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UK's Defence and Security after Brexit

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Lili Kaouther

Abstract

Brexit, is the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, which it has been inextricably for four decades. Eurosceptists motivated by strong sense of nationalism and sovereignty, have long expressed reservations about UK's participation in the EU and the impact of the latter on their way of life, citing security, defence, terrorism, immigration and nuclear power technologies. The UK has crucial role in EU, through its contribution to the EU budget. It gives significant financial support to EU security efforts, Defence and Security issue will be a major element of any EU-UK framework agreement. The Exit was not easy for both policies in which they have to prospect for the future security cooperation between EU and UK.

Résumé

Le Brexit, c'est le retrait du Royaume-Uni de l'Union européenne, ce qu'il est inextricablement depuis quatre décennies. Les eurosceptiques motivés par un fort sentiment de nationalisme et de souveraineté ont longtemps exprimé des réserves quant à la participation du Royaume-Uni à l'UE et à l'impact de cette dernière sur leur mode de vie, citant la sécurité, la défense, le terrorisme, l'immigration et les technologies de l'énergie nucléaire. Le Royaume-Uni joue un rôle crucial dans l'UE, grâce à sa contribution au budget de l'UE. Il apporte un soutien financier important aux efforts de sécurité de l'UE. La question de la défense et de la sécurité sera un élément majeur de tout accord-cadre UE-Royaume-Uni. La sortie n'a pas été facile pour les deux politiques dans lesquels ils doivent prospecter la future coopération en matière de sécurité

ملخص

بريكسيت ، هو انسحاب المملكة المتحدة من الاتحاد الأوروبي ، وهو ما كان عليه منذ أربعة عقود. لطالما أعرب المتشككون في الاتحاد الأوروبي بدافع من الشعور القومي والسيادة ، عن تحفظاتهم بشأن مشاركة المملكة المتحدة فيه وتأثير هذا الأخير على أسلوب حياتهم ، مستشهدين بالأمن والدفاع والإرهاب والهجرة وتقنيات الطاقة النووية. تلعب المملكة المتحدة دورًا حاسمًا في الاتحاد الأوروبي ، من خلال مساهمتها في ميزانيته. يقدم دعمًا ماليًا كبيرًا للجهود الأمنية ، وستكون قضية الدفاع والأمن عنصرًا رئيسيًا في أي اتفاقية إطارية بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والمملكة المتحدة. لم يكن الخروج سهلاً لكلتا السياستين حيث يتعين عليهما التنقيب عن التعاون الأمني المستقبلي بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والمملكة المتحدة.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	ii
Dedication	iii
Abstract	v
Résumé	vii
ملخص	viii
Table of Contents	viii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	x
General Introduction	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Chapter One: The Evolution of the UK's Security and Defence Policies and Capabilities.....	7
Introduction	7
1.1. The Evolution of the UK's Strategic Priorities	8
1.2. The UK's Global Role	12
1.3. The UK's International Strategy	13
1.4. The UK's National Strategy	16
1.5. The Role of the Armed Forces	18
Conclusion	20
Chapter Two: The UK-EU Security and Defence Cooperation	22
Introduction	22
2.1. The UK-EU Defence Cooperation	24
2.2. The UK-EU Security Cooperation	29
2.3. The UK-EU Judicial Cooperation	33
2.4. The UK-EU Security and Defence Investment	34
2.5. The UK-EU Political Commitment to Common Security and Defence	37
2.6. The UK Security and Defence outside the EU	39
Conclusion	41

Chapter Three: The UK's Security and Defence post-Brexit	43
Introduction	43
3.1. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Defence	44
3.2. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Global Role	49
3.2. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Security	54
Conclusion	57
General Conclusion	59
List of Works Cited	62

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

MOD	Ministry of Defence
DfT	Department for Transport
CSDP	The Common Security and Defense Policy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nation
EU	European Union
UK	United Kingdom
COE	The Council of Europe
NCIRC	NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
UNSC	Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
ESC	European Security Council

General Introduction

“We have voted to leave the EU, but not Europe,” wrote Theresa May in the *Figaro* in 2017 to express her government commitments the UK’s relationships with Europe. Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty provides that “any member state may decide, in accordance with its constitutional rules, to withdraw from the Union.” Under this article, a referendum on the question of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union – Brexit (a portmanteau word of “British” and “Exit”) – took place on June 23, 2016. This consultation of the people honored the promise of the former head of government David Cameron who had promised to hold a referendum, during his so-called “Bloomberg” speech on January 23, 2013 if he were re-elected in 2015, with the aim of bringing together the conservative party, torn between Europhiles and Eurosceptics. After 43 years of European integration, the British voted 51.9 % in favor of its exit. The United Kingdom which had two years from March 29, 2017 to withdraw from the Union, however, postponed its withdrawal until January 31, 2020.

The triggering of the United Kingdom's withdrawal procedure is not a surprise in view of the tumultuous history that this country shares with the European organization. It is clear that over the years, relations between the United Kingdom and the European institution have always been turbulent. First of all, the European Economic Community (EEC) had previously blocked the Kingdom's access to this European project. Absent from the process of European unification during the 1950s, the United Kingdom applied for membership of the EEC to gain access to the common market twice, but its membership was refused, mainly at the instigation of France represented by General de Gaulle who believed the UK would want to “impose its own conditions” on what were then the bloc’s six countries. The “insular” character of the island nation across the Channel had created a politico-economic “structure” which differed “profoundly” from “that of continental Europeans”, the General postulated. The following French President Georges Pompidou marked a break in the traditional relationship between

the United Kingdom and the European institution allowing the UK to join the EEC in 1973. This was confirmed by the 1975 referendum which resulted in 67.2% of the British saying “yes” to Britain’s membership in the EEC.

Since its integration into the EEC, the vision of the UK with regard to the European project has been characterized by mistrust. This circumspection is illustrated by the famous “I want my money back” of Margaret Thatcher. Starting from 1994, the British skepticism of the European project reached its peak. From then on, the United Kingdom granted itself a special status within the Union by means of the “opt out” withdrawal option allowing the its refusal to apply certain policies of the European Union.

The distrust of the United Kingdom towards the European Union has been affirmed within British society for the next two decades. This Eurosceptic tendency was expressed by the foundation in 1993 of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which calls for a UK departure from European Union. The popular referendum on the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union took place in this context of British rejection of European integration and assertion of sovereignty.

Indeed, the Brexit campaign has mainly focused on the UK’s resumption of the control of its sovereignty, its borders, and its economy. According to H. J. Howorth and V. Schmidt, these considerations justified the victory of “leave” campaign over the “remain” one. While no reference to security and defense issues was made during the campaign, these are nevertheless important questions for both the UK and the European Union.

In the domain of security and defence, several questions arise. First, it seems unavoidable to ask how the United Kingdom can redefine its new place on the international scene both with regard to the European Union and to other third-party organizations such as the Atlantic Treaty Organization North (NATO). Moreover, within the Kingdom itself, given the disparity of the results of the referendum by regions and the pressure exerted by Northern

Ireland on the other regions, the question of maintaining the cohesion of the entities forming the Kingdom (Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and the Kingdom's ability to ensure domestic security becomes crucial. Security and defence problems for Great Britain in other regions also exist like in Cyprus or Gibraltar.

The consequences of the British departure from the Union are also to be understood through the prism of its relationship with the European Union and the other global power, the United States. This dissertation will thus try to understand the consequences of Brexit in the fields of security and defense on the UK and to a lesser degree on the European Union.

The importance of the study stems from the changing geopolitics of the region and the challenges facing the UK and Europe especially in regard to terrorism in all its forms and the threat Russia represents today. In fact, with regard to the areas of security and defence, the crises which seemed remote have recently manifested themselves inside Europe: the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Russian pressure exerted on the Baltic countries, the migration crisis, terrorism and cyber security issues.

Moreover, this situation is unprecedented as no member of the EU has previously triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, it seems interesting to analyze the various levers of action available to the UK to affirm its cooperation with the European Union as it leaves the Union but not Europe as suggested by Theresa May.

The study postulates that the UK will adjust its measures and laws to fill any gap left by its withdrawal from the EU and that both the UK and the EU will seek to maintain a high level of cooperation in terms of security and defence. As far as security is concerned, the UK and the EU will compensate their cooperation within the framework of agreements of the European Union-third state type. With regard to defence, British collaboration with the European Union will continue both in the field of the defence industry and in that of operational cooperation. The UK will stick to its alliances within NATO and with its other

allies, especially the United States. Bilateral treaties can also be another option. While hypothesizing this, the study tries to answer the following main questions: what is the impact of Brexit on the UK's security and defence? What are the measures and the policies changes the British government and the European Union will undertake to adjust to the new situation? What will the new UK-EU relationship look like in the post-Brexit era?

The research relies on the qualitative method by applying a descriptive analysis of the security and defence policies, initiatives, and alliances. The study uses also the historical approach to review and trace the main developments of security and defence policies and the the cooperation between the UK and the EU since its access to the European Community. The approach is also comparative in that it endeavors to identify factors of change and or of continuity in the UK policies and initiatives in its relations to those of the European Union and other allies and partners.

Since the appearance of the unexpected results of the Brexit referendum in 2016, researchers and observers started to ask questions about the implications of such a development on the both UK and the EU in all fields including the field of security and defence. Many books and researches were published. In *Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU*, Simon Dukes discusses the potential future Brexit scenarios. The author examines the security and defence consequences of Brexit for the UK and the European Union, considering that both sets of actors share mutual interests that Brexit will affect in the near future. He affirms that if the UK aspires to keep its "Global Britain" status, it should avoid a strong disconnections with the EU's security and defense policy, and he postulates that the "UK will remain actively involved in European security."

In the same fashion, a report published by the RAND research organization under the title *Defence and Security After Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK's Decision to Leave the EU*, Black et al. overview the UK capabilities and the possible

implication of Brexit on these including defence spending, research and industry, multinational defence formations, EU CSDP and NATO, Scotland and the UK nuclear deterrent, migration, border security and overseas territories, counterterrorism, organised crime, cyber and resilience. The researchers end the report giving directions and recommendations for policymakers suggesting integrating defence and security into the UK's exit talks with EU.

Another report published by Clingendael Institute entitled *European Defence: how to Engage the UK After Brexit?* Bakker et al. review the domains of security and defence that will be affected by Brexit, namely the UK's participation in missions and operations, participation in the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the UK's participation in the EU defence research programmes. The Report, on the other hand, suggested the UK and the EU would compensate this disengagement through the role of Britain in NATO, EU-NATO cooperation, and bilateral and regional clusters.

From a rather European point of view, in *Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe: Risks and Opportunities*, by Baciu and Doyle highlight the challenges Brexit represents to both the EU and the UK in terms of security, peace, defence, and foreign policy. The researches analyse the mechanism of security cooperation in relations to innovative security technologies, defence procurement, EU-NATO relations, new capabilities frameworks (such as PESCO, EDF and EII), the role of French-German military cooperation, and the implications of Brexit for European deterrence or the Northern Ireland peace process. The research uses the findings to a better understand, manage, and anticipate security challenges in post-Brexit Europe.

