality is difficult to quantify. But presidential rhetoric practically shuts hermeneutic doors on Zarefsky’s account.

The “force of interpretation” is nowhere clearer than in President Bush’s reactions to the 9/11 incidents. In those responses, Bush helped to shape the turbulent events related to social reality. Implementing the principle of Zarefsky’s “presidential power of interpretation” to Bush’s speeches instantly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks shows an extraordinary illustration of “fact” shaping and hermeneutic door closing. The first five addresses was Bush’s initial public reaction to 9/11. The last speech on “Axis of Evil” illustrates a more considered and anticipated response to the attacks. This speech is particularly interesting because it comes after the Taliban’s fall, and to some degree it reflects the foreign policy under which the U.S still worked. Here the review focuses on the development of three key themes: the relation between security, safety and solidarity; the story of divine providence and fate; and the fight to detect an “enemy.” An analysis of these themes shows how the rhetoric of President Bush represented a specific form of hermeneutic sovereignty which can be employed almost only by a figure that signifies a unified nation (Maggio 812).

The primary objective of the president after 9/11 was to reassure the nation and make it feel safe. This sense of security is closely connected to conceptions of national security and solidarity. Bush, on the night of September 11, stated:

I want to reassure the American people that the full resources of the federal government are working to assist local authorities to save lives and to help the victims of these attacks . . . I’ve been in regular contact with the Vice President, the Secretary of Defence, the National Security Team and my Cabinet. We have taken all appropriate security precautions to protect the American people. Our military at home and around the world is on high alert status, and we have taken the necessary security precautions to continue the functions of your government. We have been in touch with the leaders of Congress and with world leaders to assure them that we will do whatever is necessary to protect America and Americans.

Those statements were basically the first public words that Bush chose to speak after the NY and Washington attacks. Bush felt that the nation needed to be alerted that the government was working correctly and that he and his security staff were in control. This is particularly significant, since Bush does not hurry into emergency procedures while calling the events a “threat.” He stresses that the government is on the move and working. Bush has conveyed his sovereignty in this sense by announcing the government’s standard “functioning” (Maggio 815).

In Bush’s gallant “Islam Is Peace” speech, he used the rhetoric of unity – and hence the concept of sovereignty – to emphasize Muslim Americans’ seamlessness, he says:

America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, military personnel members, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, mom and dads... This is a great country. It’s a great country because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honour to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do. They're outraged, they're sad. They love America just as much as I do.

Bush has sought admirably to quash Muslims’ suffering by setting them down as average Americans. In reality, he said, they “heart America just as much as I do.” Accordingly, he used affiliation to bring Muslim Americans into the fold of “natural” Americans like himself. In addition, bush disassociated the terrorist versions of Islam from the real Islam: the real Islamic version teaches “peace” not “violence.” In this moment Bush again asserts a sort of hermeneutic hegemony by claiming to know the “true Islam” (Maggio 815-16).

Shifting rhetorical gears a little bit, Bush (2001) started his comments on September 12 with the following statements: “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out

yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve.” He again connected security and protection with solidarity and steadfastness during Bush’s (2002) “Axis of the Evil” debate. He states: “Our War on Terror is well begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch –yet must be and it will be waged on our watch. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.” Soon, this concept of “freedom” was related to God’s providence became a mantra of the Bush administration in Bush’s speech (2001) before both House of Congress on September 20, he equated his self-described “War on Terror” as part of the fight for freedom past. (Maggio 819).

Bush Associates the terrorists with former oppressive regimes (Hyde 12). Heirs of communism, totalitarianism and Nazism are Islamic fundamentalists. Thus, Bush puts the U.S at the centre of a historic fight for democracy in this community. In addition, he rhetorically frames the downfall of Islamic Fundamentalists as inevitable but still a battle that will involve a great deal of American effort and sacrifice. Nevertheless, as the United States is on the side of freedom, and therefore of divine providence, the terrorists must ultimately be put in the “unmarked grave of discarded lies in history” (Maggio 816). His words, however, are a direct declaration of war on terrorism, a war which does not take place in the lands of America, a war against Muslims and Islam in Islamic countries.

2.3.2. Post-9/11 Imperialism

Until George W. Bush was endorsed for the 2000 presidential election by the Republican Party, he delivered a speech called “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Bush pledged to build strategies that would turn “American influence into decades of democratic peace.” Bush also expressed concern about: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system, relationships experienced. Bush’s address made no

reference to multilateralism or unilateralism. Aware of concerns from other countries about the future of American foreign policy, Bush has stated unequivocally that his foreign policy would not be imperial: “America has never been an empire. We may be the only great power in history to have the potential and to have declined, preferring greatness to power and justice to glory.” (Yordan 35).

The 9/11 attacks and the Taliban’s collapse opened the door to a more unilateral approach using American military power to transform the world according to U.S. interests and principles (Yordan 35). The terrorist attacks had little effect on the international system’s power distribution but they gave Bush an opportunity to implement a more expansionist approach. Congress bowed to the foreign-policy forces of the President, while the general opinion, furious with the attacks, favoured a more muscular foreign policy. The emerging political environment has lifted the national boundaries to the U.S power and Bush has used the aftermath of the assaults to broaden the impact of the nation in key geo-strategic areas and achieve his own personal objectives. Following the election; Bush vowed to regain presidential power (Yordan 36).

The Bush administration started developing a new foreign-policy strategy in this new political environment. This new doctrine has made Bush’s decision to invade and transform Iraq legitimate. The Bush administration worked hard to formulate this new policy from January to September 2002. The first move was to extend the global war on terror, targeting Al Qaeda, though important, would not protect America. In the State of the Union Address of 2002, Bush clarified that rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction and their potential links with terrorist groups were the new dangers. Bush described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” and, while he did not specify how he would prevent these states from creating such weapons, he suggested that American stability would be better maintained by replacing such regimes with democratic structures (The White House 2002). The speech

also indicated the involvement of the Bush administration in ousting the government of Saddam Hussein from power and in reforming the Middle East (Yordan 37). He argued that the war on terror cannot be waged on the defensive, saying: “Before they emerge, we must take the fight to the enemy, disrupt his plans and support the worst threats. In the world; we’ve entered a path of action which is the only path to safety” (The White “President”).

The speech from June 1st, 2002, set the tone for the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Bush administration. The NSS portrayed, in essence, a violent world and America as its saviour. Thus, the Bush administration ignores diplomacy, arms control, and negotiation, turning to the use of force instead, as it believes that there is little or no time for such acts (Crawford). The NSS was more than a call for action; it was an imperial-informed policy. The United States violated international law by claiming a right to launch preventive attacks. The United States has thus not acknowledged any limits on its power. The NSS did not call for other territories to be colonized. A close reading, however, indicates otherwise. While the NSS asserted that America should respect the views and practices of other states; it argued strongly that the US interpretation of human dignity, equality, democracy, and market capitalism must be embraced as the principles that all countries in the world would follow (The White “National”). Therefore, the NSS proposed the creation of an informal empire where government officials in other sections were expected to reorganize their societies in compliance with American interests (Yordan 39).

The Bush Doctrine defends the intervention of countries supporting terrorism and using Afghanistan as a justification for removing the Taliban government. In addition , the U.S. preparations to intervene in Afghanistan were carried out prior to the 9/11 attack; thus events escalated the prospects of the Americans in the country , due to both Afghanistan’s strategic and important position and the region’s natural gas wealth. Afghanistan was worthy of being the base for US military operations. Afghan invasion was preceded by the 2003 invasion of

Iraq, justified by the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by Iraqis. Both the US government and the media have demonstrated Saddam's regime as a threat to American and Middle East interests and peace (Cakmak 5).

2.3.3. Framing the War on Terror

With new ways of global collaboration and access to weapons of mass destruction the threat of political violence has evolved. After the now infamous 9/11 policy reference point, the Bush administration's response to this challenge has had far-reaching implications for national security strategy, international community relations, and civil liberties. Labelling the "War on Terror," the campaign was framed inside a term now becoming a normal and instinctive shorthand part of the mainstream lexicon. But frames are more than phrases "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that function symbolically to structure the social world meaningfully" (Reese 149). As would any advocate for policy; administrations pursue persuasive structures to identify the issues and help win the discursive battle, while critics in turn try to resist certain interpretations and find more favourable ones (Pan and Kosicki 1). The War on Terror created a favourable political climate for what was considered the biggest foreign policy blunder in modern times: the invasion of Iraq, therefore, in the nature and consequences of its policy-forming effect. The War on Terror is perhaps the most significant process in recent memory (Reese 151).

In the now-well-known transformation and evolution of the administration's policy, powerful neo-conservatives within the government had long advocated regime change in Iraq, but the 9/11 attacks gave them a convincing way to pursue their ideas quickly and justify a new pre-emptive war policy, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (The White "National") defined the 9/11 attack as acts of war against the United States and its allies, and against the very concept of a civilized society. It defined the enemy as terrorist groups, an "evil" which threatens the "freedoms" and way of life of the

American people. The America's related National Security Strategy published in 2006 explicitly separates "the Americans" from "the others/them" (the terrorists) connecting terrorism to rogue states that "hate the United States and everything that it stands for." "Addressing himself as an agent of God, Bush's Manichean struggle pitted the United States and its leader against the evildoers" (Domke).