The study relies also on a plethora of documents and reports issued by the different governmental bodies and agencies. On top of these documents comes the *Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015* published by the British government during the second Cameron

ministry to outline the UK's defence strategy up to 2025 and identify key threats to the UK and the strategy to address them. Another important governmental document is *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy*. Presented by the Boris Johnson cabinet to the parliament, the document reviews the foreign, defence, security and international development policies of the United Kingdom. Described by Boris Johnson as "the largest review of its kind since the Cold War," the review which was published in March 2021 identified Russia as an "acute threat" and China as a "systematic challenge."

The dissertation is written in three chapters. The first chapter, entitled "The Evolution of the UK's Security and Defense Policies and Capabilities," reviews the UK's evolution of strategic vision and priorities nationally and internationally. The chapter also tackles security and defence capabilities and the role of the armed forces. The second chapter, entitled "The UK-EU Security and Defence Cooperation," reviews the UK's security and defence after it joined the European community. The chapter scrutinizes the most important EU initiatives and arrangement in relation the participation, or not, of the United Kingdom. The last chapter, entitled "The UK's Security and Defence post-Brexit" deals with the implications of Brexit on the security and defence of the UK. The Chapter also speculates about the potential future scenarios in regard to the UK-EU relationships.

Chapter One

The Evolution of the UK's Security and Defense Policies and Capabilities

Introduction

British security policy is at a turning point. Britain's relative power, security role and tradition compel it to hold a dominant position. At the same time, the limits of its power reinforce the need for an effective organization of the security effort with its partners, as well as the relevant use of all State instruments with a view to a policy of supreme security, of which security is only a part. As a result, after fifty years of EU membership, a new strategic concept is emerging in the United Kingdom, which will have to rethink the relationship between the stability sought with the means and the objectives of British security and defense policy.

Such a change in vision will not be easy. Over the past fifty years, the UK's security effort has focused, for example, on a Europe under an American domination. With the collapse of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, the UK made an unprecedented commitment in its history to the defence of Europe in peacetime; then, following the fiasco of the Franco-British intervention in Suez in 1956, it delegated the care of major strategies to the United States. Today, these twin pillars of Britain's national strategy is being scrutinized. This is partly due to the challenges posed by a rapidly changing world, where nature and centers of power change rapidly. However, with the power of the UK, which is the fourth largest economy in the world, its armed forces, which can be considered as the most efficient in the world, London realizes that the country must play a much stronger role in terms of security and defense if it is to ensure the safety of its citizens and its institutions in a complex and dangerous world. Moreover, the feeling that the country must, to some extent, rethink its security policy is reinforced by concerns about the nature and

direction of the United States security policy, as well as the need to introduce a certain degree of strategic sobriety in the security and defense of the EU, which too often seems disconnected from the world around it.

1.1. The Evolution of the UK's Strategic Priorities

The UK of the 21st century is no longer that of the 19th century. It would be impossible for a British Foreign Secretary to assert like Lord Palmerston in the 1840s that Britain has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests. Indeed, the nation has permanent friends today and the United States is on top of them, but it has no such enemies. As with all European states, the mixture of liberal democratic values and state interests leads to a complex set of goals and objectives which, in turn, give rise to a security policy. Accordingly, it can be said that the UK's motives for action are threefold: normative, self-interest, and compliance with legal obligations.

Thus, the UK shares and experiences some of the same problems as Europe. British security policy focuses first on using significant means to extend human security, in order to improve its national security. But unlike the other European countries, with exception of France, Britain is both a global and a European power. The United Kingdom stands out of most other European states because of the predominant role it must play to assume its responsibilities. Because of that and because the UK takes its security and defense very seriously, it retains its sovereign right to apply its efforts in the manner and by the means it deems most likely to be effective – the UN, the EU, NATO, the G8, the Commonwealth, Coalitions of the Willing, or simply national efforts. Accordingly, the UK sees that an international system based on effective multilateral institutions and shared values has long been the cornerstone of British foreign policy, and that in an age of interdependence, it is more necessary than ever for the UK to reform its institutions in order to guarantee their effectiveness and respect (*Active Diplomacy* 6).

It is necessary to recall certain basic facts about the UK to make its security and defence efforts more understood. According to the report of Office of National Statistics published in 2021, the UK, in 2020, had a population of 67 million inhabitants. According to the same Office, the gross national product (GNP) of the UK was 2.831 trillion USD in 2019 making it the fifth economic world power. In the same year, the United Kingdom spent approximately 38 billion British pounds on defence with an increase of almost 2 billion pounds when compared with the previous year. Within the European, only France's defence budget can parallel that of the UK. The two countries' budgets added together used to represent around 45% of the total defence effort of the EU (IISS 43).

The security policy is at the service of military strategy which in requires setting strategic priorities at the highest political level. In turn, the defence policy supports security policy, of which it is one component among others, albeit of vital importance. According to the Foreign Office, the British security policy has long been organized around compliance with nine strategic priorities: protecting the world from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; reduce the harm caused in the UK by international crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering; conflict prevention and resolution through a strong international system; building an efficient and globally competitive EU in a secure environment; supporting the UK economy and businesses through an open and growing global economy, science, innovation and secure energy resources; encourage sustainable development and poverty reduction through human rights, democracy, good governance and environmental protection; managing migration and combating illegal immigration; effective support for British citizens abroad, in ordinary times and in times of crisis; ensuring the security and good governance of UK overseas territories (*Active Diplomacy* 28).

Accordingly, the development of British security policy involves a range of actors and officials under the direction of the Prime Minister and the cabinet; it increasingly includes the work of ministries of foreign affairs and others within the framework of the new global approach. This is due to the complex political context of security policy and the relationship between the UK's need to project its influence by both cooperative and coercive means and to protect society by making it more resilient to the threat of disasters. The three ministries that have primary responsibility are, of course, the Foreign Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) which replaced the Department for International Development (DFID) in 2020. At the same time, the ever increasing role of homeland security in security policy is reflected in the prominent role of home ministries in shaping UK security policy. The need to protect critical infrastructure and ensure consistent consequence management is reinforced by the increased role of civilians in the success of missions in regions such as Afghanistan or Iraq. As a result, the Home Office, Department of Trade and Industry, and their Scottish equivalents, are now important security actors in the UK context.

The hierarchy of British security and defence policy is much more European than American in its training. This is mainly because the Pentagon has greater influence than the State Department on the formation of US security policy. In no country in Europe, including Britain, does the Ministry of Defense have more influence over security policy than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This may partly explain why, in the eyes of many Europeans, the Americans tend to militarize security too much and why, for many Americans, the Europeans make it too civilian. The UK has solved this dilemma in a rather original way: the Foreign Office tends to focus excessively on Europe and the European Union, as well as on the United States, and the Ministry of Defense on the forces American armies. This is due to the fact that British security policy went through a period when it was above all reactive. Now much of the

debate is about how best to revamp major state institutions behind a UK security policy that is becoming far more proactive, given the nature and extent of change and the “re-globalisation” of the UK foreign policy.

The “re-globalization” of British security policy is reinforced by other influences. Specialists in international affairs (political advisers, diplomats and intelligence officers) tend to view security from a narrow here-and-now perspective. However, the increased role of foreign relations and researchers contributes to renewing the debate on security in its broadest sense, in particular on the role of defence. Moreover, success today can no longer be reduced to the continuous exercise of overwhelming power, dominating time and distance. The term “sentient power” is perhaps the best description of Britain’s approach to its contemporary security policy. In addition to the use of instruments of national strategy, the role of civilian tools such as aid, development, information and media strategies are an integral part of tactical effectiveness, incorporated into the British strategic effort.

For the UK, the most important vector of security policy is the security environment it must serve. British security policy also reflects internal political imperatives, spending choices and the influence of powerful individuals and actors. However, British security policy certainly has more emotional charge since the events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the attacks of July 7, 2005 in London, as well as the potential links existing between them. Accordingly, the 2006 Foreign Office White Paper and the 2003 Defense White Paper refer to threats to Britain’s security resulting from international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the access there would be extremist groups; this list also includes the regional and potentially global implications of failed states, the impact of social and demographic pressures, as well as ethnic and religious tensions. Similarly, the British are increasingly challenged by the re-emergence of state competition caused by the search for stable energy resources.

1.2. The UK's Global Role

It is the UK's position in the international system which separates the UK from most other European states. The United Kingdom is a traditional power and therefore an architect of the international system. The country sees itself as a guardian of the institutionalized system of security governance, which the West has taken so long to create. Consequently, unlike many European states which seem convinced that they are too small to attract terrorist threats, even if their membership of organizations such as the EU or NATO imposes on them strategic responsibilities well beyond of their respective traditions; Britain, like France, is too powerful to hide. However, it is also too weak to ensure its interests unilaterally: this first principle of reality leads to a security policy mainly oriented towards the proper functioning of international institutions and towards effective partnerships with allies and neighbors throughout the world.

At the same time, the country is no longer that great power it used to be in the past which had the ability to influence the evolution of the world to its own advantage. It is more accurate to say that Britain must play a global role on the basis of a regional power and that, in pursuit of its legitimate global interests, it is forced to choose the best domain of investment to achieve the strategic priorities that are at the heart of its security policy. Recently, most of its resources have been invested in areas where British interests are most likely to be affected: Europe, the Gulf, and the Mediterranean.

However, as the world grows bigger and bigger, the return to a global role is once again reconsidered. This can be seen in the revisions to security policy that took place in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001: they aimed to adapt the form of British powers and capacity to the fight against international terrorism and its havens. It is in defense policy that the renewed recognition that the center of gravity of British security increasingly lies beyond Europe is best seen. As stated in the UK's defense objective,

the country's mission is to provide security to the people of the United Kingdom and its overseas territories by defending them, including against terrorism, and to act as a power for good in strengthening international peace and stability (*Global Britain 6*). This is no easy challenge, given the contemporary sources of insecurity affecting British interests and those of its partners. A brief review of Britain's military commitments reinforces the challenge facing leaders and strategists: to make the best use of Britain's meager armed forces in pursuit of their strategic objectives.

1.3. The UK's International Strategy

In order to bridge the gap between challenges and strengths, British security policy is based on five strategic axes: a strong strategic partnership with the United States, as well as with France and Germany; permanent membership of the UN Security Council; leadership status in the context of NATO and the EU; the Commonwealth; leadership of coalitions of the willing. However, British thinking is undergoing a significant shift. For fifty years, the British strategic effort was mainly aimed at stabilizing the European security space. From now on, the United Kingdom takes into account the world as a whole: it adapts its policy and its forces to the projection of a world stability. As a result, while the legitimizing role of institutions remains central to British strategy, London admits that if Britain is to contribute fully to a stable world, it must reserve significant room for maneuver for politics and diplomacy. However, the proper functioning of international institutions remains central to the UK's national strategy and therefore to its security policy. This rebirth of national power and strategy in itself changes the role of institutions in British security policy: they are no longer objectives in themselves but rather points of support for British strategy.

NATO remains the touchstone of British security and defence policy, not least because the British invented it and because it allows London to have the greatest strategic influence within it and beyond, precisely when, once again, security policy is going global. For the UK,

NATO remains the only effective guarantor of the collective defence of Europe and, thanks to the link with the United States, ensures European stability. Moreover, as a militarily effective mechanism and an example of democratic control of armed forces, the Alliance is developing in line with the British: Thus, NATO plays a vital role as a coordinating mechanism of all states that agree to ensure stability and moderate the behavior of states in a troubled world. For the British, the West is no longer a space but an idea. A large part of NATO's role is therefore to change the mentalities, military resources and capabilities necessary for the Alliance to fulfill its role. This is why Britain places so much importance on the development of sustainable military assets, which can be deployed through intelligent transformation and organisation. It is a comprehensive approach to strategic security, through the establishment of links with new state partners and civilian actors. This policy is reinforced by the experience of British forces not only in Iraq, but above all in Afghanistan, under NATO command.

Britain has also taken a leading role in the development of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU. Indeed, London has been sensitive to the accusation that the British were bad Europeans; its efforts, especially in the field of European security and defence, are unparalleled. From a British perspective, the country has been too often attacked by France on the grounds that it would not have shared, and therefore financed, its ambition to use the EU as a counterweight to American power – a French approach that Great Britain will never accept. For London, regardless of the political party in power, even if there may be, on occasion, deep concerns about the politics of the United States, it is not, structurally, the Americans who must be contained and rebalanced by the Europeans, but rather the systemic instability with which the world is confronted: the terrorist strategy, even the new actors, such as Iran and North Korea, which seek to destabilize regions or interests which are crucial for European security . It

implies a tight-knit West in a global context, where Britain and the United States would play strong leadership roles together.

Under these conditions, the partnership with the United States via NATO remains central in British thought, even if Great Britain criticizes European policy more openly when it considers it necessary. Thus, the UK wanted the ESDP to develop as a complementary tool to that of NATO. It is an approach to European security and defense which believes that the Europeans must play an important and autonomous role in the West's new mission of great world stabilizer. The British would therefore never accept an ESDP that would actively seek to compete with the United States or weaken the strategic relationship with the United States: first, because such a policy would be bad in principle; secondly because, with so many Europeans tending towards Euro-isolationism, such a policy would lead to a weakening of their security. Britain supports a more cohesive CFSP, led by the states from the European Council, able to rehabilitate the Europeans as important actors in security, with the objective of security and stability in Europe and its surroundings.

For this reason, the British supported the pragmatic efforts to improve the decision-making in the EU, in particular for crisis management, such as better cohesion between the Council and the European Commission as part of a comprehensive European approach and a realistic interpretation of the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and crisis management), in order to strengthen civilian and military resources and capabilities within the framework of the 2010 Objective. The UK also supports the development of the EU Strategic Partnerships and the Long Term Vision as part of renewing Europe's role in the world. This commitment is reinforced by development support from the European Defense Agency (ADE), in order to make access to and the development of advanced military and security systems more affordable. Britain also prefers action to words, as demonstrated by London's leading role in the EU military operations in the former

Yugoslav Republics of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a lesser but important role in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The United Nations remains central to the UK security policy. The United Kingdom takes its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council very seriously. In its view, the United Nations must remain the privileged meeting place where the international community can discuss key security issues; Britain is determined that the organization retains this role. Thus, the forces of the United Kingdom remain on the alert to support the UN, either by direct action at the request of the latter, as in Sierra Leone in 2000, or to support the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Some suggest that the status of permanent member of the Security Council reflects the state of the world in 1945 not today. This is obviously false: as the fifth richest country in the world and probably the second largest military power, the United Kingdom has every right to be a permanent member, insofar as the Security Council is well founded on power. Those who want to transform the Security Council into a UN executive committee based on other criteria, such as the size of the population, must also admit that, in a world dominated by the power of large States, these great states generate most of the changes in this world. The UK may one day have to give up its seat, but this will not be in the near future.

1.4. The UK's Security and Defence: the National Strategy

As Britain stood alone against the Nazis in 1940, Churchill turned across the Atlantic and asked the United States for the means the British needed to “finish the job;” the United States replied positively and the war was won. Today, the UK still believes that if people are given the right means, they will “finish the job” themselves. An important part of British security policy is based on this simple assumption. While institutions and partners are the international axes of UK security policy that shape the country's effort, there are many domestic axes that London believes can help shape the international environment. As noted

earlier, the national strategy is conducted today with three instruments, diplomatic, economic and military. Britain is making a conscious effort to better coordinate these three instruments into one strategic tool that maximizes the impact of its security policy. Specifically, this coordination takes place under the leadership of the Home Office to harmonize the objectives and intentions of all relevant government departments and to enable London to perform better in complex security. Lessons learned from previous operations have reinforced the need to incorporate different disciplines and agencies into an overall mission organization to achieve and stabilize objectives.

Known as the comprehensive approach, efforts to achieve more lasting effects, which are part of managing strategic change through the protection of all appropriate national instruments, rely on building internal coalitions. The focus is on rapid response and crisis prevention, as well as crisis management. Accordingly, the composition of these coalitions must be assessed by location and by the nature and scope of the mission. In concrete terms, the establishment of a conceptual framework aimed at a better application of a coherent British influence also aims to prevent certain conflicts of competence which inevitably arise between very different State agencies, obliged to work together. This is not just a question of sensibilities and practice. A large part of the debate refers to doctrine, because each ministry has its own way of working. These peculiarities condition the behavior that will be adopted during complex moments of crisis to optimize the use of power and resources. The comprehensive approach therefore emphasizes flexibility, making government agencies and departments the primary or supporting entities in the area. Military strategy and doctrine tend to stay in the foreground, given the army's experience in time and space, but this is not always necessary. The concept is simple: due to the complexity of the actors involved, armed forces may be needed on certain occasions to create a space of security, but they must not, over time, occupy it.

The Global Approach itself is dominated by a holistic view of what security entails in the modern world. This concept is itself based on the firm belief in human security as the supreme objective towards which the national strategy should aim. Britain fully understands the vital importance of human aspirations and the responsibility that the principal actors of the state have in meeting those needs.

This is why, for example, the UK was one of the strongest supporters of the UN program on the “Responsibility to Protect.” In a world that has become internationalized, precisely because of the supremacy of the Western system of security and democratic governance, the desire to be free from violence, want and fear and to meet basic needs is at the heart of the British concept: to be a force for good in the world consists in implementing all national efforts in this direction. Britain today does not seek power for itself, but recognizes the burden that power places on any dominant state. Thus, the comprehensive approach emphasizes strengthening all aspects of societal security in the fight against instability that undermines security. These aspects are the rule of law, education, legal and commercial activity, humanitarian and health systems, free information, civilian control of the armed forces, economic freedom, representative diplomacy, and reasonable and fair governance (*National Security Strategy* 8).

1.5. The Role of the Armed Forces

The UK through the Foreign Office states that the UK’s armed forces will be at the heart of the country’s broad international objectives and will address threats to its security, often as part of wider multilateral operations involving states, as well as other NATO allies or EU partners, and that European nations will have to continue to reform and modernize their military resources. The countries whose regional and global influence is growing, particularly China and India, will play an increasing role in international security” (Billon-Galland).

The professional British army represents a force of approximately 150,000 men. It has a history of interventions overseas. Of these, 7,500 were in Iraq, leading the Multinational Division SE, while around 3,300 led the NATO Security Force (9,000 strong) in Afghanistan, in addition of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. It also participated in deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as Sierra Leone, and permanent engagements in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.

Given the relationship between the objectives of the UK's security policy, the resulting commitments, and the scale and capacity of the tools and resources that can be deployed, the importance of sound strategic decisions cannot be neglected. To this end, strategic leadership is a primary factor in British security policy, whether to influence American policy or to shape and direct the policies of other crucial partners. For this reason, the center of gravity of the organization of the British strategic forces is the maintenance of the forces at the top of the alert and alert positions. France remains a key partner in this regard, as evidenced by the strong link between the armed forces of the two partners: indeed, London sees Paris as a co-leader in producing strategic effect, but struggles to understand why France seems to invest so much political energy in preventing NATO, in particular, from adopting the role required by the Alliance's Global Political Guide. This French policy, so seemingly counterproductive, seems to place short-term political advantage before the consolidation of the Franco-British partnership, which is nevertheless of crucial importance, which both the EU and NATO urgently need.

The strategic choices also support the defense objective and the role the armed forces play emphasizing British leadership in the military aspects of security. In particular, the British armed forces excel in advanced overseas missions. Such qualities are necessary in the role assigned to them by the government as leaders or principal partners in joint and combined external operations, based on a adaptable and expandable force structure, configured to match

the most frequent types of operations, with the ability to respond to the most difficult ones. Producing the optimum effect given resources and capabilities requires many other choices, as it is obvious that there will probably never be enough British forces to meet all the commitments that a country like the United Kingdom can take. Accordingly, the size of the British forces is designed to satisfy four criteria, based on an assessment of permanent commitments and the probability of simultaneous and random operations. It foresees scenarios where the British armed forces would have to conduct three simultaneous missions, either the equivalent of one medium operation and two small ones, or one large operation and one small one.

Future force designs place British forces at the forefront of networked and multi-tasking coalition advanced overseas missions. As evidenced by the cooperation with other European powers in the designs of the future Navy and the dialogue on the extended strategy. It is therefore time to realize the potential of a relationship that has not always kept its promises.

Conclusion

The United Kingdom is a power that must be recognized as such. Britain regains confidence in itself strategically and in its rightful place as a strategic leader. Many in London regretted what it was seen as excessive debate by some European commentators on its decline. In reality, Britain remains an extremely powerful player in Europe and the world.

To sum up, very little happens in Europe without the agreement of the British and nothing happens in the field of European security and defense without the agreement of the British. There is also a tendency in some European capitals to imagine that British politics is static, in its conception of its so-called special relationship with the United States or in its role in Europe. For example, on the continent side, the stereotype is that the geographical isolation of Great Britain mirrors that of the British. In fact, Britain is probably the most internationalist

of European nations, with a much better understanding of world changes than most continental European isolationists, who seem to believe that the only changes that matter are taking place in Europe, about of Europe and its shape.

It is indisputable that, after the Suez crisis in 1956, Britain did hand over its high-level strategy to the United States. After that, it found itself following the American high strategy in the world, and the European strategy in “the world of Europe.” This is changing: Britain is slowly reclaiming its place in high strategy, a process that started in 1982, with its military victory over Argentina in the Falkland War. This astonishing victory by arms, the longest invasion by sea in history, helped restore the British to their lost pride after Suez.

This evolution seems to have started is at the right time when Britain was unexpectedly heading to “Exit” the European Union. However, together, Britain and Europe must lead the Europeans towards a reasonable high strategy, at what is a pivotal moment in international relations. American strategy has become dangerously one-dimensional, particularly in the pivotal region of the Middle East. The other European powers are consumed in an excessive debate on their decline, which does not do justice to the leading role that Paris can and must play. Germany is only beginning to emerge from self-imposed isolationism, as the past continues to weigh on the shaping of a national strategy. The rest of the European countries oscillate between the inappropriate and the incongruous, too often obsessed with the architectural details of political Europe in order to be effective actors of security. Britain and Europe must support each other, regardless of elections or changes in political leadership, for the good of Europe, the transatlantic relationship, and the future stability of a complex world.