In addition to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States has launched a war on terrorism against Al-Qaeda. The United States priorities have been adjusted to take stringent measures in those areas that the United States regarded the centre of terrorism as well as countries that sponsored the Taliban such as Pakistan. According to Barnett Rubin in his book *Saving Afghanistan: Foreign Affairs*, he notes that "in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the rushed negotiations between the United states and Pakistan changed Pakistan's behaviour but not its interest. Pakistan's support for the Taliban was so essential that Musharraff also contemplated declaring war against the United States rather than losing his allies in Afghanistan" (57). Rubin defines the objective of attacking Pakistan where the latter protects the terrorists.

Arguably, the most important consequence of the creation of the "War on Terror" was to give the invasion of Iraq a political (if not empirical) justification. Gesek Koff and Kushner demonstrated how, by juxtaposing Iraq and 9/11, Bush explicitly portrayed the Iraq policy within the War on Terror (526). He scored the connection the following year in proclaiming a military success: "Iraq's fight is one victory in a war on terror which began on Sep 11, 2001; and continues" (McQuillan and Benedetto). Indeed the public support for the war relied crucially on whether or not one believed in the relation between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein, which a majority of Americans did. This correlation served to provide retroactive explanation for the invasion. For instance, on September 14, 2003, Vice-President Dick Cheney falsely claimed falsely that victory in Iraq would strike a significant blow at the terrorists' geographic

base who have been targeting the Americans for several years now, but most notably on 9/11 (Cheney).

Consequently, the incident was perceived to be the beginning of the “War on Terror” and the final chapter of the Taliban regime. The impact of the media and cinema influenced the political and military acts of America, either implicitly or explicitly to influence the public opinion in many countries to a large degree. They show enormous support for this “War on Terror.” In addition, many countries approved and even backed the attack on Afghanistan. As Paul Rogers states in his book *Iraq and the War on Terror*, “the war seemed to be remarkably successful from an American viewpoint” (231).

2.4. Hollywood and Post-9/11 Bush’s Foreign Policy

Hollywood films are the basis from which the American citizens understand who their enemy is. To accomplish their propaganda the United States has to portray its opponent as the “other,” the bad side against the good American side via the lenses of Hollywood (Totman 2). The American enemy is always the villain which is portrayed in films. In Hollywood movies, whether countries which are allies or enemies to the United States are depicted or represented as such. This shows how the U.S government operated together with Hollywood to destroy or misrepresent the enemy’s face. Jack Valentine of America’s Motion Picture Association said: “Washington and Hollywood have sprung from the same DNA,” (qtd. in Shaheen, *Guilty* 35). He shows how a strong relationship has developed over the last 20 years between the Department of Defence and film studios in Hollywood.

After President George Bush declared the war on terror, Hollywood screens started depicting Muslims as terrorists. Jack Shaheen claims that “Film producers were called upon to serve the country in the “War on Terror” and make patriotic films” (*Guilty*1). Hollywood has portrayed Muslims as deficient in morality, as well as terrorists and hijackers who are willing to sacrifice their lives in the “honourable name of Allah.” This peaked in the wake of 9/11,

when bearded men and veiled women were viewed as threats to US peace and stability. The movie *Pretty Persuasion* (2005) portrayed a Palestinian veiled Muslim girl among her schoolmates as unwanted. One of the main characters in the movie mocks her hijab and sees her as a terrorist girl who wanted to bomb and kill (Shaheen 36).

Islamophobia and void toward Muslims grew out of the stereotypical portraying of Arabs as ignorant barbarians in American media during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Hollywood screen reflects the mirror of American foreign policy, and plays a crucial role in increasing American influence abroad. This is not a secret as “demonizing an opponent in times of war” is seen as “so normal” (Alsultany15).

The American foreign policy relationship with Hollywood is not a mere coincidence. The Bush administration has used the Hollywood industry’s dramatic stories as an intangible weapon for broadcasting its plans to get people to embrace its foreign policy. Hollywood and Washington had worked together after 9/11. For instance, a movie about nuclear terrorism, *The Sum of All Fears*, reflected the Pentagon’s collaboration with the movie industry. It provided military equipment and weapons to Hollywood producers and even the majority of its soldiers took part in the filming process. This help was intended to present a positive image of the American Army (Fraser182).

The Pentagon, which sought to promote U.S. military presence around the world, is presented to the mass public throughout the screens of Hollywood. The movie industry has a long partnership with the armed forces: military public relations offices typically review movie scripts in return for access to bases, facilities, stock footage and expert consultation, all required for “authenticity.” Nevertheless, the profound patriotic and militaristic nature of most fighting pictures is seldom dictated by strict Pentagon controls over how authors, directors and writers do their job, but it emerges from the broader culture of politics and media that is the repository of imperialist ideology. Most Hollywood movie makers are so

hooked to the spectacle of war with its enduring expectations of superpower benevolence that they never venture away from the “bipartisan” foreign-policy consensus.

2.4.1. Mirroring Terror: The Impact of 9/11 on Hollywood

Depending on Siegfried Kracauer’s definition of the cinema as a “society mirror,” this part of the research examines the effect of the “terror years” on American cinema since 2001. “Hollywood was the main cultural infrastructure to cope with 9/11, leaving Americans stuck in the “desert of real” (Zizek). Interactive imagery simplifies traumatic incidents such as terrorist assaults on viewers – frequently presenting them in simplistic black and white Manichean terms and hence providing moral guidance, solidarity and sense of fate. The response from Hollywood to 9/11 involved around all those various aspects: it made an appeal to an “unbroken” spirit, tried to reaffirm the symbolic co-ordinates of America’s dominant truth and prepared to respond to new dilemmas. With time going by, the increasing suspicions and opposition associated with this process were also integrated in Hollywood. As the study of the “terror years” related films reveals, the American film industry has analysed, presented, and interpreted the significance of the terrorist attacks in a wide variety of ways: from pure atmospheric citations to re-enactments from pro-war propaganda to critical self-inquiry (Riegler 68).

The theme of Kracauer’s cinematographic mirror is tailored to tackle different manifestations of socio-political anxieties linked to 9/11 as well as the treatment of terror-related trauma and the reaffirmation of America’s cultural pillars (individual and economic rights, faith and family). This dedication, as Kracauer points out, is less accessible or vocal, but expressed implicitly through metaphor, emotion and atmosphere. Read this way, the post-9/11 Hollywood pictures “under the surface” show how the US environment and culture have undergone dramatic changes since 2001: from democracy to security and fear, from assumed stability to confusion (Riegler 69).

2.4.2. Post-9/11 Hollywood

The dominant executive mantra in the immediate post-September 11, 2001 period was “no more mass destruction movies.” Forty-five film projects were either cancelled, substantially altered or postponed. Several critics have suggested that Hollywood was to blame for 9/11, because its films had prefigured the terrorist attackers and “inspired” them (Maher). For example, Director Robert Altman believed that such an atrocity would have been impensable “unless they had seen it in a film” (qtd. in Coyle 2). There were also assurances that Hollywood would henceforth provide a “kinder, gentler” form of entertainment but, as Jim Hoberman has pointed out, “the public did not buy it.” In the first months following 9/11, action flicks such as *Die Hard* or *Fake Lies* were rented three times more often than before, as if in the entertainment domain the often agonizing inefficiency of real life counter-terrorism had to be compensated for (McCorkle 171).

In addition, the sense of insecurity also enhanced patriotic and warlike themes – fairly soon after the American invasion of Afghanistan began on October 7th, 2001, “Hollywood began marching to a military rhythm.” War films such as *Black Hawk Down* (2001), *Behind Enemy Lines* (2001) and *We Were Soldiers* (2002) topped the U.S. box office charts. “There is now a greater awareness of how everyone feels when their country was under attack,” commented a director on the reasons for this phenomenon (Andson 75).

None of these war movies dealt with terrorism but rather re-established clear-cut military successes in Vietnam as well as American contributions to the flawed UN interventions in the Balkans and Somalia in the early 1990s; however, it didn’t matter anyway: “recreating past wars as U.S. fought a new one, they seemed as much about America after 9/11 as Vietnam and Somalia, their geographical locals and historical clashes” (Carruthers 168).

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the plotlines were viewed as pro-interventionist reflecting the declaration of the War on Terror by George W. Bush as an effort that “will not end until every terrorist group with global reach has been identified, prevented and defeated.” A post script was added to *Black Hawk Down* shortly before the release in December 2001. It indicated that Washington’s 1993 decision to withdraw from Somalia, as well as its decision to interfere in Rwanda and Bosnia, “was part of the unwillingness to wage war, which ultimately emboldened America’s enemies to strike the Pentagon and the WTC.” That idea was abandoned, when director Ridley Scott decided that it was “a good time” to release the film. Scott said that he “found that these soldiers were like fire-fighters and police and rescue workers, in that they were all people who would go into burning buildings or under flames without worrying about themselves, but only about their duty.” (qtd. in Malanowski 16).