Chapter Two

The UK-EU Security and Defence Cooperation

Introduction

The United Kingdom, like many other states, is facing the most total uncertainty as to the nature and evolution of the dangers that lie within the international scene. These uncertainties find their equivalent on the inner scene. The risks and threats, whether of natural origin (such as the catastrophic floods that occurred in the North of the Kingdom at the beginning of 2016), linked to cyberattacks whose origin is difficult to identify, or to terrorist attacks, remain largely unpredictable to their magnitude and occurrence. They will manifest themselves without it being possible to know in advance where, when, and how. It is in this extremely fluid context that the SDSR 2015 (National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review – A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom) was drafted, published in November 2015 (citation).

The conditions under which the SDSR takes place are also influencing other European states: reduction in the defense budget and questions about the role and function of the armed forces in international relations. Moreover, in the British case, the issue is more complicated and mitigated because of the expeditionary wars undertaken behind the Americans in Afghanistan and in Iraq and which would result in the rejection by many British people in the future of any military engagement outside the Kingdom and which would also be ill defined in its objectives and its interest.

Moreover, the debates in the Commons on the refusal to engage air assets against the forces of Bashar al-Assad bore witness to this even if, a few months later, the Parliament authorized the bombardment of Daesh in Iraq by the RAF. The two military adventures of the

2000s have, moreover, literally exhausted the British armed forces. The SDSR 2015 thus comes in a difficult context for the armed forces, especially since the previous strategic review, undertaken at the initiative of the Cameron Government (SDSR 2010), had reduced the expenditure of 8% defense in real terms.

2.1. The UK-EU Defence Cooperation

The SDSR 2015, presented by the prime minister, is above all a programmatic document which defines and fixes the place and role of the United Kingdom in international society. The strategic review relates as much to the conditions impacting the security of the United Kingdom as to the conditions of its prosperity and its international influence. The first chapter recalls the vision of international society of the British authorities and the values that underlie their external action and that they also intend to promote. This reminder precedes the statement of priorities in terms of security, namely: protection of British citizens and territory, defense and maintenance of the global influence of the United Kingdom, sustainability and development of the prosperity of the kingdom. The following chapters detail the ways and means to achieve the goals previously defined. The defense is only one element among others. Before addressing the military dimension of SDSR, several remarks are in order.

Reading the document reveals the debate on the possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) even though the British political parties remain divided on this question (“Half of Tory Party”). The Conservative government was itself plagued by dissension on this subject to such an extent that the prime minister was forced to accept, at the beginning of the year, that the members of the Cabinet Office could take divergent positions during the referendum campaign on whether or not the United Kingdom should leave the European Union (“EU Referendum”). The sustainability of the government was at stake the resignation of influential members favorable to Brexit.

In 2016, the EU Dutch and Slovak presidency had to manage this question and with it the relationship between the political deepening of the EU, the sovereignty of the States and the role of the European institutions. It seemed doubtful that David Cameron could influence enough the position of its partners on its demands for reform of the Union on the occasion of the extraordinary EU Summit held in February 2016. It had nevertheless affirmed this at the end of the European Summit held in December 2015, where its demands, in particular on the limits to be imposed on the free movement of European workers, and in particular those from Central and Eastern Europe, had greatly irritated many of its partners, including the President of Lithuania, Mrs. Dalia Grybauskaitė, accusing the British Prime Minister of blackmailing Europe. The German Chancellor, for her part, said that the interest of the Union was to avoid Brexit without having to rewrite the fundamental principles governing the functioning of the Union, adding that a compromise such as that proposed in Denmark in 1992 could serve to solve the problem. It was on this path that the British were heading, a referendum that was expected to allow David Cameron to save his face.

In the document, while the importance of the European Union is repeatedly emphasized, the editors of SDSR 2015 were careful to reaffirm that the UK is a power with global influence with multiple affiliations (Commonwealth, Five Eyes Agreement, privileged links with the United States, close relations with Japan, etc.) and possesses, of its own, multiple means and channels to maintain and increase this influence (power of the City, role of the BBC or even the British Council). Such reaffirmations were pledges given to both the supporters of remaining in the EU and to those who oppose it. From this point of view, the document is consensual, especially since the ambitions and arrangements in the areas of defense and cybercrime would not really be affected, as such, by either choice on the EU.

By emphasizing the qualities, particular strengths and successes of the United Kingdom, the SDSR 2015 takes on a marked national tone, a label that its editors will

obviously refuse but which corresponds well to the mainstream thought. The British are therefore no exception to a basic trend that seems to be taking shape in Europe, for multiple reasons, and which is akin to a “return” to the nation. In the British case, this does not mean turning in on oneself but rather a form of rediscovering the “open sea”, the document gives many signs of this.

Among the closest partners of the Kingdom in the field of defence, the United States is always mentioned, but it should be emphasized that France also occupies a place of choice. What is new is the insistence with which this antiphon is repeatedly reaffirmed in the statement of British declaratory policy on security and defense matters. On the French side, it would also be appropriate to take the measure of this shift and to work to bring the two countries even closer together on a certain number of subjects, especially since a possible success of the “no” vote in the referendum on the maintenance of the United Kingdom in the European Union should not result in the reduction of the security links which exist between 10 Downing Street and the Élysée. The British emphasize the exceptional quality of relations between London and Paris in terms of defence, particularly since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaty in 2010 (“Treaty”), and because both are fighting a common fight, in the Middle East and in Africa, in the face of terrorism, against organized crime, and over air transport security. At various times in the document, strengthening these relations is desired, including through the strengthening of cooperation between the various headquarters and command centers of the two countries. These links were further strengthened with the operational commissioning, in 2016, of a Franco-British joint expeditionary force (Combined Joint Expeditionary Force) of 10,000 men. The nuclear dimension is not forgotten: nuclear cooperation with France is mentioned in relation of the TEUTATES Treaty of 2010.

The budgetary aspects of the investments required by the SDSR 2015 are amply detailed. However, there are certain gray areas to be noted. Two points can be raised as

examples. The first concerns the vague nature of the financial commitments resulting from major programs highlighted by the SDSR, and hints that give the impression of wanting to do more with as many resources (“Cameron’s Defence”). The second point relates to the costs induced by certain programs whose funding is not detailed, or even addressed, by the SDSR.

When it comes to combating security breaches linked to organized crime or illegal immigration, not only the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) have not been provided with additional funds but cuts in their budget have been announced (Chalmers). In the field of defence, certain programs which are about to reach maturity leave many uncertainties as to their real cost. The final acquisition cost of nine Boeing maritime patrol aircraft P-8 Poseidon, the first of which was programmed to be delivered in 2020, seemed very uncertain (the Australians had to pay 3.6 billion dollars for 8 copies). One hundred thirty eight F-35 fighters were planned at 104 million dollars each (the last should not enter service before 2030). The first 24 will form two squadrons, the first operational in 2018 on the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth, the second only in 2022. This budget estimate assumes that the fighter, which has experienced many setbacks in its development, will not know any new ones which would delay its entry into service in the RAF. In addition, the F-35, as well as the P-8, will not be able to use the brand new RAF in-flight refueling aircraft, the Airbus A 330 Voyager KC2/KC3, which will have to be modified with a refueling pole in flight compatible with the two aircraft of American origin, which represents so many costs to be budgeted for when the time comes and which the SDSR neglected.

The British authorities have confirmed their commitment to nuclear deterrence, which also reinforces the French position. The SDSR 2015 guarantees the process of renewing the four current Vanguard-class SSBNs with four successor submarines, with an additional 6 billion for a project which should amount to 41 billion £. The nuclear dimension of British defense, however, continues to be debated with the opposition of a significant segment of the

population as well as part of the political class like Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn who was named vice-president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament movement (“Jeremy Corbyn”), a movement created in 1958 which vigorously opposes nuclear weapons. On this issue, Corbyn hardened his party line by replacing (January 2016), as shadow cabinet defense minister, Mrs. Angela Eagle, favorable to the maintenance of deterrence, by Emily Thornberry, a long-time opponent of military nuclear. Added to this is the hostility of the SNP (Scottish National Party) to nuclear power and the maintenance of installations which are located in Faslane (HMNB Clyde) and Coulport (RNAD Coulport) in Scotland.

Prime Minister David Cameron also affirmed his desire to see the United Kingdom remain a global military actor with the forthcoming commissioning of the two aircraft carriers Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, which attests to the desire displayed in the SDSR 2015 to break with the austerity cure imposed on the armies by the SDSR 2010. Cameron decisions were favoured by a British economy that is generally in good health, which has earned it access to the fifth rank of world economic powers (with a GNP of 3 trillion dollars in 2015), ahead of France (seventh in the IMF ranking with 2.93 trillion dollars in 2015). The Conservative government was thus able to announce an increase of around £12 billion in the ten-year investment program for the purchase of military equipment, initially set at £166 billion.

This increase is not only due to increases in monetary indices but rather forms part of a five-year savings plan of £11 billion which includes, in particular, the sale of a third of the 200,000 hectares (500 000 acres) of land belonging to the Defence Ministry as well as cuts in the civilian structure of the MoD (Ministry of Defence), which will be amputated by approximately 30% (18,000 people) to be reduced to 41,000 people in five years.

As far as the three armies are concerned, the investments announced are far from solving the various problems with which they are confronted and which are largely due to the

legacies mentioned above: reduction in the defense effort over the past ten years and “fatigue” linked to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with the consequences are the wear and tear of certain equipment, difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff. It should be noted that the military space practically does not appear in the 2015 SDSR.

The RAF has seen its combat squadrons drop from 30 in 1990 to 8 in 2015. After five years of budget cuts, the British Air Force finds itself having to maintain two squadrons of Tornado fighter-bombers in service in the context of operations against Daesh (the 2nd, which operates from Cyprus, and the 12th squadron were to be withdrawn from service in 2015 and March 2016 respectively). In the long term, in 2019, after the Tornado have been withdrawn from active service (5 squadrons in total), the RAF should experience a very serious capacity problem pending the arrival of the F-35, leaving the French Air Force as the only significant air force in Europe. Such a reduction in the number of combat aircraft already leads to the use of armed Reaper drones. Between September 2015 and early January 2016, almost half of the 300 British airstrikes against Daesh were carried out by the Reaper.

In 2019, 76 Typhoon fighter-bombers remain in service which, in 2015, after eight years of service, still could not use the latest version of the Brimstone air-to-ground missile, widely used by the Tornado (“UK Integrating”). Of these 76 aircraft, approximately half were reserved for the protection of the British Isles and a small contingent in the Falkland Islands, leaving a stock of around 40 aircraft for overseas operations (which corresponds to the contract fixed at the RAF by SDSR 2010). The SDSR 2015 only partially responds to this problem of scarcity of the number of fighter-bombers by providing for an increase in the Reaper fleet and the creation of two additional Typhoon squadrons.

This modest increase, which would need 4,000 additional men, does not resolve the question, which also arises in the other two armies. It is not certain that under these conditions the Navy has enough men to arm the two aircraft carriers (“HMS Queen Elizabeth”) when

they enter service. The fleet of frigates set at 19 also risks to decrease if the modernization program for the 13 Type 23 frigates commissioned between 1989 and 2001 is cut. Future Type 26 frigates will see their number reduced from thirteen to eight.

The three armies will thus have to be able by 2025 to project an expeditionary force of around 50,000 men with: a maritime component around an aircraft carrier with its flotillas of F-35s and its escort drawn from the fleet of 19 frigates and 7 SNAs; an army division made up of three brigades drawn from a reserve force, including two new strike brigades; an air group formed from RAF resources; and special forces units.

2.2. The UK-EU Security Cooperation

The British contribution to European security has always been described as limited. Moreover, its participation is at three levels in the CSDP, and its commitment can take three forms: positive, neutral, or harmful. By adopting the Europe system as of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the United Kingdom took the opposite view from the other European countries, thus participating sparingly and in complete autonomy in the resolution of security issues. It does this within the framework of the opt in / opt out system. These apply both in the economic sphere and in those of security and defence. The United Kingdom has always kept away from the third pillar of the European Union established by the Maastricht Treaty: the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The JHA sets out 130 measures relating to judicial and police cooperation and defines in particular crimes, mutual recognition between States in criminal matters, the organization of criminal procedure, the exchange of information and European police and judicial agencies. Considering that the areas of security and defense are an integral part of the regal powers of the State and fall under its sovereignty, the United Kingdom has preserved its discretionary power in the matter, excluding from this sphere the interference of Community law. The JHA sets out 130 measures relating to judicial and police cooperation and defines, in particular crimes, mutual recognition between states in

criminal matters, the organization of criminal procedure, the exchange of information and European police and judicial agencies. Considering that the areas of security and defense are an integral part of the regal powers of the state and fall under its sovereignty, the United Kingdom has preserved its discretionary power in the matter, excluding from this sphere the interference of Community law.

The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 integrated the JHA pillar into the economic pillar. Therefore, Article 10 of Protocol 36 of the Lisbon Treaty has defined the process that is the opt in / opt out of Community policies. Thus, the United Kingdom had the choice whether or not to apply European legislation in certain areas ranging from the Schengen area to the JHA area.

As such, on July 24, 2010 the UK decided, after agreement of the two chambers of Parliament, to exercise its right of opt-out on all criminal measures relating to police and judicial cooperation. However, the government, through the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, expressed the wish to transpose a limited number of measures which it considered to be in the British national interest and to set aside those which are not compatible with this interest. Thus, in November 2014, the United Kingdom used the opt-in process for 35 measures (out of 130) related to the police and criminal justice. These 35 measures are applied in the context of the fight against organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime.

Moreover, by refusing to contribute fully to the CSDP which it had nevertheless relaunched by the Franco-British Saint-Malo agreement of 1998, the UK has also distanced itself from defense issues, whether they are political, operational or of financial order. If the Saint-Malo agreements, and more generally the Blair period, are often considered as an exception to the British Eurosceptic vision, it is on the one hand linked to the absence of initiative from the UK recorded in the field of defense since 1998, and on the other hand because of the non-engagement of the British in the military operations carried out in the

name of the European Union since their creation in 2003. The country reaffirmed its initial vision with regard to the CSDP, qualifying this institution of politics and not of defence.

Moreover, in the field of European defence, the UK's capacity and financial contributions to the Union are moderate.

The limited commitment of the United Kingdom in the European Union is transcribed by opt-ins and opt-outs in terms of security and by a marginal investment in the field of defense. As a reminder, out of the 130 measures making up the JHA, only 35 have been adopted by the United Kingdom. In terms of European police cooperation, the UK's involvement is mainly found within two European entities, Europol and the Schengen Information System (SIS II).

The cooperation instrument most used by the UK, Europol is a criminal police agency whose establishment is based on framework decision 2009/371/JHA. Its objective is to support the activities against crime and terrorism carried out by law enforcement authorities in the EU, providing a database of personal information and operational activities in twelve criminal areas ranging from narcotics to illicit motorcycle gangs. According to the information note relating to Brexit drafted by the French National Assembly in February 2017, the United Kingdom would actively participate in the governance and operation of this office. On the one hand, the United Kingdom is one of the member states providing the most information in its database. According to the British roadmap unveiled on February 2, 2017, the United Kingdom would currently contribute to thirteen priority Europol operations, which represents more or less half of the projects against organized crime. On the other hand, the UK plays an important role in its governance because the director of this agency, Rob Wainwright, is of British nationality. Under Article 16 of the Framework Decision on Europol, the director is empowered to legally represent the agency, to implement the tasks

assigned to this agency, and to draw up multiannual projects, annual work programs, and annual reports and their action plans.

Concerning the SIS II, the United Kingdom has joined it in 2016. This system aims to facilitate the exchange between national authorities of information relating to border controls, customs, and the police. The compilation of this information by each member state enriches the database via an encrypted network. The content of this database relates to third-country nationals and the exchange of additional information for the purposes of refusing entry or stay in the member states. In practice, the United Kingdom, by its withdrawal from the Schengen area, does not have access to data relating to foreigners reported with the aim of prohibiting their entry into this area; however, the country continually uses the SIS II system. Between April 2015 and April 2016, over 6,400 foreign alerts were received in the UK and over 6,600 in the opposite direction. The UK represents the 4th user country and the 7th contributor country of this system which means that it benefits more from the system than it feeds it. Thus, the participation of the United Kingdom in this agency is more self-serving than profitable in the eyes of the European Union.

In 2016, while the United Kingdom showed a desire to intensify its integration into police cooperation, this accession process was called into question by Brexit. Indeed, London expressed the wish to integrate the mechanism of cross-border cooperation in matters of police set up by the “Prüm Convention”. It even maintained its candidacy of membership after the official triggering of its withdrawal. This cooperation administers the exchange of personal data such as DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration between member countries of the European Union in the context of the prevention of criminal offenses and investigations. In addition, 2016 put an end to more than ten years of negotiations relating to the European Passenger Name Record (PNR), with the adoption on April 27, 2016 of a European directive authorizing its implementation. This tool will allow the use of air passenger data for law

enforcement purposes. Having a national PNR, the United Kingdom has shown great enthusiasm for this project in order to enrich its national register and maximize the protection of its national interest. Thus, the real British contribution in terms of European police cooperation remains to be qualified insofar as the latter is carried out in a national and non-European interest.

2.3. The UK-EU Judicial Cooperation

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from judicial cooperation with the EU means in the first place the end of mutual recognition. This had been established by the Tampere Convention of 15 and 16 October 1999 and then enshrined in Articles 81 (in civil matters) and 82 (in criminal matters) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

According to the French National Assembly, the most important representation of the principle of mutual recognition is the European arrest warrant, the implementation of which constitutes one of the greatest advances in the field of European judicial cooperation. The European Arrest Warrant Directive defines it in these terms: “The European Arrest Warrant replaces the extradition system. It requires each national judicial authority to recognize and execute, subject to minimal checks and within strict deadlines, the request for the surrender of a person made by the judicial authority of another country of the European Union. This mandate considerably simplifies judicial relations between the countries of the European Union. Indeed, while the extradition of Rachid Ramda, under the regime of extradition conventions which prevailed before the European arrest warrant, was successful after nine years of proceedings, that of Jeremy Forrest, which was framed by the regime of the arrest warrant European arrest warrant, only took twenty-four hours. Beyond the intrinsic effectiveness of the instrument, the United Kingdom takes an active part in this judicial collaboration tool. Since the entry into force in 2004 of the European arrest warrant, more

than a thousand suspects have been brought before British courts and 80,007 people have been extradited.

In addition, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) is a European institution to which the United Kingdom is a state party. This entity allows coordination between national judicial authorities in the framework of joint investigations and prosecutions relating to serious crime affecting several states of the EU or requiring prosecution on common grounds. These investigation and prosecution systems are set up by “a liaison prosecutor.” This liaison prosecutor is defined by Frédéric Baab as having “virtually the same capacity for action as the national members: they can open a file, organize coordination meetings and chair them, and participate in a joint investigation team.” Within the framework of Eurojust, a European public prosecutor’s office will be set up for which the United Kingdom has already opted out.

Thus, The UK cooperation in terms of justice remains modest. The only tool which is a real step forward and which will be a significant loss for the European Union is the geographical restriction of the application of the European arrest warrant.

2.4. The UK-EU Security and Defence Investment

Regarding defence, here again the United Kingdom favors a nationalist vision in its cooperation with the European Union. Thus, while the weight of British defense industries in the European capability aspect is substantial, the UK is not interested not only in the political aspect but also in its operational action in the field of European defence.

An EU defence aims to intervene effectively in crisis management, to develop European military and civilian capabilities and to preserve their defense industry to guarantee their strategic autonomy. Since 2004, the European Union has erected the European Policy on Arms Capability within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The same year, the EU created a permanent body, the purpose of which was to pool forces

between the member states. This entity called the European Defense Agency (EDA) aims, among other things, to help identify the capabilities of the member states, promote harmonization of operational projects, and propose all measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of military expenditure. This policy is implemented by the introduction of the Green Paper on Defense public procurement in 2004, the Code of Conduct of 21 November 2005, the “Defence” package proposed in 2007, a European Defense Industrial and Technological Base and the 2009 Defense Directive on defense procurement.

The major role of the UK in the field of the defense industry can be measured in regard to three aspects: the relative weight of British industrialists in terms of volume and quality in European industry, the cooperation of these industrialists with other industrialists, and the constant financial investment of the British State in the field of capabilities which benefits the European Union.

The UK is a key country in the defense industry of the European Union in view of the technical reliability and technological excellence of its defense industries. Indeed, it has several national champions who appear on the world podium in their specialty: Rolls-Royce in aircraft engines, BAE Systems in defense and GKN in aero-structures. The UK also relies on high-performance champions in their niches such as Cobham, Meggitt or the specialist in small satellites SSTL (subsidiary of Airbus).

The know-how developed by British manufacturers is made available to other major European groups. The UK collaborates primarily with the countries of the EU, facilitated by the cooperation tools set up within the framework of the EU such as tax advantages for research and development or by legislative provisions advantages relating to customs and transfers. Thus, the UK hosts a multitude of industrial sites of foreign groups such as Airbus in Filton (engineering, design), Broughton (production of wings for all Airbus aircraft) and Stevenage (space). Similarly, Safran has nine subsidiaries at thirteen British sites (nacelles,

power systems, landing gear); Thales displays a dozen sites specializing in missiles in Belfast or in naval defense (Templecombe, Cheadle).

In addition, the intensity of the UK collaboration is reflected both in purely European industries such as MBDA or CNH Industrial, whose headquarters are in Basildon in the United Kingdom, and in companies established in other member countries of European Union. For example, in addition to the case of Thalès previously mentioned, the French company Dassault Aviation is working in cooperation with BAE system on a future combat aircraft study program. Another program combines the skills of Safran and Rolls-Royce for engines.

Finally, the United Kingdom constitutes a relatively important source of financing for the European capability domain. Its withdrawal from the European Union does not affect its desire to invest. In order to preserve its global influence and maintain its capability lead, the British Minister of Defense plans, in the 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), to make national investments dedicated to human resources and weapons. Among the changes to come, the United Kingdom announced the purchase of two aircraft carriers, a fleet of twenty-two A400M transport planes, a fleet of one hundred and thirty-eight F35 fighter planes, seven nuclear attack submarines, supply planes, the re-equipment of their ground forces and the parliamentary decision to launch the program of a new nuclear deterrent force. The colossal amounts allocated to these projects are charged to the British defense budget which remains considerable, in absolute value, compared to other countries of the European Union, even if lately the overall expenditure of the Union has increased for the first since six years (Black et al.). Indeed the United Kingdom spends a quarter of the budget of all the countries of the European Union in 2015.