After the highly divisive American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the flood of military-related movies soon exploded – both the WW2 epics *Windtalkers* (2002) and the pro-interventionist *Tears of the Sun* (2003) were low grossing. Commentators found it difficult to decide whether viewers viewed films that glorify the strength of the U.S. military as morally complex or whether they were merely warm-minded after watching in real combat in news. Following the terrorist attacks, some experts warned of a political “pact” between Hollywood and Washington encouraging imperialism and even jingoism, just as after Pearl Harbour attacks. Shortly after 9/11, Jack Valenti, long-time MPAA president, had indeed promised the industry would respond to the call: “Many people in Hollywood are veterans who fought in other wars, only willing to fight again if their country needs them” (qtd. in Valentin 8). But the reaction was more ambivalent in retrospect than clear propaganda.

In reality, pure escapism was a major part of it. After 9/11 monumental combat between the powers of “light” and “darkness” became extremely popular. Referring to the trilogy *The Lord of the Rings* (2001-2003), Critic Lev Grossman explained the appeal of this matter

especially in relation to the mysterious fight against terrorism: “Tolkien offers us the war we wish we were fighting – a struggle with an enemy whose face we can see, who is battling on the open battlefield, for being separated from innocent civilians. You can tell an evildoer in the *Middle Earth* unlike the *Middle East*, because he / she look evil” (Grossman).

Likewise, one of the reasons the *Harry Potter* (2001-2011) and the *Chronicles of Narnia* (2005/2008/2010) series kept a note with fans was that the stories included notions of war, leadership, dangers and strength, courage and personal sacrifice, all important in uncertain times. “By the evil of 9/11 you might look at the Harry Potter show,” a reviewer from the *New York Times* explained. In this sense, with the notion of Lord Voldemort as the evildoer of all evildoers who would attempt to take down the world, it was very difficult not to (White).

The simplistic interpretation of the superhero story as if the incidents instilled new confidence in the need for lone and all-powerful people to step up to the challenge. Posting comments on the superman remark *Man of Steel* (2013) and doubting the cultural reasons behind the genre’s current burst, superhero films are being created for a culture that has practically given up. The police are not able to protect us, the government is not able to protect us, there are no more inspirational loners to defend us and the Euro is gone. So let’s turn it over the vigilantes (Queenan). While 9/11 references are defused in superhero movies and not overt assertions, there is a significant change in the portrayal of the main characters that reflects the pessimism of the post-9/11 mentality. Whether it’s *Batman*, *Captain America*, *Superman*, *Iron Man*, *Spiderman*, *Wolverine* or *Thor*, these heroes are enduring losses and humiliating defeats – in fact they’re all found to be weak, traumatized and eventually ambivalent; however they still do what’s “necessary” (Pollard 183).

In addition, the U.S. movie industry responded with a series of movies like *Zero Dark Thirty* and *United 93* to the September 11th assaults. Furthermore, the impact of 9/11 on

cinema was significant in the long run after the attacks: a primary interest in the apocalyptic genre was evident. Douglas Kellner develops a variety of reasons behind the expansion of this genre of movie in “*Social Apocalypse in Contemporary Hollywood Film.*” He assumes, in addition to religious beliefs, that the topic imposed an atmosphere of catastrophe and devastation produced by the assaults and the hawkish retaliatory tactic in the Middle East which was inevitably regularly expressed by the media (26). Furthermore, in *Melancholic and Hungry Games: Post-9/11 Cinema and the Culture of Apocalypse,*” Mathew Leggatt argues that “the concept of deconstruction could also be understood as an overthrow of the capitalist system” (63).

Amongst the most remarkable apocalypse films of the post-9/11 era, one can cite Neil Marshall's *Doomsday*, Francis Lawrence's *I am Legend*, and Alex Proyas' *Knowing*. As far as the genre of apocalypse is included, Walliss and Aston in “Doomsday America: the Bleak Turn of Post-9/11 Apocalyptic Cinema,” argue that these films are a representation of the collective American consciousness which was formed by hope and insecurities regarding the aftermath period of the assault that had been the focus of the movie (60). As a consequence, the authors point out the ambivalence of such dystopian films; some are seen as carrying a negative message, whereas others are regarded as positive in recent productions. The latter are said to correlate with George W. Bush's second presidential term ending and moving towards “renewal and start-up” (Walliss and Aston 61-62). Such an argument evokes a political allegory within that specific movie genre, and essentially draws a connection between movies and politics. In this regard, Walliss and Aston claim that in “*The Book of Eli*,” there is a scathing critique of the use of religious rhetoric by President Bush via a character who tries to manipulate people through the use of the Bible (62).

2.4.3. 9/11 Arrives on the Screen

Being a significant chapter in the socio-political field of America, the events of 9/11 were also the focus of various depictions and portrayals in the cinema. By way of illustration, Thomas Riegler stated in “Mirroring Terror: The Impact of 9/11 on Hollywood Cinema,” that “even though the character of the jihadist emerged in the movies as early as the first terrorist assault on the WTC in the early 1990s; the attacks of 9/11 produced a multitude of films addressing the war themes and disputes including the U.S., consequently reflecting George W. Bush’s proclaim of the war on terror” (104-05). Several cinematic projects dealing with the assaults are worth mentioning as examples. For instance, the *United 93* showcases the passengers’ heroic act on board the “United Airlines Flight 93” who attempted to take control of the plane over the hijackers, leading to a crash in the suburb of Pennsylvania, therefore preventing potential human and material damage to occur. Contrary to this interpretation, Douglas Kellner argues that *United 93* often reveals the utter inefficiency and failure of the authorities to deal with the assaults (103).

Drawing a conclusion on the tenth anniversary of the terrorist assaults Jim Hoberman commented the Hollywood’s products claiming that “the 9/11 incidents were to be avenged but not relived,” and while forming the emotional context for all sorts of escapist adventures, there was considerably less interest in portraying the actual incident. Consequently, the first movies related to 9/11 did so in a purposefully disassociated way, with the aim of not attracting controversy. As per the *New York Times*, the trauma “silently arrived, writing tiny in a series of new pictures that have no political content but are overcome by an intense, lasting sense of sorrow born in the midst of the tragedy”(qtd. in Farber 45). First came *The Guys* (2002): it displayed a journal that helped an FDNY captain who lost nine men in the Twin Towers write eulogies. Spike Lee’s *25th Hours* (2002), published fifteen months after

the terrorist assaults, is about a NY drug dealer arrested on his last day of freedom before a seven-year prison sentence starts (LaSalle).

The film industry took more than five years to address 9/11 directly at *United 93* (2006), and it was all about civilian heroism; the terrorists' motives and personal history remain totally unknown to the viewer. Oliver Stone's *World Trade Centre* (2006) did not even show the planes that struck the twin towers, but instead focused on the heroic rescue of two ground zero survivors. The 9/11 attacks constructed the emotional climax of a *Remember Me*, a love drama produced in 2010; Tyler (Robert Pattinson) is last seen on the 88th floor of the WTC in his father's office, and it is eventually revealed that the date was 11 September 2001. The movie has been criticized for that as "appalling" and "exploitative" as it uses 9/11 as a "simple plot device" (White).

As already stated, in the early stages, a direct examination of 9/11 was a kind of a taboo. Terrorism-related films such as *Collateral Damage* (2002) and *The Sum of All Fears* (2002), made before 2001, suddenly became out of sync with the new paradigm. *The Sum of All Fears* was noticeable because it showed Baltimore's nuclear destruction, but when it came to depicting the enemy, the European Neo-Nazis, the film was criticized for being implausible. Hereupon, Stephen Prince noted that "at least for a while, 9/11 rang the curtain on the theatre of mass destruction in Hollywood" (70). But with increasing distance, movie makers started to focus on the War on Terror, its success and consequences, at home and abroad (Riegler 71).

Shortly before the 10th anniversary of 9/11, key policy decisions and incidents put both the United States counter-terrorism strategy and its cultural representation in a new platform: *The Killing of Osama Bin Laden* (2011) represented a highly significant victory for the United States. Within a year, a TV adaptation, *Seal Team Six, The Raid on Osama Bin Laden*, and *Zero Dark Thirty* dramatized the U.S. attack. The U.S. also pulled its fighting troops from

Iraq in 2011 and scheduled a 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, essentially ending the Global War on Terror as described by George W. Bush (Riegler 71). The movie *Zero Dark Thirty* shows how the film industry is promoting American foreign policy today. The movie was a result of Osama Bin Laden's dramatic assassination and torture at the CIA hands, but some argue the reality about his death is not as it was depicted in the movie. Bin Laden suffered from Marfan syndrome that caused his death and the CIA desires to entertain the audience and hide the facts about its failure to capture Al-Qaeda leader (Piecezenik).