Thus, beyond being beneficial for the United Kingdom, cutting-edge British technology, its cooperation with countries of the European Union and its constant investment

in this aspect of defense benefit the EU in the sense that it enables European states to acquire an efficient European armament capability. Nevertheless, the British interest in collaboration in the defense industry is not reflected in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

2.5. The UK-EU Political Commitment to Common Security and Defence

Regarding the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the UK first revived it and then distanced itself from it. The UK was one of the key countries in the revival and strengthening of the CSDP. This initiative was born during the Tony Blair premiership, whose positions in favor of Europe are notorious. Thus, the former British Prime Minister and the former French President Jacques Chirac agreed, during the Saint Malo summit, on the need for a common security and defense policy. They declared that “the Union must have an autonomous capacity for action, supported by credible military forces, with the means to use them and being ready to do so in order to respond to international crises.” This declaration transcribes perfectly the Franco-British desire to relaunch the CSDP.

However, the agreements appear to be an exception for the British who are used to adopting a neutral position and abstaining on defense issues. A striking example of the UK’s lack of bias in this regard is a ban on British military personnel discussing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) issues with their European counterparts. British neutrality in this area has its sources in its vision of the Union. For the British, the Union is understood as a component of the transatlantic space which is associated with a military power, the United States and sometimes Canada. As such, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recognized as antagonistic the integration and treatment of defense issues by the future Union in the sense that these are based on sovereign and not community powers.

A nuance to the restrictive vision of the UK on European defense must be made. Indeed, this perception does not mean that the British do not contribute to the CSDP. On the contrary, leader of the Eurosceptics, this country often expresses its concerns and comments,

as Federica Mogherini underlines during the establishment of the European defense and security strategy then published the day after the vote in favor of Brexit. While it often seeks to block the development of European defence, the Kingdom also initiates constructive debates.

While the United Kingdom tries to remain a major power on the international scene, it does not manifest it within the framework of the European Union. Indeed, its operational contribution to the European institution is marginal. In 2016, the UK took part in five of the seventeen military operations carried out on behalf of the EU and it made a minimal commitment. During operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the participation in terms of logistical support from the UK was lower than that of the Ukrainians (who are not part of the European Union) and that of the Luxembourgers. Similarly, in many military operations, the British presence amounts to the mobilization of 20 or 30 officers, at most. This is the case for EUFOR in Chad, EUFOR in the Central African Republic, EUFOR Althéa in Bosnia and Herzegovina (31 soldiers), EUTM in Mali (26 soldiers). The only recent exception is the British participation in Operation Sophia where the UK uses an oceanographic vessel, HMS Enterprise. To sum up, the British proportion in terms of men in military operations represents 4.19% of the European troops deployed. However, if its participation is weak in the operations carried out in the name of the European Union, the UK does not let go of the mutual defense clause erected by article 42-7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

The British non-commitment is also found in the financing of military operations. Today, the British State is the 5th largest contributor to military operations carried out within the framework of the CSDP, behind France, Italy, Germany and Spain. It is also the 7th country to subsidize EU civilian missions after Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France and Finland. Finally, this country contributes five million to the budget of thirty-one million euros of the European Agency.

Thus, it is clear that the Kingdom has one foot in and one foot outside the EU both in terms of security and defence. In addition, its exit from the Union does not necessarily mean the abrupt severance of all links in these matters. Indeed, the United Kingdom has the possibility of investing in the Union, no longer within the framework of the status of member state but in that of a third State.

Finally, because of the opposition it has exercised within the Union in terms of defence, the Kingdom has hindered the constitution of a Europe of defense which is, at this stage, embryonic. Indeed, London has opposed in particular the creation of a military operational headquarters, the increase in the budget of the European Defense Agency (EDA), and the extension of the scope of the Athena mechanism covering the common costs of European Union military operations carried out within the framework of the CSDP. It therefore seems legitimate to ask whether the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU will not breathe new life into European integration and progress in terms of security and more particularly European defence. It is important, however, to recall that British relations with European countries in terms of security and defense can be built outside the European framework.

2.6. The UK Security and Defence outside the EU

The United Kingdom does not rely only the judicial and police cooperation tools set up at the international level, but it also relies on the instruments of defense collaboration at the regional and bilateral levels. As far as security is concerned, the UK also participates in other international organisations. In this context it is, like all the countries of the European Union, a member of the UN. This organization aims for world peace through cooperation between member countries. Through the establishment of the Palermo Convention, the UN has framed organized crime. In addition, the United Kingdom is a member of the Council of Europe, which ensures a minimum of cooperation in the field of terrorism and cybercrime. The UK is

also a member state in the international police cooperation organization INTERPOL. Brexit naturally raises the question of the ability of these organizations to compensate for the probable losses of judicial and police cooperation between the UK and the EU.

With regard to military organisations, the United Kingdom has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its creation in 1949 and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO is a politico-military alliance whose objective is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. More specifically at the political level, NATO aims to promote democratic values and encourage consultation and cooperation on defense and security matters in order to build long-term confidence between its parties and prevent conflicts. On the military level, this organization is responsible for resolving conflicts both peacefully and through the intervention of armed forces. In this regard, NATO has a military committee and two strategic committees: Allied Command Operation (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Faced with widespread skepticism, the evolution of NATO activities and more particularly the continuation, within it, of military collaboration between the United Kingdom and the European Union, is the subject of many questions.

As for bilateral defense cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union states, the most notorious example is the Franco-British cooperation sealed at Lancaster House on 2 November 2010, the purpose of which is to develop a common center dedicated to nuclear warhead safety tests. In addition, the UK signed on September 4, 2016 a letter of intent to cooperate with other member states of the European Union: Denmark, the Netherlands and the Baltic States with a view to developing a force common expeditionary aspiring to be operational by 2018. Like international and regional organizations, the question that arises about these bilateral cooperation agreements remains in their capacities to

compensate to a certain extent, the loss of security cooperation and of defense between the UK and the EU.

Conclusion

The SDSR underlines the UK's desire to remain a major military player. At the same time, it reveals a gap between London's strategic aspirations and the resources provided in the framework of the SDSR 2015. It seems, moreover, that London has implicitly made a choice, or more exactly has confirmed a choice that has long been that of the United Kingdom: to have a military tool that would enable it to play a role with Washington and, above all, to be able when the time comes to influence or even participate in the US choices. From this point of view, some British commentators wish to reverse the US perception according to which "the United Kingdom deserts the world scene and France is a more reliable partner" ("Partial Fix"). In a way, indeed, the reintegration of France into NATO, even if it continues to pose serious questions to a segment of public opinion, has facilitated a military rapprochement with the United States. The French are investing in it by seeking, with limited means, a kind of operational excellence which places them as an essential partner of the United States. The results prove it as, for example, the allocation of operational commands. This is how the TF50 (Task Force), which operates in the Arab-Persian Gulf, has been commanded since December 2015 by the commander of the French carrier group, Rear Admiral Crignola. This is the first time that a non-American admiral has been in charge of this command, which acts in close collaboration with the US naval units which belong to the Central Command and which form the naval component of the coalition against Daesh. The British seek rather to maintain, or even to consolidate, their place with the US military power by privileging not so much the operational character of their forces, which remain of a very high level, than by the connection with the American politico-military decision-making centers. This presupposes

having significant means of intelligence, command and the ability to plan complex operations, all of which the French also have.

Chapter Three:

The UK's Security and Defence post-Brexit

Introduction

“Any voluntary participation of the United Kingdom in European defense will confer rights and obligations in proportion to the level of this participation” With this formula, Michel Barnier, chief representative of the EU for the Brexit negotiations, brings more questions than answers to the consequences of Brexit on the UK and the European defence. It is nevertheless interesting in at least two respects. First of all, this aspect of the negotiations has so far been very little mentioned in public debates to the detriment of trade negotiations. This is a fact that can legitimately be questioned, insofar as the United Kingdom is an essential player in European defence. Consequently, the consequences of Brexit could well be as harmful in this respect as in the economic field. However, the chief negotiator of the EU evokes “European defence” in reference to the defense instruments implemented by the EU, i.e. the Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP), itself being a component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, European defense and CSDP do not actually refer to the same thing, which is also never mentioned in most public debates or in the media, where they are often presented as being synonymous. This does not help to clarify the terms of the debate on the consequences of Brexit.

It is clear now that the UK has lost the “multiplier effect” of EU membership and that it faces a diminished international stature. In turn, the EU has lost UK assets: its permanent seat on the UN Security Council; its security and defence capabilities and its global outlook and diplomatic heft. With Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make. EU Member States have sought ways to work together against cross-border threats, including organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, through different agencies and cooperative measures. This chapter

examines the UK's interaction with those measures after Brexit, and the prospects for future security cooperation between the UK and the EU.

Many scholars and researchers looked to the relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit; the relations that will develop over the short- and medium- term is highly uncertain. Although neither side walked away from the talks, relations were strained throughout. The differences extended beyond the respective negotiating positions of the two sides, expressed a more fundamental clash of principles and understandings. Negotiations which essentially concerned the terms of separation and the introduction of barriers were perhaps never going to bring the UK and the EU closer together. The sharpening of rhetoric did not help.

Although the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, its participation in the Single Market and the Customs Union until 31 December 2020 postponed the full effects of its withdrawal. Since the transition period overlapped with the Covid-19 pandemic, it also concealed the scale and detail of the change. The transition period had been requested by Theresa May to allow time for the EU and the UK to reach agreement on the terms of trade following the UK's withdrawal from the EU. It was also intended to permit public authorities, businesses and others on both sides to prepare for the new arrangements.

However, the distance between the UK and the EU on key issues in the negotiations on the future relationship, and the refusal of the Johnson Government to use the UK's power under the Withdrawal Agreement to request an extension, took the talks themselves beyond the eleventh hour and the sign off on Christmas Eve left no more than a week for business and others to make their adjustments to new rules and new processes.

3.1. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Defence

In the 2019 Queen's Speech, the British government announced that it was undertaking the drafting of an Integrated Review of Security, Defense and Foreign Policy to

cover all aspects of international policy, from defense to diplomacy and development. The ambition of the new document as wished by Prime Minister Boris Johnson was thus to exceed the previous strategic documents. There has been at least one defense review per decade since the 1950s at irregular intervals until David Cameron attempted in 2010 to match the timing of these reviews to that of the five-year elections. The last review, the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review, had been published in 2015, a new major document was therefore expected in 2020, especially since no update had followed the referendum of June 23, 2016. The Queen's Speech stated that the new review was expected to be "the most radical reassessment of the United Kingdom's place in the world since the end of the Cold War." In the context of the UK's exit from the European Union, the integrated review had to respond to the uncertainties as to Great Britain's role in the world, in particular concerning the articulation of its foreign and defense policy in relation to its European partners. Beyond the European circle, the "special relationship" with the United States had also been considerably tested by the Trump presidency. Finally, while Theresa May and Boris Johnson had evoked the global vocation of Great Britain (Global Britain), the Review had to give substance to this ambition by defining the new priorities of the British presence in the world, in particular in the East of Suez, from where the country had withdrawn its troops since the late 1960s.

Delayed in particular because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the publication of the Integrated Review in March 2021 came a few months after the Johnson government took several decisions that anticipated the content of the document and announced both its ambition and the ambiguities. One of the most debated measures was the merger, in September 2020, of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to form a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Department (FCDO). This institutional reform was one of the symptoms of a strategic shift in

development aid and the goal of poverty reduction. Reduced to 0.5% of gross national income in the 2020 Spending Review, the development aid budget no longer meets the target set by the UN of devoting 0.7% of GNI to official development assistance. Although announced as temporary, this reduction in the development aid budget, and the end of the independence of the ministry in charge of its administration, jeopardize one of the major cards of British influence in the world.

On the other hand, the government announced in November 2020 an increase of 16.5 billion pounds in the budget allocated to Defence. The move ended nearly a decade of decline, signaling the priority Boris Johnson intends to give to the armed forces as a tool of British power and influence. It was also a question of sending a signal to its allies, particularly within NATO, by becoming one of the States with the largest defense budget in proportion to its GDP. The priority of the new budget is given to new technologies, the bulk of the sums having to be devoted to research and development, in an effort to modernize the armed forces.

The increase in the defense budget could be interpreted as one of the signs of the choice of a realistic international policy, where the defense of the national interest and the role of Great Britain in the world passes through an ability to project its power, including in the context of armed conflict. But reading the Integrated Review suggests that despite other choices, such as cutting the aid budget, the government has not given up on making Britain a “power for good of the world”, including in a rather liberal vision of promoting democratic values in a multilateral framework.

Thus, the review published in March 2021 is a generous proposal for redefining British strategic ambitions, but that it struggles to identify an order of priority adapted to the United Kingdom’s status as a middle power. By multiplying the priorities, the government missed an opportunity to clarify the role of the UK in the world, at the risk of disappointing expectations for lack of means.

While previous defense reviews, notably that of 2015, had been accused of being too ambitious given the lack of resources, the Johnson government promised that the Integrated Review would avoid falling into this pitfall. However, despite the announcement of an increase in the budget of the armies, it would seem that it is just as difficult to match ambition and means in 2021 as during previous reviews. The Defense Command Paper emphasizes how British forces will be “modernized” to achieve the military objectives set out in the Integrated Review, but behind this modernization, it can also be seen the decision to reduce the number of existing personnel and equipment, particularly in the land and air forces, to finance new equipment in the field of space and cyberspace.

The most spared army of cuts is the Royal Navy. The “Indo-Pacific turn” and the designation of Russia and China as the main threats to British security mean that the Navy has to play a major role in achieving the objectives set out in the Review and that it is necessary to ensure that it can be deployed at any time. “A symbol in action of Great Britain with a global vocation”, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and the carrier battle group are at the center of British strategy, while remaining “permanently available to NATO”. But while the Defense Review confirms that HMS Prince of Wales, the other Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, will indeed be commissioned, one can wonder about the relevance of such a choice as long as the Marine will only be able to deploy one carrier battle group at a time. In addition, the Review remains vague on the number of aircraft the Navy will be able to have in the years to come. In addition, the deployment of two new “Littoral Response Groups” is announced for 2021 in the Euro-Atlantic area and 2023 for the Indo-Pacific in order to guarantee a permanent presence in these two regions of the world. But the equipment of these two naval groups depends on ambitious projects to build new generation frigates and destroyers (Type 83) and nuclear attack submarines which will not be operational until 2030.

Budget cuts will affect the Army. The Defense Review announces a review of its structure, the “modernization” leading to cuts in the number of personnel and equipment. While there is talk of reducing the number of personnel from 82,000 to 72,500 by 2025, in reality the Army has not reached the planned number of personnel for several years, the cuts will therefore be less important in practice. Moreover, contrary to what was reported in the press in August 2020, the Review does not plan, at least for the moment, to do without its Challenger II armored vehicles which will on the contrary be modernized for 2/3 of them (i.e. 148 armored vehicles). Other older vehicles, on the other hand, will be withdrawn from service without being modernized. The reduction in resources and capabilities available to the 3rd Infantry Division (the only operational division based in the United Kingdom) forced it to limit its maneuvering capacity, now limited to two combat groups (Brigade Combat Team). The British Army thus becomes one of the NATO armies with the most constrained capabilities.

The Royal Air Force will also have to do without some outdated aircraft and helicopters, which will lead to a short-term reduction in equipment. This should be partly offset by a £2 billion investment in the Future Combat Air System programme. After the failure of the Franco-British drone project, the British SCAF is mainly concentrating on the development of the Tempest which, in the long term, must replace the Typhoon type combat aircraft. The British program therefore differs from the program carried out by France, Germany and Spain to replace their own combat aircraft. It can also be noted that the Defense Review foresees a reduction in military transport planes and helicopters (the Hercules being somewhat replaced by the A400M Atlas and the Pumas and Chinooks also being slated for retirement). However, it is somewhat paradoxical to withdraw these transport devices from service, while the Integrated Review insists on the British desire to increase its international presence.

3.2. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Global Role

The history of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the area that goes from the Gulf to the Pacific is old. It is mainly linked to its role as a colonial power, notably in Aden and Oman, in India, in Malaysia, in Singapore, or in Burma, without mentioning the older links with Commonwealth countries such as Australia or New Zealand. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of British forces from East Suez from the end of the 1960s led the British to hesitate on the attitude to adopt towards the region. Since the 2016 referendum, one of the refrains of Brexiters has been to insist on the need for the United Kingdom to reorient its strategy towards the Indo-Pacific. This emphasis on the Indo-Pacific is important, as it is a recognition of the importance that the region, particularly Asia, has assumed in international relations and the future of a globalized economy. Therefore, Brexiters wanted to strengthen the country's historical ties and influence in the region. Thus, the turn towards the Indo-Pacific is part of a broader strategy which aims to strengthen the British presence "East of Suez". The expression has been reintroduced into British foreign policy discourse, notably by Boris Johnson, who became foreign minister in Theresa May's government. According to Boris Johnson, the British withdrawal from the region was a mistake due to the economic difficulties encountered by the United Kingdom in the 1960s and the reorientation of its strategy when it joined the EEC. Although disputed, this historical interpretation serves to justify the renewed British interest in the region, now that the United Kingdom has left the EU.

British security and defense policy is already well aligned with the challenges of the region. The United Kingdom is one of the main members of the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA), a collective security agreement which brings together Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. Its membership of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance with Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada also makes it a major

player in the region, especially in the context of heightened strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

Specifically on China, the Strategic Review notes the challenge of dealing with an “authoritarian state with values different from its own”, which is both a threat to British economic security and a major trading partner. British strategy towards Beijing is thus characterized by an attempt to reconcile a desire to work with one of the main economic powers in the region, and the world, while seeking to contain what its attitude may have a negative influence on the international scene. But it may be an illusion to believe, as the British seem to do, that it is possible to strengthen commercial ties with China while having divergent security interests.

Moreover, the Review presents a nine-point strategy to support its “turn” towards the Indo-Pacific. With regard to the economic interests of the United Kingdom, the Review indicates the desire of the country to strengthen the commercial links which it maintains in particular with Australia and New Zealand. It is also worth noting that the desire to get closer to ASEAN, of which it wants to become one of the “dialogue partners” (status from which the United Kingdom benefited through its membership of the EU). As such, the opening of a new diplomatic mission to the ASEAN Presidency in early 2020 can be seen as a sign of the ongoing rapprochement with the organization. However, one can wonder how the ASEAN member states perceive this rapprochement; the United Kingdom having most often distinguished itself by its closeness to American policy towards China and having challenged Beijing for its repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the democratic movements in Hong Kong, the members of the ASEAN may wish to avoid an association that would lead them to take a more clear position in the rivalry between China and Western powers.

The fact remains, however, that the United Kingdom has already strengthened its commercial presence in the region, in particular by signing free trade agreements with Singapore and Vietnam at the end of 2020. However, its priority, also listed in the Strategic Review, is to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which brings together 11 Pacific Rim states. Despite the geographical distance, the fact that the UK already has security interests in the region (notably through the FPDA and the Five Eyes alliance) has already signed free trade agreements with 7 of the 11 members of the CPTPP, makes it a natural partner. As a member of the CPTPP, the United Kingdom would have an easier time getting acceptance for possible ASEAN membership, since its commercial and military involvement in the region would no longer be in doubt.

Concerning the military, the approximately 1,000 members of the Brunei garrison constitute the last permanent military force in the region, with the exception of the Diego Garcia base. But the maiden voyage of HMS Queen Elizabeth, the new British aircraft carrier, which is to take it to Asia, is presented as the prelude to the return of a greater permanent British presence in the area, in partnership with countries and security organizations in the region.

Finally, the United Kingdom presents itself in the Integrated Review as a “soft-power superpower”. This requires the emphasis on development aid and scientific cooperation. The UK has invested over £3.5 billion in development aid to ASEAN countries over the past decade. The Newton Fund has also enabled it to invest 106 million pounds in support of scientific cooperation and innovation in Southeast Asia. These soft power instruments are a new priority for the British government, which intends to take advantage of them to strengthen ties with ASEAN countries after the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the fragility of their economies and their support for a public policy in favor of scientific research.

The Integrated Review outlines the opportunities the Indo-Pacific region presents for the UK, at a time when it seeks to give substance to the discourse on “Global Britain.” Nevertheless, the success of the British return to “East of Suez” depends not only on the means that the country will be able to implement but also on the way in which the states of the region will welcome it. Finally, the evolution of British policy towards the Indo-Pacific has been described as an alignment with the US policy in the region. But it should be noted that, in addition to bilateral partnerships and multilateral alliances, the Integrated Review does not mention the United States, but France and Germany as privileged partners. The redefinition of the international role of Great Britain in fact requires above all a reflection on the articulation of its strategic choices with those of its European partners.

The other global orientation of the UK defense strategy remains however focused on Europe and transatlantic relationship. If there is a lot of “more Asia” in the Review, the new British strategy is much more European than it seems.

Despite the limited number of references to the EU in the Review, European and British foreign policy will remain extremely close. First of all, despite the discourse on “Global Britain” and the aspiration to revise priorities and means in the service of this ambition, the British Review does not contradict the terms of the debate on security in the rest of Europe. The security of Europe, like that of Britain, will be determined first and foremost by events affecting the European continent. This means the UK cannot ignore the challenges facing Europe and will need to continue to engage in the continent’s security.

The Integrated Review then insists on the role of NATO, at the “foundation of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area”, as well as on the role played by the United States, within the Atlantic Alliance, but also the “Five Eyes”, as well as bilaterally. However, the British share with the rest of Europe the concerns aroused by the tensions with Russia, the growing threat posed by China, but also the ambivalence of the United States whose

commitment to the security of the euro zone-Atlantic is fluctuating. The fact that France is mentioned 11 times in the Integrated Review, and Germany 7 times, is a clear indicator of the interests and strategy that the UK has in common with its neighbors. As for Paris and Berlin, it is expected that the dialogue that exists with London in the E3 format will be gradually institutionalized in the absence of satisfactory and rapid progress at EU level.