To sum up, Hollywood's depiction of terrorism is embodied in two people: the villain men depicted as Russians, Germans, Japanese, and Arabs (Muslims), while the hero is American men who rescue the U.S. soil from evil anti-American aliens who threaten its protection. Through such depictions, the U.S. is depicted as a benevolent power seeking to promote peace and harmony throughout the world.

2.5. The Invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States launched an international war on terrorism characterized by military intervention, the construction of ideas and efforts to reshape Middle East politics. It was likely following 9/11 attacks that the U.S. would topple Afghanistan's Taliban Regime. Stephen Kinzer claims that "Afghanistan had not only become a refuge for Osama bin Laden and his associates but a shelter for global terrorism as well. At first, before waging war on Afghanistan, President Bush just requested that the Taliban remove its chief, Mullah Omar, and cut its ties with Al-Qaeda. That was the choice that Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, was enthusiastically pushing"(276). The justification for this enthusiasm was that it was Pakistan that established and supported the Taliban regime and did not want to be easily defeated now (qtd. in Cetin 533).

Barnett Rubin notes that “in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks, the hurried talks between the US and Pakistan changed Pakistan’s attitude, but not its interest. Supporting the Taliban was so important to Pakistan that Musharraf even thought of waging war against the United States rather than abandoning his allies in Afghanistan” (61). Yet Stephen Kinzer states that “General Musharraf’s failure to convince the Taliban leaders to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States was the start of the end for the Taliban regime” (page number). As a result of the horrific death of American citizens in the WTC, public opinion in many countries seemed readily to support any American intervention in Afghanistan. Before the declaration of war, a lot of states, including the United Kingdom and NATO members, had approved and supported the US attack on Afghanistan in many respects. The US soon targeted Al-Qaeda’s protector the Taliban government. The rapid war lasted for only three months and from an American viewpoint seemed to be extremely successful (Rogers page number). As a result of the war, the Taliban rule was ended, several Al-Qaeda militants were killed or captured and the United States has built two military bases in Afghanistan (Cetin 536).

The invasion of Iraq, on the other hand, was the most divisive and vitally important move in the U.S. foreign policy. The invasion and occupation of Iraq is one case in point. According to Bush’s theory of “pre-emption,” the invasion was justified as a means to deter a terrorist attack on the United States. It has been reported that the Iraqi government possessed WMD and is likely to sell them to terrorists like Al-Qaeda, despite their past use of chemical weapons (Snauwaert 130).

In March of 2003, in a preemptive attack on Saddam Hussein’s “tyrannical” rule, the United States invaded Iraq. Regardless of the fact that President Bush and his administration had promoted the war as necessary to protect America against the WMD which Hussein would use in the near future, it became immediately noticeable in the wake of the invasion

that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons, or had not been found at the time, and had committed no crimes that would justify a pre-emptive strike by the United States (Bojang 1).

Nevertheless, since the Gulf War, in a crucial region of the world, Iraq has been a perfect example of a rival power that needs to be changed in accordance with the international strategy. The change of Iraqi regime was morally justified as a preemptive act of self-defence, whereas the main intention was geopolitical. Controlling likely the most significant Arab nation and its oil resources provides the United States significant power not only in the Middle East area but even beyond to Europe, Central Asia and China (Snauwaert 131). On this basis, Malang Bojang concluded that “the invasion of Iraq was morally wrong, unfair, unjustified and harmful” (72).

2.5.1. The Cinematic Treatment of the Iraq and Afghanistan War

Riegler argues that “the perspective on radical Islamist terrorism and 9/11 events is therefore expected to develop from social and political analysis to a rapid historization of the topic.” Accordingly, this retrospective viewpoint in *Zero Dark Thirty* originally presented as a narrowly focused and closed-ended inquiry into the American military’s failure to arrest Bin Laden in later in 2002. *Zero Dark Thirty* has chronicled Osama Bin Laden’s ultimately successful ten year manhunt, whereas emphasizing the moral costs. The film depicts the dark side of that battle. It reveals the unspeakable allowing Americans to know if Bin Laden’s death was worth the price they paid (Dragis). Nevertheless, *Zero Dark Thirty*’s forceful in its depiction of the War on Terror as a form of legitimate vengeance for the September 11 attacks horrors, initially illuminated by emergency phone calls from the burning buildings and hijacked airplane against a black screen (Weswell 86).

Michael Moore’s *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004), the first major wide-release movie with the Iraq war as a subject, easily prevented the constraints of embedded reporting, as the director never went to Iraq (Chown 460). *Fahrenheit 9/11* was released one year after starting military

operation in Iraq. While it quickly dated as a portrayal of the Iraq War, its immense commercial success both in theatrical and ancillary markets made it the only realistic images that many Americans witnessed at home early in the war. There have also been claims that the DVD is widely distributed in Iraq by American soldiers, and Muslim jihadists have referenced it for footage, or even pirated it (Chown 463).

Fahrenheit 9/11 has its own reality shot clips. Though it was filmed shortly before disclosures about the 2004 Abu Ghraib prison scandal, it shows captives being humiliated by soldiers. In a heart aching scene, with non-diegetic Christmas soundtrack music, soldiers break into Iraqi suspect's homes aggressively. A tank crew is shown on patrol listening to "Fire Water Burns" by Bloodhound Gang. Moore carefully supports these images with a remark on the soundtrack that they are samples of what would happen when good kids are sent out on a bad mission. In some of the shot clips Moore purchased, a weeping Iraqi mother cries at the camera that Americans are killers just after her home was bombarded (Chown 463).

The first major cinematic release of the Iraq War, *Fahrenheit 9/11*, can be characterized by both its speed of production and the rage of its polemics. Despite those limitations, it is amazing that it was so correct in its assessment that the war would become both the quagmire and that George W. Bush and his cabinet would be vilified in the retrospective study of the rationalistic war. In its documentary style, Moore's epic may look to Vietnamese models, yet it represents a new landmark in the documentary role in public policy debate (Chown 466).

2.5.2. Hollywood, the "War on Terror," and Islamophobia

The debate concerning Muslims in the years after 9/11 has been politicised to be severe, as can be seen for instance in the 2016 election campaign in which Donald Trump used this debate to unite Americans to his cause. The manner in which Muslims and Islam are depicted in the news amplifies this debate. In the news, the common religious denominators are mostly

used to depict the entire population community as vicious or frightening, instead of blaming the ones responsible: radicalized lone wolves or groups. In his article “The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and Flying While Brown,” Craig Considine argues that the racially biased process is greatly affected by historical, regional, and geopolitical tendencies encircling American Muslims and individuals who “look Muslim” (1).

The racialization of American Muslims in the sense of the “War on Terror” generates local and tangible perceptions of discrimination and violence for both Muslims and non-Muslims (Considine 9). The word Islamophobia now recognized and defined as a special form of discrimination, encompasses those experiences. Even though Islamophobia is broadly used in world press, it still appears in quotation marks, implying that the significance of Islamophobia is not fairly obvious or not as obvious as others pretend (Richardson 3). Another assumption of the quotation marks is that in fact there is no such thing as Islamophobia; it is solely the figment of a delusional or politically driven imagination or ending justified criticism or lazy violence (Richardson 3-4).

To give a thorough and complete definition, here are three various sources and their definition to the term. The first description is given by the American-Islamic Relations Council (CAIR), which is an advocacy group based in Washington D.C which questions stereotypes of Islam and Muslims. It notes that “Islamophobia is a closed-minded discrimination or detest of Muslims,” (About 2) a concisely yet clear description of the word. The Bridge Initiative Team provides the second definition and analyzes the concept a little more thoroughly:

Islamophobia is prejudice toward or discrimination against Muslims because of their religion or perceived religious, nationality or ethnicity which associate with Islam.

Islamophobia, including anti-Semitism, racism and homophobia, defines mindsets and

acts that dehumanize a whole group of people. A number of cultures have confronted prejudice and discrimination throughout the course of history. Islamophobia is merely another reincarnation of this unfortunate bigotry phenomenon. (“What is Islamophobia” 1)

Lastly, the third definition is given by the University of California, Berkeley’s Centre of Race and Gender: “Islamophobia is a contrived anxiety or prejudice formed by the current Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure. It is targeted at a real or perceived Muslim menace via the preservation and extension of existing inequalities in economic, political, social and cultural connections, while trying to rationalize the need to use violence as a means to achieve “civilization rehab” of the target communities (Muslim or otherwise). “Islamophobia reintroduces and reconfirms an international racial structure which maintains and extends the differences in the distribution of resources” (“Defining Islamophobia” 3)

A recent polls review shows that most non-Muslims in the United States are becoming increasingly hostile to Muslims, parallel to the growing discourse between politicians and media platforms. The Council on American-Islamic Relations 2017’s new analysis of Islamophobic hate crime data reveals that anti-Muslim bias incidents rose by sixty-five per cent between 2014 and 2016. In 2016 alone, Islamophobia incidents increased by fifty-seven per cent (Considine 10). A hate crime is comprehended as “a criminal offence encouraged in whole or in part by another’s actual or perceived group status such as race and ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender or gender identity. Hollywood has played its role in propagating Islamophobia and thereby augmenting Islamophobic hate crimes, as Hollywood films have a huge degree of influence, especially among the young generations”(Considine 10).

2.5.3. Re-Constructing Islamophobia: the Post-9/11 Representation of Muslims in Hollywood Movies

Islam has become heavily politicized in the wake of 9/11 events and the resulting Islamophobia has expanded across the media and especially Hollywood. The threat that falls in this is that Hollywood, especially amongst younger generations, has an enormous level of influence helping to perpetuate the issue. Not only will the concepts depicted in Hollywood films play a big part, political opinions and approval by actors are mostly even more impactful amongst the younger generation, as they are more likely to idolise these celebs.

The aftermath of 9/11 assaults generated a fear that also encouraged American Muslim advocates to take more control over their own image in Hollywood movies and products. Efforts on this front are explored via the task of four key institutions whose involvement with Hollywood has resulted in a subtle but significant shift in the jihadist sub-gender of post-9/11 through clear dissociation of Islam religion from terrorism. Evidence of this transition is provided by reviewing five films after 9/11: *Civic Duty* (2006), *Home of the Brave* (2006), *Body of Lies* (2008), *Liar* (2008) and *Unthinkable* (2010). Via a crucial step toward more accurate depictions of Islamic religion, they are not yet the norms for Hollywood films. Nevertheless, while the reticence to vilify Islam is definitely a small step in the right direction, Muslim characters on the screen still overwhelmingly terrorist (Alalawi 18-20).

Jack Shaheen analyzed movies which were released in the period from 1896 to 2001. His study recorded over 1000 movies portraying Arabs, and later found that 932 movies portrayed them in a stereotypical or negative context. Only 12 movies have a positive portrayal. He also cites movies displaying Arabs as cold, money-hungry Muslims or incompetent villainous terrorists seeking to destroy “Western civilisation” (Considine 11).

The author of “Reel Bad Arab: How Hollywood Vilifies A People,” Jack Shaheen archives stereotypes in American popular culture, spent his professional life analyzing how

Arabs were depicted in American movie and television over the last 100 years. His book revealed in 2006 that Hollywood represents Arabs as “brute killers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits and women abusers” (Considine 11).

Hollywood is the world’s most influential movie industry, with its deceptive and unjust portrayals of Muslims and Arabs, buying the audience to create his thoughts and perceive the whole Arab world as a place of terror. The picture of Arabs and Muslims by the stereotypes is deeply rooted in American cinema as Shaheen in his statement: “from 1986 to today, filmmakers have collectively pointed out that all Arabs as the number one public enemy, barbaric, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatic, money-mad political, other bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews” (Shaheen 172).

In his book *Evil Arabs in American Popular Film*, Tim Jon Semmerling tries to question the Arabs’ portrayal of stereotypes and everything for the viewer to differentiate between Arabs whose face Hollywood disfigured by Hollywood moviemakers. He also argues that the misrepresentation of Arabs on American screen helped to maintain the feeling of superiority and power of Americans that began to rise in the seventies after the oil crisis. The Arabs are just as evil, barbaric, lazy, only love money and exploit and abuse women. The spectator has never seen an average Arab living a normal life through Hollywood lenses like the American (Shaheen 180).

A significant point to make is that the words “Arab” and “Muslims” are not inherently interchangeable with one another. Not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims are Arabs, yet most of people often forget these differences. *The Siege* (1998) opens with Khobar Towers bombing holding American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and showing an American barracks bombing in 1996. It illustrates how terrorism could be used to legitimate racism against Muslims and Arabs (Kellner 18). Hollywood, however, tends to take advantage of its worldwide popularity by distorting Arabs and Muslims' image.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the impact of the 9/11 event as it touched upon the superpower of the globe, that is, the United States of America. The shifts that pursued the assaults subsequently impacted not only America but other parts of the globe as well, such as the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter shows that the post-9/11 agenda of neo-conservative president George W. Bush was marked by dependence on exceptionalism, religion and Manichaeism. Such ideas, applied to the country's desperate situation, helped to look at Bush as a national hero, fostering an unprecedented sense of pride, patriotism and a rally around the flag influence. Since the attacks were seen live on television, it can be argued that media magnified these attacks, and the position of the latter became even more important as the assaults eventually became embedded in a variety of narratives although American and foreign films have depicted the 9/11 attacks alike to a great extent. Hollywood was one of America's most prominent mass entertainment industries and presented the case from a multitude of viewpoints.

General Conclusion

The present research aimed to highlight the impact of film and its ability to pass subliminal messages which are mainly ideological to the human psyche and therefore influence unconsciously their behavior. Being aware of this, the US administration used widely Hollywood movies nationally and internationally to influence audiences and urge them to adopt a particular way of thinking and visualizing events. This according to Louis Althusser's theory that claims that any work of art acts as an ideological state Apparatus to be propagated to the masses.

Propaganda is dangerous and the role that the media can play in society is equally important. Manipulation of opinion by precise mechanisms, based on Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes, is used by Hollywood to achieve specific purposes. Their persuasive techniques of propaganda and advertising are similar and can make men and women dependent on a simplified message and its consequences on the behavior of citizens and consumers.

No wonder then that most people know Hollywood films as a means of filling the populace's thoughts and feelings, nevertheless Hollywood films go beyond this matter. Throughout film history, Hollywood movies have always been a device of political propaganda agitation, as many have opened the public's eyes to bigotry, malfeasance, and weaknesses. During the 20th century, the Hollywood movie industry and entertainers have affected national politics, inspired cultural constructions of U.S. identity and also impacted social change. The industry has formed and has been formed by regional, state, national, and global political pressures, decisions, and negotiations.

At times Hollywood's blatant politicization has also caused serious debate. The House Un-American Committee of Activities inquiry into the communist influence in the film

industry during the 1940s and 1950s brought global attention to questions about the political potential of film industry propaganda and celebrity political activism. Film stars became more involved in grassroots movements and national politics during the 1960s. Amidst the use of stories and Hollywood imagery by Ronald Reagan to promote domestic and international policies, historians have conducted archival research into the history of such imagery and the significance of silver-screen images and American identity constructions through film. Films have played an increasingly influential, if not sometimes controversial, role in American political culture since the beginning of the film industry. Since the early 20th century, links between Hollywood and the political sphere have permeated business in a variety of respects.

In the first place, in the United States, the “information spectacle” was found with the events of September 11, 2001, the opportunity to feed on particularly exceptional information. The United States, on the other hand, sees communication as a means of convincing consumers. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the only new political element which was supposed to make it possible to relaunch aggressive communication is the development of the all-out war against terrorism, both in the United States and in Europe.

George Bush has made several speeches on various media preparing public opinion for a long and difficult war that would be waged to its end and in all places necessary to bring about the eradication of the invisible enemy. Public opinion had to be convinced of the choices and the targets. The European allies have opted for the activation of Article 5 of the NATO charter. This decision was made for Afghanistan. European public opinion was prepared for this action by demonstrations of solidarity relayed by television channels showing unanimity of the slogan: “We are all Americans.” Communication techniques were thus used for propaganda purposes accepted by all, both from the media and the citizens. Man would need propaganda, and modern society would provide the conditions for the manipulation of the masses by propaganda.

Accordingly, communication has always been a matter of state for Washington which made it the central element of all its politics, especially towards other countries of the world. Communication would not only serve as direct support for an identifiable political or economic discourse. It would be a tool of entertainment, leading to the integration of the dominant American cultural and social model. Likewise, communication, especially films and television, is a central element of United States foreign policy. Audiovisual media such as cinema, television, Internet and mobile telephony have wholly or partly served this strategy which has been copied by most states, both democratic and authoritarian. Through image and sound, these different media disseminated messages that mainly acted on the emotional brain.

The cinema was undoubtedly the first means of disseminating an opinion or a message by acting on the emotional brain. The United States has become the masters in the matter and has quickly dominated the global film industry, showing films imprinting American values and transforming those values into the dominant ideology.

The reasons for this domination are due to several factors. Apart from the emotional dimension which attracts an audience seeking entertainment through relaxation, strong emotions, and basic human feelings, other elements come into play. The size of the American market allows it to create large-budget films highlighting a technological capacity through special effects and productions that can meet the expectation of ever more spectacle. Moreover, English is the dominant language in the world for two reasons. First and foremost, it is the language spoken by the world's largest developed market, the United States. The other states whose mother tongue is English are also rich countries. These are Great Britain, Canada, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand. The expectations of consumers are taken into account by some American directors who have significant resources to captivate a large audience.

Of the global film production as a whole, a very large majority of turnover is achieved by a dozen films of American origin. This success is undoubtedly due to the conjunction between the use of primary feelings like love, fear, anger, friendship, and financial means to transform these into a spectacle. The special effects, the catastrophic dimension, the war, the struggle of good against evil, and other themes of this type have allowed American blockbusters to highlight a series of subjects that frighten, reassure, make dream and provoke nightmares in public opinion. For example, earthquakes, fires in large buildings, falling meteorites, tidal waves, or the return of certain prehistoric animals have fueled the fears of children and adults alike.