In addition to cooperation with France and Germany, the Review finally highlights the need to cooperate with Ireland, and to a lesser extent with Italy, Poland, but also the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. For Britain, these countries share a common concern for “values, free trade and a transatlantic commitment”. In this regard, the Review mentions the bilateral ties that exist with these countries, but also, for some of them, their commitment within NATO or the Joint Expeditionary Force, a joint expeditionary force that associates the 5 Nordic countries, the 3 Baltic countries and the Netherlands, under British command. This force, mainly oriented towards the Far North, is mainly intended to ensure the security of the region against threats emanating from Russia.

One of Boris Johnson’s commitments when the process of writing the Integrated Review was initiated was to match the resources of each department to implement the findings of the new strategy document. However, the multiplication of priorities in the Review leads to doubts about the possibility of matching capacities and objectives. But it is the very coherence of the Review that can be called into question in certain cases.

One can wonder in particular about the evolution of the British nuclear policy, which contradicts the choices made since the end of the Cold War and whose consistency with other priorities listed in the Review has not been established. Indeed, since the 1990s, the British have consistently and regularly asserted their desire to reduce their nuclear arsenal. The government had even committed not to increase the number of nuclear warheads at the time

of the replacement of the Trident program. In addition, the 2021 Review stresses the importance of British support for multilateral diplomacy, particularly with a view to nuclear disarmament. How then can it be explained that the government has chosen to abandon the limit of 225 warheads that it had set itself, as well as the objective of lowering this number to 180 in the next five years, in order to set itself a new ceiling of 260 warheads? In addition, the UK will no longer publish data on how much of its nuclear arsenal is operational, nor reveal the number of warheads and missiles deployed on board its submarines.

These changes are presented as a response to the evolution of the international environment, in particular the growing importance of the threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea or Iran. Since these States possess a nuclear arsenal which is only increasing in size and, beyond deterrence, they seem ready to use it, the United Kingdom no longer wishes to exclude the possibility that its own force will also increase. Such an announcement runs counter to commitments made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and may undermine efforts by Britain and its allies to reduce the arsenal of nuclear weapons of other countries like China, or discussions with other countries like Iran.

But it is also the cost of the British nuclear program that raises questions. The Trident missile replacement program in cooperation with the United States announced in February 2020 was estimated at over £31 billion. The nuclear program represents a significant share of the defense budget, and this share is destined to increase in the coming years, which the increase in the budget announced in November 2020 will not be able to fully offset.

3.3. The Brexit Implications on the UK's Security

Admittedly, out of the 114 pages of the document, there are only two references to the European Union. The first mentions the UK's current relationship with the EU and recalls that the December 2020 agreement protects "essential economic interests" of the British, while giving them the freedom to adopt "economic and political approaches different in many

fields” according to their interests. The EU is also mentioned to imply that the UK would work with the Union when their interests coincide, in particular to promote “the stability and security of the European continent”. In this regard, the Review particularly mentions cooperation in the field of climate and biodiversity policies.

These references to the EU are few, but this should not be a source of astonishment. Even when it was a member of the EU, the United Kingdom was never among the most important players in the Union’s foreign and security policy, and one could not expect that Brexit leads to a reversal in the British attitude towards the CFSP. The British have also refused to address the issue of cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy in the discussions that led to the signing of the December 2020 agreement, which is not mentioned.

Nevertheless, one wonders what the absence of details on relations with the EU means in an Integrated Review which repeatedly indicates the priority given to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Review is very clear that NATO will remain the main international organization for the security of the region and that the United Kingdom sees itself there as “the main European ally”. However, one can doubt the reality of such a claim of the country to be the main power in Europe without a relationship with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy. The Review claims that leaving the EU has allowed Britain to gain speed and flexibility and to make a “strong and independent voice” heard better by working with new partners. The prevailing idea is therefore that of a Brexit which would have “unleashed the potential of Great Britain” to use the slogan of the Conservatives in the 2019 elections.

One of the areas in which the United Kingdom has indeed gained autonomy and flexibility is that of sanctions policy, particularly in the fight for respect for human rights. The adoption in July 2020 of the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 enabled the country to adopt new rules inspired by the American Magnitsky law. In September 2020, Britain was the first European country to announce sanctions against Belarusian leaders

following accusations of electoral fraud and violence against pro-democracy protesters. This can be seen as a positive consequence of Brexit. However, the effectiveness of such sanctions does not only depend on the speed with which they are adopted, but also on their content and the way in which they are implemented in a concerted manner by trading partners. In this sense, the coordination of sanctions policies between Americans and Europeans has more meaning and weight than the possibility for the United Kingdom to make its own arrangements. It can therefore be expected that efforts will be made by Great Britain to make decisions consistent with those of its main trading partners.

In other areas of foreign and security policy, the Integrated Review confirms that the United Kingdom prefers involvement in alliances or partnerships in various formats, more or less formal, to cooperation with the EU. The Review mentions, for example, the “Five Eyes” of which the United States and Canada are also members of NATO. In Europe, a number of bilateral partnerships are listed. The most important of these is certainly the one with France, which is based on the Lancaster House treaties of 2010 which notably gave rise to the establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The Review also highlights the growing importance of the foreign policy partnership with Germany, both bilaterally, but also trilaterally in the E3 format formed by Paris, London and Berlin. While these partnerships allow the United Kingdom to remain one of the main players in foreign and security policy in Europe, it can be noted that they already existed before the British left the EU, and that none was made possible precisely thanks to Brexit, which could on the contrary weaken them in the event of political tensions, in particular with the member states of the EU.

The Integrated Review announces plans to make the UK a “responsible and democratic cyber power” and mentions cyber power twenty times. Faced with China and Russia, which have invested in cyber power as an integral part of their expansionist strategy, the United Kingdom aims to give a different definition of this power. The creation in

November 2020 of a National Cyber Force, which combines military and intelligence personnel, was a first step in strengthening the British cyber force. The government has also indicated that it wants to invest in the 1,200 companies and 43,000 jobs dedicated specifically to this sector. The first objective associated with these decisions is to equip the country with the means to resist costly and potentially dangerous attacks for national security. But the Strategic Review also indicates the will to work in cooperation with other states as well as foreign companies in order to strengthen their digital infrastructures and their capacities in the field of cyber-security. This cyber diplomacy is thus the basis of new relations that will allow Great Britain to extend its influence abroad. It also represents a potential opportunity for the UK cyber industry to expand its exports. And beyond the potential benefits that the industry could derive from it, the Review insists on the essential nature of the sector's investments to support the government's strategy, as well as the role that universities, schools and society can play in it.

This openness to the research community and more broadly to society in the development of a "responsible and democratic" cyber strategy completes the role granted in the field to the armed forces, which remain the main protagonist. Complementary to the Integrated Review, the Defense Command Paper published on March 22, 2021 under the title "Defense in a Competitive Age", underlines the essential nature of cyberspace as a field of action for the armed forces, alongside the four other areas (sea, land, air and space). Thus the Ministry of Defense announced the increase in expenditure devoted to cyberspace, to the detriment of the resources allocated to the forces that could be described as traditional (navy, army and air force).

Conclusion

From the increase in the number of nuclear warheads and the modernization of the armed forces, from new capabilities to fight terrorism to the defense of cyberspace, from the

fight against global warming to development aid, including defense of the Euro-Atlantic area with increased attention to the Indo-Pacific, the Integrated Review lacks neither ambition nor orientation. If none of these orientations are questionable in themselves, it will be much more difficult to implement these objectives than to set them.

The absence of details on relations with the European Union remains the main question mark of this post-Brexit strategy. Britain's changing attitude towards China, its willingness to continue to participate in the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, its insistence on democratic values and the strengthening of the international order while taking an active role in the fight against global warming, make the UK an essential partner for the EU member states whose priorities it continues to share. The same is true for relations with the United States, which will continue to encourage more investment from its European allies in the defense of their continent and for international security.

General Conclusion

The involvement of the British State in the European Union has not been very strong when it comes to the areas of security and defence. Indeed, playing on the possibilities of opt-in/opt-out in terms of security, the UK only integrates 35 of the 130 measures making up the JHA pillar and uses them in an interest that is more national than European. This state vision adopted by the UK in security matters is also observed in the field of defence. Even if it is a driving force in the weaponry industry, the UK's commitment when it comes to acting on behalf of the European Union remains however punctual, whether in the establishment of a policy of ambitious common security and defense policy or in the operational contribution to the latter.

If the loss of the UK's membership is limited, it remains compensable within the framework of agreements of the European Union-third State type. Indeed, as far as security is concerned, British reintegration into the European security agencies (Europol and Eurojust) will probably be partial but remains possible. However, it will be impossible for it to apply the European Arrest Warrant and to implement the SIS II database. With regard to defence, British collaboration with the European Union will continue both in the field of the defense industry and in that of operational cooperation.

It is also essential to note that the British withdrawal from the European Union will not entirely hinder the country's collaborations with the institution insofar as the agreements outside the European framework will be maintained. If these channels constitute alternatives of collaboration, they are developed in an unequal way according to the field of study. Thus, security cooperation instruments outside the Union (INTERPOL, the Palermo Convention on organized crime, the Council of Europe Conventions on terrorism and the Budapest Convention on cybercrime) offer only substitutions of reduced police and judicial

cooperation, compared to the mechanisms deployed within the European Union. On the contrary, the defense tools outside the European Union are largely accomplished, whether NATO or bilateral arms agreements. If Brexit can weaken and destabilize these means of defence, this risk remains highly hypothetical.

Beyond the consequences on the future of security and defense cooperation, it is important to emphasize that the British withdrawal from the European Union will also lead to a renewed interest of the remaining member states for the European Union.

The enthusiasm for the European Union is characterized first of all by the reconsideration of the defense of Europe. The European institution is freed from a blocking country in this area and affirms, through the European Council, its ambition to develop a European defence force. The momentum for relaunching Defense Europe, brought about by Brexit, is hampered by the different perceptions of the member states with regard to the objective of defence. This slowdown in the construction of European defense is illustrated by the recording of symbolic but localized advances and is explained by national differences as to the role of the European Union towards NATO. These divisions are also found in the various military strategies adopted by the member states of the European Union. Disagreements between Member States are particularly marked between France and Germany, two countries which aspire to become the military engine of the European Union in the aftermath of Brexit.

Brexit requires clarification of the procedure for the withdrawal of a member state from the European Union. This lies first in the prerequisite detail of Article 50 of the TEU, but also in that of the procedure for withdrawing security legislation. In addition, the departure of the British from the European Union allows this institution to take an interest in legal issues referring to European standards. While the United Kingdom and the European Union wish to continue their privileged collaboration, the British case raises the question of

the counterparties imposed by the European Union on other third states having a privileged status in terms of security cooperation. These European requirements reside in the level of the standard of protection of personal data requested and in the recognition of the supervision of the CJEU over the national authorities. The latter is all the more delicate as the British refusal of dependence on the CJEU constitutes one of the key arguments of pro-Brexit supporters during the campaign.

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