Through these films, advanced technology and the resources of the United States would make it possible to detonate meteorites, deflect an earthquake, or a lava flow. The heroism of a man or an institutionalized group such as the police, firefighters, or the military shows the courage of Americans in the face of great catastrophes, wars, or terrorism. The individual is put forward and Manichaeism always breeds the victory of good over evil. Through its films, America shows itself to be powerful, strong, courageous, and respectful of human rights.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, which looked like the worst of American disaster films, without the fiction of the triumph of technology and the courageous effectiveness of firefighters, police, and other rescuers against evil, the film production companies, at the request or not of the Bush administration, have decided to delay the release of several disaster films or purely to suppress them. This is the only element that resembles self-censorship and that can be seen as an act of questioning and doubting the policies of America's all-powerfulness in the various scenarios.

This study concludes that American politics asserts itself through various means at the international level. America's political role in the globe during the 20th century has reached an unprecedented level, and its victory in the Cold War has enabled the nation to focus more on

the international stage. The 9/11 epoch undoubtedly poses a divergent set of visual responses to the movies. Inevitably the 9/11 episode provides us with a divergent spectrum of on-screen visual responses. Continuity of the predictable, inane, hero-based narrative can be found there. In this regard, it was rather ironic that the most revolutionary and iconoclastic of filmmakers, Oliver Stone, managed to create the most nostalgic film portrayal of the 9/11 period with the World Trade Centre.

There is plenty of proof in the 9/11 movies questioning the belief that Hollywood merely maintained and strengthened American imperium notions. One hopefully imagines that politically aware directors such as Paul Greengrass and Anton Corbijn are likely to be well conscious of media theory critiques of traditional Hollywood conventions and to stop replicating them in their movies in general. Flawed though they may be, many of these films question the authenticity of United States reactions to the so-called War on Terror. Many of them understand the morality of the grey arena fuelled by this age. They were equipped to question the dilemma necessitated by “working on the dark side,” whereas mirroring more expansively on what this tells about the present state of the American soul. Hollywood assumptions had formerly maintained the development of a genre that at least some constituent national myths challenge, if not all.

Therefore, Hollywood, it can be advanced, is the most American broadcast industry and plays a significant role in spreading American domestic and foreign policy. The U.S and its broadcast media, primarily Hollywood films, have built a bridge between both the civilized, democratic West and the less civilized East. This contradiction allows the United States to justify its geopolitical interests and imperialistic ambitions in the Middle East; thus, the region needs the United States to defend and rescue its territories from global reach terrorism. And therefore, claiming the right to interfere preemptively as in Afghanistan and then Iraq, which

led to a war waged in the Middle East region underneath the cry of “War on Terror,” which turned out to be proved unjustified and unfair immediately.

Last but not least, this study encountered the substance of the American ruling class living inside the Beltway’s supercharged atmosphere; they operate in a secrecy environment that leads to the creation of true believers. This is the “Big Lie” psychology that tends to make people swallow grossly exaggerated tales more than scant lies because the audience would not believe that country leaders would use to that extent deception. The existence of so much mystery and fabricated stories quickly locks main players in a mirror hall: under ordinary circumstances, people who turn their backs on truth are soon set straight by the criticism and mockery of their surroundings, making them conscious that they have lost credibility.

One can conclude that the entire globe was then, and still, is engulfed by explosive reports that reeks of toxic misinformation and dangerous propaganda and to avoid being stuck into the “Big Lies” which Hollywood and the U.S. government are making; one can seek facts beyond their walls and open their eyes to Hollywood’s political and cultural films other faces as well.

LIST OF WORKS CITED

I. Primary Sources

1. Reports and Government Documents

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington DC, 2006. Accessed 12 April 2020.

---. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington DC, 2003. Accessed 15 April 2020.

---. *President Delivers the State of the Union Address*. 29 January 2002. Accessed 13 April 2020.

---. *President Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point*. 1 June 2002. Accessed 13 April 2020.

---. *George W. Bush Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*. September 12, 2001. Accessed on 20 December 2019. Web.

---. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington DC, 2002. Accessed 15 April 2020.

---. *National Security Council, the National Security Strategy of the United States*. September 2002. Accessed 22 Feb 2020. www.whitehouse.gov/

2. Surveys and Polls

Jones, Jeffery M. "One in Four Americans Say Lives Permanently Changed by 9/11," *Gallup.com*. *Gallup*, 8 Sep. 2011. Accessed on 13 March 2020. Available from news.gallup.com/poll/149366/one-four-americans-say-lives-permanently-changed.aspx

Saad, Lydia. "Americans Fear of Terrorism in U.S. is Near Low Point." *Gallup.com*. *Gallup*. 2011. Accessed on 25 April 2020.

3. Films

“*All the President's Men.*” Dir. Alan J. Pakula. Prod. Walter Coblenz. Perf. Robert Redford.

II. Secondary Sources

1. Books

Alsultany, Evelyn. *Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11.*

New York: NYUP, 2012. Pdf.

Anderson, David L. *Hollywood Goes to War.* Newsweek, 2001. Pdf.

Baehr, Theodore. *Hollywood's Reel of Fortune: A Winning Strategy to Redeem the*

Entertainment Industry. Fort Lauderdale: Coral Ridge Ministries, January 1, 1991. Pdf.

Bahn, Paul G. *The Archeology of Hollywood: Traces of the Golden Age.* Rowman &

Littefield, 2014. Pdf.

Balio, Tino. *The American Film Industry.* Revised ed. Madison, WI: Wisconsin UP, 2011.

Pdf.

Barret, Oliver B et al. *Hollywood and The CIA: Cinema, Defense , and Subversion.* NY:

Routledge, 2011. Pdf.

Bayles, Martha. *Through a Screen Darkly Popular Culture.* Public Diplomacy, and America's

Image Abroad, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2014. Pdf.

Beck, Ulrich et al. *Global America? The Cultural consequences of Globalization.* Liver Pool

UP, 2003. Pdf.

Blum, John M. *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War 2.*

Mariner Books; 1st ed., 1977. Pdf.

Coyne, Michael. *Hollywood Goes to Washington: American Politics on Screen.* Reaktion

Books LTd, London, 2008. Pdf.

- Daalder, Ivo H and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in foreign Policy*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Pdf.
- Der Derian, James and Micheal J. Shapiro. *International/Inter-textual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Lexington: Lexington Books. 1998. Pdf.
- Dizard Jr, Wilson P. *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Pdf.
- Domke, David Scott. *God willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the War on Terror and the Echoing Press*, London Press: ML Pluto Press; 1st ed., 2004. Pdf.
- Duek, Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2006. Pdf.
- Eagleton, Terry. *Ideology: An Introduction*. U of Michigan, 1991. Pdf.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge*. Vol (1) Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin 1978. Pdf.
- Fraser, Matthew. *American Pop Culture as Soft Power Movies and Broadcasting*. Soft Power superpower: Cultural and National assets of Japan and the United States. Ed Yasushi Watanabe and David L. McConnell. Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe, 2008. Pdf.
- Gibson, James J. *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Routledge; 1st ed., 2014. Pdf.
- Gurr, Ted R. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970. Pdf.
- Habermas, Jurgen. *The Divided West*. Ed and Trans. Cianau Cronin, Combridge: Polity P; 1st ed., 2006. Pdf.
- Hammoudi, Abdelouahab. *The Lantern of Hope: is there a Social Function of the Cinema?* Independently published , 2018. Pdf.
- Hayden, Craig. *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Context*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books; 1st ed., 2011. Pdf.

- Hayward, Susan. *Ideology, Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts*. New York: Routledge, 2000. Pdf.
- Herman, Edward S. *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*. Boston: South End Press, 1999. Pdf.
- Jenkins, Tricia. *The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Television*. Austin, TX: Texas UP, 2013. Pdf.
- Keane, Stephen. *Disaster Movies*. London: Wallflower Press, 2006. Pdf.
- Kinzer, Stephen. *Overthrow: American's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*. Times Books, 1st ed., 2006. Pdf.
- Koppes, Clayton R. and Gregory Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: how Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War 2 Movies*. Berkley: California UP, 1990. Pdf.
- Kracauer, Seigfried. *The Mass Ornament: Weimer Essays*. Translated Harvard UP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1963. Pdf.
- Layne, Christopher. *The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power: Soft Power and Foreign Policy Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, New York and London: Routledge, 2010. Pdf.
- Leggatt, Matthew. *Melancholic and Hungry Games: Post-9/11 Cinema and the Culture of Apocalypse*. Popping Culture. ed. Murry Pomerance and John Sakeris, 7th ed. Boston: Pearson, 2012. Pdf.
- McCorkle, Suzanne. *War and Film in America: Historical and critical Essays*. McForland Co, 2003. Pdf.
- Molloy, Claire and Yannis Tzioumakis. *The Routledge Companion to Cinema and Politics*. London: Routledge, 1st ed. Taylor and Francis Group, 2016. Pdf.
- Munsterberg, Hugo. *The Photoplay: A Psychology Study 1916*. Appleton, New York:NY Nell V. 1988 Last in a Book. Yale UP, New Haven, CT, 1916. Pdf.

- Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. PublicAffairs, 2005. Pdf.
- Pan, Zhongdang and G.M. Kosicki. *Framing as a Strategic action in Public Deliberation*, in S.D. Reese, Oscar .H.J. Gandy and Jr., August .E Grant (eds) *Framing Public Life*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbawm, 2001. Pdf.
- Pollard, Tom. *Hollywood 9/11. Superheroes, Supervillains, and Super Disasters*. Routledge; 1st ed., 2001. Pdf.
- Puar, Jasbir K. *Terrorist Assemblages*. Durham: Duke UP, 2007. Pdf.
- Ranstorp, Magnus. *Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research, Challenges and Politics*. In *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and future Direction*, ed. Magnus Ranstorp. New York: Routledge, 2009. Pdf.
- Rich, Frank. *The Greatest Story Ever Told: The Decline and Fall of Truth in Bush's America*. Harmond Worth: Penguin. 2007. Pdf.
- Rizzo, John. *Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014. Pdf.
- Robb, David L. *Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors Movies*, New York: Prometheus Books. 2004. Pdf.
- Rogers, Paul. *Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgence 2004/2005*. IB Touris & Co Ltd, 2006. Pdf.
- Scott, Ian. *American Politics in Hollywood Film*. Edinburgh UP, 2000. Pdf.
- Shaheen, G. Jack. *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies A People*. Oliver Branch Pr, 3rd ed, 2014. Pdf.
- . *Guilty: Hollywood's Verdict on Arabs after 9/11*. Interlink Publishing: Massachusetts, 2008. Google Books. Pdf.
- Sharp, Joanne P. *Condensing the Cold War: Reader's Digest and American Identity*. Minnisota UP, 2000. Pdf.

Shpherd, Laura. J. *Gender, Violence and Popular Culture: Telling Stories*. London:

Routledge; 1st ed., 2013. Pdf.

Smith, Geoffrey. *The Oxford History of World Cinema*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 17th ed., 1997.

Pdf.

Steger, Manfred B. *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford UP, 4th ed., 2003. Pdf.

Suid, Lawrence H. *Guts and Glory: the making of the American Military Image*. Lexington:

Kentucky UP, 2002. Pdf.

Totman, Sally-Ann. *How Hollywood Projects Foreign Policy*. New York: NY, 2009. Pdf.

Tulis, Jeffery K. *Revising the Rhetorical Presidency*. In *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*.

Ed: Martin Medhurts, College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1996. Pdf.

Weber, Cynthia. *Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film*. London: Routledge,

1st ed., 2006. Pdf.

West, Cornel. *Democracy Matters: Winning the Flight against Imperialism*. New York:

Penguin Press, 2005. Pdf.

Zizek, Slavoj. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. Verso; 1st ed., 2001. Pdf.

2. Articles

Adey, Peter. "The Geopolitics of Man of Steel," *E-International Relations*, 2013. www.e-ir.info/2013/06/27//the-geopolitics-of-man-of-steel/ Pdf

Alalawi, Nora. "How Hollywood Movies Portray Muslims and Arabs after 9/11?" *Content Analysis of the Kingdom and Rendition Movies, CS Canada*, Vol 11. 2015, pp 58-62. Pdf.

Ali Ibbi, Andrew. "Hollywood, the American Image and the Global Film Industry."

University Library System: University of Pittsburgh, 2014. Pdf

- Aydemir, Emrah. "Use of Hollywood as a Soft Power Tool in Foreign Policy Strategy of the United States of America." *International Journal of Humanities and social Science Invention ISSN*, Vol 6(11). 2017, pp 79-83. Pdf.
- Bahgat, Karim and Richard M, Medina. "An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in Terrorism Research." *Perspectives On Terrorism*. Vol, 7(1), 2013. Pdf
- Bi, Yantao. "For Hollywood, The Medium is a Message." *China Daily*, February 28, 2012. Pdf
- Bleiker, Roland. "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. Vol 30(3). 2001, pp 509-533. Pdf.
- Bojang, M.B.S. "The Hidden Agenda Behind the Invasion of Iraq: the Unjust War Over Iraq in 2003." *Central European Journal of Politics*, Vol 2(2). 2016, pp1-14. Pdf.
- Burns, Tom. "The Propaganda of Violence: Early Hollywood War Films." *Estação Literária*. Londrina, vagão, Vol 6, 2010. Pdf.
- Cakmak, Cenap. "American Foreign Policy and September 11." *Sam.gov.tr.N.P*, 2012. Pdf
- Carruthers, Susan. "Bringing it all Back Home: Hollywood Returns to War." *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 14(1):167-82, 2003. Pdf
- Cetin, Cem H. "War on Terrorism: What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?" Vol 10(2). 2013, pp 532-543. Pdf.
- Chang, Jastin, and Peter, Debruge. "Does Man of Steel Exploit Disasters like 9/11?" *Variety.Com*, June 17, 2013. 2:32 pm . variety.com/2013/news/does-man-of-steel-exploit-disasters-like-911-1200497860/ .
- Chown, Jeffery. "Documentary and the Iraq War: A New Genre for New Realities." *Northern Illinois University*, 2008. Pdf

- Considine, Craig. "The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes and Flying While Brown." *Department of Sociology, Rice University*. 2017. Pdf.
- Coyle, Jake. "September 11: Hollywood and 9/11," *nz.herald.com*, 2011, www.nzherald.co.nz/news/ Pdf.
- Crockett, David A. "George W. Bush and the Unrhetorical Rhetorical Presidency." *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Vol 6(3), 2003. Pdf.
- Dargis, Manohla. "Looking Apse in the Eye." *The New York Times*. 2011. Accessed on 20 October 2019. Web.
- Davies, Matt. "Teaching IR with Popular Culture," *E-International Relations*, 2013. Available from www.e-ir.info/2013/06/26/teaching-ir-with-popular-culture/ Pdf.
- Derzyan, Tatev. "Cinematography as a Tool for Political Influence." *Enlight*. Mar 14, 2016, Web. Available from enlightngo.org/language/en/post/8152
- Dodds, Klaus. "Popular Geopolitics and the War on Terror," May, 10, 2015. www.e-ir.info/2015/05/10/popular-geopolitics-and-war-on-terror/ Pdf.
- "I'm Still not Crossing that: Borders, Dispossession and Sovereignty in Frozen River," *Geopolitics*, Vol, 18(3). 2008, pp 560-583. Pdf.
- "The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research," *Revisited, Journal of Communication*, Vol 57(1), 2007. Pdf.
- Evera, Stepehn V. "Assesing U.S Strategy in the War on Terror." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 607(1). 2006, pp 10-26. Pdf.
- Farber, Stephen. "9/11 is Sneaking onto a Screen Near You." *The New York Times*. March 13, 2005. Pdf.

- Foran, John. "Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Mussadiq, and the Instalation of the Shah." In Christian G. Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: the Political Cultural of U.S. Imperialism*. Amherst, MA: Massachusetts UP, 2000.
- Gershkoff, A and S. Kushner. "Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11 Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric." *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol 3(3), 2005. Pdf
- Grondin, David. "Publicizing the US National Security State Through Entertainment," *E-International Relations*, Aug 6, 2014. Available from www.e-ir.info/2014/08/06/publicizing-the-us-national-security-state-through-entertainment. Pdf.
- Grossman, Lev. "Feeding on Fantasy." *TIME*, December 2, 2002. Pdf.
- Hoberman, Jim. "The Avengers: why Hollywood is no Longer Afraid to tackle 9/11." *The Guardian*, May 11, 2012. Pdf.
- Horn, John. "Hollywood's War Effort." *Los Angeles Times*. April 30, 2008. 7 AM. Pdf.
- Hyde, Micheal J. "The Rhetor as Hero and the Pursuit of Truth: The Case of 9/11." *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Vol 8(1). 2005, pp1-30. Pdf.
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. "The Golden Age of Operations: The CIA and American Democracy." *New Haven, CT: Yale UP*. 1989, pp 81-99. Pdf.
- Kellner, Douglas. "9/11 Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A critique of Jihadist and Bush Media Politics." Vol 1(1), 2006. Available from doi.org/10.1080/17405900410001674515 Pdf.
- Social apocalypse in Contemporary Hollywood Film." *MATRIZES*, Vol 10(1). 2016, pp 13-28. Pdf.
- "Cinema Wars Hollywood film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney Era." *West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell*, 2010. Pdf

- “Film, Politics, and Ideology: Reflections on Hollywood Film in the Age of Reagan.”
Velvet Lightrap. University of Texas at Austin, Texas UP, 1991. Pdf
- Kittner, C.C.B. “The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol, 19(3). 2007, pp307-329. Pdf.
- Koole, S.L. “The Psychology of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative Review.” *Researchgate, Cognition and Emotion*. Vol 23(1). 2009, pp 4-41. Pdf.
- Kraidy, Marwan M, “Globalization of Culture Through the Media.” *University of Pennsylvania*, 2002. Pdf
- Kreiger, Tim. “Calculating the Costs of 9/11.” *Researchgate*. January 1, 2013. Available from www.researchgate.net/publication/26303273/ Pdf.
- Kumar, Deepa and Arun Kundani. “Imagining National Security: the CIA, Hollywood, and the War on Terror.” *Democratic Communiqué*, Vol 26(2). 2014, pp 72-83. Pdf
- LaSalle, Mick. “9/11: Five Years Later- Spike Lee’s 25th Hours.” *San Fransosco Chronicle*, 2006. Pdf.
- Livingston, White. “Reconsidering Cultural imperialism Theory.” *Transnational Broadcasting Studies Archieves*. May 1, 2001. Pdf.
- Maggio, J. “The presidential Rhetoric of Terror: the (Re) Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11.” *University of Florida, Politics and Policy*, Vol 35(4). 2007, pp 810–835. Pdf.
- Maher, Kevin. “Disaster Movies: Back with a Bang.” *Theguardian.com*. June 29, 2002. Accessed on 17 December 2019. Web.
- Maisuwong, Wanwarang. “Promotion of American Culture through Hollywood Engineering Research and Technology.” *Thammasat University*, Vol 1(4), 2012. pdf
- Malanowski, Jamie. “Black Hawk Down: War without any Answers.” *The New York Times*, 2001. Pdf.

Margasak, Larry. "Hollywood Went to War in 1941 –and it Wasn't Easy." *National Museum of American History*, 2016. Web. Accessed 10 January 2020.

McQuillan, L and R, Benedetto. "Bush Hails Win, Looks Ahead." *USA Today*, 2003. Pdf.

Monahan, Brian A. "The Shock of the News: Media coverage and the Making of 9/11." *The New York and London: New York UP*. 2010. Pdf.

O'Doherty, Cahir. "Pop Culture, huh, What is it Good For? A Lot of Things, Actually," 2013. Available from www.e-ir.info/2013/10/25/pop-culture-huh-what-is-it-good-for-a-lot-of-things-actually/ Pdf.

Owens, Mackubin T. "The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire." *Elsevier Ltd*. Winter 2009, pp 23-40. Pdf.

Pape, Robert A. "Introduction: What is New about Research on Terrorism," *Security Studies*, Vol 18. 2009, pp 643–650. Pdf.

Pape, Robert A. "Introduction: What is New about Research on Terrorism," *Security Studies*, Vol(18). 2009, pp 643–650. Pdf.

Queenan, Joe. "Man of Steel: does Hollywood Need Saving from Superheroes?" *The Guardian*. Jun 12, 2013. Pdf.

Rathee, Majneet. "The Media and Globalization." *Globalization and Media*. 2014, pp 3-10. Pdf.

Raza, Hassan. "Depiction of Military in American and French Cinema." *Foran Christian College*, 2018. Pdf.

Reese, S.D. "Framing Public Life: a Bridging Model for Media Research," in S.D. Reese, O.H.J. Gandy and A.E Grant (eds) *Framing public Life*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001. Pdf

- Richardson, Douglas. "Building a Research Agenda on the Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism: An On-Going Process," *Transactions in GIS*. Vol 6(3). 2002, pp 225-229. Pdf.
- Richardson, Rubin. "Islamophobia or Anti-Muslim Racism- or What?" *Inservice Training and Educational Development*, 2009. Pdf.
- Rock, John C. "The Geographic Nature of Terrorism," *The Pennsylvania Geographer*, Vol (1), 2006. Available from [www.ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/papers/Rock\(Geo\)](http://www.ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/papers/Rock(Geo)) Pdf.
- Rock, John C. "The Geographic Nature of Terrorism," *The Pennsylvania Geographer*, Vol. 7(1), 2006. [www.ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/papers/Rock\(Geo\)](http://www.ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/papers/Rock(Geo)) Pdf.
- Rubin, Barnett R. "Saving Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs*. 2007. Pdf.
- Rugh, William A. "The Case Soft Power." *Toward a New Public Diplomacy*, ed., Philip Seib, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009, pp 3-21. Pdf.
- Sidaway, James D. "Geopolitics, Geography, and Terrorism in the Middle East," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol 12(3). 1993, pp 16-25. Pdf.
- Snauwaert, Dale. T. "The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory." *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol 6(1). 2004, pp 121-135. www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/61snau Pdf.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. "Media Covers the World." *New Bury Park: Sage*. 1990, pp 296-307. Pdf.
- Stockwell, Stephen. "The Manufacture of World Order: the Security Service and the Movie Industry," *M/C Journal: a Journal of Media and Culture*. Vol 7(1). 2005, journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/10-stokwell.php. Pdf.
- Straiger, Janet. "Dividing Labor for Production Control: Thomas Ince and the Rise of the Studio System." *Cinema Journal*, Vol 18(2), 1979. Pdf

- Sunstein, Cass R. "Terrorism and Probability Neglect." *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*. 2003. Pdf.
- Tan, Ed S. "A Psychology of the Film." *Palgrave Communications*, 2018. Pdf.
- Valentine, Jean M. "Hollywood, the Pentagon and Washington: The movies and National Security from World War 2 to the Present Day." *London: Anthem Press*, Vol 69(1). 2003. Pdf.
- Visch, Valentijn et al. "The Emotional and Cognitive Effect of Immersion in Film Viewing." *Cognition and Emotion*, Vol 24(8), 2010. Pdf.
- Visch, Valentijn et al. "The Emotional and Cognitive Effect of Immersion in Film Viewing." *Cognition and Emotion*, Vol 24(8), 2010. Pdf
- Wallis, John and James Aston. "Doomsday America: the Pessimistic Turn of post-9/11. Apocalyptic Cinema." *Journal of Religion and Popular Culture*, Vol 23(1). 2011 pp53-64. Pdf.
- Weber, Cynthia. "International Relations Theory," *London: Routledge*. 2010. Pdf.
- Westwell, Guy. "Zero Dark Thirty." *Sight and Sound*. 2013, pp 86-87 . Pdf.
- White, Dave. "Hollywood struggles with 9/11." *today.com*. 2011. Pdf.
- Willmetts, Simon. "Quit Americans: The CIA and Early Cold War Hollywood Cinema." *Cambridge UP*, Vol 47(1). 2012, pp127-147. Pdf.
- Winseck, Dwayne. "Information Operations Blowback: Communication Propaganda and Surveillance in the Global War on Terrorism." *International Communication Gazette*, Vol 70(6). 2008, pp 419-441. Pdf.
- Yodanis, Carlos L. "The Imperial Turn: Analyzing Post-9/11 American Foreign Policy Through the Prism of 1898." *RHA*, Vol 4(4):, 2006, pp 27-44. Available from www.researchgate.net/publication/228234069 Pdf.

Yodan, Carlos L. "The Imperial Turn: Analyzing Post-9/11 American Foreign Policy Through the Prism of 1898." *RHA*, Vol 4(4). 2006. pp 27-44.

www.researchgate.net/publication/228234069 Pdf.

Zakerfsky, David. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol 34(3), 2004. Pdf.

Zalewski, Marisya. "Theorising Emotions: the Effective Borders of Homeland," *Critical Studios on Security*, Vol 1(1). 2013, pp 133-135. Pdf.

3. Websites

About. "Islamophobia.org. Council on American-Islamic Relations." 2014. Accessed on 15 January 2020. Web

"American Cinema in the 1910s." the Harry and Roy Aitken papers. Wisconsin Center for Film and Theater Research. Web. Available from
wcftr.commarts.wisc.edu/exhibits/harry-roy-aitken-papers/american-cinema-1910s

Bridge Initiative Team. "Two Decades of Americans." Views on Islam and Muslims: the Bridge Initiative. Accessed on 11 December 2019. Web.

Cheney, Dick. "Meet the Press," Transcript for Sep 11. 2003, Accessed 20 April 2020.
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244

"Defining Islamophobia." Crg. Berkley.edu. University of California, Berkley's Center for Race and Gender, n.d. Accessed on 15 February 2020. Web

History Channel. "Remembering 9/11." Apr. 18. 2013, www.history.com/9-11-anniversary. Accessed 23 March 2020. Web.

www.britannica.com/topic/Americanization. Accessed on 10 February 2020. Web.

4. Anthologies and Chapters in Books

Social Impact of Cinema. Ch 7, No Author, Pdf.

5. Dissertations

Quarantello, Kim. "The Bush Doctrine and Presidential Rhetoric: Change and Continuity in US Foreign Policy." MA thesis. Wellesley College, 2013. Pdf.

Zakova, Olga. "Strange Bedfellows: cooperation between Hollywood and the Pentagon." MA thesis. Lehigh University, 2011. Pdf.

6. Reviews

Crawford, N. "Principia Leviathan : The Moral Duties of American Hegemony." *Naval College Review*, LV2- Vol 3(4), 2004. Pdf.

Dessi, Roberta. "Collective Memory, Cultural Transmission, and Investments." *American Economic Review*, Vol, 98(1), 2008. Pdf.